<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Into Asia]]></title><description><![CDATA[Ian Buruma and Chang Che on the history, politics, and culture of East Asia.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 01:21:03 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[intoasia@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[intoasia@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[intoasia@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[intoasia@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[“I Helped Build China’s Brave New World”]]></title><description><![CDATA[The rise of China debunked a myth in the West that freedom of speech was critical to innovation.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/i-helped-build-chinas-brave-new-world-19f</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/i-helped-build-chinas-brave-new-world-19f</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 13:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980734/e68f61e005715a2ccb70b36c7c8efa84.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p>The rise of China debunked a myth in the West that freedom of speech was critical to innovation. In the latest episode of <em>Into Asia</em>, the music composer turned YouTuber <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@yinfi">Yinfi (real name: Yin Lu)</a> challenges this view. What if China&#8217;s tech rise resulted not in <em>spite </em>of freedom of speech, but from its selective accommodation? An example is the coding repository Github, which remans open in China despite the pervasive Great Firewall. Another is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnnuZ3DQq10">the relative freedom</a> Elon Musk enjoys in China compared to other prominent figures like the comedian Uncle Roger.</p><p>A more unsettling factor that emerges in Yinfi&#8217;s video essays, which are part-memoir, part-analysis, part-reportage, is that his colleagues in the Chinese tech industry are complicit in this deception. They avoid political issues&#8212;the Covid-19 lockdowns, the Russia-Ukraine war, Uyghur repression&#8212;but the products they build are cross-pollinated by the technologies of free societies. This includes AI &#8220;distillation&#8221; and the use of pirated software, but it goes beyond property theft, encompassing the West&#8217;s universities as well as simply borrowing innovative paradigms like the scaling law that drives much of AI development today.</p><p>Gaming, the industry where Yinfi worked, serves another political purpose in China, he says: it floods the void left by political censorship with pleasure and entertainment. China has one of the largest gaming sectors in the world, replete with tech talents who keep themselves, their colleagues, and their countrymen &#8220;amused.&#8221; Yinfi tells us the story of how the tech juggernaut he worked for, miHoYo, abandoned his projects as soon as he began raising uncomfortable questions about the political system they were all living under. Below is our interview:</p><p><strong>In this episode:</strong></p><ul><li><p><strong>01:20</strong> Yinfi&#8217;s experience in the Chinese gaming industry</p></li><li><p><strong>05:57</strong> Why Yinfi emigrated from China; the forms of censorship Yinfi faced during the Covid-19 pandemic, and censorship from miHoYo</p></li><li><p><strong>12:56</strong> Transnational repression and the pressure on family back home</p></li><li><p><strong>15:21</strong> How Beijing restricts games for children but promotes them abroad as &#8220;soft power&#8221;</p></li><li><p><strong>17:18</strong> Thinking in a foreign language, and how Party-speak has corrupted Chinese</p></li><li><p><strong>25:19</strong> The &#8220;hidden liberties&#8221; behind China&#8217;s tech rise</p></li><li><p><strong>26:57</strong> &#8220;Hyper-hedonism&#8221;: how censorship emptied public life and left games and fantasy worlds to fill the gap</p></li><li><p><strong>32:05</strong> What the West gets wrong about Chinese censorship: speech versus the impact of that speech</p></li></ul><p><strong>Full Transcript: <br><br>Chang Che </strong>[00:00] Hello, everyone, and welcome to Into Asia. Over the past few years, a new wave of Chinese immigrants has settled in cities like Tokyo and London. Some of them resettled for reasons related to political repression. Others were fleeing the COVID lockdowns of 2022. There were also people who were tired of the competition in the economy back home and wanted to start over somewhere else. Some of these new immigrants have found a new voice abroad as YouTubers and podcasters with big audiences.</p><p>Our guest today is one of them. Yin Lu, who goes by Yinfi, was a music composer in Shanghai who arranged songs for some of China&#8217;s biggest video games and pop stars. He is now a content creator on YouTube. You may have seen his channel, Yinfi, where he publishes really insightful video essays analyzing the origins of China&#8217;s tech innovation and the inner workings of Chinese censorship and surveillance.</p><p>One of the things I really like about his work is that he blends his own personal experiences with deep analysis that you really can&#8217;t get anywhere in the Western media. I think that&#8217;s what I aspire to as a journalist. So, Yinfi, welcome to the show.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[01:10] Thank you very much for the introduction. I&#8217;m flattered.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[01:13] I wanted to ask you to introduce yourself and maybe say a little bit about how you ended up on the career path of a music composer.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[01:20] Sure. I&#8217;m Yin Lu, also known by my stage name, Yinfi. I&#8217;m originally from China and now living in the UK. I&#8217;m a screen composer for games and films, a performer, and now a YouTuber. Earlier this year, I started making YouTube videos about the mindsets that shape modern China, based on my three decades of living inside the country.</p><p>First of all, I want to be clear that I wasn&#8217;t strictly in the tech industry. My job title was screen composer, but I was sort of half attached to the tech sector in China, especially gaming. Since the early 2010s, China&#8217;s ACG culture has exploded. ACG stands for animation, comics, and games; it&#8217;s very similar to Japan&#8217;s anime culture. That was when the big-name studios started up as separate divisions within the big tech companies, like Tencent, NetEase, miHoYo, ByteDance. Most of the games they make are live-service games, which need constant updates with new characters and new dungeons. So they need a huge amount of music.</p><p>Since 2014, I was an outsourced music provider for them. Across the global industry, the vast majority of game music is outsourced to independent music studios. But because live-service games in China are on such a huge scale, many Chinese studios hire dozens of full-time composers to keep up with the constant demand, which is very rare in the West.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[03:02] The music industry you&#8217;re referring to is basically music for video games&#8212;the really, really big video games coming out of China in this period. One of them is a massive gaming company that became really famous for a game called Genshin Impact. People make fun of it for being kind of similar to Zelda, but it was super popular in the West as well. Those games require music and scoring, and that&#8217;s sort of where your career took off. I was wondering whether you could speak a little bit about what it was like day to day. What does it look like to be a music composer for a big company?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[03:39] It was very competitive, but I enjoyed it. I worked at Yu-Peng Chen&#8217;s studio in Shanghai. It was a very luxurious villa in central Shanghai, and there were three of us, three composers. I was very lucky, because in 2015 I composed for a Tencent game called Moonlight Blade. At that time, Yu-Peng Chen happened to be working on that game, and my score caught his attention. So he invited me to join his team. I quickly became a core member of his team and his close assistant, because he liked my style, my production quality, and my passion.</p><p>I was also a pretty good demo singer. Game directors always want to know what a song could sound like in its final version, so they can find the right singer for the marketing. A demo singer is very important, but in a production team a good singer is really rare. So I was lucky to fill that gap. I became the most trusted member of his team and worked on his scores. Normally he wrote the themes, and I did the rest&#8212;the orchestration, the scoring, and the production&#8212;and I sang the demos for him. I worked on a lot of the most difficult scores for him, because some of the boss-battle music was really hard to do, and sometimes he refused to do it because it was so time-consuming. So I did a lot of that.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[05:33] Can I ask you something? There&#8217;s a lot of talk, when it comes to Chinese arts, cinema, writing, and so on&#8212;and you&#8217;ve spoken about this yourself&#8212;about problems of censorship, including in the music business, and especially the music business to do with games. Are you completely free of that kind of thing? Is there no interference at all?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[05:57] It&#8217;s a long story for me. A lot happened in my career, in Shanghai and in the UK. There was a major incident in 2022. When the pandemic came, all the work stopped. I was stuck in my room, binge-watching news about the Chinese government&#8217;s cover-up in the early stages of the pandemic. I had read some of the tragic stories, and I knew about some of the dark history of the Chinese system, but it wasn&#8217;t until the pandemic that I realized how an opaque system that actively suppresses speech can enable disasters that affect everyone in the world.</p><p>At that time I was just worried about the situation, so I posted on Facebook and Instagram to speak up for the Chinese whistleblowers who had been punished for reporting on the pandemic. Then, in 2021, I learned that a Uyghur friend of mine had been arbitrarily detained during the mass detentions, and I posted about that too. A few of my Chinese collaborators saw the posts and blacklisted me. Obviously I lost several collaboration opportunities back in China. But a lot of other friends still thought I had done the right thing, so they were still happy to work with me&#8212;including Yu-Peng Chen. In 2021, he spent two hours on the phone with me. He told me Genshin Impact had obviously gone viral worldwide, and he still wanted me to join his team, because in 2019 I had helped him organize a large recording session in London with the London Philharmonic Orchestra for his Genshin Impact score.</p><p>Even then, he wanted me to join his team after my graduation from the Royal College of Music. I didn&#8217;t mention that I first came to the UK in 2018 to study at the Royal College of Music. That was why I came to the UK, but I still worked remotely with artists in China, and I still flew back and forth between London, Shanghai, and Beijing. At the end of 2019, I worked on this major UK project for Genshin Impact; I assisted with the recording session. I was really impressed by how much miHoYo invested in music. I believe it was &#163;90,000 for a three-day session. That was crazy. At that time, I promised Yu-Peng that after my graduation in 2020, I would go back to Shanghai to join his team. But then, in 2021, there were lockdowns everywhere.</p><p>Then, in 2022, there was a big update to Genshin Impact, and they needed another major recording session in the UK. Yu-Peng asked me again to take charge of the whole thing, because he couldn&#8217;t come to the UK himself&#8212;in 2022 there were draconian lockdowns in China. So I was asked to arrange the recording sessions with the London Symphony Orchestra at Abbey Road Studios, along with lots of other brilliant British soloists. I said yes. I received all the files and paperwork and started preparing for the very complicated sessions.</p><p>Then, out of nowhere, I got an email from a manager at miHoYo. The manager said this was a major project and they would be filming the whole recording session, which meant everyone appearing on camera needed to have a, quote unquote, &#8220;clean background.&#8221; They had done some background checks and found my sensitive posts online. And she said that, after all, they were a Chinese company, so unfortunately they couldn&#8217;t work with me.</p><p>To be honest, I expected something like that could happen with a company that is close to the Chinese state. I expected it, but I was still shocked that it could happen that way, here in the UK. I was literally kicked out of a team made up of British musicians.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[10:57] I wanted to ask you a little more specifically about the kind of comments you were making on behalf of your Uyghur friend, and what you were saying about the lockdown.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[11:08] I posted on Facebook and Instagram about the detention of dissidents like Chen Qiushi. He was the first and only citizen journalist who broadcast the early stages of the pandemic in Wuhan. He did livestreams on YouTube at the time, and he said something like, &#8220;I don&#8217;t fear death. How could I fear the Communist Party?&#8221; I watched that on YouTube, and a few days later he disappeared. So I posted about Chen Qiushi. I also reposted something about skepticism over the origin of the virus.</p><p>And I posted about my Uyghur friend. That was another story, because I only learned about his detention in 2021, through a friend of his in Xinjiang. That friend told me the news, and I was quite shocked. I didn&#8217;t realize that situation could affect a friend of mine. He was my classmate and roommate during my undergraduate years at Nanjing University, from 2009 to 2013. He was a really smart guy; he got a master&#8217;s degree at Nanjing University. He&#8217;s not someone you could imagine being associated with anything to do with terrorism. But at that time, the official line was that everything was about cracking down on terrorism.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[12:45] What happened after that? I think what you&#8217;re saying is that it wasn&#8217;t actually state repression&#8212;it was a kind of social ostracization that you experienced. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[12:56] There were two incidents that could count as transnational repression. In 2023, I posted a Mandarin song on YouTube on the eve of the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. The song is called &#8220;It&#8217;s My Duty,&#8221; with lyrics about all the memories censored in China.</p><p>The next day, my dad sent me a message saying that the local police had called him and several other family members to ask for my personal information in the UK, in order to update my hukou, the household registration. They didn&#8217;t mention anything political, but they were definitely sending me a message.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[13:44] When you posted these messages, were you in the UK or in Shanghai?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[13:49] I was in the UK. I haven&#8217;t been back to China since the end of 2019. In 2023, that was the first incident that made me realize I was probably on the list of the national security department. Then, later that year, in November, there was another incident. The head of the hospital where my mom worked called her in for a meeting to talk about me.</p><p>The hospital head told my mom that a national security officer from Beijing had instructed him to ask her to stop my activities in the UK; otherwise my family&#8217;s jobs, or even my interests in the UK, could be damaged. So those were the major incidents, both in 2023.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[14:49] So it seems like there are actually two things going on. One is that the state is watching your posts and harassing your family. That&#8217;s definitely state repression. But then there&#8217;s what you mentioned earlier: some of your friends blacklisted or blocked you, and later, when you were going to work on this big project for miHoYo, one of the project managers said, &#8220;We can&#8217;t have you in the video, because you have to be clean, and you&#8217;re not politically clean.&#8221; What do you think is going on there?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[15:21] That&#8217;s very complicated. That second kind of censorship was largely from the company. But it&#8217;s different, because giant game studios like miHoYo receive a lot of state support, including financial support, especially from the Central Propaganda Department, because they&#8217;re treated as a sort of soft-power export pioneer. They are literally listed on the propaganda department&#8217;s website as soft-power export pioneers&#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[15:58] Which is really funny, because&#8212;just to pause on that&#8212;the Chinese government does not like games. They think games are addictive for children, they&#8217;ve cracked down on that, and they&#8217;ve put very strict restrictions on minors playing games. But on the other hand, games can be a very good soft-power tool, right? So they&#8217;re also very supportive of games. It&#8217;s kind of paradoxical.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[16:25] But they&#8217;re supportive of games for foreign consumption. So presumably they don&#8217;t particularly care if foreigners get addicted.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[16:32] Yeah, that&#8217;s true. They don&#8217;t care.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[16:34] Sorry&#8212;you were saying something about the psychology of the company and that kind of censorship.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[16:39] Yeah. I think the music industry is quite apolitical, and most of my colleagues are actively against any discussion related to politics. That&#8217;s just the norm in the Chinese entertainment industry, because if you stay silent, you get the privilege of enjoying all the benefits of the Chinese market.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[17:06] Interesting. All these experiences you&#8217;ve had with repression&#8212;transnational repression, and also this kind of company-based repression&#8212;how have they fed into your work now on YouTube?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[17:18] To be honest, when I started doing these monologues on YouTube, I genuinely wanted to organize my thoughts by talking through my problems, because I&#8217;ve always wanted to think about all this systematically. I struggled to make sense of the situation I was experiencing. I wanted to be articulate; I wanted to think clearly. That was my first motivation for doing these videos.</p><p>Also, Chinese society really discourages critical thinking and reasoned debate, and I was always struggling to be articulate in that environment. Later I realized it wasn&#8217;t because I struggled to express myself. It was just that I had never had the opportunity to equip my mind with enough critical thinking, or enough vocabulary, to put my thoughts into words. Then, when AI took off in 2025, I found I could improve my language skills with it. So I thought, why not make some content online to improve my English?</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[18:26] What did you use? Duolingo, or&#8212;</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[18:30] I used a plugin called Trancy. It&#8217;s a subtitle plugin that can translate YouTube videos, so I&#8217;ve been watching YouTube with that plugin. It&#8217;s really helpful. I can hide the translation, and it&#8217;s based on AI models, so the translation is very accurate, word by word and sentence by sentence. It&#8217;s called Trancy.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[18:55] And now you&#8217;re very articulate in English. When you do your YouTube work now, is your main audience English speakers, overseas Chinese, and so on, or would you also like to reach people in China?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[19:10] I think English helped me a lot in terms of critical thinking and vocabulary, because I watched a lot of debates in English. It really helped me think clearly.</p><p>I also think it works as a kind of shield when I&#8217;m trying to express myself. I remember Haruki Murakami once said something like: he felt more comfortable speaking English than Japanese in public, because it gave him an excuse to make mistakes, and he didn&#8217;t always have to sound poetic and erudite. That really resonates with me. I constantly feel pressure when I speak Mandarin in front of people, because we are always expected to use lots of Chinese idioms and to appear erudite rather than just sound reasonable.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[20:06] I&#8217;m very interested in this, because I studied Chinese in the &#8217;70s, and we had to read things like Hongqi [Red Flag] and Renmin Ribao [People&#8217;s Daily]. All that language was very strictly controlled communist, Marxist language. One of the reasons they did that is that by forcing people to speak in a certain idiom, they were forcing them to think in a certain way, one that was loyal to the Party line. That affected the Chinese language very much. But I don&#8217;t think that&#8217;s true anymore. So is there anything in the way people speak Chinese today that is still somehow controlled by the Party or the state? I&#8217;m talking purely about idioms and the language itself, not about the security apparatus.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[20:54] I think some words have become associated with negative meanings to a great degree&#8212;like human rights, like democracy, or something like critical thinking. I don&#8217;t think there&#8217;s an accurate translation of &#8220;critical thinking&#8221; in Chinese. We just didn&#8217;t talk about it.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[21:20] There are also words&#8212;in Chinese, we&#8217;ll sometimes just use Party-speak to explain things. I use the word zheng nengliang (&#27491;&#33021;&#37327;), &#8220;positive energy,&#8221; all the time when I talk to people. Sometimes you just borrow the language of the Party. So I can totally understand why you&#8217;d want to get away from that sometimes, but&#8212;</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[21:42] You can get away from it. You don&#8217;t have to write that way in China anymore. Forty years ago you had to write in that language, otherwise you wouldn&#8217;t get published.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[21:52] Yeah, but I think a lot of what you see online comes from state-sponsored media. That&#8217;s where the new vogue words come from. But what Yinfi is saying about a foreign language helping you think in a different way&#8212;that&#8217;s the story of a lot of writers who write in foreign languages, like Ha Jin.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[22:16] But Yinfi, can I ask you: the cost is that you might lose touch with your own language and your own culture. Does that bother you, or is that not something you&#8217;re particularly worried about?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[22:28] Sometimes I definitely feel that I&#8217;ve been detached from my culture and language for a long time, and I feel a little bit lost. Sometimes I feel a sort of identity crisis. But I still watch a lot of videos from the Chinese diaspora community. More and more very famous intellectuals from China have started YouTube channels. They were forced into exile. Many of them are household names in China, like Chai Jing. She used to be a household name, a journalist and CCTV host in China.</p><p>I told her story to my mom, because my mom knows her very well. My mom was very upset about my situation overseas. She didn&#8217;t even know what YouTube was. So I helped her install a VPN, and then she could get access to YouTube. She saw my YouTube channel, and I told her that some very famous intellectuals, like Chai Jing and Yan Geling, or [unclear], were all forced into exile because of what they said.</p><p>Obviously it was a very ridiculous situation, and I told my mom that their situation is sort of similar to mine.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[23:55] How long do they remain household names in China after they leave? Do people in China forget about them after a while, or do they still have a lot of influence?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[24:05] Obviously they can&#8217;t have any influence on Chinese social media or on TV, but some of them still have some presence. Someone like Chai Jing&#8212;her documentaries and books are absolutely banned in China, but people can still use a VPN to watch her videos on YouTube. Actually, I believe the majority of the views on her YouTube channel are from mainland China. So I think they still have enormous impact in mainland China, but&#8212;</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[24:46] That&#8217;s a real change, isn&#8217;t it? In the past, people who went into exile were very quickly forgotten. Now, because of social media and so on, it&#8217;s much easier to keep some kind of connection.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[24:59] Yeah, that&#8217;s true. It also has to do with the widespread use of VPNs in China. I think after the White Paper movement&#8212;after 2022&#8212;VPN usage in China just exploded.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[25:19] That&#8217;s really interesting. I would love to talk with you a bit about the work you&#8217;re doing now on YouTube. One theme that comes through in your videos is the hidden role of free expression, and of access to the West, in underwriting a lot of Chinese innovation.</p><p>So the question I want to ask you is: why do you think China is so successful in technology, and what do you think we&#8217;re not seeing?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[25:49] That&#8217;s a great question. I like the idea of hidden liberties; it&#8217;s an interesting way of putting it. I think the gray zone exists because sometimes the censorship institutions just aren&#8217;t competent enough to keep up with how fast technology is evolving. The censors can&#8217;t really reach GitHub, because they don&#8217;t understand it. And they also need GitHub to stay accessible to tech talent, so that they can build software that&#8217;s critical to the national strategy.</p><p>With AI, we all know there is all sorts of censorship of political words in all the AI models. But if you download a Chinese AI model and run it entirely on your local hardware, most of the censorship rules no longer apply. So that&#8217;s probably a good way to use Chinese models more freely.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[26:49] What are those hidden liberties you mentioned? I find that very interesting. What hidden liberties are there that create such success?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[26:57] I think it&#8217;s if you just stay within the boundaries. There is a very strong incentive within the tech industry to stay silent publicly about all the human rights violations and misconduct by the state. If you stay silent on all of this, you can take advantage of the gigantic market.</p><p>And there&#8217;s also a trend of hyper-hedonism. This trend is partly driven by the crackdown on serious discourse and open debate. To some extent, the lack of free speech desensitized people to serious discussion and created a kind of hyper-hedonism. It left a huge content vacuum. Social media platforms like TikTok, or games, or ACG culture happened to fill that gap among young people. They basically created a brave new world.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[28:06] That&#8217;s fascinating.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[28:07] So I watched people immerse themselves in all sorts of fantasy worlds in China. On Bilibili [a Chinese video platform], there are all sorts of subcategories and subcultures I didn&#8217;t really understand, and fantasy worlds&#8212;which I also helped build. I helped build this brave new world in China for five years. I worked on some of the hit songs on Bilibili; some of the songs I worked on ranked at the top on Bilibili several times. It all comes down to the attention economy. If there&#8217;s lots of political discussion, like in the West, attention gets pulled away from those fantasy worlds.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[28:56] That&#8217;s very interesting. There&#8217;s a clear parallel in history: what happened in Japan between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, when there was complete political repression. That&#8217;s what created the whole culture of prostitution and kabuki and teahouses&#8212;the hedonism of the merchant class. It&#8217;s exactly what you&#8217;re describing: people who are intelligent putting all their attention into pleasure-seeking rather than any kind of political discussion.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[29:29] That&#8217;s true. So I think, ironically, political control sometimes works as a kind of favorable incentive structure for fantasy-world builders, including me. I&#8217;ve often thought that if I hadn&#8217;t happened to be abroad and experienced that sudden shock during the pandemic, during that period of absurdity, I would probably be sitting in miHoYo&#8217;s office right now, running projects in the entertainment industry across the world. I could have lived in a parallel world. Without some initial trigger, the industry&#8217;s incentives are just too strong to resist.</p><p>I think that&#8217;s the mechanism behind China&#8217;s entertainment industry, and it&#8217;s also something that triggers downstream innovation, like in the gaming industry. In terms of broader tech innovation, I&#8217;m not an expert, but I can say something that is also very significant in China&#8217;s tech innovation, which is intellectual-property theft. I worked in screen composition, and I saw all sorts of pirated software for composers in China. All of our tools&#8212;samples, sample libraries, digital synthesizers&#8212;were pirated versions downloaded from a gigantic Chinese website. It hosts all of this software, and much of it is cracked by Russian hackers. It&#8217;s not a secret. It&#8217;s been going on for decades, and the government has never bothered shutting it down, because it serves the Party&#8217;s interests.</p><p>Whenever there was a major update to one of those sample libraries, the next week you could download it for free. So when I came to the UK, I was shocked that most of my colleagues were using really outdated sample libraries, because they couldn&#8217;t afford the latest versions. These libraries are very expensive. That&#8217;s just one tiny example of how China&#8217;s industries can build some of their innovation on IP theft.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[32:05] It&#8217;s interesting, because I think your work is trying to show an outside audience some of the hidden costs of this. And I&#8217;m wondering: what do you think the West doesn&#8217;t quite understand about China? Is there something you feel the average Western listener is missing when they&#8217;re very awed by Chinese technology?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[32:27] I think what I&#8217;ve just said actually summarizes how I see China developing its model. As for Westerners, I think there&#8217;s a kind of illusion, a problem of optics. I imagine that Westerners don&#8217;t have a sense of what it means to lose freedoms and constitutional rights. They don&#8217;t know what it&#8217;s really like to have your basic rights taken away, which is something I experienced personally.</p><p>Also, when they go to China, they don&#8217;t necessarily experience the same fear of punishment from the authorities, because there are multiple tiers of punishment. It&#8217;s really utilitarian: if you can bring positive economic outcomes to China, then you are tolerated, whatever you say.</p><p>One of the first videos I made on my channel was about this kind of double standard&#8212;how some rich people, like Elon Musk, can be welcomed despite criticizing the Chinese government on X, but someone like Uncle Roger, who just made some trivial jokes about Huawei and Xi Jinping, got immediately banned in China.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[34:00] Who&#8217;s Uncle Roger?</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[34:02] Uncle Roger is a stand-up comedian in the US. He&#8217;s a pretty popular social media influencer.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[34:09] Yeah. He asked one of the audience members, who was using a Huawei phone&#8212;and then he said, &#8220;Long live President Xi. All Huawei phones are listening.&#8221; That was the joke.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[34:25] That&#8217;s an interesting example, because I think the censorship in that case is a nationalistic kind of censorship&#8212;it &#8220;hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation.&#8221; But what you&#8217;re saying is really interesting, because one important distinction in China&#8217;s many-layered censorship is between foreign and domestic. If I&#8217;m American and I&#8217;m writing for foreign media, that&#8217;s a lot less dangerous than if I&#8217;m writing in Chinese.</p><p>If I write the exact same thing in Chinese and publish it on Weibo, that&#8217;s more dangerous, because the Chinese government obviously cares more about what its own people think than about what foreigners think.</p><p>So when you&#8217;re a foreigner and you base your sense of censorship in China on your own experience&#8212;you&#8217;re just visiting as a vacationer and you think, &#8220;I can say whatever I want&#8221;&#8212;that&#8217;s a very misleading barometer of how censorious China is. China&#8217;s censorship system is not based on what you say. As you rightly showed in your video, it&#8217;s based on the outcome of that speech. So depending on what kind of person you are, what language you&#8217;re speaking, whether you&#8217;re a tech entrepreneur like Elon Musk or a humanities person, the repression is very, very different. To get a real sense of the Chinese censorship system, you need to look at people other than yourself to gauge how repressive the society is.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[35:59] That&#8217;s a good way to put it.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[36:01] What&#8217;s your situation now that you&#8217;ve started your YouTube channel? Are you scared of what might happen to your family, or about whether you might be able to go back to China?</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[36:11] Since 2023, I haven&#8217;t really received any harassment from the government. Even after my YouTube videos, the monologues, I haven&#8217;t received any transnational repression from the Chinese authorities. But again, I think it has to do with the nature of these videos: they&#8217;re in English. They&#8217;re not generating impact among Chinese citizens, which is what the authorities are largely concerned about. If I made Mandarin versions of those videos, I would probably be targeted more harshly. So I don&#8217;t think I can go back to China. But I don&#8217;t know&#8212;it really depends. Someone like Ai Weiwei could go back to China to visit his family. So it&#8217;s a really unpredictable situation. Maybe sometime in the future I can go back, I think.</p><p><strong>Chang Che </strong>[37:23] That&#8217;s a good place to end it. Thank you so much, Yinfi.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma </strong>[37:25] Thank you very much. That was very interesting.</p><p><strong>Yin Lu </strong>[37:28] Thank you so much.China&#8217;s tech rise seemed to debunk an old Western belief that free speech drives innovation. Yinfi (Yin Lu), a music composer turned YouTuber, thinks the old Western view should be revisited. For five years he wrote music for China&#8217;s biggest video games. Now, from Britain, he makes video essays reflecting on his time there, among which is the observation that China innovates not despite its censorship but because it tolerates freedoms selectively. He now believes that censorship is driving Chinese into the fantasy worlds of games and anime, an industry Yinfi helped build.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Untold Story of Jimmy Lai]]></title><description><![CDATA[Before Jimmy Lai was branded the biggest &#8220;black hand&#8221; behind Hong Kong&#8217;s 2019 protests, he was a child laborer in a glove and textile factory.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-untold-story-of-jimmy-lai-e6c</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-untold-story-of-jimmy-lai-e6c</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980735/afef5fa30e78853a172d374f7cfaaee2.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Before Jimmy Lai was branded the biggest &#8220;black hand&#8221; behind Hong Kong&#8217;s 2019 protests, he was a child laborer in a glove and textile factory. His unlikely story is chronicled in <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Troublemaker/Mark-L-Clifford/9781668027707?st_source=ai_overview">The Troublemaker: How Jimmy Lai Became a Billionaire, Hong Kong&#8217;s Greatest Dissident, and China&#8217;s Most Feare</a></p><p><strong>In this episode:</strong></p><ul><li><p>00:00 Intro; Jimmy Lai in prison</p></li><li><p>04:07 Why Beijing fears Lai</p></li><li><p>05:41 Apple Daily and the 2003 march</p></li><li><p>09:37 Lai&#8217;s fortune: sweaters, Giordano, Li Peng</p></li><li><p>13:05 Faith: Lai&#8217;s conversion to Catholicism</p></li><li><p>16:48 Lai, the American right, and the Democrats</p></li><li><p>19:43 Hong Kong vs. mainland civil society</p></li><li><p>23:13 Why Lai wasn&#8217;t jailed sooner</p></li><li><p>26:03 Hong Kong today: &#8220;soft resistance&#8221;</p></li><li><p>29:52 Universities and daily life</p></li><li><p>31:55 The diaspora and transnational repression</p></li><li><p>34:32 Coalitions: Hong Kong, the mainland, and the lockdowns</p></li><li><p>40:51 Hongkongers in Taiwan</p></li></ul><p><strong>1. Intro; Jimmy Lai in prison (00:00)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 00:00</strong> Hello. Welcome to Into Asia. I&#8217;m your host, Ian Buruma, and my co-host in Tokyo is Chang Che. We&#8217;re very pleased to talk today to Mark Clifford, a distinguished journalist and the author of <em>The Troublemaker</em>, a biography of Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong newspaper mogul and businessman who is in prison for at least 20 years for many alleged crimes, one of them conspiracy to collude with foreign forces. Mark is also president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, and he used to be the editor of the <em>South China Morning Post</em>. Welcome, Mark.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 00:39</strong> Thanks very much. Great to be here.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 00:40</strong> Mark, I was last in Hong Kong in January 2020, about a month before Covid really became a big issue. Hong Kong then was still jumping. There were demonstrations every day. I interviewed all the famous dissidents, including Jimmy Lai; we had lunch. It seemed more exciting and lively than I&#8217;d ever experienced it. I lived in Hong Kong in the 1980s, which is when we first met, when it was still a British crown colony. There wasn&#8217;t much politics going on then. You had headlines in the paper you later edited saying things like &#8220;British colonial secretary decrees.&#8221; In early 2020 it felt exciting because the young generation had been born and raised there. They were no longer immigrants. It was their city, and they felt they had a real say. And as we know, it all ended badly. Three-quarters of the people I interviewed ended up in prison, and some of them are still there. Perhaps you could first give us an update on Jimmy Lai himself. What&#8217;s happening with him, or not happening?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 01:51</strong> First of all, thanks very much. It&#8217;s great to have this opportunity to talk to you, and it&#8217;s always a pleasure. Jimmy is, as you mentioned, serving a 20-year sentence. He&#8217;s 78, so it&#8217;s effectively a life sentence. Unless there&#8217;s some sort of release on medical or humanitarian grounds, he will die in prison. He&#8217;s in solitary confinement in the oldest prison in Hong Kong, the 1937 maximum-security Stanley Prison, where prisoners on death row were held before they were executed. He has a floor to himself. He&#8217;s a real VIP. I don&#8217;t think there&#8217;s ever been a political prisoner like him in Hong Kong. They completely isolate him from the rest of the prison population. That floor isn&#8217;t there to give him privacy. It&#8217;s to make sure he doesn&#8217;t communicate with anyone and that no one sees him. I&#8217;m told that even some of the adjacent floors are at least partially empty, and this is in a facility that&#8217;s overcrowded, over its maximum. He gets out of his windowless cell for about 50 minutes a day for exercise. What&#8217;s really extraordinary is that whenever he&#8217;s moved, everyone is cleared out, and he&#8217;s escorted by a phalanx of guards holding tarps around him so no one can possibly take a picture. That&#8217;s because back in 2023, a freelance French journalist had the temerity to wait on the hill overlooking Stanley Prison, above the ocean, and got a long-lens shot of Jimmy going out to exercise.</p><p>The authorities seem so worried about just the image of Jimmy. We see the same kind of obsession with the Dalai Lama. When his wife, Teresa, has her weekly 30-minute visit with him behind Plexiglas, closely monitored, they clear the entire waiting room. Nobody else can visit their loved ones in prison while she&#8217;s there. So he&#8217;s being held in these extraordinary circumstances. He&#8217;s been in for more than 2,000 days, mostly in solitary confinement. He was imprisoned later that year, in December, after you met him. These are really difficult conditions even for someone young and in the best of health, and he&#8217;s not in the best of health. He has long suffered from diabetes, and he&#8217;s 78, so it&#8217;s not looking good.</p><p><strong>2. Why Beijing fears Lai (04:07)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 04:07</strong> Why do you think they&#8217;re more afraid of him than of any of the other dissidents? That kind of security seems extraordinary, and I haven&#8217;t heard of anything like it for any of the other prisoners.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 04:19</strong> Actually, there are many of them. This is an interesting story. There are a few dozen prisoners in isolation, and supposedly all of them, including Jimmy, have signed documents saying they wish to be in isolation. The United Nations says solitary should only be used as a last resort, never for more than 15 days, or it constitutes torture. So it beggars belief that dozens of people have asked to be in solitary for more than a month at a time.</p><p>Be that as it may, the Chinese Communist Party, in its infinite wisdom and historical understanding, seems to have decided that Jimmy Lai is a uniquely bad person, and that through his wealth, and above all his media platform, he was responsible for millions of Hong Kong people coming out into the streets in 2014.</p><p>And then most dramatically, as you mentioned in your introduction, in 2019 we had single demonstrations approaching 2 million people in a city of 7.5 million, and obviously not drawing people from over the border. They think Jimmy is the black hand, the puppeteer behind all these demonstrations. I think that&#8217;s a gross misreading of Hong Kong people and of Hong Kong history. But that&#8217;s how it is. They think he is singularly important and singularly responsible.</p><p><strong>3. Apple Daily and the 2003 march (05:41)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 05:41</strong> You mentioned he was a media mogul. How important was Apple Daily, his newspaper, part scandal sheet, part something a bit better than that, in the development of Hong Kong politics? Perhaps you could explain its role a little, I suppose starting from Tiananmen in 1989.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 06:01</strong> I think you&#8217;re right to go back to Tiananmen. But let me go back a little earlier. Jimmy was born on the mainland just before the Communists took power. He left at the age of 12, in 1961, in the midst of a famine that killed something like 45 million people. His mother and, I think, his twin sister left a couple of years later. I think his mother faced the choice of watching her kids waste away and die, or getting them to Hong Kong. So he came to Hong Kong and went from sleeping on a factory floor to owning a factory in 15 years. He built up first a sweater manufacturing business and then a retail operation. He wasn&#8217;t political. He supported Deng Xiaoping&#8217;s economic reforms in the &#8216;80s. But he was sickened by the killings of June 3rd and 4th, 1989, when hundreds, maybe thousands, of people were killed across China.</p><p>That&#8217;s when he decided to go into media. He had a visceral hatred of the Chinese Communist Party. He&#8217;s a primary school dropout, no PhD or egghead. He had an instinctive aversion to the Party&#8217;s control over people and over the economy, as a successful businessman in freewheeling Hong Kong. When he decided to go into media, his friends said, &#8220;What do you know about media? You&#8217;re a garment guy, you&#8217;re from the rag trade.&#8221; And he said, &#8220;I read <em>Fortune</em>, I read <em>The Economist</em>, I read <em>Time</em>. I can do this.&#8221; Real entrepreneurial verve. He first started <em>Next Magazine</em>, which did heavy investigative work but also had lots of paparazzi, starlet movie gossip, and scandal. Five years later he doubled down and started a newspaper, Apple Daily, which, as you said, was all over the place. It had everything from really sleazy sex scandals, and worse, to really good political coverage. It had Nobel Prize&#8211;winning economists. It had a horse racing section. It was a real smorgasbord of a paper, and it quickly became wildly popular and made him a lot of money.</p><p>But on the point of how important they were: in late 2002, the government started talking about introducing a national security law, which it was obligated to do under the Basic Law, the mini-constitution that governed Hong Kong after China took over. I was at <em>BusinessWeek</em> then, and one of my colleagues went to the first demonstration against it. I think he told me there were 15 or 20 people. Being nice Hong Kong people, they politely burned a copy of the draft bill and put it in the trash can. That was October 2002, I think. The following July 1st, 500,000 people came out into the streets, and I&#8217;d say Jimmy, Apple Daily, and Next Digital were more responsible than anyone for getting those crowds out. There were opposition parties, there was civil society, there was a lot going on. But Jimmy really led the charge. The magazine had fold-out posters attacking the city&#8217;s leader, Tung Chee-hwa, including one with a custard pie being thrown in his face. They were probably the closest thing to an opposition political party. Fast-forward a decade or so to the 2014 Umbrella Movement. By then they were a little behind; it was a younger generation of students. But Apple and its journalists were really there, even if Jimmy was perhaps a little more conservative.</p><p>And then in 2019, full-throated support for the movement.</p><p><strong>4. Lai&#8217;s fortune: sweaters, Giordano, Li Peng (09:37)</strong></p><p><strong>Chang Che 09:37</strong> How did Jimmy Lai make his wealth? Was he already wealthy before he moved into the newspaper business?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 09:45</strong> Interesting question. He made his first fortune making sweaters, and he became the biggest sweater manufacturer in Hong Kong, maybe in Asia.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 09:52</strong> Jeans, too, right? Giordano.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 09:54</strong> He&#8217;s a serial entrepreneur. He got bored with just making sweaters, and he got mad that the retailers seemed to be taking most of the profit. So he said, &#8220;I can do this,&#8221; and set up Giordano, which was really the first of the fast-fashion chains. Tadashi Yanai, who was starting a little clothing company at the time, came down to learn from him, and really learned a lot from Jimmy and Giordano when he was setting up what became Uniqlo. Yanai offered to make Jimmy a 25 percent partner. Jimmy said he wasn&#8217;t interested. Yanai said, &#8220;How about 30 percent?&#8221; Jimmy passed on that too. Obviously, Yanai went on to extraordinary success. He had something Jimmy didn&#8217;t: more follow-through. He&#8217;s a much more systematic person. Jimmy is a classic entrepreneur, a classic Hong Kong entrepreneur. He&#8217;d start things and get them going, they&#8217;d be successful, and just as they started paying off, he&#8217;d move on to the next thing. So he did sweaters, then Giordano.</p><p>Giordano is interesting because it went public shortly after 1989. All of a sudden Jimmy&#8217;s stake was worth a couple hundred million dollars, and the Chinese saw that he was expanding into China. He&#8217;d opened a store in Beijing by 1994, certainly. Then he wrote a column trashing Li Peng, the premier, who was making his first trip to the West after Tiananmen. Jimmy was livid about this and famously called him &#8220;son of a turtle egg,&#8221; which basically means bastard. So the Chinese authorities responded as they so often do: they found a number of safety violations at the Giordano store in Beijing and forced it to close. Jimmy then doubled down. He wrote something like, &#8220;I&#8217;m really sorry about the bad words I used. I was a little intemperate in my language in that last column. Li Peng is a bad dude. The Chinese Communist Party is going to be consigned to the dustbin of history, and the sooner it gets there, the better.&#8221;</p><p>So the Chinese authorities kept increasing the pressure, figuring that, like most business people, he&#8217;d crumble. He would choose the profits of this company that was doing really well in China and dial back his criticism. Jimmy said, &#8220;Forget it.&#8221; He sold his Giordano stake, pocketed a couple hundred million dollars, and used it to finance the launch of Apple Daily the next year.</p><p>So he is singular, I think, certainly in modern Chinese dissident history, in having not just principles but also the cash to act on them: to start a media business and to withstand the pressure and attacks on him.</p><p>He was in Hong Kong, which was free then. But it was that kind of boldness in standing up to the Chinese that, I don&#8217;t know if it unnerved them or angered them or both, but I think there&#8217;s a long-standing desire to get Jimmy Lai, going back to 1994, even 1989.</p><p><strong>5. Faith: Lai&#8217;s conversion to Catholicism (13:05)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 13:05</strong> There&#8217;s another side to him, which is also true of some other Chinese dissidents in recent history: he&#8217;s a devout Christian, a devout Catholic. He&#8217;s convinced, and I&#8217;ve heard the same thing from other Christian dissidents in China, that Christianity is somehow the key to Western democracy and liberalism, and that as long as the Chinese don&#8217;t find the true faith, it will always be difficult to get rid of the authoritarian heritage. His religion may help him in prison. But to what extent do you think it contributed to his political evolution? And when did he embrace the faith?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 13:48</strong> That&#8217;s a really interesting question. He was not religious. When I first met him in 1993, I didn&#8217;t see any signs of it. But writing the biography, I learned a lot more. In 1989 he met two people who really changed his life. One was Martin Lee, the so-called father of democracy in Hong Kong, who is a devout Catholic. The other was a young woman named Teresa Li, who interviewed him when she was a summer cadet at the <em>South China Morning Post</em>. He fell in love with her. His first wife had walked out a couple of years earlier. A little later, Teresa&#8217;s sister married another prominent pro-democracy figure, Yeung Sum, who later headed the Democratic Party. So he moved into this Catholic milieu. After 1989 he was still reluctant to convert. Teresa&#8217;s a Francophile, and he spent a lot of time in Paris, where he had long discussions with a Chinese priest living there, whom I was unable to track down.</p><p>And funnily enough, the week before the handover, in late June 1997, a friend asked him to convert, at Teresa&#8217;s behest. Jimmy said no. The day after the handover, he changed his mind and asked Bill McGurn, who&#8217;s at <em>The Wall Street Journal</em>, to be his godfather. I understand it usually takes about a year of preparation to convert to Catholicism. Jimmy did it in a week or so. He had the help of Joseph Zen, who I don&#8217;t think was a cardinal yet, but whom Jimmy was close to, another very prominent pro-democracy figure and one of Asia&#8217;s most prominent pro-democracy theologians. Cardinal Zen helped him prepare. Jimmy&#8217;s a very intense guy. He read assiduously. From what I&#8217;ve heard, he barely slept for a week or ten days until the conversion.</p><p>So he converted in 1997. But it&#8217;s interesting what you say, because when I hear Jimmy talk, he&#8217;s not like any other human rights person I&#8217;ve heard. He doesn&#8217;t talk in terms of universal human rights. He always talks in terms of Western values, sometimes British values. Rule of law is what I&#8217;ve always heard him say is the key. He has become increasingly religious. Even after his conversion, Apple Daily kept running reviews of brothels, and worse. I know Bill McGurn and others thought, &#8220;It&#8217;s great that Jimmy&#8217;s converting, another convert for the fold.&#8221;</p><p>But how much of it was social and political, and how much did he really believe? I think we can say without a doubt that after six years in prison, he&#8217;s a very, very devout Catholic. He reads intensely. I think he&#8217;s only allowed six books a month, but they&#8217;re all Roman Catholic, and they&#8217;re all pretty hard-core theology.</p><p><strong>6. Lai, the American right, and the Democrats (16:48)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 16:48</strong> What he told me, and I&#8217;ve heard it from others, has to do with the notion of truth. His argument is that in China, truth is always imposed from above, by the state, by the government, and in modern times by the Communist Party. Whereas for Christians, it&#8217;s God&#8217;s truth. And that has led him to the views he holds.</p><p>There&#8217;s another element, which is perhaps more disturbing to some human rights activists. The people who support him most, in the United States in particular, are fellow devout Christians, and they&#8217;re often on the right.</p><p>I don&#8217;t think Donald Trump is a devout Christian. He pretends to be sometimes. But nonetheless, Jimmy Lai was rather supportive of Trump, because he thought Trump and his supporters were more supportive of freedom in Hong Kong, and by extension China. People on the left, where are they? Would you say it&#8217;s true that the right in the United States has been more active in supporting democracy activists in Hong Kong and China than the left?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 17:55</strong> It&#8217;s a great question. I think the left, and maybe the Democratic Party as a whole, lost their focus on China and Hong Kong human rights sometime in the last couple of decades. In the 1990s you had a Nancy Pelosi way of thinking and a Bill Clinton way of thinking, and Clinton famously linked human rights and trade, I believe in 1994, in the debate over giving China most-favored-nation trading status.</p><p>Then after China got into the WTO, that debate was settled, unfortunately to the detriment of human rights. Pelosi just met with Jimmy&#8217;s son in mid-September, I think, so Pelosi and some other Democrats are still very supportive. But what&#8217;s true is that Jimmy is a businessman. He was friends with Milton Friedman. He considers himself a Hayekian; it was reading Hayek that really turned him on to this broader truth about economics and liberty. And as a Catholic, Jimmy has personally identified with, and has more contacts among, the religious and pro-market right than the Democratic Party. Still, I&#8217;d say Jimmy personally, and Hong Kong more generally, has a lot of support among Democrats, though not as much as I&#8217;d like to see. And I do think progressives in particular, in the States and beyond, tend to check their brains at the door when it comes to China and human rights. There isn&#8217;t the concern there should be. I think we&#8217;re starting to see the Democrats get their mojo back on the issue. I&#8217;m not really sure why it disappeared.</p><p><strong>7. Hong Kong vs. mainland civil society (19:43)</strong></p><p><strong>Chang Che 19:43</strong> Mark, I wanted to ask you about the erosion of civil society in Hong Kong compared to the mainland, because you mentioned 2003. That was also a big inflection point for civil society on the mainland. It was the year of the Sun Zhigang incident, which kicked off what became known as the rights defense movement.</p><p>There were also similar publications on the mainland, like <em>Southern Weekend</em>, <em>Nanfang Zhoumo</em>. I&#8217;m curious how you&#8217;d compare <em>Southern Weekend</em> to Apple Daily. My sense is that after &#8216;89, not many mainland activists went directly after the regime. Most civil society activists tried to invoke China&#8217;s own constitution to protect civil liberties, whereas Jimmy Lai wasn&#8217;t afraid to go after the regime itself. Is that just a result of the civil society protections the government had committed to in Hong Kong? How do you explain the difference?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 20:37</strong> I think Hong Kong was never democratic, but it was quite free. And as Ian said earlier, Hong Kong in the 1980s, when we first met, wasn&#8217;t political on the surface, but underneath there was a huge amount bubbling. Parenthetically, I got a PhD a few years ago in postwar Hong Kong history, and it&#8217;s really interesting how much politics was going on beneath the surface.</p><p>So civil society in Hong Kong had been developing pretty powerfully since 1945. The shoots were small, but there were decades of slow growth: people like Christine Loh and others in groups like Hong Kong Observers or Meeting Point, which British intelligence was all over, going back to the 1970s. Then Chris Patten came along and really turbocharged the whole environment. In 1989, people in Hong Kong said, &#8220;China today is Hong Kong tomorrow.&#8221; And the lesson they took was not &#8220;Let&#8217;s hide under a rock,&#8221; but &#8220;Let&#8217;s fight and extend the civil liberties and freedoms we have.&#8221; Then Patten brought in more electoral reforms, and we got much more political engagement. Patten encouraged all this, and he encouraged Hongkongers to really believe in themselves and in Hong Kong. Jimmy came into this environment. So things were fairly well rooted by 1997. You could say they&#8217;ve spent the last three decades trying to uproot those freedoms. The elite hated Jimmy, and many of them still do. They&#8217;d be delighted if he died in jail. But Hong Kong people were ready, because, as Ian said, you had a whole generation who had grown up in Hong Kong and didn&#8217;t see it as a way station to somewhere else. The expansion of the universities, environmental groups, civil society, arts groups, the sense of Cantonese as a language and a culture: it had all been developing, and it really blossomed after &#8216;89, when Patten came in &#8216;92, in that run-up to &#8216;97.</p><p>As for <em>Nanfang Zhoumo</em>, and <em>Caixin</em> and <em>Caijing</em>, they were always more cautious. In my reading, they were much more focused on economic and business issues, although they clearly did get into some rights and labor issues, and the incident you mentioned was obviously very important. I just think things were more rooted in Hong Kong.</p><p><strong>8. Why Lai wasn&#8217;t jailed sooner (23:13)</strong></p><p><strong>Chang Che 23:13</strong> Just to follow up: something I struggle with, looking back at the erosion of civil society on the mainland, is the reverse question. Why didn&#8217;t it erode earlier? What was holding it up in the 2000s? There are a bunch of explanations on the mainland. One is that there was a collective leadership system then. It wasn&#8217;t just one guy, and there were turf disputes among elites, so it wasn&#8217;t easy to crack down on civil society. How would you explain why Jimmy Lai didn&#8217;t go to jail earlier?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 23:48</strong> That&#8217;s a great question. In June 1997, a couple of weeks before the handover, I was at an event in the grand ballroom of the Grand Hyatt. There were probably 500 people jammed in there. Jimmy Lai was on stage in conversation with Al Neuharth, the founder of <em>USA Today</em>, who really put the Gannett newspaper chain together. The question came up: &#8220;What&#8217;s going to happen?&#8221; And Jimmy started crying. He broke down on stage and said he expected to go to jail. I was more optimistic, or more naive. I thought, really? I knew Jimmy, and here was a guy who had just started this newspaper. So maybe we should just be surprised it took three decades instead of five years.</p><p>I should mention that I was on the board of directors of Next when it collapsed, so I got a pretty close-up view of this. I should also say that Jimmy was a very hands-off proprietor, by everyone&#8217;s account. If you wrote anything that smacked of socialism, you were gone. But other than that, he even had a columnist, Lee Yee, who was very close to the Beijing leadership. There was a real multiplicity of views. I think Apple and Next were instrumental in pushing forward the notion of freedom and of a Hong Kong identity, or a modern Chinese identity, whether in Taiwan or in Hong Kong. They weren&#8217;t the only factor. We also had a somewhat more open election system, and other media were emboldened by the example of Apple and Next. And again, I think Patten was key in raising the bar and opening things up. You had a generation, or a couple of generations, who had been held back, and they said, &#8220;This is our moment. We&#8217;re going to take it and push forward.&#8221;</p><p>But it is a good question why it didn&#8217;t happen earlier. They were trying. Think back to 2003: Tung Chee-hwa, who by the way has just died, was trying to push through the national security bill. If it had gone through in 2003, if those 20 people hadn&#8217;t somehow turned into 500,000 people on the streets and forced Tung&#8217;s resignation, maybe all this would have happened two decades earlier. We can&#8217;t really do counterfactual history, but it&#8217;s a really interesting question.</p><p><strong>9. Hong Kong today: &#8220;soft resistance&#8221; (26:03)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 26:03</strong> Those numbers are huge. And as you say, political ferment had been bubbling under the surface for a long time. They can&#8217;t put everybody in prison. So what&#8217;s happening in Hong Kong today? Have people simply gone home and called it quits? Or is something still bubbling under the surface?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 26:22</strong> I very much believe something is bubbling beneath the surface, but it&#8217;s quite far beneath. Consider the elections. The first real territory-wide election for the Legislative Council was in 1991. The pro-democracy camp shocked everyone, including, I think, themselves, with a landslide: about six out of ten votes. The same held in every free election all the way through November 2019, right before you were last there, when the pro-democracy camp won a landslide in the district council elections. Again, about six out of ten people voted for pro-democracy candidates, even after the tumult, chaos, and violence of the summer of 2019.</p><p>Beijing and the pro-government camp thought there would be a real flip to a more conservative vote. Instead, the pro-democracy candidates stomped home, because most Hong Kong people want some form of democracy. They can debate what it should look like, but they want to live in a free, open society. Sure, a couple hundred thousand people have left, but most of the 7.5 million people who were there in 2019 are still there. And in their hearts, if they had the choice, probably six out of ten Hongkongers would again choose the pro-democracy candidates.</p><p>What we&#8217;re seeing now is what the government, being a totalitarian regime, calls &#8220;soft resistance.&#8221; Soft resistance is anything they don&#8217;t like. It&#8217;s people lining up for days before a court hearing for Chow Hang-tung, the Hong Kong Alliance member who, with her colleagues, organized the June 4th commemorations in Victoria Park every year. She was just sentenced, in early September, to, I think, over seven years and three months. People lined up for days. Somebody was actually arrested in the line. Supporters are showing up where they can, at court hearings. So I think we are seeing support, but you can&#8217;t ask people to commit suicide. People are trying to figure out where the lines are.</p><p>We&#8217;ve seen a number of booksellers arrested, including for selling my biography of Jimmy Lai. I was amazed to learn that as of earlier this year, there were 70 independent bookstores in Hong Kong. I thought there were a handful, maybe half a dozen. Most of them are the size of a closet, or a little bigger, but the point is, people are out there. The first person arrested, apparently for selling a copy of the Jimmy Lai biography, runs a bookstore whose name is usually translated in English as Mighty Punch. This guy is incredible. He&#8217;s been arrested for so many things. He was convicted for giving unauthorized Spanish lessons. Think about it: you get people together to study a foreign language, something a little more international, and that&#8217;s seen as a threat to the regime. He had a Japanese author come down, served people little cups of sake, and was arrested for serving alcohol without a license. So there are all these small things happening. I don&#8217;t want to say the authorities are powerless to stop it. They aren&#8217;t powerless; they&#8217;re arresting people. But they can&#8217;t arrest the entire city. As best we can figure, close to 2,000 people have been jailed on political charges since the 2019 protests, and 200 to 300 are behind bars right now. That&#8217;s not a huge number, but it&#8217;s pretty big for a single city of 7.5 million people.</p><p><strong>10. Universities and daily life (29:52)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 29:52</strong> How is it affecting the universities, and education in general?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 29:56</strong> I can only give you an anecdotal answer. I went to the University of Hong Kong&#8217;s history department, and much of that department has left. Some people go back and forth, but there&#8217;s a huge squeeze. The student unions have all been disbanded, or have &#8220;voluntarily&#8221; disbanded. Many student leaders have served time in prison, and some are still there. So there&#8217;s a real crimp on intellectual freedom. You&#8217;re free if you want to study the sciences. You&#8217;re not free if you want to study history, sociology, law, the liberal arts.</p><p><strong>Chang Che 30:33</strong> What about daily life? Since the pandemic, or basically since 2020, have you noticed something similar to the mainland, where you&#8217;re not really at liberty to talk about politics in public? On the mainland, people are pretty honest in private. But talking about politics in any public setting is a really big taboo.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 30:53</strong> I haven&#8217;t been there since October 2020. I was planning to go back, but then Jimmy was thrown in prison. I&#8217;ve been doing quite a lot with him. I was on the board, as I said, and we&#8217;ve been doing regular weekly livestreams. My name was mentioned by the prosecutor and has continually been mentioned by Hong Kong authorities since then. I was also threatened under the national security law by a leading Hong Kong businessman. So I haven&#8217;t been back, and I don&#8217;t think the Hong Kong authorities would welcome me in. And if they did, I&#8217;m not sure they&#8217;d let me leave. So I can&#8217;t give you a great answer. But I think if you&#8217;re a foreigner working for a big bank, you&#8217;re probably enjoying the same nice expatriate lifestyle you always did, and you know not to talk about certain things. So yes, people don&#8217;t talk about politics anymore. But on the surface, as in Berlin in the mid-1930s probably, life goes on.</p><p><strong>11. The diaspora and transnational repression (31:55)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 31:55</strong> And what about life outside Hong Kong? There&#8217;s quite a diaspora, and some of its members were prominent figures in the democracy movement. Are they heard in Hong Kong? Are they effective in any way? Or are they just voices crying in the wilderness?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 32:14</strong> Ian, I think that&#8217;s a great question, and I&#8217;ve been thinking about it. Whether you go back to 1848, or the Bolshevik Revolution, or the Hungarian Revolution, you can look at how diaspora groups try to maintain some force and relevance. There are several hundred thousand Hongkongers outside Hong Kong, concentrated in the United Kingdom, where it&#8217;s fairly easy for them to go, work, and eventually get citizenship. There are also a lot in Canada and Australia, and a lot in Taiwan as well. It&#8217;s a robust, active community. Because of technology, I think their voices have much more resonance in Hong Kong now than they might have had in, say, Hungary after 1956. Our website at the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation was recently blocked by the Chinese authorities, and they attack us. My Hong Kong Chinese colleagues have bounties on their heads: a $130,000 reward for bringing them back to Hong Kong to be prosecuted. The transnational repression is quite serious, and it&#8217;s a new and worrying trend. But I feel there&#8217;s a huge amount of interest in Hong Kong in the support they&#8217;re getting from abroad.</p><p>Take Chow Hang-tung. She and Jimmy Lai are probably the two best-known political prisoners. She and her supporters know what&#8217;s going on. Her prison statements and her statements in open court are sometimes posted on social media by her supporters almost before she&#8217;s read them out.</p><p>So there&#8217;s a surprising degree of porosity, a flow of ideas in both directions. Hongkongers in Hong Kong know the world hasn&#8217;t forgotten them. And that support continues. At the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, we&#8217;re extremely active in Washington, DC, and in London, for obvious reasons: it&#8217;s a former British crown colony, and the US is still quite engaged with China and Hong Kong.</p><p><strong>12. Coalitions: Hong Kong, the mainland, and the lockdowns (34:32)</strong></p><p><strong>Chang Che 34:32</strong> Mark, to what extent is the Hong Kong diaspora in coalition with the mainland diaspora? After Covid, a huge mainland contingent went overseas. I haven&#8217;t spent much time in these communities, but in Tokyo, which I guess counts, you sometimes see some mixing. At some of the bookstores, a lot of the events bring together Taiwanese, the Hong Kong diaspora, and the mainland diaspora. The reason I ask is that I wonder whether the Hong Kong diaspora is focused on the future of Hong Kong and not necessarily thinking about reform on the mainland. Is that what you see?</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 35:14</strong> That&#8217;s a really interesting question. I just came back from Washington earlier this week. In the five-plus years I&#8217;ve been doing this work, I&#8217;ve been really encouraged to see Hong Kong become part of a coalition. You can&#8217;t really call it a united front, but it&#8217;s brought Hongkongers together with Tibetans, Uyghurs, Han Chinese, and, not surprisingly, a lot of Falun Gong and human rights defenders from the mainland. I&#8217;m sure Ian would appreciate this: Hong Kong can be a very parochial place.</p><p>One criticism I&#8217;d make of some of the younger activists is that they didn&#8217;t even want to go to the June 4th commemorations. Their attitude was, &#8220;We&#8217;re Hongkongers. That&#8217;s the mainland. It has nothing to do with us.&#8221; Really? Hong Kong isn&#8217;t going to change until China changes. So unwittingly, and I&#8217;m sure to its dismay, the Chinese Communist Party has done a lot to forge a coalition between Hong Kong and others. On September 24th, the day Xi Jinping comes to DC, there will be a number of demonstrations around the city, and they&#8217;re all coalition efforts. One might be led more by the Tibetans, another by somebody else, but all the groups are involved in all of them. From my perspective, that&#8217;s incredibly encouraging and a really interesting development. I also want to underscore the importance of technology, which gives both sides new capabilities and new opportunities. Although our website is blocked, it&#8217;s pretty easy for us to get our newsletter and statements into Hong Kong.</p><p>So we&#8217;ll see how it plays out, but I think it&#8217;s a fascinating question.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 37:01</strong> That also perhaps explains why Jimmy Lai is such a target. When I think of the famous Hong Kong activists and politicians, Martin Lee, Emily Lau, and, from the youngest generation, Joshua Wong, they were all focused on Hong Kong, and deliberately so. I knew Emily very well, as you did, and she always said she wasn&#8217;t interested in China. She was interested in Hong Kong. Whereas Jimmy Lai went straight after the central government in China. That&#8217;s a big difference, I think.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 37:35</strong> You bring up an interesting point. Jimmy is of a generation born in China. He had tried to leave China behind and just focus on his business, but when he saw the Tiananmen protesters, he said, &#8220;I felt like my mother was calling.&#8221; My young colleagues were born 20 or 25 years ago. They don&#8217;t remember the handover. They don&#8217;t have a Chinese identity. We&#8217;ve seen this in all sorts of polls: Hongkongers&#8217; sense of being Chinese peaked, coincidentally or not, in 2008, around the Olympics. And I think it was in 2007 or 2008 that Xi Jinping, then vice premier, took over as head of the leading group on Hong Kong and Macau. That&#8217;s when a much harder-line policy started.</p><p><strong>Chang Che 38:21</strong> I have an interesting anecdote for you, Mark. I noticed a similar kind of political attachment from mainlanders to Hongkongers during the pandemic. I was in Shanghai during the Covid years, and during the lockdowns a lot of the Shanghai residents I spoke to related their experience to Hong Kong&#8217;s. They&#8217;d say, &#8220;It&#8217;s so interesting. When Hong Kong was protesting the national security law in 2019, [NB: 2019 was the extradition bill, 2020 was the national security law] I was always thinking, what are they so mad about? Come on.&#8221; And then, locked in their homes by the Party, they&#8217;d say, &#8220;I finally understand what Hongkongers were feeling.&#8221; That was a very powerful sentiment during the lockdown. So in a way, Xi Jinping has helped reunify a generation that, as the polls you mentioned suggest, was splintering apart, and pushed them into a kind of coalition, an anti&#8211;united front.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 39:23</strong> That&#8217;s very interesting, because one of my teachers, a young local guy who has since emigrated to Tokyo and speaks excellent Japanese, Thai, Burmese, and everything else, an amazing guy, experienced exactly the opposite. His view was, &#8220;Where were the mainlanders? We needed them in 2019.&#8221; And then something happened. It was pandemic-related, though not directly; it might have been around the White Paper movement as well. There was some new platform where, for a week or so, mainlanders and Hongkongers were suddenly mingling and talking. And he came away saying, &#8220;These mainlanders are people too.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Chang Che 40:01</strong> That was Clubhouse.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 40:03</strong> Clubhouse, exactly. Because there were real divisions, real racism. And by the way, Apple and Jimmy sometimes played into this. They ran a headline that called mainlanders locusts. And then Hongkongers get upset when they&#8217;re called cockroaches. The demonization on both sides is really incredible. We can all understand it, though I think the average American isn&#8217;t going to see the differences between the Cantonese, the northerners, and other mainlanders. But I think you&#8217;re right. I don&#8217;t know how durable it will be, but at least we have a foundation for real knowledge, personal relationships, and integration. I was amazed to see some of this earlier this week between the Han and the Uyghurs, and even the Falun Gong.</p><p>So it&#8217;ll be interesting to see.</p><p><strong>13. Hongkongers in Taiwan (40:51)</strong></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 40:51</strong> I think those attitudes on the mainland long predated Covid. When Hong Kong people were complaining, many mainlanders said, &#8220;Who are these pampered Cantonese? We should have their lives, and they&#8217;re making a fuss,&#8221; and so on.</p><p>But what about the Hongkongers now in Taiwan? That same year I was in Hong Kong, 2020, was also election year in Taiwan, and quite a lot was made of Hong Kong exiles and their politics. The Taiwanese are very interested in these people.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 41:25</strong> It&#8217;s fascinating, because Taiwan&#8217;s Sunflower Movement fed into the uprising in Hong Kong, and people like Emily Lau would go to Taiwan, which drove the mainland nuts.</p><p>But I can&#8217;t give you a really good sense right now. I&#8217;ll be in Tokyo and Taipei next month, and I want to meet a lot of the Hongkongers there. What I always hear is that the Taiwanese government makes things very difficult. It&#8217;s very suspicious of Hongkongers and makes it hard for them to come. Quite a few people have told me that, for one reason or another, things didn&#8217;t work out in Taiwan. The economy isn&#8217;t great, and jobs are pretty low-paid. So I hear a lot of complaints. But I don&#8217;t know, because when I go there, the communities seem very vibrant.</p><p><strong>14. Beijing&#8217;s misreading of Hong Kong (42:08)</strong></p><p><strong>Chang Che 42:08</strong> Let&#8217;s go back to Jimmy Lai. Earlier, when we were talking about the government&#8217;s narrative about him, you wanted to say something about why it isn&#8217;t true. I wanted to give you the chance to finish that.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 42:23</strong> Thanks. The irony is that Jimmy has no political ambitions at all. He&#8217;s a private person, actually quite shy. I&#8217;m sure Ian would attest to this. He&#8217;s very happy one-on-one. He loves playing host. He has invited hundreds of foreign journalists, economists, religious figures, and politicians to his house and out on his boat. Then, usually around nine at night, it&#8217;s, &#8220;I&#8217;m going to bed. Good night, goodbye.&#8221; He&#8217;s not a man who&#8217;s generally out on the front stage, and he wouldn&#8217;t be even if he were half his age. He never had any ambition to be a Nelson Mandela or an Alexei Navalny. It&#8217;s just not who he is. So it&#8217;s ironic that the government has turned him into public enemy number one.</p><p>I think it shows, first, his entrepreneurial success. But above all, it shows how much his willingness to stand up, to not be afraid, to have principles and speak truth to power, resonated with the people of Hong Kong, because their leaders weren&#8217;t doing that, Patten being the one exception. Nobody else would stand up and call the Chinese Communist Party out for what it was: a corrupt, power-seeking cabal. Jimmy was willing to, often very crudely and rudely. He&#8217;s a primary school dropout. The fact that a primary school dropout, a Cantonese merchant, a garment guy, could rally millions of people in Hong Kong behind him is really a testament to truth. It&#8217;s not about Jimmy. It&#8217;s about his ideas.</p><p>So I think the Chinese government has consistently misread Hong Kong. I&#8217;ve looked at a lot of the material from the &#8216;80s, around Thatcher&#8217;s visit. I obviously don&#8217;t have access to all the internal documents, but British colonial civil servants, British businessmen, and Hong Kong Chinese businessmen trooped off to Beijing and told the Chinese leaders, and told each other, and believed, that Hong Kong people didn&#8217;t care about politics. That&#8217;s just total rubbish.</p><p>That misreading, I would say, is at the heart of the failure to understand Hong Kong, and of the failure to preserve it as the free, open, prosperous city it once was. It could have stayed that way under Chinese rule. It didn&#8217;t have to be like this, and it could change again. The DNA, the bones, are still there for Hong Kong to flourish as one of the most open cities in the world.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma 45:11</strong> That&#8217;s a great place to end. Thank you very much, Mark.</p><p><strong>Mark Clifford 45:15</strong> Thanks a lot. It&#8217;s been fun.<a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Troublemaker/Mark-L-Clifford/9781668027707?st_source=ai_overview">d Critic</a> (2024) by veteran journalist Mark Clifford. Clifford, now the president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, sits down with Ian and Chang to discuss Lai&#8217;s path from garment factories to founding <em>Apple Daily</em>, Hong Kong&#8217;s loud, gossipy, fiercely pro-democracy tabloid, and his effective life sentence, meted out in February.&nbsp;</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[What Trump’s Military Pullback Means for East Asia]]></title><description><![CDATA[Trump has scaled back military exercises with South Korea and is courting North Korea's president Kim Jung Un.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/what-trumps-military-pullback-means-2b0</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/what-trumps-military-pullback-means-2b0</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980736/1332c512351c542be69bab3dead292f8.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Trump has scaled back military exercises with South Korea and is courting North Korea's president Kim Jung Un. Chang and Ian discuss what this means for Japan and South Korea from discussions of nuclear re</p><p><strong>We discuss:</strong></p><ul><li><p>1:42 &#8212; What&#8217;s different about Trump&#8217;s pullback from South Korea now compared with 2018?</p></li><li><p>8:16 &#8212; If the U.S. security guarantee weakens, what would Japan and South Korea actually have to do to defend themselves?</p></li><li><p>12:24 &#8212; The historical obstacles to closer military coordination between Japan and South Korea</p></li><li><p>17:28 &#8212; Will a weaker American nuclear umbrella push Japan and South Korea toward nuclear weapons?</p></li><li><p>22:23 &#8212; Has the Iran war made East Asia more vulnerable to China and North Korea?</p></li><li><p>24:18 &#8212; How an American pullback could reshape Japan&#8217;s domestic politics</p></li><li><p>27:23 &#8212; Is Japan ready to revise its pacifist constitution?</p></li><li><p>31:06 &#8212; Why the history of Japanese imperialism still complicates rearmament</p></li></ul><div><hr></div><h1><strong>Transcript:</strong></h1><p><strong>Chang Che [00:00]</strong></p><p>One of the topics Ian and I have discussed over the past few months is what East Asia is going to look like now that Trump has made it very clear that he is treating military alliances like transactions, destabilizing what used to be the American security umbrella in East Asia.</p><p>We got a really good look at this last week, when a joint military exercise between the U.S. and South Korea, called Ulchi Freedom Shield, was pared down by Trump with an announcement on Truth Social&#8212;which is apparently the main place to announce these kinds of major military decisions.</p><p>He said that, because of his good relationship with Kim Jong Un, he did not want to antagonize North Korea. That was one reason he cited. The other was that he had asked South Korea for help in opening the Strait of Hormuz&#8212;again, Iran comes into this&#8212;and South Korea said, &#8220;No, thanks.&#8221;</p><p>So Ian, I guess one way to ask you this question is to play devil&#8217;s advocate and say: What&#8217;s new here? Trump also did this in 2018. If we remember, in 2018 Trump and Kim Jong Un began a series of meetings, and that year he also canceled military exercises with South Korea so as not to antagonize Kim Jong Un.</p><p>It seems Trump wants to meet Kim again later this year. U.S. officials have apparently already said as much to the media. So is this just a repeat of 2018? And shouldn&#8217;t we also be happy that Trump is meeting leaders of nuclear-armed countries to presumably try to stabilize those relationships?</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma [01:42]</strong></p><p>In a way, it is a repeat. But certain things have happened since he canceled the exercises the last time. Furthermore, the cancellation&#8212;or scaling back&#8212;of the so-called Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises was followed even more recently by the cancellation of joint exercises between U.S. and South Korean Marines. All of that is important.</p><p>Now, the difference from 2018 is not Trump&#8217;s psychology. Trump has this illusion that, if only he can get together with other strongmen&#8212;he likes talking to dictators; he much prefers it to talking to prime ministers or presidents of democracies&#8212;and if they like him, then he can somehow sort things out with them.</p><p>He tried that in 2018. He had a meeting with Kim Jong Un, and it didn&#8217;t go anywhere. Since then, the North Koreans have simply carried on and built up even more formidable nuclear capabilities. They have been lobbing missiles in the direction of South Korea and Japan and have become, if anything, more threatening.</p><p>And nonetheless, Trump is still basically repeating North Korean propaganda points by saying that South Korean and American military exercises are a provocation, and so on; that if only he and Kim Jong Un could get together, they could sort things out.</p><p>The South Koreans become a sort of hindrance, in the same way that he thinks Ukraine is hindering his ability to sort things out with Putin. He thinks that if only he and Putin could organize the world according to their interests, smaller countries shouldn&#8217;t stand in their way.</p><p>I think he sees South Korea very much in that light.</p><p>Now, this is terrifying to allies such as South Korea and Japan&#8212;and, in Europe, to the Europeans and Ukrainians&#8212;because what it suggests is that Trump wants to divide the world among three or four strongmen, and anybody who objects should be given short shrift.</p><p>In East Asia, this is upsetting the whole postwar order. The deal after 1945, after the end of World War II, was that the United States would guarantee the security of its allies, South Korea and Japan, by offering a nuclear umbrella, conducting military exercises, and stationing troops in those countries as so-called &#8220;tripwires.&#8221; Meaning that, if there were an attack on American troops, the United States would automatically defend its allies.</p><p>That deal is now unraveling.</p><p>That is causing huge problems for the South Koreans and the Japanese, just as it is causing problems for NATO members in Europe. But in my view, the problems in East Asia are even more serious.</p><p><strong>Chang [04:39]</strong></p><p>Yeah. I was thinking maybe we should consider why this is happening.</p><p>Obviously, there&#8217;s the Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz. Trump has been asking a lot of allies for help with that, and he&#8217;s been unhappy with many countries for their lack of help. So that&#8217;s not new.</p><p>But why do you think Trump wants to repair relations with North Korea now? Is he just trying to find some kind of foreign-policy win that he can sell back to his base before the elections?</p><p><strong>Ian [05:09]</strong></p><p>I think he has this fantasy. Don&#8217;t forget, he&#8217;s an amateur. He knows nothing about foreign policy, balances of power, relations with allies, and so on. He&#8217;s a fantasist.</p><p>His fantasy is of his own omnipotence.</p><p>He has promised his voters that America would no longer get entangled in foreign wars. He thinks the way to achieve this is for him to get together with other strongmen, such as Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, or Kim Jong Un, and basically come to agreements that suit the strongmen but might create great dangers for American allies.</p><p>He thinks that doesn&#8217;t matter. Those allies should just shut up and get out of the way, and he and these strongmen will decide how the world is to be ordered.</p><p>He thinks that he will then go down in history as the great peacemaker who ended wars by coming to agreements with formerly belligerent and hostile powers&#8212;that through sheer personal magnetism and personal rapport with these various figures, he will create world peace.</p><p>I think that&#8217;s his fantasy.</p><p>More sophisticated operators, like Putin and Xi Jinping, are perfectly happy and able to play up to those fantasies by flattering him and so on. But so far it hasn&#8217;t gone anywhere.</p><p>He still thinks of himself in those grandiose terms. And he still thinks allies should essentially shut up and get out of the way of his grand global vision.</p><p>So when you ask, &#8220;Has anything changed?&#8221;&#8212;no, that hasn&#8217;t changed.</p><p>But the situation is becoming more and more dangerous, because without American protection, or the guarantee of American protection, the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the Europeans will have to go it alone.</p><p>The next question, then, is: Is it time for that? How are they going to go about it? And what are the problems?</p><p><strong>Chang [07:24]</strong></p><p>We should also point out that Trump has recently made clear that, on the basis of what he considers good relations with an autocrat, he&#8217;s willing to compromise on regional security.</p><p>The biggest example was during the summit with Xi Jinping. The United States was about to sell a major arms package to Taiwan, and Trump paused it partly to ingratiate himself with Xi Jinping.</p><p>That&#8217;s another example of this worry: if push comes to shove, and there&#8217;s a moment when China can entice Trump with a good deal, will Trump be willing to compromise on the security of Taiwan? Japan?</p><p>Is he going to do something similar with joint military exercises with Japan? I&#8217;m pretty sure there&#8217;s one coming up at some point this year.</p><p>What are your thoughts on how Japan is reacting to all of this?</p><p><strong>Ian [08:16]</strong></p><p>He&#8217;s capable of doing anything. So this is very disconcerting for U.S. allies.</p><p>In Europe, at least, there is NATO. There is the EU. There are efforts to build up the arms industry in Germany. They are beginning to wake up.</p><p>Whether they have enough time to build up enough independence from the security guaranteed by the United States is a big question.</p><p>In East Asia, it&#8217;s a harder question, because there is no NATO in East Asia. There is no military alliance in East Asia apart from American security guarantees.</p><p>The Japanese security treaty with the United States is the main thing that protects them. The alliance with South Korea works in much the same way. It depends entirely on the willingness of the United States to defend them.</p><p>Taiwan is a slightly more difficult issue because there is no explicit guarantee to defend Taiwan in the case of an invasion. It&#8217;s left deliberately vague. But in the cases of South Korea and Japan, the deal was clear.</p><p>Now that deal is unraveling.</p><p>So what are the Japanese going to do?</p><p>The Japanese have a constitution that makes it unconstitutional for Japan to take part in combat outside its own borders. There have also historically been restrictions involving nuclear weapons and the export of lethal weapons.</p><p>All this has already been nibbled at for some time by conservative Japanese prime ministers like Abe, who tried to finesse the constitution so that Japan could begin exporting arms and building up its arms industry.</p><p>Japan has fairly formidable armed forces, but it still depends heavily on the United States. And it cannot become independent from American military protection without changing the constitution&#8212;without changing the famous Article 9.</p><p>The Koreans don&#8217;t have that constitutional barrier, but it&#8217;s a small country. They can&#8217;t go it alone.</p><p>So if the United States were to disappear as the guarantor of its allies&#8217; security in East Asia, those East Asian allies would have to start fending for themselves.</p><p>In Japan&#8217;s case, that means changing the constitution. It also means greater cooperation among the Japanese, the Koreans, the Southeast Asians, the Indians, and Australia.</p><p>Some new kind of East Asian NATO would have to emerge.</p><p>And one of the first steps is closer cooperation between Japan and South Korea. There are all kinds of problems there&#8212;historical problems. South Koreans are very sensitive about Japan, especially when it comes to Japanese military affairs.</p><p>They know they have to cooperate. There are already various military cooperation agreements, and conservative presidents in South Korea have been quite willing to cooperate with Japan on these issues. But left-wing politicians and South Korean leaders have historically been much less willing.</p><p>So it&#8217;s interesting that Lee Jae-myung, who comes from the left, is now drawing much closer to the Japanese prime minister, Takaichi, despite the fact that he represents a party that has traditionally been very skeptical of Japan.</p><p>On both sides, I think they realize the importance of this.</p><p>But there are still a lot of things standing in their way.</p><p><strong>Chang [11:53]</strong></p><p>Yeah. I was looking into whether Japan and South Korea conduct joint military exercises. It looks like they&#8217;ve resumed some cooperation.</p><p>Right now there&#8217;s a trilateral exercise, launched in 2024, involving air, naval, and cyber units from Japan, South Korea, and the United States.</p><p>Basically, the United States is the hub and all of the East Asian countries are spokes. They need to start building relationships outside of that&#8212;they need to break out of the hub-and-spokes model.</p><p>Do you feel like that&#8217;s different from NATO in Europe? Is that less the case there?</p><p><strong>Ian [12:24]</strong></p><p>No, it is the case, but the Europeans have enough problems cooperating with one another. The French are always suspicious of the Germans, and so on.</p><p>But there is a very high level of cooperation, also because of the EU.</p><p>I think the relationship between Japan and South Korea&#8212;the nature of those relations, the historical hurts, the constant demands that Japan should apologize more for its past&#8212;is more difficult. Those issues have largely been resolved in Europe.</p><p>Now, if a far-right party were to come to power in Germany, and possibly in France, that would create all kinds of problems as well. But so far, I think relations in East Asia are more fraught and more difficult than anything in Europe.</p><p>One thing I find very interesting is that Lee Jae-myung said at a recent press conference, talking about cooperation between Japan and South Korea and specifically about greater military cooperation: &#8220;In my view, there is a practical need for it, but if I say something like that, I&#8217;ll get scolded&#8221;&#8212;meaning domestically.</p><p>And this has long been a problem in Korea.</p><p>The attitude toward Japan, the history of colonialism and Japanese brutality in the first half of the 20th century, is very much a domestic political issue in South Korea.</p><p>The conservatives and the conservative party&#8212;even though politicians today were all born after the Japanese colonial empire came to an end&#8212;carry a legacy in which South Korean conservatives were associated, for fairly good reasons, with collaboration with the Japanese during the imperial period.</p><p>The conservative elite in South Korea, in many ways, benefited from colonial rule. They were bureaucrats. They were people who ran universities. They were officers in the Japanese Imperial Army, and so on.</p><p>And that continued after the war. Those same people, and their children, continued to be important in conservative politics in South Korea.</p><p>The left has always opposed them. And one of the ways they&#8217;ve opposed them is by saying: You were collaborators with Japan. You&#8217;re pandering to Japan. All these deals you want to make with Japan, all this military cooperation&#8212;it shows that you&#8217;re still part of that collaborationist tradition.</p><p>Whereas we, the left, believe in Korean nationalism, and we believe that Japan should be forced to pay more money in reparations and should apologize more, and so on.</p><p>That&#8217;s the politics Lee Jae-myung comes from.</p><p>But partly because of Trump, because the role of the United States has changed, things are shifting.</p><p>For a long time, the United States was like a schoolteacher in a playground trying to bring unruly kids who were fighting each other together. It was always the United States pushing the South Koreans and the Japanese to cooperate more and more amicably.</p><p>If the United States starts moving away&#8212;if it becomes erratic and is no longer dependable&#8212;the Koreans and Japanese have to start getting along not because the schoolteacher tells them to, but because they themselves see it as being in their interest.</p><p>I think Lee Jae-myung understands that very well.</p><p>Hence the fact that he has close relations with the conservative Japanese prime minister, and hence the fact that he says, essentially, &#8220;I&#8217;m in favor of more cooperation, but I&#8217;ll get hit if I say that too openly back home.&#8221;</p><p>Because his voters, of course, haven&#8217;t quite gotten there yet.</p><p><strong>Chang [16:10]</strong></p><p>The way you put it reminds me of something Trump supporters would say: this idea that East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea, as well as Europe, should do more for their own security is not a Trump phenomenon.</p><p>Successive presidents have always wanted these countries to contribute more to their own security. But Trump has, in a way, accelerated that process in record time.</p><p>And it might not necessarily be a bad thing for Korea and Japan to break out of what you described as this kind of domestic political deadlock.</p><p>I&#8217;m wondering what some of the consequences or dangers are of the United States pulling back and pushing East Asian countries to contribute more.</p><p>One unintended byproduct might be that we&#8217;re once again having debates about both countries going nuclear.</p><p>Last December, in 2025, somebody in the Japanese administration raised the possibility that this was under discussion. More recently, in July, the defense minister said in a television interview that discussion of nuclear weapons was &#8220;unavoidable.&#8221;</p><p>We&#8217;re potentially entering a world where we have multiple additional nuclear-armed states. I don&#8217;t think the Trump administration is really thinking about that right now, and they&#8217;re basically accelerating that discussion.</p><p><strong>Ian [17:28]</strong></p><p>Yes, I think that&#8217;s absolutely right.</p><p>Again, the idea of nuclear nonproliferation was predicated on a world order in which, in the past, the Soviet Union, the United States, and a few other countries monopolized these weapons.</p><p>Other countries didn&#8217;t need them because they were under an umbrella.</p><p>Once they feel that umbrella isn&#8217;t going to save them, they&#8217;re going to want their own bombs. I think that is going to be a big issue&#8212;not only in East Asia. The Poles want a nuclear bomb as well. I think this is going to become an issue.</p><p>And I agree with you: it&#8217;s not necessarily wrong that U.S. allies should begin standing up for themselves.</p><p>After World War II, these countries were impoverished and incapable of doing so. They needed the United States to create what became known as Pax Americana&#8212;the world order based on the United States acting as a kind of policeman for much of the world.</p><p>That dependency was necessary for a while.</p><p>But after a while, dependence becomes a problem.</p><p>You could compare it a little bit to the end of the European empires after World War II. The end of imperialism was greeted by most people as something necessary and desirable. Colonies wanted to be independent. It was humiliating to be colonized by faraway powers, et cetera.</p><p>The question then is: How is independence to be achieved? Can independence be achieved without a great deal of pain? Is there a right time for a country to become independent?</p><p>One of the arguments of colonial empires was always, &#8220;We&#8217;ll give our colonies independence at some point, but they&#8217;re not really ready for it.&#8221;</p><p>Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister in the early 1960s, under whose premiership many colonies in Africa became independent, was once asked by the right-wing American journalist William Buckley whether these countries were ready for it.</p><p>His answer was essentially: Well, no. But if we don&#8217;t give them independence now, they&#8217;ll never be ready for it. The longer we postpone it, the longer it will take them to learn how to be independent nations.</p><p>In some cases, independence perhaps came too soon. In India, for example, the British left rather quickly. Pakistan and India became two states, and independence came at the price of enormous massacres and murders. Hundreds of thousands of people died as a consequence.</p><p>Britain was later accused of leaving too soon&#8212;that it should have stayed longer and made sure this wouldn&#8217;t happen.</p><p>But if they&#8217;d stayed longer, until when?</p><p>Is there an ideal point?</p><p>The way the United States moved out of Afghanistan more recently is a similar story. Joe Biden was accused of leaving too quickly. But the longer you stay, the more difficult it becomes for these dependencies to gain independence.</p><p>You build up a class of people who are dependent on the colonial, imperial, or dominant power, and who make money out of it. It creates a new elite&#8212;exactly the kind of elite in South Korea that, to this day, is accused of having been collaborationist.</p><p>So these dependencies have to end at some point.</p><p>The question is: How do you do it without creating mayhem?</p><p>More independence from the United States is desirable, both in East Asia and Europe. But the way Donald Trump is shaking up the world creates enormous dangers.</p><p>One of them is very practical and concrete.</p><p>Having started a very foolish and reckless war in Iran, thinking that he could simply do this in five minutes, he has depleted American arms. The aircraft-carrier presence the United States had in the Pacific has been affected by deployments to the Middle East.</p><p>The United States is looking increasingly weak.</p><p>This could become an incentive for China or North Korea to try something reckless. It could make the Chinese bolder about taking over Taiwan in one way or another. They might feel that this is their opportunity: America is weak; Trump is not interested in defending his allies.</p><p>It could have all kinds of consequences like that.</p><p>So yes, it is desirable for allies that are now rich enough to start standing on their own feet without the United States.</p><p>But everything depends on how it&#8217;s done.</p><p><strong>Chang [22:23]</strong></p><p>We should definitely emphasize that.</p><p>Right now, because of the war in Iran, there has been a significant depletion of U.S. military stockpiles, especially long-range missiles. I think there&#8217;s been something like a 50 percent depletion in some categories of long-range missiles, which is quite significant.</p><p>It&#8217;s going to take years for the United States to build that back up.</p><p>There&#8217;s an argument in the security world that, if China has been deterred from invading Taiwan primarily because of American military might, then over the next year, two years, or three years, we may find out whether that really was the determining factor.</p><p>There are, of course, domestic considerations in China. Xi Jinping has been purging the military and its leadership quite significantly.</p><p>But there is a theory of the case in which China&#8217;s prudence about invading Taiwan has been based mainly on the American military presence.</p><p>As you said, a U.S. carrier had to be shifted because of the war in Iran. That effectively means a carrier is missing from East Asia.</p><p>That should make East Asians very nervous about what happens going forward.</p><p>One thing I wanted to ask you about, Ian, regarding your analogy to the colonial era: my understanding was that you were also talking about the possibility that the process of becoming independent can produce a lot of domestic disarray, and about whether nations are ready for that process.</p><p>That got me thinking about whether a withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from East Asia would change the domestic politics of Japan&#8212;whether it would empower the right, and maybe radicalize the left.</p><p>Japan has a history of political violence and assassinations.</p><p>Could this kind of dynamic have an effect on domestic politics? How do you imagine that might happen?</p><p><strong>Ian [24:18]</strong></p><p>I think that&#8217;s a very good question. This is speculation, of course.</p><p>First of all, there is a great temptation&#8212;even though the Japanese, Koreans, Europeans, and so on realize perfectly well that, in the long run, they have to become more independent from the United States&#8212;to kick the can down the road, as they say.</p><p>Right now, probably many people in Tokyo, and possibly Seoul, are thinking the same thing as many Europeans and Ukrainians: Well, Trump is going to be in power for another two years. Let&#8217;s try to wait this out and hope for a more moderate U.S. president in two years&#8217; time, so that somehow the status quo ante can be restored.</p><p>I think that&#8217;s a fatal temptation.</p><p>As you pointed out, it is desirable for these countries to start thinking about standing on their own feet more independently of the United States.</p><p>But I think what they&#8217;re hoping is that things will stabilize again and they won&#8217;t have to worry about this so much, because it is a worry.</p><p>And one of the worries is exactly what you&#8217;re talking about.</p><p>If the Japanese start to panic and think this is becoming an existential issue, and that China is a huge danger to the nation&#8212;possibly exaggerated, but such panics do occur&#8212;that could lead to more right-wing, more authoritarian politics.</p><p>There are voices on the right in Japan that hint at what might happen: much stricter laws, perhaps restrictions on free speech, tougher sanctions on dissidents, and that kind of thing.</p><p>And that could lead, in turn, to a backlash from the left and potentially to violence.</p><p>This is very possible.</p><p>A nuclear arms race in East Asia and elsewhere that runs out of control is obviously very undesirable, too.</p><p>It will have an impact on domestic politics.</p><p>In some ways, the relative stability and calm&#8212;perhaps too much calm&#8212;of Japanese politics since World War II has rested on this arrangement. Japan has basically had one conservative party in power most of the time, with very little political turbulence.</p><p>Again, perhaps too little. Politics should have been livelier. There should have been changes of government and different parties that were equally viable as governing parties.</p><p>But that stability was largely possible because of Pax Americana. Because the United States was there to take care of Japanese security, the Japanese could concentrate on building up their industries, their economic wealth, and so on.</p><p>That stability would be in great danger, I think, once Pax Americana crumbles.</p><p>In South Korea this is perhaps less dangerous, because since the disappearance&#8212;or toppling&#8212;of the military regime in the 1980s, in some ways South Korea has had a better-functioning and livelier democracy than Japan.</p><p><strong>Chang [27:23]</strong></p><p>So, to catch people up on the current state of Japan&#8217;s military readiness: we did an episode last year about the relationship between Japan and China becoming strained after Takaichi said, during what was essentially a budget hearing, that an attack on Taiwan could constitute an &#8220;existential threat&#8221; to Japan.</p><p>She used a specific legal term that could potentially trigger Japan&#8217;s ability to come to Taiwan&#8217;s defense militarily.</p><p>That tension has not subsided. This kind of winter chill between Japan and China is continuing.</p><p>And what she was saying in that hearing fed directly into the increase in the Japanese military budget.</p><p>Japan&#8217;s defense budget was effectively stuck around 1 percent of GDP until 2022. Since then, it has been moving toward 2 percent.</p><p>And the biggest shift potentially coming up is in the spring of next year, when Takaichi has said she would like to have the prospect of formally initiating a constitutional amendment in sight by the spring.</p><p>She still has to convince roughly ten more people in the upper house. She has a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house, but she does not have a supermajority in the upper house, which is required to pass a constitutional revision before it can then go to the public in a referendum.</p><p>There have already been protests this year. There was a major protest over the summer. Tens of thousands of people across multiple cities in Japan came out around Constitution Memorial Day to support maintaining Article 9.</p><p>From your experience in Japan, where do you think the public is on this?</p><p>Do you think there&#8217;s a chance the public is ready to revise Article 9? And is that going to radicalize half of the public?</p><p><strong>Ian [29:28]</strong></p><p>I don&#8217;t know about half the public.</p><p>From the polls I&#8217;ve been reading, the people who have the biggest problem with revising it tend to be older people who grew up in the pacifist postwar world.</p><p>They were comfortable with it because they had had more than enough of war, being bullied by the military, Japanese military adventures, and so on.</p><p>So they were perfectly happy with it, and even felt slightly morally superior to other countries.</p><p>You still see that tone a little bit in the <em>Asahi Shimbun</em>, the liberal <em>Asahi Shimbun</em>, where editorials are constantly saying: We are the only country that has been atom-bombed, so it is our duty to show the world the way to peace, and so on and so forth.</p><p>Many people in the older generation feel that way, for very understandable reasons.</p><p>The last thing they want is for Japan to become involved in another war. They feel that the constitution, and Article 9, protects them against that.</p><p>But again, that&#8217;s predicated on the United States defending them in the event of war.</p><p>The people who are beginning to realize that this is not a lasting solution&#8212;that simply calling for peace and saying Japan has a moral role to be the great peacemaker is not sufficient&#8212;tend to be younger.</p><p>So I think eventually the constitution will be revised, probably with the support of a majority in Japan.</p><p><strong>Chang [30:58]</strong></p><p>Right. And by the way, I can also confirm from the photos of the protests that the average age was definitely on the higher side.</p><p><strong>Ian [31:06]</strong></p><p>Again, history still haunts all of this.</p><p>Just as it haunts the South Koreans&#8212;the history of collaboration, the history of Japanese brutality, and so on&#8212;which still stands in the way of healthy relations with their neighbor, history also haunts Japanese politics.</p><p>Because it&#8217;s one thing for the Liberal Democrats, the conservatives, to say: We need to change the constitution because it&#8217;s no longer viable. We need to be able to defend ourselves better.</p><p>It&#8217;s another thing to say: This is necessary because we&#8217;ve been beating ourselves up far too much about what we did in the past. By the way, it wasn&#8217;t all that bad. We just behaved like any other great power. There&#8217;s nothing the Japanese did during the colonial period or World War II that was any different from what anybody else did. It&#8217;s just leftists making us feel ashamed of being Japanese.</p><p>As long as conservative politicians use that argument to revise the constitution, there will be opposition&#8212;not only from the Japanese left, but from countries like South Korea, too.</p><p>So when South Koreans say, &#8220;We understand that it is necessary to cooperate more closely with Japan, but we also want Japan to apologize,&#8221; that history is part of the equation.</p><p>Now, in my view, Japan has actually apologized quite a bit under various Japanese governments. The demand for constant apology is perhaps overdone, and in some ways it is weaponized.</p><p>But that won&#8217;t go away as long as conservative politicians in Japan use history as part of the argument for revising the constitution, and say that Japan really has nothing to be ashamed of and no reason to apologize&#8212;and therefore Article 9 is obsolete.</p><p>That should not be the argument.</p><p>What should happen is that you have a responsible Japanese government that argues for a revision of the constitution while also being prepared to acknowledge what went seriously wrong in the past.</p><p><strong>Chang [33:16]</strong></p><p>We&#8217;re having a collision of realpolitik and history, and we&#8217;ll have to see which one wins out.</p><p><strong>Ian [33:21]</strong></p><p>That&#8217;s right.</p><p><strong>Chang [33:23]</strong></p><p>Great. Thank you again.</p><p><strong>Ian [33:25]</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p>Thanks for reading Recent Works by Chang Che! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.armament to the political consequences of a less dependable United States.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The China Model, ten years on]]></title><description><![CDATA[Things we discussed:]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-china-model-ten-years-on-2ca</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-china-model-ten-years-on-2ca</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980737/4fc3cf61d1fd3cf32d45a7b33151e20a.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p>Things we discussed:</p><ul><li><p><strong>00:00</strong> &#8212; Introduction</p></li><li><p><strong>00:53</strong> &#8212; How Bell&#8217;s training in Western communitarianism led to Confucianism</p></li><li><p><strong>10:42</strong> &#8212; Does Xi&#8217;s fixation on loyalty and the cult of personality undermine Bell&#8217;s political meritocracy?</p></li><li><p><strong>19:28</strong> &#8212; Inside the Chinese bureaucracy: five years as the first foreign dean of a political science faculty in mainland China</p></li><li><p><strong>24:00</strong> &#8212; What Party Secretaries actually do all day</p></li><li><p><strong>26:12</strong> &#8212; The return of Communist education and the increase in censorship on academics</p></li><li><p><strong>38:25</strong> &#8212; Why the Legalists, not Marx, helps you understand Xi&#8217;s reform of the bureaucracy</p></li><li><p><strong>47:49</strong> &#8212; The Legalist roots of Xi&#8217;s obsession with &#8220;eating bitterness&#8221;</p></li></ul><p><strong>Full Transcript:</strong></p><p><strong>Chang Che (00:00):</strong> Hello everyone, and welcome to Into Asia. My name is Chang Che, and with me today is Daniel Bell. Daniel Bell is a professor of political theory at the University of Hong Kong, and he is the recent author of <em>Why Ancient Chinese Political Thought Matters: Four Dialogues on China&#8217;s Past, Present, and Future</em>. Daniel, welcome to Into Asia.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (00:24):</strong> Thanks. I very much look forward to our conversation.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (00:27):</strong> So you are very well known in the political theory world, which is where I came from. For listeners who don&#8217;t know, I graduated from a master&#8217;s at Oxford University, where Daniel was also a student. He completed his DPhil, I believe, under David Miller.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (00:43):</strong> Yes, under David Miller &#8212; in 1991 I completed it.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (00:46):</strong> I completed it a little bit after Daniel.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (00:49):</strong> Were you born? I&#8217;m not sure if you were born then. But anyway.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (00:53):</strong> But the reason why I mention this is because at the time, you were well known as an author, writer, and thinker of communitarianism, which is a sort of rejection of the current at the time, which was predominantly Rawlsian &#8212; the liberalism under John Rawls. There were many criticisms, but one of them was a kind of universalist assumption that liberal principles should or could apply to other societies. And I&#8217;m wondering whether your communitarianism ultimately informed some of the work that you would later go on to produce, such as the book on the China model.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (01:31):</strong> Yeah &#8212; at the time I didn&#8217;t know, but if I want to do some sort of rational reconstruction of the past, I would say something like this. As you say, communitarianism has different strands, and one strand is that it&#8217;s a critique of the liberal view of the self, arguing that liberals tend to have an overly individualistic view of the self. And allegedly, they neglect the fact that we are communal creatures &#8212; a bit like lions, who live in packs, rather than tigers, who live individually &#8212; and also that the good life lies in nurturing the communities that give meaning to our lives. And we thought that by developing that view, we could literally overthrow the whole liberal theory that underpins much of the Western way of life. That&#8217;s part of it. The other part, as you say, is that we also argued that this liberal view, to the extent that it&#8217;s predominant, is only there in Western cultures, and not so important outside of that context.</p><p>So the first part &#8212; basically, as you suggest, I was a defender of this communitarian view at the time. But I guess I realized I was an unsuccessful revolutionary, because the liberals, I think, responded to the communitarian criticisms quite well. So basically the communitarian debate died out. But then my first job was in Singapore, from 1991 to 1994. And at the time there was this debate about Asian values &#8212; and the term &#8220;Asian values&#8221; is so broad. What do Asian countries really have so much in common that differentiates them from the West? But when the debate became more focused on Confucianism, I thought, this is really fascinating, because we have some of the same themes that we have in the communitarian debate &#8212; the idea, for example, that the good life lies in nurturing our social relations. But it actually has a much deeper and richer tradition. It&#8217;s not just an offshoot of liberalism, so to speak &#8212; it&#8217;s very much its own tradition, with diverse views and perspectives. And there are some issues that Confucians argue about that are really not prioritized in debates in Western political theory: like the importance of ritual for securing a sense of community, or the importance of harmony in social and political life, or this idea of political meritocracy &#8212; that the most important task of politics is to select and train public officials with above-average ability and virtue.</p><p>So basically, I was pushed in that direction as a result of discovering this rich and diverse Confucian tradition that has so much to offer, both for political theory in general, but also for understanding this part of the world in particular &#8212; like China, where Confucianism is a dominant political tradition, or at least has been until recently.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (04:19):</strong> This is something that I want to tease out with you in this interview. On the one hand, there&#8217;s a kind of language that the Confucians discuss, as you say &#8212; like ritual, and the role of ritual in maintaining harmony. I could see how that is a really refreshing thing to look at coming out of the Western tradition, having battled liberals for so long. But then I also feel that it&#8217;s a different thing, right, to talk about what Confucianism implies for contemporary governance and modern states. And I think the Asian values debate was certainly about the latter, whereas what you were trying to refer to was more of the former &#8212; it was sort of opening a door to a new intellectual inquiry.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (04:58):</strong> Yeah, exactly. When I studied Confucianism at first, it was a purely intellectual exercise. I didn&#8217;t relate it to the political realities of East Asian countries, even though I knew it was part of the intellectual heritage. But it&#8217;s only when I moved to China, and especially to Beijing, that I began to realize these ideas are very much live and part of the political discourse. Because I was a professor at Tsinghua University, which trains many of China&#8217;s political elites. My colleagues were all arguing about what is the best way of selecting public officials with superior ability and virtue &#8212; in Chinese it&#8217;s <em>xianneng zhengzhi</em> [&#36132;&#33021;&#25919;&#27835;], which is very much this mainstream Confucian ideal. And then: which virtues matter for rulers, which abilities matter, what&#8217;s the relation between virtues and abilities, how do you assess virtue, how do you assess ability? All these issues &#8212; as someone brought up in Canada, this was just not something that we talked about, either in everyday life or in political theory.</p><p>Then I realized: where does this come from? It doesn&#8217;t come from the Marxist tradition. It doesn&#8217;t come, at least much, from the liberal tradition either. If you want to look into Western political theory, the closest would be Plato&#8217;s <em>Republic</em>, which is a long work that also lays out a long educational process for how to select public officials &#8212; or, as he called them, guardians &#8212; with superior ability and virtue. But when I was in Beijing, these Confucian texts were used both to understand the political system and to think about how to improve it. And I became quite fascinated. And that&#8217;s why eventually I wrote this book, <em>The China Model</em>, which was an effort to make sense of these ideas and put them in a relatively systematic way. What exactly is political meritocracy? What are its advantages, what are its disadvantages, and how to combine it with democracy? That came straight from my experience living and working in Beijing. I would never have written it had I stayed in Canada, or even Singapore &#8212; even Hong Kong, frankly. In Hong Kong at the time, the debates were all about how we could move towards one person, one vote, which they call democracy.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (07:13):</strong> So you mentioned <em>The China Model</em>. This is your most famous book. I&#8217;m wondering whether you could talk to us about the debates with your Western interlocutors that animated it. Because it&#8217;s coming at a time of deep anxiety in the West, right? This idea of the rise of China, and this feeling that this system &#8212; a little bit opaque and difficult to understand &#8212; was now potentially going to catch up to the West. It was a really important chapter for understanding where we are today. So can you give us a little bit more background?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (07:42):</strong> Thanks. I&#8217;m critical of the view that there are two kinds of political systems. One is a kind of democracy, where leaders are selected by means of one person, one vote &#8212; competitive elections, free and fair elections. And the others are all labeled authoritarian, and they&#8217;re all put in the same camp. So you have family-run dictatorships in North Korea, you have military dictatorships in Myanmar, you have hereditary monarchies like in Saudi Arabia &#8212; and you have China. And they&#8217;re all lumped into the same category. And it&#8217;s both a descriptive category, but it&#8217;s also a normative one: they&#8217;re fundamentally illegitimate, because we &#8212; meaning we brought up in the West &#8212; tend to think there&#8217;s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders, and that&#8217;s by means of one person, one vote.</p><p>Now, I thought: hold on a second here. That doesn&#8217;t quite fit the reality in China &#8212; what we can call the China model &#8212; where there&#8217;s a very complex bureaucracy which aims to select and promote leaders over decades of training. Those leaders are supposed to have above-average ability and virtue, and there&#8217;s this huge Department of Organization &#8212; the <em>Zuzhibu</em> [&#32452;&#32455;&#37096;] in Chinese &#8212; which is like the largest human resources department, at least in the political world, which really aims to select and promote those leaders. So then I decided: let&#8217;s just try to make sense of this ideal and what it would mean, and then use that as a critical perspective for evaluating the reality in China, and to think about how the Chinese political system can be improved on the basis of its own guiding political ideals &#8212; namely, this ideal of political meritocracy.</p><p>But the book itself argues for a kind of differentiated form of politics. And again, I got this from China &#8212; because when I asked questions, including, frankly, to leaders &#8212; and at that time, I was lucky enough to meet the head of the Department of Organization. And I said, what&#8217;s the right way of choosing leaders? And immediately the response: it depends what level you&#8217;re talking about, right? The right way of selecting leaders in villages is not the right way of selecting leaders at the higher levels of government. At lower levels, you can have more democratic practices, because the farmers especially know who&#8217;s a good person, who&#8217;s corrupt, who&#8217;s not corrupt, and the issues are not so complex. And then at higher levels, we want leaders who can take a more long-term perspective, who have a lot of education and training and political experience. Whereas in the middle, we don&#8217;t quite know what&#8217;s the right way, so we allow for lots of experimentation. And that really &#8212; maybe I shouldn&#8217;t admit this, but it&#8217;s rare, as a theorist, as an academic, that you get great ideas from politicians. But really, I thought this put things in perspective. That&#8217;s why I decided to develop that. And as you say, I think it hit maybe at the right time, because in 2016 Donald Trump was elected &#8212; and he&#8217;s been reelected recently. And that cast a lot of doubt on this idea that in the West there&#8217;s only one legitimate form of government, and that&#8217;s electoral democracy.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (10:42):</strong> One thing that I think has really aged well from 2014 to now is that China has its own ideal. I don&#8217;t think anybody would contest the idea that China is not just an authoritarian dictatorship, but also one that is functioning quite well in certain respects &#8212; primarily, I think, the recognition that the Chinese are doing something right that the Americans aren&#8217;t in certain technological sectors. Why China has the ability to dominate in electric vehicles and solar panels &#8212; all these technologies of the future. And this sense that the American system is somehow losing out. That, I think, very much speaks to what you&#8217;re saying about this bureaucracy that is incentivized to experiment and innovate. So your book has really aged well in that respect.</p><p>I think what hasn&#8217;t aged well &#8212; if I were to offer my critique of the book &#8212; is that it doesn&#8217;t seem like, in the past ten years, the government is actually moving towards the kind of political meritocracy that you have set out as their ideal. In fact, if I were to put it strongly, I&#8217;d argue that Xi Jinping is actually the greatest repudiation of the Daniel Bell China model. Because rather than meritocracy, he has emphasized personal loyalty. There is a kind of reintroduction of the personality cult in Chinese life &#8212; you see this man everywhere. I&#8217;m not sure whether we could say that there&#8217;s any sort of meritocratic reason for this. And one thing that struck me about your book is that the Communist Party plays a kind of background role in it. It&#8217;s not clear to me that it even needs to exist in the Daniel Bell version of the China model. Whereas what&#8217;s been clear in the past ten years is that the party is like the most important thing about the Chinese system for Xi Jinping &#8212; the survival of the Communist Party, the role that party secretaries play; the power of party secretaries has increased across the government. And just the focus on ideology. Whereas in your book, it felt as though the Communist Party was almost superfluous to some kind of core meritocratic ideal &#8212; it&#8217;s actually the meritocracy that is superfluous to Xi Jinping, and the real core is the Communist Party.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (13:11):</strong> I think there&#8217;s a lot of truth to what you&#8217;re saying, but I do need to push back a little bit. So, the Communist Party &#8212; in the book <em>The China Model</em>, the word &#8220;party&#8221; is kind of misleading in English, because we tend to think of one party among others. But if you think of it as a giant, bureaucratic, and quite diverse organization which aims to select and promote public officials with above-average ability and virtue, then it&#8217;s a necessary part of what I called this China model. And what has changed over the past ten years, as you suggest &#8212; it&#8217;s always been the core of the political system, but it has infiltrated more, perhaps, into everyday life. It&#8217;s become more centralized than it used to be, and there&#8217;s less experimentation at mid-levels of government than there used to be. Because remember, part of this China model, or what makes it desirable, is that at mid-levels of government, you had bureaucrats who were rewarded partly according to their ability, in uncertain situations, to take risks and to do something new. But what has really changed is the intensity of the anti-corruption campaign, which makes public officials so risk-averse and so conservative and so reluctant to experiment. I think that really poses a huge danger to the success of the Chinese political system and its meritocratic aspects.</p><p>At the very top &#8212; I&#8217;m not so inclined to say it&#8217;s like one person who&#8217;s changed everything. I think when Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, there were some issues that would have had to be prioritized regardless of who was in power. Corruption was completely out of hand. In a meritocracy, the leaders are selected partly according to virtue, and virtue means you&#8217;re committed, at least partly, to serving the public. If you&#8217;re misusing public funds for yourself or your family interests &#8212; that is, if you&#8217;re corrupt &#8212; then it fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of the whole system. That&#8217;s one reason why corruption had to be attacked so ferociously. But arguably it&#8217;s gone on too far. Another is environmental disasters &#8212; at the time, you remember, in cities like Beijing, the pollution was so horrible. Something had to be done to promote more environmental sustainability. Another thing is reducing the gap between rich and poor. So all those things would have had to be done regardless of who was in power.</p><p>The aspect of what you call the personality cult &#8212; again, that&#8217;s not really, as you suggest, a necessary part of a political meritocracy. In fact, if you look at Chinese history, most of the Chinese emperors have been quite &#8212; staying in the background. It&#8217;s more in ancient Rome, for example, that you had those sorts of personality cults. So that&#8217;s a little bit of a, let&#8217;s just say, odd kind of addition to Chinese history &#8212; or you can argue maybe that&#8217;s more Maoist in inspiration than meritocratic.</p><p>In other words, I wouldn&#8217;t agree with what you said earlier &#8212; that political meritocracy as an ideal could operate without any sort of communist-style political organization. I do think there&#8217;s a need for a very complex and huge bureaucratic organization, whatever we&#8217;re going to call it, for political meritocracy to be operationalized.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (16:24):</strong> I think the difference between the way that you see China today and maybe the way that I see China has to do with what will be defined by meritocracy. Because when I think about this idea of meritocracy, I think of objective, impersonal standards or metrics, right? Testing, KPIs, how much business you bring into your particular locality &#8212; things that you can actually measure. Whereas I feel like when Xi Jinping talks about corrupt officials, maybe there&#8217;s a little bit of that, but I think what he&#8217;s trying to say is: you&#8217;re not red enough. You don&#8217;t believe in the redness of the Communist Party. You don&#8217;t believe in the Communist Party being the one who stood up China against the Western powers, and that the only way for China to survive into the 21st century is for the Communist Party to be reaffirmed by the whole of society &#8212; that society should support communism, rather than a Confucian, meritocratic standard. It&#8217;s the redness that I feel has been brought back to Chinese society over the past ten years. Whereas I think earlier leaders, like Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, were trying to pursue what you suggested &#8212; this idea of meritocracy in the more impersonal metric. An example of this is separating the party system from the government, right? Separating civil servants from the party.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (18:02):</strong> In <em>The China Model</em>, I have a chapter where I describe the key qualities of public officials in a meritocratic system. One is you have high IQ, because at higher levels of government, the issues are so complex &#8212; you have to have high-level analytical ability. Two, you have emotional intelligence, which is much harder to measure, because most of your time as a public figure, you don&#8217;t spend in your office reading books &#8212; you engage with other people, you have to persuade people with different perspectives and different views, and you have to have very good social skills. And three is virtue: at some level, you have to be committed to serving the public. And four &#8212; I think this is something that I learned more working within the system myself &#8212; is hard work. None of it works without hard work.</p><p>So, what you said about the redness &#8212; it depends what we mean by that, right? If redness means that what matters more is to have a strong political party, that&#8217;s not the Confucian view. The Confucian view is that the ultimate point of politics is to benefit the people, to serve the people. It&#8217;s more of a legalist idea &#8212; <em>fajia</em> [&#27861;&#23478;] in Chinese, which I explore in my new book as well: this idea that the main point of politics is to have a strong state that could be victorious in war and withstand attacks from outsiders. I think you may be referring more to this legalist strain rather than this Confucian strain.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (19:28):</strong> That&#8217;s the question that I hope we can get into more, which is to what extent legalism and Confucianism can explain contemporary China, as opposed to, say, a kind of return to Maoism. But before we get there: you left Tsinghua at some point to take up a deanship at Shandong University, and this made you the first foreign dean of a political science department in China. Is that correct?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (19:55):</strong> Yeah &#8212; maybe I overstated that. There may have been some ethnic Chinese with foreign passports who served as deans. I&#8217;m not sure.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (20:03):</strong> Right. So the first foreign dean with a white face. That must have been an experience. So what was that like?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (20:12):</strong> There&#8217;s a bit of background to that. I had written this theoretical work on political meritocracy. I knew some public officials, but I hadn&#8217;t really understood the system from the inside, and then I thought: what a great opportunity this would be. It was a new campus in Qingdao, which is a beautiful city in Shandong province. And the party secretary who invited me to serve as dean was a descendant of Confucius &#8212; of Kongzi in Chinese &#8212; and his surname was Kong. Even though he&#8217;s a party secretary, he never once mentioned &#8220;you have to promote Marxism.&#8221; He said: there are two things I hope you can do. One is to promote more of these Confucian values, and two is to help us internationalize. That&#8217;s one reason why I accepted this job &#8212; also, to learn more about the political system from the inside. And so I served as dean for five years and left in 2022.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (21:03):</strong> One thing that you had mentioned about your experience that I&#8217;m really curious about is whether it confirmed what you had already been arguing in your career &#8212; that there&#8217;s a difference between China and North Korea. One thing that the Chinese have really spent a lot of time thinking about, in contemporary times and in ancient times, is how you pick and select good bureaucrats. Did your experience confirm that or not?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (21:28):</strong> At the mid-levels of government, almost everybody I meet is super talented and super hardworking. It&#8217;s the hardworking part that I discovered and that I didn&#8217;t address in <em>The China Model</em>. It&#8217;s only when I went back and read some historical accounts of public officials throughout imperial Chinese history that I realized what really makes them successful, among these other traits I mentioned, is this capacity to work hard. As dean, I was on call all the time, for five years &#8212; literally, if I didn&#8217;t respond to a work-related WeChat message, seven days a week, 365 days a year, within like half an hour, people would start panicking. And it&#8217;s not just me. These public officials work incredibly hard. We can ask whether they&#8217;re doing the right kind of work, but just in terms of this ability to work hard, to be successful &#8212; I think that&#8217;s so important. After a few years, I realized I didn&#8217;t have the level of energy that it takes to be a really successful public official in China. And I think that probably differentiates the Chinese political system from other political systems. You can&#8217;t slack off. You have to be always committed to work, and ultimately to serving the public. And at least at the mid-level of the bureaucracy, most of the public officials that I encountered &#8212; I have great respect for them, including during COVID times, when they were even more hardworking than usual. Again &#8212; certainly towards the end, I don&#8217;t think it was for a good cause, because in the last year, the zero-COVID policy made no sense, and people were working so hard to implement a policy that made no sense. So I&#8217;m not saying that hard work itself is sufficient.</p><p>I also learned about the importance of collective leadership, which we read about. That&#8217;s why I&#8217;m a bit resistant to this idea that it&#8217;s Xi Jinping decides this and decides that &#8212; as though he decides everything on his own. Theoretically, I was dean, but all the decisions had to be made by means of this collective leadership, where we had meetings with four vice deans and three party secretaries. And we had to argue from different perspectives. And in these closed meetings, we really did argue in a very open way. But once we made a decision, there was a consensus, and we implemented it throughout the university. And I strongly suspect that happens at different levels of government, including, to a certain extent, at higher levels of government. Just try to think: how many things has President Xi said that are really odd or strange, or where a different leader would have said something different? I&#8217;m not sure about that. There&#8217;s a very strong machine in place, a very powerful bureaucracy, and whoever occupies different posts, at the end of the day, it doesn&#8217;t really make that much difference. That&#8217;s what&#8217;s really key to the Chinese political system, I think.</p><p>Another aspect is, again, the party secretary &#8212; it sounds almost sinister in English, where their main task is to enforce political indoctrination. It&#8217;s part of what they do, but at the mid-levels of the bureaucracy, it&#8217;s literally a tiny part of what they do. Most of what they do &#8212; like in the case of this party secretary who hired me: he built the whole campus from scratch, and he spent most of his time persuading people, including members of the Qingdao government, for funds to build this beautiful new campus &#8212; and how to build it, which buildings, who should be the architects, what kind of university campus we&#8217;re going to have. And those who work at the lower levels, including, for example, in the faculty &#8212; they would spend most of their time dealing with social issues: teachers who are complaining about their housing, or students who do bad things, like smoking drugs or whatever. That&#8217;s the sort of thing they would deal with most of the time. That&#8217;s why, in the book that I wrote about my experience as Dean of Shandong, I have a chapter called &#8220;The Harmony Secretary,&#8221; which is only a little bit tongue-in-cheek. I think if you want a term that accounts for most of what these mid-level party secretaries do, that makes much more sense: they spend most of their time trying to secure harmony in whatever organization they&#8217;re part of, and only a little bit of their time on political indoctrination.</p><p>Another part of the experience that you asked about &#8212; one of the not-so-positive parts of my experience &#8212; and this goes back to, if I were to be quite critical of the developments over the past ten years: it hasn&#8217;t been good for intellectuals, or we can call them the creative class, whether it&#8217;s academics or artists or journalists, or even entrepreneurs. We have faced greater and greater constraints. And that part hasn&#8217;t been a positive part of my experience.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (26:12):</strong> Can you give an example?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (26:14):</strong> I was dean of this faculty of political science. Before I assumed my post, you had many academics working on issues like social protests at local levels. You could do great work on that &#8212; you could do hands-on interviews and write about it in publications, both in English and Chinese. Now, forget about it. You can&#8217;t do that anymore. There are some areas where you can do good work, like on environmental issues or international organizations, but people have had to change their research interests, because the space that allowed for independent scholarship &#8212; not to mention social criticism &#8212; has really narrowed of late. And I think it does come from different factors. One is the very top, where current leaders in power have gone through the Cultural Revolution, which made them so paranoid and looking out for enemies. And that empowers a kind of security apparatus, rather than the more reform-minded parts of the Chinese political system.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (27:14):</strong> That seems to be the role of the party secretary, right? He&#8217;s supposed to impart those kinds of changes.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (27:21):</strong> It doesn&#8217;t mean that they like doing it. And it&#8217;s something that almost everybody under, like, 60 &#8212; whether they&#8217;re party secretaries, or whether they&#8217;re liberals or socialists or Confucians &#8212; we want to have freedom to express our views. And we are committed to serving the public, but we also want to criticize things that go wrong. And the space for that has been drastically narrowed, which is really, I think, a huge problem.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (27:46):</strong> So one difference that I observed throughout my time in Shanghai &#8212; and this became extremely apparent during the Shanghai lockdowns in 2022 &#8212; is that public officials are always more accountable to their superiors than they are to those who they are managing. So when there is an order that is sent from, say, the Shanghai government, or the center, the whole system falls in line, regardless of any kind of reaction or uproar from the citizenry &#8212; the party has to follow the orders from the top. The difference in the United States is that it&#8217;s actually kind of the opposite. The question is: are you accountable to the people that you rule, who are below you, or accountable to the superiors above you?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (28:29):</strong> No, I agree. In terms of national emergency, or social chaos, or warfare &#8212; that&#8217;s when we would expect the top level of the political system to make a decision, and others are supposed to almost blindly enforce it, without too many questions. And that&#8217;s what happened in the days of COVID. It worked more or less the first two years, because the policies were more or less correct &#8212; and also because, in some indirect way, they were accountable to the people. But when it made no sense in 2022 &#8212; these harsh and very cruel policies, and you faced even worse in Shanghai than other parts of China &#8212; the people were totally against it, and then things changed almost overnight. So in some indirect sense, I think there&#8217;s some form of accountability. I wish it had come much sooner. And I wish especially that scientists in China had had more possibility to express their views. Because in the very early days of COVID, things went wrong because some of the scientists were shut down. And also in 2022 &#8212; I knew some scientists, as did you, and they were totally against the policies, but they couldn&#8217;t express it publicly. What a disaster that was. So there&#8217;s definitely a need for more freedom of speech to correct mistaken policies in the political system.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (29:47):</strong> So you have this kind of self-deprecating joke that you were almost like a symbolic leader. This is a quote: &#8220;Deep in my heart, however, I knew that a more accurate description of my role would be not responsible for any administration of the faculty, only responsible for symbolic leadership.&#8221; What are you saying here? Are you saying that, in fact, your role was more ceremonial, and that the real power lay in the party secretary?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (30:11):</strong> So the real power lay in whatever decision emanated from the collective leadership. And I had a say, but not much say. But then I realized &#8212; symbolic leadership &#8212; let&#8217;s not cast that in such a negative light. It&#8217;s still very meaningful, because you need people to generate a sense of community. For example, at Shandong University, you have these graduation rituals. As a symbolic leader, I had to give speeches and give certificates to students. So then I realized: maybe an even more ideal political system would be one that more clearly separates between a symbolic leader, who has the task of providing a sense of community and maybe intergenerational solidarity, and one where you have real meritocratic leaders who do the hard work.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (30:59):</strong> Can you just elaborate on what you mean by the collective leadership? Who is the one holding the administrative power, then, at Shandong University?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (31:05):</strong> So there&#8217;s no one person. When it comes to deciding how much money you get from the city government to fund a new building on campus, then this top-level party secretary for the whole campus would have the most power. But when it comes to faculty decision-making, there we had myself, four vice deans, and three party secretaries, arguing about who gets a scholarship, how should we change our curriculum &#8212; and these sorts of issues were decided in these collective leadership meetings.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (31:41):</strong> You do have a chapter in your Dean of Shandong book called &#8220;The Communist Comeback&#8221; &#8212; the emphasis on Marxist studies and a sort of cultural shift in prioritizing Marxism. Would you maybe summarize a little bit of what you were saying there?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (31:56):</strong> So in the 1980s and 90s, until, let&#8217;s say, ten or twenty years ago, Marxism didn&#8217;t have much of a hold on people&#8217;s value system. People paid lip service. But the idea that Marxism should inspire the way that we think about China&#8217;s political future &#8212; even high-level officials in the Chinese political system would say, off the record: we know we say that, but that&#8217;s not really what we&#8217;re &#8212; you know. But what happened in 2008 was a huge financial crisis, generated by the excesses of capitalism. So many independent intellectuals began to think about the Marxist tradition as a resource for thinking about the excesses of capitalism, and how we could critique capitalism. That&#8217;s one issue. And also this ideal of higher communism, where advanced machinery does the socially necessary work, and then people are free to realize their creative talents &#8212; that seemed crazy until recently. Many intellectuals are becoming excited about that in China, including reformist members of the government. So that&#8217;s what I meant by this communist comeback: it&#8217;s being taken as a serious value system in a way that hadn&#8217;t been true prior to, like, twenty years ago.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (33:09):</strong> The thing that I was reminded of is just the sheer number of new Marxist institutes that have arisen in universities. That was something that I was quite surprised by.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (33:24):</strong> That&#8217;s a concrete manifestation of this communist comeback. But it&#8217;s not always a very good thing, frankly, because it does mean that those who are in those Marxist organizations have to spend a lot more time teaching a very boring political ideology, which the teachers don&#8217;t like and the students don&#8217;t like. That said, I know some people who are officially supposed to be doing Marxism, but then they also teach feminism and Confucianism and other things. But still, they have to spend a lot of time on this really mind-dulling stuff, which is really not what academics are supposed to do, frankly.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (34:01):</strong> It seems to me like, in the past few years, this kind of emphasis on Marxism is going against your theory of the ideal in <em>The China Model</em> &#8212; that in each aspect of society &#8212; you can see it at the university level, at the corporate level &#8212; there&#8217;s been a growth of these party divisions within companies, right? You can see the party inserting itself into all aspects of society, in a way that the West, obviously, will cast as extremely nefarious. The way that I think about it is that it&#8217;s kind of like a rudder that helps steer society. And the party is interested in inserting rudders into different aspects of society, so that they can steer &#8212; within what the leader at the time, in this case Xi Jinping, decides should be the direction of society. If we feel like there&#8217;s an aspect of society that&#8217;s going awry, or moving away from our priorities, we can nudge it in the right direction.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (34:51):</strong> I think that&#8217;s a good metaphor, and I&#8217;m more inclined to your view. But again, I wouldn&#8217;t say that it&#8217;s the leader who decides everything and then people blindly follow. I think it&#8217;s much more than that &#8212; there&#8217;s much more bottom-up: views that inform the political system before decisions are made, and then decisions are made in a more collective way.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (35:09):</strong> Okay, so let&#8217;s talk about ancient political thought, because this is your new book. For listeners who haven&#8217;t picked it up, it&#8217;s a really fascinating look at the way that ancient Chinese philosophers thought, through this modern dialogue format. There are four chapters, and there are debates about contemporary issues. So one has to do with the family, one has to do with corruption, one has to do with invading Taiwan, and another has to do with funding a musical arts house in a village. And what Daniel has done is he&#8217;s pit modern, contemporary channelers of these ancient political theories against each other, to create these really humorous and fascinating debates. So Daniel, my first question is: to a skeptic &#8212; I can imagine a China analyst reading this book and saying, I&#8217;d much rather spend my time reading Mao, Stalin, or Lenin, or Marx, as a way of understanding China &#8212; why should we read the ancients to understand contemporary China?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (36:09):</strong> So the book has two main points. First, for those who are not familiar with these ancient Chinese debates, I want to use the original words of the authors to show that these are fascinating and diverse &#8212; as fascinating and diverse as ancient Greek debates on politics. There are these huge, diverse traditions &#8212; Confucianism, legalism, Mohism, and Taoism &#8212; that were hugely influential, and that continue to be influential throughout history. And, here&#8217;s the part that finally addresses your question: they continue to be influential today. But I&#8217;m not saying that they explain everything in contemporary China. The Marxist idea of historical progress &#8212; that&#8217;s not in any of those traditions, and that&#8217;s important, too, to understand some of the guiding political ideals in China. But on some issues, what they argued about, for example, in the Warring States period &#8212; those issues are timeless, and they set the terms in which those debates are still argued about today.</p><p>As you mentioned: one is about family law. If you want to understand family law in China, and the debates, for example, about filial piety &#8212; whether it should be legally enforced, or whether we should use more indirect means &#8212; Marxism has nothing to say about that. You have to look to Confucianism. Or debates about how to reduce corruption in government &#8212; there are huge resources in this tradition: the legalists saying we need to use, first and foremost, laws and fear to reduce corruption; the Confucians saying no, we have to transform people&#8217;s hearts. That debate is still very much live today, and set in very similar terms as it was argued about 2,000 years ago. Again, you can&#8217;t go to Marxism or liberalism to make sense of those debates. And finally, the debates about just war, between the legalists and the Confucians &#8212; these debates are so important, so rich. Again, as rich as anything you had in ancient Greece.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (38:00):</strong> Just to add on to that &#8212; I think also, quite simply, Xi Jinping and political leaders just reference these thinkers.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (38:07):</strong> Exactly. Even if you want to understand Marxism, the official view now is <em>liangge jiehe</em> [&#20004;&#20010;&#32467;&#21512;], which is sometimes translated as &#8220;the two combines&#8221; or &#8220;the two integrations&#8221; &#8212; which means, and it&#8217;s official, right: we need to combine the Marxist tradition with the best of Chinese culture, with Confucianism at its core.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (38:25):</strong> The other thing that really struck me about reading your book is that if you think of Xi as a kind of reversion to Marx, or if you think of him as moving away from the Deng Xiaoping reform years, there&#8217;s an element of this where I think you&#8217;re actually still missing a lot. One aspect that you&#8217;re missing is the sheer amount of ingenuity, but also ruthlessness, that Xi has brought towards the Chinese bureaucracy &#8212; which is so hard to understand if you don&#8217;t read the legalists. The legalists are the answer to understanding how Xi Jinping &#8212; maybe you will contest me saying the word Xi Jinping &#8212; the current regime, and the approach that they have brought to the bureaucracy. It&#8217;s something that I don&#8217;t really see in Western discourse. Though I think in recent times there&#8217;s been a kind of interesting convergence with intellectuals on the American right &#8212; there are discussions about a managerial elite, or what they call a deep state. Have you ever thought of a more Chinese concept than the deep state?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (39:22):</strong> The legalist idea, as you say, is to have a strong state. And how do you do that? It&#8217;s by having a bureaucratic system that covers most of everyday life, where the bureaucrats are there to implement the decisions of the top. And they&#8217;re not supposed to have any discretion &#8212; they&#8217;re supposed to do exactly what they&#8217;re supposed to do, not more, not less. And if they do more or less, they&#8217;re ruthlessly punished. And to a certain extent, I agree with you &#8212; that&#8217;s coming back in China, which is really not a good sign for China&#8217;s future. There&#8217;s a need for more &#8212; let&#8217;s call them Confucian-oriented &#8212; public officials, who have more discretion to rely on their experience and judgment and wisdom, and even virtue, to make public-spirited decisions, as well as to address new challenges in new and innovative ways. So that&#8217;s a big problem in China &#8212; this reversion towards a more legalist-style bureaucracy.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (40:20):</strong> So to dive a little bit more deeply into the book: the second chapter is a debate between a descendant of the legalist tradition &#8212; Han Feizi, he&#8217;s a kind of representative of the legalist tradition &#8212; versus Xunzi, a Confucian in his morals. And one of the patterns that comes out in this debate, which is really fascinating, is the moral goody-two-shoes, right? The Confucian, who is trying to be a good person, versus the cold, hard, pragmatic realist. That kind of tension plays out throughout all of your debates. What&#8217;s most resonant for journalists like me, who write about contemporary China, is the legalist side. So the person channeling Han Feizi in this debate about corruption is arguing for, effectively, a ruthless approach to anti-corruption &#8212; to punish harshly, to have a set of rules, and, as you say, bureaucrats who slightly stray away from the mandate should be punished harshly. The other thing that&#8217;s really resonant is just the general disdain toward intellectuals. He says something like: intellectuals instill doubt in the law. All of this is justified in the legalist tradition through a kind of cold calculus of maintaining a stable state. And it&#8217;s not a personalistic approach &#8212; which is very Trumpian. There&#8217;s an aspect, from the Western perspective, that these kinds of maneuvers, at least in the past few years, have been mostly because of egotism. But in the Chinese system, there&#8217;s something cold about it that I&#8217;ve always wondered about, and it seems to really jive with the legalist perspective.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (41:58):</strong> Yeah, I think that&#8217;s right. So the dialogue is with Xunzi, who&#8217;s actually less goody-two-shoes than Mencius &#8212; Mengzi, right? He was actually Han Fei&#8217;s teacher, and he was writing in the most violent part of the Warring States period. It was hard for him to be very optimistic about human nature. He thought we have this tendency to badness, but that we can improve through education, through great teachers, and through participating in rituals that generate a sense of harmony. He thought, if you want to reduce corruption &#8212; he&#8217;s not against laws &#8212; but ultimately, to have long-term success, you have to make sure that you transform people&#8217;s hearts and make public officials more public-spirited.</p><p>But even Han Feizi would argue that, at the end of the day, you need to have punishments that work to eliminate punishment. He would have found it strange that we have this anti-corruption drive that is still there ten years later, and seems to be with no end in sight &#8212; and also that it relies on sometimes obscure means, right? Sometimes the public officials just fall into a dark hole &#8212; you never know what happened, or why it happened to them. That doesn&#8217;t sound very legalist either, because they also argued for clear and transparent laws that are easy to understand. So whether it&#8217;s the legalists or the Confucians, I think they would argue that at some point, probably earlier than later, there&#8217;s a need for a transition from these legalist measures to more Confucian-style soft power.</p><p>And one of Xunzi&#8217;s great insights is that, at the time, he predicted that the state of Qin, which went on to unify China &#8212; he said, look, they&#8217;re very militarily powerful; their meritocracy is objective &#8212; you get promoted according to the number of heads of decapitated soldiers, if you&#8217;re a soldier &#8212; and that&#8217;s going to work, but it won&#8217;t work in the long term, because eventually people rebel against cruelty. The dynasty collapsed after 15 years. So that debate &#8212; I tried to show that some aspects of it are still relevant today.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (43:54):</strong> Maybe we should then go a little bit into the push and pull of legalism and Confucianism. So, as you say, Qin Shi Huang was the emperor to unify China under legalist principles; it collapses. And then, when would you say is the high point of Confucianism?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (44:10):</strong> So it was made into an official value system in the Han dynasty, which succeeded the Qin and lasted for about 400 years, more or less. But it was always combined with some legalist means. So the idea is that the ends should be more Confucian &#8212; meaning that the point of government is to benefit the people &#8212; but that we can use some legalist means to help bring about that end. So, the Confucian-legalist state &#8212; to borrow the title of a very good book by Dingxin Zhao, who shows that this was influential throughout Chinese history. More or less, the pattern was set in the Han dynasty. So some of us were hoping that we&#8217;d move more towards this Han dynasty model, as opposed to this seemingly permanent Qin dynasty model. I&#8217;m not sure whether it&#8217;s happening or will happen.</p><p>But I do want to make one point, which is important, because both the legalists and the Confucians agree on the need to limit arbitrary rule by the top ruler. For the legalists, one very important point of having this legal system in place, and a bureaucracy that&#8217;s objective, is that even if you have a mediocre ruler, the system would still work, more or less. And they explicitly argue that the ruler shouldn&#8217;t interfere too much once the machine is in place, so to speak. In imperial China, you had court historians who had to monitor the words and deeds of rulers for posterity. That also served as a check on rulers, because they knew that if they did something really bad, future generations would know about it. And there&#8217;s another institution, called the censorate, where meritocratically selected Confucians had the task of criticizing mistaken policies. They didn&#8217;t usually address the very top, because they knew that was very dangerous, but it did have an important function in limiting abuses of power. So my point here is that if we are to move towards a more Confucian period in Chinese history, there are resources also to think about how to limit abuses by the very top, and personalistic rule.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (46:02):</strong> But Mao Zedong famously was inspired by the legalist philosophers &#8212; notably, he wrote a high school essay about Shang Yang, one of the intellectuals who emerges in the fourth chapter of your book. And I guess he certainly didn&#8217;t see it the way that you described it, right? He basically saw legalism as a way of maximizing state authority.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (46:29):</strong> So it goes back further than Mao, right? You can say the May Fourth student movement was meant to promote science and democracy, and they viewed Confucianism as a kind of feudal ideology that promotes patriarchy and aristocracy. And then the communists, including Mao, latched onto that. And that helps explain this anti-Confucian tradition throughout much of the 20th century, which culminated in the Cultural Revolution, led by Mao, which was an explicit attack on Confucianism. But as you say, he was also inspired by legalism explicitly in his early days &#8212; his first essay, as you say, was dedicated to Shang Yang. And in times of social chaos, that&#8217;s where legalism matters more, right? When do you need a strong state? When you&#8217;re being attacked by foreign states, and when there&#8217;s social chaos at home &#8212; that&#8217;s when you need to focus first and foremost on strengthening the state. It wasn&#8217;t a crazy idea that legalism made more sense in that context. But when it comes to peaceful times, or times of economic development, then legalism doesn&#8217;t have that much to offer. And Mao and others explicitly invoked legalism to justify their anti-Confucian movement, which really made no sense, and led to a tremendous amount of destruction and anti-intellectualism.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (47:49):</strong> The last chapter that I wanted to mention is the invading-Taiwan one. This dialogue reminds me of something that could easily happen in the US context, with a president and a really hawkish foreign policy advocate, like John Bolton. And so the hawkish guy is represented by Shang Yang, the person that we&#8217;ve already mentioned &#8212; Mao favored him, and he was a legalist. He&#8217;s just very much gung-ho about invading Taiwan when the enemy is weak: we have to do this to maintain our superiority and our control over the rest of China. And then we have, again, the moralist &#8212; is this Xunzi?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (48:29):</strong> Mencius &#8212; Mengzi, the descendant.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (48:32):</strong> Mencius comes back, right? Mencius is arguing the other side: why we should exercise restraint. What&#8217;s really interesting about this dialogue is the legalist rationale for trying to create a war-ready population. And you use the term that Xi Jinping has often used, which is &#8220;eat bitterness.&#8221; In other words, the public should not be too engaged in the pleasantries of life, like music and all this, because what it ultimately comes down to is whether or not the society is ready for some kind of battle or collision &#8212; in this case, Taiwan. I was wondering whether you could speak a little bit about this, because it&#8217;s very much something that I&#8217;ve felt is in the zeitgeist in China &#8212; this idea right now that the young are being too lazy, they&#8217;re being too indulgent with their lives, and they need to get a dose of the bitter pill.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (49:23):</strong> I think that&#8217;s right, and I&#8217;d agree with what you say. Just one point about legalism: it is the political tradition that most strongly endorses war, as you suggest, and it also worries about war readiness &#8212; worries about a military that grows rusty over time. China hasn&#8217;t gone to war since 1979, and that would be a huge concern for legalists, because you need to practice to get better at war. That said, they recognize that war is hell. The only way to motivate people is by making them realize that if they don&#8217;t go to war, things would be even worse. So Shang Yang says you have to force soldiers to go to war. And the way to do that is: if you don&#8217;t go to war, we&#8217;ll torture you and we&#8217;ll kill your whole family &#8212; the alternatives would be even worse. I&#8217;m still more or less convinced that there&#8217;s not a desire to go to war now, and that people, including the leaders, recognize that the best way for China to develop is to do it in a peaceful way. And it&#8217;s only if Taiwan would formally declare independence, or the US would pressure them to do so, that there&#8217;s a really serious risk of war. In this dialogue, I begin with that assumption &#8212; which hopefully won&#8217;t come true.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (50:43):</strong> Okay, so the last question I wanted to get your thoughts on is about this idea of harmony. Because when I read this in the Confucians in your book, it&#8217;s oftentimes discussed in this really soft, or almost ritualistic, way &#8212; to try and guide people with the power of the example. This idea of soft power, right &#8212; which you&#8217;ve suggested is something that the Confucians came up with, not Joseph Nye. And what immediately comes to mind for me is that it&#8217;s actually a joke &#8212; there&#8217;s a running joke in China that you get &#8220;harmonized&#8221; when you get censored, or when you get invited to tea. There&#8217;s a cynicism in the population in China about harmony as it&#8217;s used. And what it suggests to me is that oftentimes this kind of Confucianism, or this kind of goody-two-shoes moralism that comes out in your debates, is kind of like window dressing for the state. And the Chinese are actually aware of the fact that it is something like window dressing. What would you say to that? Do you feel like there&#8217;s a truth to that?</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (51:41):</strong> There is a truth to it, but it&#8217;s not the whole truth. The Confucian idea of harmony &#8212; one of the most famous sayings that all intellectuals know in Chinese is <em>he er bu tong</em> [&#21644;&#32780;&#19981;&#21516;]: that if you&#8217;re an exemplary person, you should pursue this ideal of <em>he</em> [&#21644;], which we can translate as diversity in harmony, rather than <em>tong</em> [&#21516;], which is sameness, or uniformity, or conformity. The Confucian idea of harmony celebrates diversity and pluralism. The question is: how can we deal with it in a peaceful way, in a way that the outcome is even more beautiful and better than the parts, so to speak? That&#8217;s the idea. And I think most intellectuals understand it that way. But sometimes it&#8217;s misused by the government to justify <em>tong</em> &#8212; conformity, or sameness. And that&#8217;s a misuse of the idea.</p><p>So what should we do? I think that&#8217;s one reason why we need more freedom of speech: to criticize misuses. And this is a Confucian view, too &#8212; they also make harmony a political idea. It&#8217;s very clear in the ancient texts, which I quote as well, that if you have different ministers, they need to express different views, so that they can criticize mistaken policies. That&#8217;s what they mean by harmony in a political sense. And if you only have one perspective &#8212; a perspective that agrees with the ruler &#8212; you will never expose and criticize and improve mistaken policies, and the state will be doomed. The Confucians are very explicit about that. Yes, you have misuses, but it&#8217;s also very important &#8212; I think most intellectuals know that&#8217;s not what harmony is supposed to be. We need freedom of speech to criticize those misuses. That would be my somewhat pompous conclusion.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (53:21):</strong> So I guess the last question that I have: I&#8217;m wondering whether, when you were writing ten or twelve years ago, when you wrote <em>The China Model</em>, you were trying to push back against a certain worldview among liberals that suggests that one person, one vote may be the only legitimate form of selecting leadership &#8212; and you were trying to present the Chinese answer, or the way that the Chinese were really thinking at the time. I&#8217;m wondering whether, over time, the target of your criticism has changed, or whether you feel like that problem still persists today &#8212; and that in your books, you&#8217;re still trying to push back against this, maybe, hubris: the belief that China is still just authoritarian.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (54:00):</strong> The target is still there. I do think it&#8217;s this idea that we in the West tend to divide the world between the good democracies and the bad authoritarian regimes. It&#8217;s still there in everyday speech, it&#8217;s still there in journalism, it&#8217;s still there in academia. Try to get a book published, or an article published in a political science journal, that doesn&#8217;t use that language &#8212; it&#8217;s very hard; you&#8217;ll get knocked down by referees. And it&#8217;s still used by political leaders. So there&#8217;s a need to have a different language to try to understand China&#8217;s guiding political ideals. That&#8217;s so important. So I still think that the critique is directed against that way of understanding &#8212; or misunderstanding &#8212; China.</p><p>And to the extent that some of it is directed within China &#8212; I try to be fair to the legalists. In fact, in this book, I try to be fair to all four major schools that I discuss, and I don&#8217;t want to take sides too explicitly. But some people who have read it, including my students, say: come on, your Confucianism &#8212; it&#8217;s hidden, but it&#8217;s still there. So if I do want to persuade readers of that book within China, it would be to have less legalism and more Confucianism, if I can crudely summarize.</p><p>That said &#8212; this is a little point about academic freedom in Hong Kong. You can write a lot about mainland Chinese politics in Hong Kong in a balanced and academic and independent way &#8212; but not about Hong Kong politics; that&#8217;s highly sensitive. But if you work on mainland Chinese politics, you can still be balanced, independent, and academic, including in Chinese. So this book will be translated by a Hong Kong publisher, but no mainland Chinese publisher will touch it, because it addresses so many politically sensitive topics &#8212; including the last chapter, on what would be a justified invasion of Taiwan. That said, it will be published in Hong Kong, the PDF will be available, and it&#8217;ll be widely distributed in mainland China, in Chinese. So if I had a moral, proselytizing kind of view &#8212; which really goes against my character &#8212; then I would hope that some of the Confucian aspects affect the reality.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (56:00):</strong> With that &#8212; Daniel, thank you so much for coming on the show.</p><p><strong>Daniel Bell (56:04):</strong> Thank you for the great comments and questions and conversation.In 2015, Daniel Bell, then a political theorist at Tsinghua University published &#8220;The China Model.&#8221; China should be evaluated not by its failure to live up to a Western liberal democracy, Bell argued, but by its own ideals, what he called a "political meritocracy." More than a decade into the Xi Jinping era, Chang asks Daniel whether his views had changed. They also discuss Bell's new book Why Ancient Chinese Political Thought Matters, and whether ancient Chinese wisdom does inform policies like Xi's anti-corruption campaign and his criticism of "lying flat" youths.</p><p>See Bell's book: https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691279800/why-ancient-chinese-political-thought-matters</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[China's Grand Bazaar of Artificial Intelligence]]></title><description><![CDATA[Chang just returned from a extended trip to China and shares some of his reflections.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/chinas-grand-bazaar-of-artificial-f51</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/chinas-grand-bazaar-of-artificial-f51</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 02:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980738/40473754a22bff5038e8c751bcd60f8d.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Chang just returned from a extended trip to China and shares some of his reflections. He visited frontier AI labs and stopped by the World AI Conference in Shanghai, where Xi Jinping spoke and announced a new AI governance body with 29 member countries. Chang and Ian discuss what the AI talks between the US and China might produce, what the Chinese worry about as they develop stronger and stronger models, and why Chinese generally feel much more optimistic about AI than Americans.</p><p>Topics discussed:</p><ul><li><p>Differences between China&#8217;s post-pandemic malaise (2023-) and now (2026-)</p></li><li><p>Competition between Beijing and Shanghai and entrepreneurial dynamism</p></li><li><p>Who came to Shanghai&#8217;s World AI Conference?</p></li><li><p>Trump&#8217;s reverse course on AI safety</p></li><li><p>US-China AI talks in September and Track II dialogues</p></li><li><p>Kimi K3 and the transparency gap in Chinese safety evaluations</p></li><li><p>China&#8217;s image makeover as a responsible AI power&#8212;is it true?</p></li><li><p>Why Americans seem to be more unsettled by AI than the Chinese</p></li></ul><p><strong>Ian Buruma (0:00):</strong> Hello, and welcome to <em>Into Asia</em>, the podcast by Ian Buruma &#8212; myself &#8212; and Chang Che. Chang has just spent time in China. I&#8217;m in New York, and I&#8217;d like first of all to know what it was like. You normally live in Yokohama, where life is very different from life in China, especially under Xi Jinping. What is it like to be back in China after Japan?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (0:27):</strong> To take a step back: I came to China in 2020, during the pandemic, and I witnessed a lot of tumultuous events, the most intense being the Shanghai lockdowns in 2022. In the years after that, I felt a kind of malaise &#8212; a sense that people were stuck in their careers and their lives, that they didn&#8217;t have the right to reach for more, to have ambition, because so much was out of their control.</p><p>Coming back in 2026, I feel like there are new pockets of energy. What&#8217;s structurally different is that in the 1990s and 2000s you could see this happening nationwide. You can&#8217;t really say that in the 2020s. There are little pockets &#8212; specifically the AI sector and the robotics sector, which is where I spent most of my time.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (1:27):</strong> You spent time in Beijing as well as Shanghai. Are there significant differences between those two cities in terms of morale and entrepreneurial attitudes?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (1:39):</strong> They&#8217;re both pretty dynamic. Beijing and Shanghai compete fiercely with each other to maximize industrial competitiveness in sectors like batteries, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence. What that means is that both cities invest heavily and try to recruit talent from all over the country and the world. You see tech zones where the government has given over entire districts to robotics facilities.</p><p>Take the three top frontier AI companies in China: DeepSeek, MiniMax, and Moonshot AI. [<em>NB: there are others, Z.ai, ByteDance, Alibaba&#8230;etc.</em>]. Each of them is in a different city. DeepSeek is in Hangzhou, MiniMax is based in Shanghai, and Moonshot is in Beijing. That gives you a sense of how distributed this is, and the reason is that it&#8217;s a competitive system. The cities are competing with one another.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (2:42):</strong> So nothing in the south. The south is really, as it was thousands of years ago, outside the center of Chinese civilization.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (2:50):</strong> Well, Hangzhou is sort of south. I think you mean Guangzhou and Shenzhen. They play a big role, but they&#8217;re not in the large language model business &#8212; they&#8217;re more in manufacturing. Shenzhen is the home of DJI, the big drone company. And the founder of Unitree, which is the hot robotics company in China right now, came out of DJI. So there&#8217;s a connection there.</p><p>Shenzhen is the crucible of the robotics industry. Even though you now see robotics companies all over China, a lot of the components and the talent came out of Shenzhen. It&#8217;s very, very important.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (3:37):</strong> The last time I was in Shenzhen &#8212; which was quite a while ago &#8212; what was interesting was that it sat outside the mainstream. It attracted a lot of young people because the air felt a little freer there, socially and, I&#8217;d assume, intellectually. Do you think that&#8217;s still true, and that it has an effect on the development of AI?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (4:02):</strong> At that time, the system was still trying to figure out the right balance of political control and economic freedom. In those economic zones, people were flocking there for all kinds of reasons &#8212; partly economic freedom, partly political freedom.</p><p>Now we&#8217;re in an era where the system has become very good at controlling political freedom, but it&#8217;s also become very good at unleashing entrepreneurial dynamism under extremely restrictive circumstances. So you see this strange dynamic in every city: very little civil society, but plenty of entrepreneurial energy. Entrepreneurs will go to Shanghai and Beijing for the entrepreneurship and won&#8217;t much mind the political controls. Something different is going on now in China.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (4:51):</strong> You spent a lot of time on this trip at the grand bazaar of artificial intelligence in Shanghai &#8212; WAIC, the World Artificial Intelligence Conference. What were your impressions? What did you learn?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (5:06):</strong> My first impression was that China is in some ways so closed and yet sometimes so weirdly open. China was basically a closed country from around 2020 until 2023. When it reopened, there wasn&#8217;t much people-to-people movement between the US and China. And then you have conferences like WAIC, where Western scientists and scholars from Europe and the United States come in and meet Chinese officials in this very choreographed spectacle. That was bizarre.</p><p>It also selects for people who want sustained engagement with China. There&#8217;s a self-selection effect: the Westerners I tend to meet there are people who have worked in China for a long time, who engage with the Chinese system, who have a certain optimism about China. I consider myself one of them, actually.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (6:11):</strong> Are there more Americans who seriously engage with China, or is it coming from Europe as well, and other parts of Asia?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (6:19):</strong> It was definitely heavy on the Europeans and Canadians. There&#8217;s vetting on both sides. If an American scholar wants to come to China, they probably have to notify their university or institution, and the institution probably has a say. And if a Chinese institution wants to invite somebody from America, they also have to go through checks. At any one of those points, something might go wrong, somebody might say no, and it doesn&#8217;t happen. So there were fewer Americans &#8212; but there were still some, which surprised me.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (6:56):</strong> In a conversation we had earlier, you pointed out that those Americans did not include the so-called accelerationists &#8212; the people in Silicon Valley who have almost turned the development of AI into a religion and think the world will be saved by it. They weren&#8217;t well represented.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (7:17):</strong> In the United States there&#8217;s a dichotomy between people, typically in Silicon Valley, who are focused on development, and the people they sometimes call the AI doomers, who focus on safety. What&#8217;s happened is that the accelerationists &#8212; the people who support unbridled development of AI &#8212; also tend to be quite hawkish on China. So naturally, people from the US labs are not coming to China.</p><p>What China is attracting is a lot of people who are not actually building AI capability but who work on governance and safety, who think about AI ethically. That&#8217;s the crowd WAIC draws. On the other hand, the Chinese labs bring their own people, so the Chinese accelerationists are available to talk to at WAIC.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (8:20):</strong> My impression is that in the Trump world, the accelerationists have had more influence than the ethicists. Is that still true? Is it changing? And how does it compare to the Chinese scene?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (8:37):</strong> It&#8217;s changing. It was definitely the case when Trump took office. He came in and scrapped the Biden-era executive order that was supposed to govern AI policy, which had a lot of safety components in it. He set a precedent. He also brought in people focused on stripping out the guardrails &#8212; David Sacks, major Silicon Valley figures. He brought them into government. So there was a period of maximalist AI development policy in the White House.</p><p>I think that&#8217;s changed with the arrival of Anthropic&#8217;s newest model, Mythos. Anthropic claimed it had the ability to discover bugs in decades-old software, and to hack into power grids and telecommunications systems. That freaked out the administration. I think that&#8217;s why, when Trump went to Beijing to talk to Xi, they discussed the prospect of AI dialogues. And it&#8217;s also why the administration export-controlled Anthropic&#8217;s release. Anthropic felt it had done enough safety testing to release a version of Mythos called Fable, and it was the White House that stepped in and said no &#8212; you cannot make this accessible to people outside the US.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (10:08):</strong> How far have those talks gone? And where does Scott Bessent stand in all this? He has the president&#8217;s ear on AI issues, doesn&#8217;t he?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (10:16):</strong> Bessent has been taking the lead on AI over the past year. It&#8217;s not entirely clear to me what&#8217;s going on behind the scenes between now and late September. My understanding is that there will be a round of AI dialogues before the summit, and that what&#8217;s happening now is the planning for that: what concrete proposals can the US and China agree on, so that we&#8217;re in some kind of managed competition rather than unbridled competition &#8212; the way we had nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union.</p><p>I have no idea what&#8217;s actually on the table. But there are things I hope are on the table, if that&#8217;s of interest.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (11:03):</strong> It&#8217;s certainly of interest. How much were these ethical issues discussed at WAIC? Was that a topic of conversation, or was it all much more technical &#8212; what the breakthroughs were, and so on?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (11:17):</strong> There were a lot of discussions about safety, and a lot about technical sharing, research and technology. There were hundreds of forums. Shanghai around the time of WAIC also becomes a convention center for Track II dialogues &#8212; unofficial talks among former government officials and experts, which are meant to feed into direct diplomacy later. So WAIC plays a role in shaping what happens between Trump and Xi in September.</p><p>I talked to some of the people involved. Cybersecurity seems to be one of the big topics this year, because of the release of Mythos and Anthropic&#8217;s claim that Mythos is a very good cyber attacker. That&#8217;s been top of mind for policymakers in both the US and China.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (12:14):</strong> It&#8217;s interesting to think of the parallels with the early Cold War &#8212; containing the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of AI. One school of thought very early on, and I can&#8217;t remember all the names involved, possibly Oppenheimer, held that the best way to deal with the dangers of nuclear war was to share all the data with the Soviets. Others said absolutely not. And then of course it became an arms race, and later people tried to contain it. Is this notion of sharing technical knowledge on AI strong on either side?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (12:58):</strong> In each of these cases there&#8217;s a competitive impulse and an impulse to do what&#8217;s best for humanity. In AI, that plays out around safety evaluations.</p><p>Right now, all the labs do their own safety evaluations. Every few months a company produces a stronger model, and companies in both the US and China have safety teams that test the finished model for risky behavior. Is this model going to accidentally or deliberately hack into things? Will it disobey its human interlocutor? Will it help somebody build a bioweapon?</p><p>The problem is that there&#8217;s no unified standard across the US and China about what counts as an agreed-upon risk &#8212; what the shared risks are that we, as a global community, should worry about when these systems come online. And in China especially, the labs are not very transparent about what they&#8217;re testing for. At least this year, they haven&#8217;t been transparent about their safety evaluations. When OpenAI or Anthropic release a model, they share some information about the level of safety and their confidence that the model isn&#8217;t going to hack into a power grid. That isn&#8217;t really happening on the China side, or it&#8217;s happening less.</p><p>This goes back to one of the proposals I hope can happen: a shared set of standards for testing AI models. That will require some kind of sharing. I don&#8217;t know exactly what needs to be shared, but there has to be some exchange of methodologies and experience between the companies about what&#8217;s working and what isn&#8217;t. And so far that&#8217;s obviously not happening.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (15:08):</strong> The fact that there were so many Europeans in Shanghai shows the world is moving in a certain direction in the age of Donald Trump &#8212; something Xi Jinping is actively promoting: the idea that China is a more dependable power, less erratic, and that Europeans and Canadians therefore see it in their interest to work with China and become less dependent on a United States led by a government that is in many ways hostile to its allies. Does that mean Xi is right, that China is more dependable? Do the Chinese take ethics and safety more seriously than the Americans do today?</p><p><strong>Chang Che (15:57):</strong> This is the realization I had on the trip. China really is setting up governance infrastructure for AI, which the Trump administration has historically not been keen on. China has filled the void on what everyone now calls AI governance. Xi gave a keynote at WAIC where he talked about this and announced a new organization based in Shanghai &#8212; the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. Twenty-nine countries signed on as founding members. So China has made a real diplomatic push to present itself as a responsible actor.</p><p>But at the end of the day &#8212; the other thing that happened just before WAIC was that Moonshot released a model called Kimi K3, which, according to some evaluators, is about as capable as Anthropic&#8217;s Mythos. If we take Anthropic&#8217;s word for what Mythos can do, then Kimi K3 should be pretty dangerous. In the hands of bad actors, it should have the capacity to do damage to cyber systems.</p><p>So what does that mean? While China has made a big push to present itself as responsible, it still has a long way to go in thinking about what could really go wrong. There&#8217;s currently no transparent system of checks around model releases. Kimi K3 was released yesterday, open source, which means anyone can download it off the internet. You need computing power, but with significant computing power anyone can wield it. That has made me worried that China is dropping the ball on a real safety regime, a testing regime, for the systems that are coming out.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (17:59):</strong> One thing is a safety regime for the AI systems themselves. The other concerns content. Here the Europeans and maybe the Canadians are between a rock and a hard place. The Chinese are very, very good at controlling content, for their own political reasons, because it&#8217;s a dictatorship &#8212; and you don&#8217;t want to go that route. On the other hand, the Americans, very much influenced by the accelerationists in Silicon Valley, don&#8217;t like government intervention in questions of free speech, especially when the speech suits them, and lean toward a free-for-all. The Europeans think that&#8217;s dangerous, because it opens the door to wild conspiracy theories and manipulation of public opinion &#8212; dangers Europeans do want to control and the present American administration does not.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (19:00):</strong> There&#8217;s a funny anecdote here. I talked to one of the AI scientists in China who works on governance issues, and he told me he&#8217;s recently had requests from the Spanish government for advice on how to do censorship controls. And by censorship controls he doesn&#8217;t mean political censorship. He means these models have to be contained &#8212; contained from, for example, assisting somebody in taking their own life. There was a famous case involving OpenAI. These models can say things we don&#8217;t want them to say.</p><p>So the scholar was saying: look, the West used to make fun of us, or criticize us, for being political censors of our systems. But now there&#8217;s a general acceptance that yes, we need to contain our systems. And yes, we in China will do a lot more, and we&#8217;ll have political controls alongside these other controls. But people are now learning from us about how to censor AI systems, because the Chinese are extremely good at it. They&#8217;ve been doing it for years.</p><p>The rules around content control in China are very strict, and the Chinese labs are very good at complying with them. I remember in 2023, when these systems were first coming online, there was a general view that the Chinese would be late to AI because they&#8217;d have to worry about all the censorship controls &#8212; they&#8217;d never catch up to America, because Americans don&#8217;t care about that. That&#8217;s just not true. They dealt with the censorship controls very quickly, and they&#8217;re now knocking on the American labs&#8217; door. They&#8217;re very good at it, and now the Europeans are trying to learn from them.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (20:43):</strong> This is a tricky political question. It reminds me a little of Deng Xiaoping, who wanted to open China to Western knowledge &#8212; scientific, economic &#8212; in order to modernize the country, but didn&#8217;t want ideas that could promote democracy, free speech, and human rights to come in with it. He called that &#8220;spiritual pollution.&#8221; It&#8217;s very difficult to keep the two apart. If you import Western ideas to modernize, you&#8217;ll get ideas you don&#8217;t like.</p><p>On the American side, the Trump administration talks a lot about how Europeans want to crack down on free speech. But what they mean by free speech is ideas they personally like &#8212; anti-immigration rhetoric, blood-and-soil nationalism. So controlling content very quickly becomes a political question: what is it that you want to control? And that goes way beyond technology.</p><p>It also reveals differences between the United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the world. The Americans have the First Amendment, which allows anybody to say almost anything, even neo-Nazis, as long as there&#8217;s no imminent danger involved. The Europeans have a different attitude &#8212; there are laws in Europe banning hate speech. The Chinese have their own ideas, which are even more restrictive. So content control is a very tricky issue.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (22:34):</strong> This dichotomy you&#8217;re describing, between economic innovation and so-called spiritual pollution &#8212; these Western values &#8212; China has been grappling with it for its entire modern existence.</p><p>A recent example is Jack Ma, the high-flying entrepreneur who founded Alibaba, the e-commerce giant. He effectively disappeared from public life in 2020 after a speech he gave in Shanghai at the Bund Summit, where he attacked financial regulators. Here was an entrepreneur who was a product of Deng&#8217;s opening getting a little too naughty with his words and speaking directly to politicians. The regime cracked down. And in the years that followed, Xi took a hammer to the private sector and emphasized state-owned companies for a time.</p><p>Then in 2023 you have the breakout of AI, and OpenAI&#8217;s ChatGPT shines brightly, and everyone in China is wondering why China couldn&#8217;t create something as great. And Xi reverses course a little. He starts inviting tech entrepreneurs back into the fold. Jack Ma eventually meets Xi in Beijing again, and realizes he had miscalculated. This push and pull is constant in China.</p><p>This time in China, I got the sense from the AI companies that they&#8217;re really afraid of a repeat of the Jack Ma episode, because they know what the regulators are capable of. They do not want a rogue AI agent from, say, Kimi K3 wreaking havoc on the economy &#8212; or saying something politically offensive about the leadership &#8212; and triggering a Jack Ma moment all over again. That&#8217;s top of mind for a lot of AI researchers in China.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (24:41):</strong> Now you&#8217;re talking about chatbots and AI systems running out of human control &#8212; which leads us straight into the world of Frankenstein&#8217;s monster.</p><p>It seems to me that in the United States there&#8217;s another contradiction. On the one hand there&#8217;s this often self-serving obsession with free speech &#8212; J.D. Vance lecturing Europeans that they&#8217;re cracking down on free speech when they try to control noxious far-right propaganda, the First Amendment, the accelerationists in Silicon Valley. On the other hand, there seems to be much more fear among the general American public about the consequences of AI running out of control than there is in China. American public opinion is more skeptical about the possible consequences of all this than Chinese public opinion appears to be. And of course one has to be careful, because you can&#8217;t gauge Chinese public opinion very easily when there&#8217;s no free speech.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (25:51):</strong> What you&#8217;re describing, in AI lingo, is the accelerationists and the doomers. The similarity between them is that they&#8217;re both millenarian ideologies. They both believe there&#8217;s a tipping point where some transformation of society is in store.</p><p>Structurally, that millenarian frame is less prevalent in China. I&#8217;m not saying nobody thinks that way &#8212; Liang Wenfeng, the founder of DeepSeek, is, I believe, a hardcore believer in artificial general intelligence. But generally in China you don&#8217;t see this belief that AI is headed toward an inflection point after which the world will be radically changed. I don&#8217;t really get that there.</p><p>I think that&#8217;s actually an explanation for a fascinating difference in the general population between China and the US. There&#8217;s a Stanford figure showing that a large majority of Chinese respondents see AI products and services as more beneficial than harmful, compared to well under half of Americans. That&#8217;s a stark difference toward effectively similar things.</p><p>So I wondered why. Part of it is science fiction &#8212; in the US we&#8217;re reared on tropes that talk about AI in a certain way. What I&#8217;ve noticed is that when Chinese people talk about AI, they tend to focus on much more immediate risks. When you talk to researchers, they talk about job loss, content controls, AI companions and chatbots that might get a minor hooked on an AI boyfriend or girlfriend rather than a real person. These are risks happening right now, and the Chinese government has rolled out regulations on them. In the US, you hear people talking much more about the future &#8212; there&#8217;s going to be a superintelligent machine that can do everything and solve all our problems. That&#8217;s the discourse. It&#8217;s a big difference.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (28:12):</strong> There may be historical reasons for this too. I&#8217;m wondering whether there&#8217;s an equivalent in Chinese literary history of Frankenstein&#8217;s monster. <em>Frankenstein</em> was written by Mary Shelley at the beginning of the nineteenth century and was very much a product of Romanticism, which was intensely concerned with the autonomy of the human individual. The idea of creating a fake human being was alarming because it would usurp that autonomy.</p><p>I once heard a lecture by a British philosopher, a very devout Christian, who was extremely critical of AI because he saw it as human beings playing God. That&#8217;s not quite the same thing, but it comes from the same culture, I think &#8212; the fear that human beings will be taken over by, or become dependent on, something they created that then runs out of control.</p><p>I wonder whether similar fears play a part in Chinese culture, and whether there&#8217;s an equivalent of the Frankenstein myth. I doubt it myself, because even in Japan people seem much less uncomfortable with robots, with playing with machines, even with having AI boyfriends and girlfriends &#8212; which is a universal phenomenon now. It&#8217;s happening everywhere.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (29:54):</strong> Your point about autonomy is interesting, because on the hierarchy of values in East Asia, autonomy isn&#8217;t one of the top ones. It&#8217;s much more about harmony and other collectivist values. If that&#8217;s right, it may explain why you see much less of the view in China that AI is analogous to God, or to aliens. That&#8217;s very common in the West. Many AI researchers I talk to in the West will use the words <em>God</em> or <em>alien</em> when they talk about AI. I don&#8217;t hear that in China.</p><p>So it may be cultural. There may be some cultural reason. Do you feel these differences can be explained by culture?</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (30:40):</strong> I don&#8217;t think anything can be completely explained by culture &#8212; just as you can&#8217;t explain anything totally from a political or technological point of view. These are all factors. But yes, I do think attitudes toward divinity and toward individual autonomy play a role.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (31:03):</strong> Here&#8217;s another perspective, which isn&#8217;t cultural at all. Some people I&#8217;ve talked to say the reason the Chinese are more optimistic about AI is that they&#8217;re behind. Their AI hasn&#8217;t reached the wake-up moment &#8212; the &#8220;oh shit&#8221; moment &#8212; yet, whereas in the US we&#8217;re getting there.</p><p>That doesn&#8217;t explain a lot of the discourse, but it may explain why, when you talk to Chinese companies right now, you don&#8217;t get the same alarm you might get at a lab like Anthropic, where they&#8217;ve already been running these tests and are starting to realize how capable and how dangerous their systems are. There&#8217;s less of that in China right now &#8212; but what I&#8217;m hearing is that it&#8217;s starting to happen. There are companies and researchers in China now equally worried about AI&#8217;s cyber-offense capabilities. So it might just be the lag.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (31:59):</strong> It might. But on the other hand, those statistics you were quoting &#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang Che (32:04):</strong> Right, the optimism gap. That doesn&#8217;t explain that.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (32:13):</strong> No, it doesn&#8217;t. What might explain it is not that China is lagging behind, but that public opinion in America, even under Donald Trump, still matters a great deal more than it does in China. It&#8217;s very difficult to gauge what most Chinese really think. If people are asked in official polls, they&#8217;ll say what they feel they ought to say and stay out of trouble.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (32:40):</strong> I also detect a lot of FOMO &#8212; a kind of reluctant excitement. <em>I have no choice but to be excited about this, because it&#8217;s come my way, like it or not.</em> That feeling is very strong in China. Whereas in the US, people are more used to rebelling. If you don&#8217;t like something, you say it.</p><p>So the excitement the survey registers might be a kind of fatalism &#8212; excitement under fatalism. <em>I&#8217;m going to lean into this because I have no other choice. Because if I don&#8217;t, everyone else is going to beat me and take my job.</em></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (33:19):</strong> I do think there&#8217;s a cultural difference, and it has to do with religion &#8212; hence the fact that someone deeply Christian can be very skeptical about AI. The notion that it&#8217;s deeply sinful for human beings to play God is important in monotheistic traditions, which is why Jews and Muslims traditionally were not allowed to make images of human beings, because that leads to idolatry.</p><p>The Frankenstein story is in some ways also about idolatry: creating something that is not human. So I think there&#8217;s a link between the Christian who is skeptical about AI because he feels it usurps the work of God, and Mary Shelley&#8217;s idea that it&#8217;s sinful and disturbing and dangerous for a human being to create a false human being.</p><p>What isn&#8217;t true is that the Chinese lack a humanistic tradition comparable to the Western one. In many ways theirs is longer. Think of Confucianism &#8212; cultivating your inner life, your virtue, becoming a better human being. It&#8217;s deeply ingrained. So they have their humanism too. But this idea of creating false gods, this fear of idolatry, is much less present in China. After all, the Chinese &#8212; and the Japanese, who were very much influenced by China &#8212; create gods all the time. They make gods out of human beings, out of animals, out of rocks, out of mountains. The divine is everywhere.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (35:08):</strong> You&#8217;re saying the Chinese and Japanese may be more used to that &#8212; to the creation of gods.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (35:14):</strong> Yes. They don&#8217;t have the same resistance.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (35:17):</strong> They don&#8217;t have the same resistance. Interesting. Technology comes from the word <em>techne</em> &#8212; the idea of a craft, an art. And I think the concept is decoded differently in China. In the US, when you create something awe-inspiring and potentially intelligent, you may ask yourself: what have I done? Have I created something I wasn&#8217;t supposed to create? Whereas in China there may be more of: this is so useful. This is going to make our lives better. That&#8217;s deeply ingrained &#8212; we need to build things to make our lives better.</p><p>There&#8217;s another aspect that&#8217;s just as deeply ingrained: we&#8217;re going to catch up to the West with this. We built this technology and it&#8217;s going to catch us up. We have to accept it. Technology is very nationally coded in China. In the US that doesn&#8217;t exist &#8212; we think in more individualistic terms, or more religious terms. Those are the tropes that come to mind when we think about technology.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (36:17):</strong> On the other hand, if you look at history, the opposite is sometimes true. Both the Chinese and the Japanese have resisted technical innovations for social and political reasons. When the Japanese first encountered Western firearms in the sixteenth century, they very quickly learned to build guns. But guns were then banned in Japan for a long time, because the samurai class had a monopoly on the use of force with their swords, and arming commoners would upset the social order. They kept guns out of Japan for a long time. Such attitudes existed in imperial China too: when Chinese rulers felt that Western technology or innovation might upset the social order, they resisted it.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (37:15):</strong> That&#8217;s a good point. I really think the feeling of catching up dates to the post-Mao years.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (37:21):</strong> I&#8217;d say post-1900.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (37:24):</strong> 1900, yes. Of course there was a catch-up phase during the Mao years as well. But especially in the past decade, Xi Jinping has made it clear that he wants China to be the leading industrial powerhouse of the world. And he&#8217;s willing to do that without some of the basic civic freedoms the West is used to. That&#8217;s where the association between technology and the national project comes from. Over this past decade, that&#8217;s been the ambient message from the government.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (38:09):</strong> I think that&#8217;s absolutely true. My only caveat is that I wouldn&#8217;t put it as his being <em>willing to do without</em> citizens&#8217; rights and freedoms. He thinks democratic freedoms would <em>hinder</em> China in its pursuit of industrial and technological power.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (38:28):</strong> That&#8217;s right.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma (38:29):</strong> Well, we&#8217;ve covered a lot of ground.</p><p><strong>Chang Che (38:32):</strong> Thanks so much, Ian.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[How Christianity Shaped North Korea’s Personality Cult]]></title><description><![CDATA[Before Pyongyang became the capital of the Kim dynasty, it was known as the "Jerusalem of the East," a city so devoutly Christian that one American missionary in 1925 declared it "the most Protestant city" they had ever seen.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/how-christianity-shaped-north-koreas-b08</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/how-christianity-shaped-north-koreas-b08</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 01:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980739/55b1d4920462cf7c36963f8e197c8a90.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Before Pyongyang became the capital of the Kim dynasty, it was known as the "Jerusalem of the East," a city so devoutly Christian that one American missionary in 1925 declared it "the most Protestant city" they had ever seen. Its most consequential resident was a Sunday school teacher named Kim Il Sung.&nbsp;</p><p>Ian and Chang are joined by Jonathan Cheng, the Wall Street Journal's China bureau chief, to break down how a child of the church turned a nation into a nuclear-armed religious society. He is the author of <em>Korean</em></p><p><strong>In this episode:</strong></p><p><strong>0:43</strong> &#8212; How a tourist trip to Pyongyang in 2013 turned into a book</p><p><strong>4:14</strong> &#8212; Kim Il-Sung vs. Mao Zedong: differences in personality cults</p><p><strong>9:58</strong> &#8212; Was Kim Il Sung a Christian?</p><p><strong>12:30</strong> &#8212; What are the Christian elements of the Kim personality cult?</p><p><strong>19:52</strong> &#8212; Why East Asia, and Korea in particular, seems to produce so many messianic figures</p><p><strong>34:50</strong> &#8212; Why did a child of the church become Christianity&#8217;s greatest persecutor?</p><p><strong>37:40</strong> &#8212; How Japanese imperialism fueled Korean Christianity</p><p><strong>41:17</strong> &#8212; The moment(s) when Kim&#8217;s personality cult took a dark turn</p><p><strong>47:26</strong> &#8212; The other Korean messiah: Sun Myung Moon and his endurance of religiosity in East Asia today</p><p>Below is a transcript:</p><div><hr></div><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Hello everyone, and welcome to Into Asia. I&#8217;m your co-host, Chang Che.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> And I&#8217;m Ian Buruma.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Today we are here with the Beijing bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal, Jonathan Cheng, but we&#8217;re moving a bit east of China to talk about Jonathan&#8217;s recent book, <em>Korean Messiah</em>, a biography of Kim Il Sung and the Christian roots of his personality cult. Jonathan, welcome to Into Asia.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Hey, it&#8217;s a real pleasure to be here.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So Jon, you were previously the Korea bureau chief for the Journal. You had visited North Korea while you were bureau chief. I&#8217;m wondering whether you could talk a little bit about the inception of the book. Was it partly driven by your fascination with North Korea as you visited, or did you already have an interest in North Korea before you were the bureau chief?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Well, I&#8217;d been learning Korean for a few years before being sent to Seoul. My family is not Korean. My parents are from Hong Kong, so I&#8217;m Southern Chinese, but born in Canada. So I did already have a little bit of an interest in North Korea, but I can&#8217;t say I had much more knowledge of the country than the average avid newsreader, of which I would count myself as one.</p><p>When I was sent to South Korea in 2013, one of the first things I did was to go to North Korea. I spent about 10 days there as a tourist. Back then it was a bit more of a normal thing that people could go to North Korea. These days, of course, it&#8217;s near impossible, certainly if you&#8217;re an American citizen. That is really where that fascination kicked into overdrive. I was able to make another trip in 2017 when they invited the Wall Street Journal to visit. But really, it was 2013 that this book began to take shape in my mind.</p><p>It didn&#8217;t actually start as a book at all. It was something I was thinking I might want to write as a long, perhaps essayistic weekend piece for the Wall Street Journal, because I studied history in school. I&#8217;m a big history buff, and one of the first things I did when I knew I was being sent to Korea was to read what I could about North Korea. And you find that when you pick up any book about North Korea, you&#8217;ll learn the basics of Kim Il Sung&#8217;s life, because he was the founder of the state. You&#8217;ll learn that he was born on the outskirts of Pyongyang in 1912 &#8212; born, in fact, on the same day that the Titanic sank. You&#8217;ll learn that he was raised in a devout Christian family. Perhaps you&#8217;ll learn that Pyongyang was a center of Christendom at the time. All these things were quite fascinating to me, but they&#8217;re all mentioned for about a sentence or two, or at most a paragraph, in any of these books, before the book moves on and talks about Kim Il Sung&#8217;s guerrilla fighter career, and then how he ends up in Pyongyang in 1945, and then it just keeps barreling on in that way until you get to the North Korea that we know today.</p><p>And yet for me, the really big question was: hold on, what is this bit here about his upbringing in the Christian church, about his family being quite a devout family, about Pyongyang being the city that was so Christianized it was called the Jerusalem of the East? I wanted to resolve this mystery. Here I am in Pyongyang, 2013. I&#8217;m a tourist, I&#8217;m looking around at everything I see around me &#8212; the statues of Kim Il Sung everywhere, his portrait on the walls of every room you walk into, his portrait pinned over everyone&#8217;s heart, the praise songs that have been written for him, the quotations that everyone has to memorize. It just felt to me like there must have been some sort of a connection here. It couldn&#8217;t have been coincidence: the man who created the world&#8217;s greatest and most over-the-top personality cult was raised in a Christian home in a very devoutly Christian city. Could there possibly have been any connection?</p><p>And so that was where it all started. I wanted to do a little bit of research and perhaps put together a piece of maybe 1,500 or 2,000 words, and maybe I could introduce to the average newsreader: hey, did you know that Pyongyang, before it became known as the capital of the Kim dynasty, was known as this Christian city? So that&#8217;s how it began.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I think the thesis is fascinating, but while you were talking, I kept thinking: a lot of what you&#8217;re saying about the religious fervor behind the Kim dynasty was true of Mao Zedong during the Maoist years in China, and I don&#8217;t think there was a Christian background there. How would you compare the Chinese case to the Korean case in this respect?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Sure. It&#8217;s something I think about a lot, obviously, because the last seven years of my life have been in China. The first point I would make is that one needn&#8217;t have a Christian upbringing to build a cult of personality. Certainly there have been many cults of personality built outside of the Christian context. That said, missionaries were very active in China. We all recall the example of Hong Xiuquan, the leader of perhaps the greatest religious movement, if you want to call it that, in Chinese history &#8212; the Taiping Rebellion. He was inspired by Christian tracts that missionaries had brought to China. So you do have some of that.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> He claimed to be the brother of Christ.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Precisely, yes. Now, obviously, that&#8217;s not the same as Mao Zedong and the cult around Mao, but I&#8217;m saying there are antecedents in Chinese history for a quasi-Christian following to gather quite a bit of steam.</p><p>So I think what you have in Mao is a cult of personality that certainly burned very bright for a relatively brief amount of time. But you didn&#8217;t have the same systematic approach that you saw with Kim Il Sung. For those who do read my book, you&#8217;ll find that there are many socialist allied countries whose diplomats in Pyongyang are, very early on, writing diplomatic cables back to their respective capitals and remarking on just how advanced and how far removed from orthodox Marxism-Leninism this cult of personality around Kim Il Sung is. Very quickly, it adopts these religious overtones, and it was very striking to these Eastern European diplomats, who of course would have been familiar with the traditional tropes and imagery and iconography of Christianity.</p><p>So I would say that Kim Il Sung begins almost right away, in his 30s. He&#8217;s only 33 years old when he takes power. And I think the real difference is that the runway Kim Il Sung had was so much longer, because he had from 1945, when he arrived back in Pyongyang, until his death in 1994. That&#8217;s 49 years &#8212; half a century. It&#8217;s a smaller population than China, certainly, but it burned bright and it stayed bright for decades and decades. And of course, unlike Mao, his cult was not repudiated after his death.</p><p>While it isn&#8217;t a prerequisite to have a Christian upbringing to have a cult of personality, I think Kim Il Sung is unique in that he really understood quite well how religion works, how faith works, how belief works &#8212; and how it can be harnessed, how it can be instrumentalized, how it can be weaponized, if you want to use that word. I quote in here a speech that Kim Il Sung gives quite early on &#8212; we know about the speech because the North Koreans have published it &#8212; where he tells his cadres to take cues from evangelical Christian pastors who have done a very good job of bringing young Koreans into the church. We should emulate them, we should learn from them. So you get these glimpses where it becomes very clear that he did model it on Christianity in some way.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I think one main difference with China is that Kim Il Sung has been followed by his son, and his son was followed by his son, and might be followed by his daughter &#8212; so it&#8217;s a dynastic succession. Now, that seems to me to point to something that is not so much Christian as possibly Confucian, modeled after the old Chinese imperial system, or indeed Japanese.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Yes, you can certainly point to Confucianism, but you could also turn to medieval Europe, or to any sort of feudal system where hereditary rule was the default, was the expected norm.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> China has that as well. We have revolutionary princelings, right? There&#8217;s definitely hereditary stuff in there as well.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Right. And this points to one trap that I was trying to avoid while I was trying to conceive and write and research this book. Something like bowing before a statue of Kim Il Sung, which everyone&#8217;s expected to do when they arrive in Pyongyang, or handing off power to your son &#8212; I don&#8217;t want to say that it&#8217;s exclusively from one tradition or another. I mean, who can say? Even if you had Kim Il Sung in front of you and you asked him, he may not be able to give you an honest answer, because he may not be able to articulate it himself. So I don&#8217;t want to say that what we see in North Korea today is 28 percent Confucian, 14.5 percent Christian, and so on. That would be a fool&#8217;s errand &#8212; and of course, I throw out these numbers to show how absurd such an idea would be.</p><p>But what we can certainly say is that Kim Il Sung was, like everyone, a product of all of the various influences in his life. And I think the one unmistakable influence in his life and in his family&#8217;s life that no one had seriously looked at &#8212; and this is really why I wrote this book. The reason the book is so long is because I was just astounded by how much I was able to find, and how explicit Kim Il Sung&#8217;s debt to Christianity was in terms of his upbringing and how he became the man that he did.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Jon, do you think that Kim Il Sung was Christian at some point? Or was he just a nationalist who conveniently used Christianity for his nationalism?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> I don&#8217;t know whether he was Christian or not, and it depends on how you define a Christian. Some people would say, well, he was born and raised in a Christian family, therefore he&#8217;s Christian. I wouldn&#8217;t agree with that statement myself. Whether or not anyone is a Christian &#8212; if you want to talk about Donald Trump, is Donald Trump a Christian? Is George W. Bush a Christian? &#8212; I would say the answer is really whether or not that person has made a decision that they want to identify that way, and that they really believe the doctrine to some degree. It&#8217;s hard to quantify. But in the case of Kim Il Sung &#8212; who am I to say? is really the answer, because I don&#8217;t know. He certainly never self-identified as a Christian. He self-identified as somebody who grew up going to church, who was very familiar with the church and very familiar with the Bible. And to some people, that would mean that he was a Christian &#8212; open and shut case.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> But that wasn&#8217;t the case at some point in his life, right? Later in his life, about when he was about to die, he starts to re-embrace his Christianity. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Yeah, that&#8217;s right. Though &#8220;re-embrace&#8221; is an interesting word. I don&#8217;t know that he re-embraces it per se. The word I might choose instead is that he re-engages with his faith &#8212; that&#8217;s for sure. Whether the prefix &#8220;re&#8221; suggests that he had embraced the faith earlier, I&#8217;m not entirely certain about either. But I think that he was a product of a church upbringing. He definitely understood how Christianity works at a sociological level. I think he understood how it worked at a theological level as well. That&#8217;s not the same as saying that he necessarily embraced it or believed it, which in my books would make him a Christian.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Can you perhaps become a bit more specific on that point and tell us what the Christian influence really consisted of? We know he grew up as a Christian, surrounded by Christians. We know that there were a lot of missionaries in Pyongyang. What would you identify as Christian in his cult?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Sure. I&#8217;ll start by picking up a little bit on what you&#8217;ve just laid out there, Ian. It is true that he was born and raised in this city that, by the time he was born in 1912, was already known as the Jerusalem of the East. His grandparents were converts to Christianity and quite devout. His parents were effectively raised in the church &#8212; certainly his mother was raised in the church. And this is a religion that had just arrived. By this religion, I refer specifically to Protestant Christianity, and more specifically to Presbyterianism. Catholicism is a separate thread &#8212; it actually enters Korea a little bit earlier &#8212; but we&#8217;ll set that aside.</p><p>This was a faith that was very vibrant, because it was the fervor of the newly converted. This was not something that those who had converted went through the motions on. If you go to a church in the West now, you may have families that have been Christian for many generations but may not take it very seriously. That was not the case here in Pyongyang. And when Kim Il Sung was growing up, he was not just somebody who showed up for church on Sundays because his parents dragged him out. He was intimately familiar with the church, and he was very active as well. He was teaching Sunday school, he was learning to play the organ, he was performing in church plays, he was doing all sorts of things in the church, and he was very familiar with the Bible. We know this because even towards the end of his life &#8212; and in his 30s, and all throughout his life &#8212; you see him quoting from the Bible in North Korean sources. North Korean sources will show us Kim Il Sung displaying his knowledge of the Bible.</p><p>How does that translate into the cult of personality that he built? This is where, again, it gets a little bit tricky, and I want to take a page from what I said in response to the previous question. I don&#8217;t want to say: you point to this thing in Christianity and it tracks neatly onto Kimilsungism, onto his cult of personality. You&#8217;ll see some people say Christianity has the Holy Trinity &#8212; the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit &#8212; and then say, well, North Korea also has its holy trinity, and its holy trinity would be Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il... and actually, this is where it breaks down a little bit. People will disagree on what the third person of the Trinity in North Korea is supposed to be. Some people will say it&#8217;s Kim Il Sung&#8217;s wife, the mother of Kim Jong Il. Some will say, no, it&#8217;s the Juche ideology of North Korea. Some will say, no, it&#8217;s the masses, the people. Or some will say, no, it&#8217;s the party &#8212; the Workers&#8217; Party of Korea.</p><p>So I don&#8217;t know that I would say Kim Il Sung did some sort of a copy-and-paste job. The idea that one would bow before the statue of Kim Il Sung when you arrive in Pyongyang is not something that is done in a Presbyterian church. That practice, while I think very evidently religious to us &#8212; the idea of bowing before a bronze statue of another person is a religious act &#8212; I don&#8217;t know that I would call it a Christian act per se.</p><p>What I can say is that when you talk to North Korean defectors &#8212; the 30,000 or so North Koreans who have fled the country and resettled in South Korea &#8212; many of them will tell you that when they first encounter Christianity (because of course they&#8217;re not allowed to really engage with Christianity in North Korea; when they come out, they&#8217;re often introduced to it through the South Korean missionaries helping them get to South Korea), many of them will just be bowled over. They will remark on how similar it is &#8212; this Christian faith they&#8217;re being introduced to versus the Kimilsungism that they were raised in. Some of them will point to specific things like the Ten Principles in North Korea, the highest set of principles and doctrines in the land. Many of them will say it&#8217;s so clearly inspired by the Ten Commandments. And yet it&#8217;s not like you could track the first commandment over to the first principle and the second commandment to the second principle. It doesn&#8217;t work that way. So I just want to resist a little bit this notion that it was a copy-and-paste job, because I simply don&#8217;t think that&#8217;s what happened here.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> It sounds to me that he transposed his learnings of Christianity from his upbringing to his own personality cult. But one possible interpretation is that he understands his audience. I wonder whether this interpretation is valid: that he may have not been a Christian, but he was so aware of the Christian faith among the people of North Korea that he knew how to place himself into the Christian-shaped hole in people&#8217;s brains. Is that a fair assessment?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> No, I think you&#8217;ve hit the nail on the head. He tells us that people need something to believe in. And: I&#8217;m going to be that person that they&#8217;re going to believe in. I&#8217;m going to be that messiah, that messianic figure, because everyone needs that &#8212; the Korean people need that. And he is explicit about that in his own memoir. We have a couple of these incidents in his eight-volume memoir &#8212; which very few North Korea scholars, I think, have actually read. I don&#8217;t want to make a blanket statement here, but I&#8217;ve raised it in a lot of conversations, and I don&#8217;t believe there have been too many North Korea scholars who have read all eight volumes. And that&#8217;s mostly because it is filled with a lot of fiction. And yet you have these anecdotes, these moments in his adolescence, where he very self-consciously breaks the fourth wall and helps explain why it is that he adopts this persona of Kim Il Sung &#8212; that&#8217;s not his birth name. That&#8217;s why he takes on this almost Superman type of figure, where he&#8217;s able to teleport, where he&#8217;s able to turn bullets into pine cones, where he&#8217;s able, effectively, almost to walk on water. He knows he can&#8217;t do this, and he makes that very clear. And yet he knows that the Korean people, who have been colonized by Japan, their hated neighbors, for 40 years &#8212; if you include the five years of the protectorate &#8212; want someone to believe in. They want a Korean messiah. They want somebody who is going to vanquish the Japanese. And even though we know that it wasn&#8217;t because of Kim Il Sung that the Japanese surrendered, it was such a craving in the nationalist spirit that at some level they were willing to suspend disbelief and attribute the defeat of the Japanese not to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but rather to this guerrilla fighter, born to Christian parents, who called himself Kim Il Sung and claimed to have vanquished the Japanese. And so I think that&#8217;s really what he took away from Christianity.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> So Jon, what you just said makes a lot of sense. You obviously can&#8217;t put percentages on influences, and there are many, in all countries. What I find extraordinary in the history of China and Korea and Japan is that you so often find these hybrids between Western &#8212; in this case Christian &#8212; influences and much older local cultures. In the cult of Kim Il Sung, they also make a lot of the sacred mountain, Paektu, which is where he was supposedly a guerrilla fighter, with Tan&#8217;gun, the founder of the Korean state, and all that. And so it&#8217;s these hybrids that are interesting, and they have one thing in common &#8212; and this is where I&#8217;d like you to elaborate a little bit more on the Taiping. Why is this phenomenon &#8212; which of course you&#8217;ll find in many different countries, not just in Asia &#8212; seemingly particularly strong in Korea and other parts of East Asia: this phenomenon of messianic figures who use Christianity as well as local shamanistic and other religions to position themselves as holy figures? This is not something you find so often in France, or even in Spain or Turkey. There is something East Asian about this. What could it be?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> It&#8217;s a great question. Generally, it is true, of course, that syncretism &#8212; this idea that religions mix and blend and indigenize &#8212; is natural. That&#8217;s part of the reason that a foreign religion can become a domestic religion, can take root in a place: it has to almost meld with the local culture in order to succeed in any way.</p><p>But certainly, in this book I spent a lot of time thinking about Korea in particular, and I got this question a lot, including from Koreans: is there something special about the Korean case? A lot of people will point to this notion that there seem to be more cults, for want of a better word, in Korea than in many other countries. The only point I&#8217;ll make here is that some people have theorized &#8212; Koreans have theorized &#8212; that Korea has thrived, in a sense, by going to extremes: by internalizing foreign ideologies and taking them to their logical endpoint. You could point to Confucianism, because almost any scholar of Confucius would tell you that the most Confucian country in the world is probably Korea &#8212; it&#8217;s probably not the Chinese. If you want to take a foreign ideology such as socialism, or Marxism-Leninism, or Stalinism, if you want to call it that, you can look at what the North Koreans did &#8212; they took it to a degree that surprised even their socialist bloc allies. Christianity, certainly, as I describe in the book: when it first enters Korea, the converts take it to a degree that you didn&#8217;t see in Japan or in India or in China. Indeed, even the Western missionaries who brought Christianity to Korea were stunned at how quickly and how fervently the Koreans adopted it. You could say the same of capitalism in South Korea, because it&#8217;s become this hyper-capitalistic society. You could even turn to K-pop music and say that what the Koreans did with Western pop music was to take it, internalize it, and take it to its logical extreme &#8212; which is how it&#8217;s managed to stand out even in that realm as well.</p><p>So I don&#8217;t know if I&#8217;ve directly answered your question, Ian, but I feel like that&#8217;s part of explaining how this Christianity, how this cult of personality, takes root in Korea and becomes something so much more than what you see in Stalin&#8217;s USSR or in Mao&#8217;s China.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yeah, I agree with you that it&#8217;s a mug&#8217;s game to do what many Koreans, and indeed Japanese, are prone to do &#8212; or Chinese &#8212; which is to see themselves as more unique than they really are. And I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s uniquely Korean. But this is a speculation I&#8217;m just putting to you. It could be that all three countries have a long history of imperial rule, where the emperor was also a sacred figure. And what happens when a sacred institution collapses is that you get a lot of mini-emperors. This was often said in Japan just after the war: when the imperial system collapsed, when the emperor had to say he was not divine, you got a lot of mini-emperors who had their own little cults. And maybe in China and Korea and Japan, the collapse of sacred imperial rule paved the way for figures like Mao, and for the Kim dynasty, that in a grotesque way took the place of something that was very culturally established.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> I think that&#8217;s a fascinating theory. What I tried to do in my research was less to give a grand theory &#8212; the best thing I could do was simply to present the facts as best as I could find them, and to unearth as much as I could about Kim Il Sung&#8217;s own Christian upbringing, but also about how he ended up constructing this cult of personality that was so striking to people who grew up in the system, as well as to the Christian leaders that Kim Il Sung, towards the end of his life, invites to come visit him in Pyongyang, who engage with his cult of personality and find it just striking in its parallels.</p><p>And of course, Kim Il Sung himself wrestles with Christianity again in the last decade or two of his life. He&#8217;s very explicit in grappling with his upbringing and in trying to make sense of it himself &#8212; because he too was mortal, and he too, I presume, was grappling with his own mortality, but also the immortality that he had created around himself. Because today, here we are in 2026, more than three decades after his death, and he is still the eternal president of North Korea. There&#8217;s a lot here that I think was deeply embedded in his own psyche, and so much of what the North Korean experience is, is an outward manifestation of the internal grappling that he had with his own upbringing in this Western faith.</p><p>And part of my purpose, if there was a purpose in writing this, other than to satiate my own curiosity, was to posit that North Korea is misunderstood when we look at it primarily as a political nation-state. It absolutely is a nation-state, but I think that fundamentally overlooks so much of what makes North Korea what it is. And my own theory about what it is, is that it&#8217;s a religious society &#8212; it&#8217;s a nuclear-armed religious society &#8212; but at core, I believe it&#8217;s a religious society that is built around the veneration of the Kim family.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> No, that is clearly the case. Jon, if one looks at Christian influence in East Asian countries, it&#8217;s so interesting because it has so many different facets. On the one hand, there is what you point out &#8212; the Presbyterian influences that may have gone into the cult of Kim Il Sung. Lee Kuan Yew, the strongman of Singapore, liked to say he admired the Leninist organization of the Catholic Church, and took a lot of his own autocratic notions from that. But then there is the other side of Christianity, which fires up a lot of dissidents &#8212; a lot of Chinese dissidents against the Communist Party, very much including Jimmy Lai, the newspaper owner who&#8217;s now in prison in Hong Kong &#8212; who think that Christianity is the only way to fight against Chinese authoritarianism, because it&#8217;s an alternative dogma, and so on. Maybe there is something to be looked at here, which you&#8217;ve already hinted at in an earlier answer: one reason why East Asians take to these hybrids is indeed the tradition of syncretic religions &#8212; there is no one dogma, there isn&#8217;t a Buddhist dogma or a Shintoist dogma or anything like that. What the dictatorships have often done is to create a new dogma &#8212; Mao&#8217;s Little Red Book, Kim Il Sung&#8217;s Ten Principles, and so on. And that may be the biggest influence of a monotheistic religion, in this case Christianity, which these countries have luckily not really had before &#8212; an import from the West that has had very unfortunate consequences.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Yeah. One point that I like to pull out from what you just said is that perhaps in America, this notion of separation of church and state &#8212; this ideal, anyway &#8212; is more the exception than the rule. In many places, religion and politics should perhaps be seen as a continuum. Certainly the Vatican would be a wonderful illustration of how politics and religion dovetail almost entirely in a state. And I would put North Korea right up there. There is a state religion, and that state religion is Kimilsungism &#8212; he&#8217;s literally written into the constitution of the country. And yet what it represents is something that&#8217;s true in every polity, which is that there is always an element of loyalty demanded by the state. But loyalty can bleed into something larger than loyalty &#8212; into devotion, into almost a veneration and worship. It&#8217;s a continuum, in a certain way.</p><p>And Kim Il Sung was really good at it &#8212; so good at it that when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, when the USSR and the Eastern Bloc collapsed in 1991, nobody thought that the North Koreans would be able to keep it going. And yet here we are, two more generations later. It&#8217;s now 2026, and in some ways the North Korean state is looking more impregnable than it&#8217;s ever looked. It has nuclear weapons. It is not in danger, I don&#8217;t think, of going the way of a Venezuela or an Iran, as we&#8217;ve seen this year, because of its possession of a nuclear deterrent. And it has a cult of personality that &#8212; and this is another contrast with Mao &#8212; there was never any liberalization, there was never any reform and opening in North Korea, there was never any glasnost or perestroika in North Korea. North Korea has only adhered to a very extreme and highly dogmatic cult of personality since 1945, with almost no breathing room. It has sustained itself at a very, very high level now for more than eight decades.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I think one great merit of your book is that it makes mincemeat of the clich&#233; that you often hear in East Asia: &#8220;we are not a religious people, we don&#8217;t have religion here.&#8221; People in China say it, people in Japan say it, and people in Korea. This is clearly bullshit. They&#8217;re as religious, and as prone to worship and submission and so on, as any other people. And what is interesting is the form that it takes. In North Korea, and certainly in Mao&#8217;s China, they had to actually believe dogmatically in everything that the great leader said or wrote &#8212; hence the fact that in photographs of the Kims, you see all these dignitaries behind them scribbling notes. Every word is a lesson to be taught. And this idea that you have to believe dogmatically &#8212; I think that&#8217;s the main legacy of Christianity, of a monotheistic religion, which didn&#8217;t exist before.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Although I am frequently asked: how much do you think the fervor on display in North Korea &#8212; when Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un walks into the room and you see everyone almost in a state of ecstasy &#8212; how much of that is real? First of all, let&#8217;s begin with the idea that there is no way to know for sure. But I think most people would accept that not all of it is real &#8212; some of it is feigned, some of it may be affected &#8212; and yet I still think that the vast majority of it is probably real. Again, I can&#8217;t prove that.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, but if you put a bunch of teenagers with Taylor Swift, they&#8217;d react in a very similar way. I actually saw it, because I was in Pyongyang a few months after Kim Il Sung died. I was told to go and mingle with a crowd that bowed to the statue, and you had professional mourners in the Korean tradition, through loudspeakers, who were wailing and crying, and there were a lot of teachers with children. And many of these children probably didn&#8217;t have very strong feelings about the great leader, but as soon as they saw their teachers cry and heard it through the loudspeakers, it became a matter of crowd psychology. There&#8217;s nothing particularly Korean about it &#8212; and then they all went into hysterics.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Yes, that&#8217;s right. I think in many ways, the fans of a rock star or a pop star or a movie star are akin, in many ways, to a religious experience.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yeah &#8212; which is why the founding fathers wanted to keep it separate. One almost begins to think, and I say this as somebody who has no religion whatsoever, that organized religion, just like rock concerts, is actually a good thing, because it allows people to go through all these things without it becoming political.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Jon, there&#8217;s a line in your book that says this guy who grew up Christian became the greatest persecutor of Christians. How do you explain that about him?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> I think the answer, in my mind, is quite straightforward. He harnessed the power of Christianity because he understood it. But part of understanding the power of Christianity is then recognizing it as a potential threat. In other words, I think he recognized Christianity as both a blueprint and a potential threat to the very pseudo-Christian belief system that he himself was propagating and championing. We&#8217;ve seen how Christianity has transformed our species over the last 2,000 years, and how it&#8217;s affected the sweep of history.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Do you think that if, in an alternative historical timeline, Japan was really nice to the Koreans, Christianity would not have been so ubiquitous in North Korea, and it may not have been called the Jerusalem of the East?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> It&#8217;s a great question, because I spend a lot of the book explaining how the flourishing of Christianity in Korea went hand in hand with the rise of Korean nationalism. I&#8217;m very careful about putting the two words &#8220;Christian&#8221; and &#8220;nationalism&#8221; next to one another, because it carries so much baggage in the context of modern-day America, for one thing. But certainly that&#8217;s what you saw happen in Korea at the dawn of the 20th century: the two really flourished as parallel, intertwined ideologies. Because Christianity did not enter Korea as a classically imperialist endeavor, the way Christianity entered the Americas &#8212; as an imperialistic handmaiden to the conquering power. In Korea, the conquering power was actually a non-Christian nation, a Shinto nation, and Christianity, rather than being associated with the ruling colonial force, was actually seen as a bulwark against the encroaching imperialist power. So yes, I do think that if Japan&#8217;s colonial rule over Korea had not been as cruel and as iron-fisted as it was, it is possible that Christianity would not have flourished to the same degree in Korea. That&#8217;s a big counterfactual, and I don&#8217;t know how far we can possibly take it. But it&#8217;s a fascinating one to consider.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> There&#8217;s something I noticed in your book that made me think of this, which had to do with something I&#8217;m familiar with: the Zainichi Koreans. These are the Koreans who live in Japan. During the war efforts in World War II, Japan forced a lot of Koreans to move to Japan, and a lot of them stayed. And one thing that stuck out from your book was that during the time Kim Il Sung was cultivating his cult of personality, there seemed to be a lot of Zainichi Koreans who were not on the mainland &#8212; they were not, in fact, living anywhere near Kim Il Sung &#8212; but they somehow fell into his cult of personality. I wondered whether the reason is that they had a common enemy: the Japanese. They were extremely discriminated against &#8212; famously, the Zainichi Koreans are discriminated against in Japan &#8212; and they saw Kim Il Sung as the nationalist figure that would liberate them from the Japanese.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> I think you&#8217;re spot on. Most of the Zainichi Koreans, as far as I understand it, are actually from what we would now call South Korea &#8212; the southern half of the peninsula; of course, they were all over there before the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel. So none of them should have necessarily had a geographic or familial tie, or reason to associate with Kim Il Sung. And yet most of these Koreans were indeed, as you say, the underclass in Osaka, in Tokyo, in these other cities &#8212; including, by the way, Kim Jong Un&#8217;s mother, who, as Anna Fifield wrote in her biography of Kim Jong Un, was singing in the choir of the Korean church in Osaka.</p><p>And many of them do end up identifying with Kim Il Sung. There&#8217;s one particular source that I cite &#8212; a memoir from a Zainichi Korean who ends up in North Korea and later escapes &#8212; who talks exactly about this. He said that Kim Il Sung was like a Robin Hood-Superman sort of messianic figure to these Zainichi Koreans: this superhero who could single-handedly vanquish the Japanese. And even if it was fanciful, bordering on utterly fictional &#8212; a comic book portrayal of Kim Il Sung &#8212; it&#8217;s what they wanted to believe. And because they wanted to believe it, and because Kim Il Sung was so willing to play the part, it had a real attraction, a real magnetism, for many of these Zainichi Koreans.</p><p>And that&#8217;s another thing I really hope I got across in the book: from the outside, it&#8217;s so easy to mock North Korea. We know that because so many people in the West get their understanding of North Korea from <em>Team America: World Police</em>, that movie from 2004, or from <em>The Interview</em>, the movie from a few years back that Sony Pictures put out &#8212; to their regret later. The Kim family is so easy to mock in a certain way, because of the way they look, because of how isolated the country is. And yet it&#8217;s not all what you might dismiss as brainwashing. I think there really is a genuine appeal to this plucky country that has been able to stand up to the great imperialist powers of the day. Here it is in 2026, with a nuclear deterrent, with a fourth generation waiting in the wings. This is a success story, when you consider what happened to all of North Korea&#8217;s ideological and socialist peers.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So I was kind of sympathetic to Kim Il Sung in the first half of the book, because he just comes across as a guy who &#8212; there&#8217;s an interesting section where you highlight the moment when he explicitly says he&#8217;s basically going to start a personality cult: people need a hero, and I&#8217;m going to be that person. But then in the second half of the book, things take a really dark turn. His personality cult becomes deranged; it becomes very aggressive. And I&#8217;m wondering whether there was a tipping point &#8212; the fall, the moment Adam ate the apple. In your research, did you find anything that explains how it became so dark in the second half of the book?</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Well, I would point to two moments. One is when he first comes to power in 1945. You see him actually not persecuting Christians right away. He is taking power in Pyongyang, and he knows &#8212; because he&#8217;s a child of Pyongyang &#8212; that this is a conservative Christian stronghold. So he actually reaches out with an olive branch to the Christian leaders of Pyongyang. He quotes scripture, he shows off his knowledge of the Bible, he talks about his favorite hymn from when he was a child, and all the rest of it. But then you have this assassination attempt on him very early on &#8212; March the 1st, 1946 &#8212; and on his distant uncle, whom he later makes the vice president of the DPRK. I think that&#8217;s one moment where you can see the dark side come out. Certainly the Christians who were trying to kill him &#8212; one might say they weren&#8217;t practicing the highest ideals of Christian teachings &#8212; and yet one can understand how an assassination attempt or two can change your mind about working with these Christians. That&#8217;s one moment.</p><p>The other comes in 1956, when Khrushchev in Moscow calls for de-Stalinization and the scrapping of the personality cult. When Khrushchev tries to squeeze him, they even do a joint intervention: the USSR and the PRC send two of their top men to Pyongyang to try and get Kim Il Sung in line. And he also faces a coup attempt at this point &#8212; the only real coup attempt he faces is also in 1956.</p><p>I think it&#8217;s actually pretty simple. In 1946, Christians tried to kill him, and in 1956, his own more orthodox Marxist-Leninist colleagues tried to depose him. In both cases, he fends off the challenge, he gets more extreme, and he doubles down on his cult of personality. And I think that&#8217;s really what happens.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yeah, but I&#8217;d like to challenge the idea of him as a nice fellow full of Christian virtue, who somehow psychologically tipped over into something else, in the way that power corrupts and so on. Don&#8217;t forget: he was a ruthless operator who would never have been in power had it not been for Stalin&#8217;s Soviet Union. He was their puppet. They put him in there. He knew what they were doing and used them, but they were also using him. So the thing was pretty dark from the very beginning. And you describe in your book, very well and in great detail, how there were far more decent people, many of them Christians, who could have had political power in North Korea and were ruthlessly disposed of. The same case has often been made for Ho Chi Minh &#8212; that he was really a liberal, and it was only American imperialism that turned him into a despot. And this is nonsense. He was never a Jeffersonian liberal.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> No &#8212; and thank you for making that point, Ian. I think that&#8217;s exactly right. There&#8217;s been this portrayal of him as almost bumbling his way to the top. But this was a very high-stakes game. This was life or death. The elbows were very sharp. Kim Il Sung was a genuinely charismatic figure &#8212; I believe that, not having met him, but from the photos and everything that&#8217;s written about him, I think there was a charm to him. But that doesn&#8217;t change the fact that beneath it there was a real ruthlessness that was necessary in order for him to get to where he got. There&#8217;s no way he even gets to 1956 as the leader of North Korea &#8212; perhaps there&#8217;s not even a way he gets to March 1946, when that assassination attempt takes place &#8212; unless he is very sharp-elbowed indeed. He was incredible at playing that game, as well as the game of playing his two patrons, the USSR and the PRC, off one another, as you pointed out, Ian. And also at understanding how to instill a deep, deep sense of devotion, loyalty, and worship in his people. He didn&#8217;t finish high school; he wasn&#8217;t particularly well read and educated in that regard. And yet he was very skilled in the school of hard knocks, if you want to call it that. He knew how human nature works, and he was incredibly savvy about it.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Can we talk about the other Korean messiah, Sun Myung Moon? He is also a North Korean, and he&#8217;s potentially, in a way, more powerful than Kim Il Sung, because of the power that he projects globally with the Unification Church and its different branches &#8212; his followers are sometimes called the Moonies. The person who assassinated Shinzo Abe had a mother who was deeply tied to the Unification Church. So Jon, I just want to ask: how should we think about Sun Myung Moon in light of all this research you&#8217;ve done on Kim Il Sung? Maybe also talk about their relationship, because their relationship is also bizarre &#8212; I don&#8217;t quite understand how they came to embrace at some point. Enlighten us about Sun Myung Moon, please.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Sure. This is a section of the book where I talk about all three men &#8212; not just Kim Il Sung and Sun Myung Moon, but also Jim Jones. They understood this human need to have answers, to understand what happens after we die, to find meaning, to find community, to have someone to look up to and to follow, in a certain sense. And I think all three of them were masters &#8212; were genius &#8212; at turning this mere devotion into something larger.</p><p>So yes, the Reverend Moon is this fascinating figure, because he&#8217;s just eight years younger than Kim Il Sung, and also born in northwestern Korea. He too is a messianic figure &#8212; a Korean messiah, as it were. He appears in Pyongyang and begins to preach there in 1945, the same time that Kim Il Sung is coming to power in that same city. And it&#8217;s Kim Il Sung&#8217;s state that locks up the Reverend Moon, twice. When Reverend Moon makes it out of North Korea, he becomes an anti-communist crusader and a preacher who melds his version of Christianity with anti-communism. That endears him, of course, to Richard Nixon. It brings him to the U.S. He presides over his famous mass weddings. He buys up all of these assets &#8212; the Washington Times newspaper, the New Yorker Hotel just outside Madison Square Garden. He builds up this sushi empire in the U.S.</p><p>What&#8217;s interesting is that all three of these men controlled different faith communities. Jim Jones&#8217;s was very clearly this swath of the jungle in Guyana, where he was the unquestioned deity, almost. In Reverend Moon, what you have is not a geographically delimited faith community &#8212; it&#8217;s a transnational one. But I think what really makes Kim Il Sung stand out among the three is that he happened to build his following within the confines of a nation-state. And he was able to do that because he was in the right place at the right time, but also because he was very wily: he played his cards right, and he managed to maneuver himself into the favor of Stalin and position himself in Pyongyang. But all three of them, at some level, were able to blend belief, faith, and political power, and turn themselves into these messianic figures with almost total sway over their followers.</p><p>So I think that by the time the Reverend Moon comes to Pyongyang at the invitation of Kim Il Sung, the two of them are both survivors. They&#8217;ve both been doing this for decades and decades. They both have total dominion over millions of their followers. And so I think there&#8217;s a sense of mutual respect there. And so they embrace in Pyongyang, as you mentioned &#8212; I have the photo in my book. The Reverend Moon sets up the Potonggang Hotel in Pyongyang, which still stands today and still takes guests. They start an automotive joint venture together, Pyeonghwa Motors. And Kim Il Sung permits the Reverend Moon to turn his birthplace in northwestern Korea into a pilgrimage site.</p><p>Actually, Chang, I sort of have the opposite view of you: it&#8217;s not bizarre, in a certain sense. It makes perfect sense. The two of them understand each other &#8212; they&#8217;re two peas in a pod, one could almost say, in that they could look each other in the eye.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> It&#8217;s kind of like Trump and Xi.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Yeah &#8212; they&#8217;re so different in so many ways, and they were antagonistic on the surface in so many ways, and yet there was perhaps more that bound them together than actually divided them. And I think that&#8217;s what you saw at the end of their respective lives.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Great. Okay, well, with that, thank you so much, Jonathan Cheng. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Jonathan:</strong> Thank you. It was a real pleasure being here &#8212; really, just so much fun talking about this and putting it in context.<em> Messiah: Kim Il Sung and the Christian Roots of North Korea's Personality Cult </em>(Knopf, April 2026)</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Velvet Prison: Self-Censorship from Berlin to Beijing to New York]]></title><description><![CDATA[How should decent people live in indecent societies?]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-velvet-prison-self-censorship-bc8</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-velvet-prison-self-censorship-bc8</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980740/097bd9e4685cda5d31fa6900f5512d1e.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How should decent people live in indecent societies? Chang and Ian look at historical cases from Nazi Germany and contemporary China to see how artists and intellectuals responded, and resisted, as their societies grew increasingly intolerant of dissent. We discuss the current state of the United States, the rift between exiles and those who choose to stay, and the moral implications of "inner emigration."</p><p>Readings:&nbsp;<br>Ian Buruma: https://libertiesjournal.com/articles/staying-decent-in-an-indecent-society/</p><p>The Velvet Prison: https://www.amazon.com/Velvet-Prison-Miklos-Haraszti/dp/0465098002</p><p>Brave New World: https://www.amazon.com/Brave-New-World-Aldous-Huxley/dp/0060850523</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Trump at the Imperial Court]]></title><description><![CDATA[Chang and Ian unpack Trump's historic summit with Xi Jinping.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/trump-at-the-imperial-court-eb2</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/trump-at-the-imperial-court-eb2</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2026 18:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980741/1250a332bd6fdb88766cf1b1cc1a556e.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Chang and Ian unpack Trump's historic summit with Xi Jinping. They discuss the pageantry, the Taiwan question, the first serious bilateral talks on AI, plus the echoes of Marco Polo and the Macartney Missions: the consistent awe and fear that transpires whenever the West encounters the Middle Kingdom.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I just came out of Asia as the Trump summit with Xi Jinping is happening, and have landed in New York. It&#8217;s been an interesting experience China-watching from afar as Donald Trump flew to Asia. And a lot of the journalists &#8212; what they call the pool of journalists that follow Donald Trump on Air Force One &#8212; also went to China to cover the summit. I&#8217;m curious, how have you been consuming the coverage?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I have been watching the videos. The word &#8220;pool&#8221; reminds me of when I myself was a reporter in one of those pools in China, which was in 1988, I think, when we followed the then Queen of England, Queen Elizabeth, and her husband, Prince Philip, around on the royal tour of China. The pools were very important. The royal watchers who were used to following the Queen around on these tours were very worried that there wasn&#8217;t really a story. The first story that was pooled was the question, during a banquet in Shanghai, of whether the Queen would eat sea cucumber. The conclusion was that she indeed ate a sea cucumber. But I don&#8217;t think that&#8217;s the kind of thing &#8212; the journalists around Trump are probably equally frivolous as we were.</p><p>But what I thought was interesting were the visuals of it. It showed very much China showing off its power, the longevity of its great civilization, and so on, to a rather crass American who knows little about anything and was clearly very impressed. So it was sort of back to many centuries ago, when China saw itself as the superior &#8212; the Middle Kingdom &#8212; an ancient civilization that didn&#8217;t really need business with barbarians from the West. And Trump seemed to be sort of begging for business, hoping to make lots of money from this huge market. In that sense, it was not so different from earlier missions from Europe, such as the famous Macartney mission, always with this dream of getting very rich off this huge market in China.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> There was this layered aspect of the Trump visit that I was thinking about, which is that any previous US president would go into these summits with some dose of cynicism and some awareness that these kinds of pomp and ceremonial celebrations the Chinese put on are part of their tradition. It&#8217;s part of a kind of regal, imperial, but also authoritarian cult-of-personality tradition, including the children waving. And Chinese are aware of this too. If you look on Twitter or Threads, where Chinese are posting about it &#8212; because you can&#8217;t post about it on Weibo, which is censored &#8212; there&#8217;s a sense of irony around these kinds of celebrations. If, for example, Obama had come to visit, they would also be aware of this in the back of their heads. But the funny thing about Trump is that he just doesn&#8217;t have that awareness. So he comes into this with a kind of surprise, like, what an amazing reception they have put on for me. There&#8217;s waving children, look at this military. He&#8217;s like a kid in a candy store.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> There are nuances in the way that Chinese flatter visitors, and sometimes visitors are snubbed if the Chinese government is angry with them for one reason or another. It depends on who meets the visiting dignitary at the airport, whether they&#8217;re shown around Zhongnanhai, whether Chinese leaders live, who sits where at the banquet &#8212; all those things send signals. And the Chinese, as you point out, are past masters at that, because they have a very long tradition of that kind of ritual.</p><p>Now, it&#8217;s true that Trump is na&#239;ve and thinks it&#8217;s all for him. When he was shown around Zhongnanhai, he asked whether other foreign leaders had been there before him. And Xi Jinping said <em>hen shao</em> &#8212; very few.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I think he added except Putin.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> And Trump was pleased as punch. But Xi Jinping also knows Trump&#8217;s vulnerabilities. He knows that Trump is na&#239;ve and wants pomp and ceremony and wants to be reassured and made to feel that he&#8217;s very important. So they laid it on thick &#8212; not because they always do that, but because they know that Trump is very susceptible to that kind of thing.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I think that gets us to what you think all this pomp and circumstance from the Chinese was meant to do. In the Chinese readout, much of what they summarized about the discussions focused on Taiwan and what Xi Jinping was telling Trump on Taiwan. The rest was very vague. There was a wording about the Middle East, but even the word &#8220;Iran&#8221; or &#8220;Hormuz&#8221; was not touched on at all in the Chinese readout. The business partnerships and the economic partnerships, which was the major focus of the American readout, was very little discussed in the Chinese. So do you think it&#8217;s right to say that part of the coddling of Trump is meant to try and get him to sway on Taiwan?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, I do think that. And again, they know their man. They know how easy it is to get things out of him if you flatter him enough. Whether what he says at any moment is binding is another thing. I don&#8217;t think the visuals &#8212; the show &#8212; are insignificant, because this is maybe the first time the Chinese have made it very clear that they are at least equal to the United States as a great power. Since World War Two, the Americans are used to being the most powerful nation on earth, and their presidents needed to be paid proper deference for that reason. In this case, it was very clear that Trump was not there &#8212; even though AI fakes have shown images of Trump bowing deeply to Xi, which apparently never happened. But it was very clear that, at least according to the visuals, it was not a case of the Americans coming to Beijing as the superior power.</p><p>And Trump wanted to get something out of Xi. Xi didn&#8217;t necessarily want to get anything material out of Trump. Just like the Qing emperors, who said, why should we buy anything that you have to offer? We have enough. It was the British who went to Beijing to pay deference to the imperial court, who wanted business. What the Chinese side did want was indeed a concession on Taiwan. And since Trump is more interested in pomp and circumstance and show than he is in Taiwan, it was not a foolish assumption of the Chinese to think that they could get him to say something that could be construed as conceding to the Chinese long-term wishes over Taiwan.</p><p>Now, whether Trump did that or not is still a little unclear. As far as I know, the last thing he said on Air Force One is that he hadn&#8217;t made up his mind yet whether the latest tranche of weapons would be sent to Taiwan. But at least it looks as though he hasn&#8217;t verbally committed himself to anything that would shift the rhetoric.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Do you find yourself more content with the way that things went with regards to Trump&#8217;s policy attitude to Taiwan? Or has this summit made you more nervous, because there are so many signals that cut both ways? On the one hand, I&#8217;m consistently surprised at how disciplined Trump is, relatively, on the Taiwan issue. Often times, journalists will ask him provocative questions that he just takes the bait on. He was asked one time, what does he think limits his power, and he said, just my own mind. But when it comes to Taiwan, he&#8217;s very disciplined about saying whether the US will come to Taiwan&#8217;s protection.</p><p>On the other hand, there was an interview with Fox News that he did after the summit, while he was in Beijing, where he clearly violates one of the principles of the Taiwan issue that his predecessors held &#8212; which was that Taiwan arms sales was not something the US would discuss with the Chinese. And he explicitly says, this is something that we&#8217;re gonna have to discuss. Xi Jinping clearly does not want us to. And he explicitly says that Taiwan arms sales is a bargaining chip for them, which clearly does not give much confidence to Taiwan.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> It&#8217;s always hard to say what goes on in Trump&#8217;s head. It may be that on issues that don&#8217;t fundamentally interest him very much &#8212; and Taiwan would probably be one of them &#8212; he is more likely to listen to advisers like Marco Rubio, who tell him what to say and what not to say. On issues that he cares about a bit more, like sticking it to the Europeans, he is less disciplined.</p><p>And linked to that thought is something else, which is that he respects great dictators in a way that he doesn&#8217;t respect European prime ministers. He thinks they are basically weak. Their countries don&#8217;t amount to much. They are dependent on the United States. They can be pushed around and bullied. Whereas he doesn&#8217;t behave that way with Putin, and he doesn&#8217;t behave that way with Xi Jinping. He doesn&#8217;t even behave that way with Kim Jong Un when he meets him. And North Korea is a far less significant country than Britain or Germany or France, even though it has nuclear weapons.</p><p>So he respects strong men. And I think he feels that the way the world should work is that there should be deals between strong men in charge of big powers, and the rest of the world should just fall into line. So he is awed by Xi Jinping and by Chinese power. And he&#8217;s not the first American statesman to be awed. In that sense, I think Henry Kissinger was a far more sophisticated operator than Donald Trump, obviously. I think he too was awed by the mystique of China as this great civilization, this potentially great power, where people understand power. And he was, I think &#8212; others dispute this &#8212; but I think he was susceptible to giving in more than was warranted to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, because of that sense of awe.</p><p>And again, the Chinese are very, very good at making visitors feel that. Xi Jinping&#8217;s reception of Trump is a perfect example. So those may be reasons why Trump didn&#8217;t say anything provocative. And one should be grateful for that, because anything to do with Trump &#8212; if it behaves halfway normally, one always has a certain sense of relief.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah, this summit reminds me of just the fact that nothing really came out of it, but the stability of the relationship was affirmed at many points. And coming out of that, the commentary on both sides, in China and the US, has been pretty positive &#8212; not because there were any major deals made, but just that the relationship seems to be on solid footing, and the two leaders seem to like each other. That&#8217;s really, I think, the best you can ask for with two superpowers who are locked in an intense AI competition.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Hang on, just before you go on &#8212; I think the word &#8220;like&#8221; in the case of Xi Jinping is perhaps not the most appropriate term. I don&#8217;t think Xi Jinping gives a damn. It&#8217;s not about liking Trump or not liking Trump. He&#8217;s the leader of China, and he&#8217;ll do whatever is necessary.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> But don&#8217;t you think that as a strongman himself, he feels he can deal with Trump more easily than Biden, from Xi&#8217;s perspective? This is just speculation, but I think it would be a lot easier to deal with somebody like Trump on the Taiwan issue than Biden. If you bring up the Taiwan issue to Biden, Biden has his position, and he&#8217;s going to be very clear and firm. But Trump is just a lot more flexible. He&#8217;s a deal-maker, so he&#8217;s going to listen.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> But that makes it harder at the same time. To deal with somebody when you more or less know where they stand, it&#8217;s easier to formulate a policy. Somebody who can change every day, it&#8217;s much harder, in that sense. So I think it&#8217;s very double-edged.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> That makes sense. So should we talk about AI? I wanted to bring up something before that, which is related to AI. Listeners probably don&#8217;t realize how few American journalists there are in China. Each of the American outfits has basically just one journalist in China. The <em>New York Times</em>, for example, only has one or two, I think. So the number of people on the ground who can cover what China is like &#8212; this vast country &#8212; is so few. This summit really gave America an opportunity to see China from the vantage point of a lot of journalists who sort of come in when China opens its doors for foreign journalists at these big summits. So what you got to see were video journalists going to try Chinese robots and going to schools to see Chinese students using AI. You got to see that aspect &#8212; how China was approaching AI through the lens of video journalism, really for the first time, toward a mass American audience.</p><p>So what struck me was that increased exposure, and the difference in some ways about the way the Chinese approach AI versus the US. One thing that comes out of this increased exposure is the fact that China has just a lot more robots than America. A lot of America is focused on the digital version of AI, large language models. Whereas if you go to China, you see these &#8212; they&#8217;re just starting to get rolled out &#8212; but there are these retail robots that help you order drinks. And if you go to classrooms in Beijing, you have students who are already using AI to study. When you interview them and ask them about AI, their attitude toward AI is quite different from the average American&#8217;s. If you go to an American school and interview a teacher, they might say something like, there&#8217;s just so much cheating, there&#8217;s rampant cheating, we&#8217;ve got to crack down on AI. That might be a view that you hear in America. But in China, the overwhelming majority are much more embracing of AI. And that attitude was reflected in this kind of period of the summit. That was really encouraging.</p><p>The other aspect of AI that needs to be discussed is the bilateral discussions around AI, which is a really historic moment. It was discussed in the Biden administration, but this is the first time during the Trump administration that this has been seriously discussed between the US and China. It has echoes of the Cold War around nuclear treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States. These are two countries with extremely powerful AI systems that are now discussing what they call, quote unquote, &#8220;guardrails.&#8221; It was not clear in this summit what exactly those guardrails will entail. I think there are discussions about some kind of crisis communication hotline, also very similar to the nuclear age. My guess is that there&#8217;s going to be some kind of way of reporting up and escalating up some kinds of misuses of large language models that may be shared between the two countries.</p><p>So all of that is really good, but we&#8217;re still at a very early stage. We don&#8217;t know what exactly these guardrails and protocols will look like. When I talked to some of the AI safety people after the summit, one person said that it&#8217;s kind of like a deferral from a college acceptance &#8212; you get deferred. So you don&#8217;t actually know the outcome. But I think what the summit achieved was that it created a permission to discuss AI from the perspective of security and safety between the two countries, rather than as something where you need to win the competition with the other rival. Because that was the dominant narrative.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Do you think that is the way Xi Jinping sees things? Doesn&#8217;t he in the end want China to really be in control? I also have two questions for you. One is to do with your own experience as a journalist in China. When you say that the <em>New York Times</em> has one person there &#8212; and I&#8217;m asking this out of ignorance &#8212; do they still have Chinese stringers who can fill in some of those gaps? Or has it become so difficult in Xi Jinping&#8217;s China that most local Chinese wouldn&#8217;t be able to, or want to, do that anymore?</p><p>The other question related to that is, why do you think it&#8217;s encouraging that American journalists get a very superficial impression of Chinese prowess in AI and so on? Which may be a good thing &#8212; it wakes Americans up to the fact of how far China has come. But why do you think it&#8217;s encouraging?</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> There are stringers. They still use stringers. But it&#8217;s on the decline for a number of reasons. One of them is just that the stringers are taking a lot more risk now, because China has a notorious bias against Chinese people doing Western reportage. There&#8217;s an escalating tier of sensitivity, depending on your ethnicity, your nationality, your gender. When it comes to the security state in China, the worst you can be is a Chinese female journalist reporting for Western outlets. If you&#8217;re male and you&#8217;re white, you&#8217;re less sought after by the security state. So that&#8217;s the answer to that.</p><p>Why is it encouraging? I think what you&#8217;re asking is, is it encouraging when all of this is still very superficial and a little bit stage-managed? You&#8217;re not able to really get the &#8212; a good example of this is Bret Baier, the Fox News host, who did a kind of segment on the Chinese robots and how good the Chinese robots are. And that&#8217;s really the first thing the Chinese want you to see when you go to China. It&#8217;s not the political prisoners, it&#8217;s not the censorship, it&#8217;s the robots.</p><p>So what do I think about that? You&#8217;re right that this is one-sided. But I&#8217;m of the view that no knowledge is worse than a little bit of a biased view. The robots are a part of China. The robots are very technologically advanced. China is leading the world. That is true. It&#8217;s a positive side. But I&#8217;d rather have Americans see one side that&#8217;s true about China than have no clue about China at all. I had a conversation with Saagar Enjeti, one of the influencers who had visited China, and he told me that his friends thought China was like North Korea. And he&#8217;s not talking to dissidents, he&#8217;s not talking to political prisoners, which I think is sad. We can&#8217;t always get what we want. We can&#8217;t get everyone to be able to see both sides of China. But for now, I am encouraged by having at least one side shown to the Americans.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> But that brings me to something else that I&#8217;ve been thinking about for a long time, and it fascinates me. If you look at the history of relations between the Western world &#8212; and that&#8217;s mostly Europe &#8212; and China, you see these constant swings between being over-awed &#8212; since Marco Polo, in the 13th century &#8212; this idea of a civilization that is completely unknown but is vastly superior to anything else, with all these miraculous things in great palaces, and so on. There&#8217;s this awe, which you found amongst intellectuals who thought that Maoist China was a kind of paradise on earth. And you found it, as I said, with somebody like Henry Kissinger &#8212; the mystique of China. And then it alternates with fear. This idea of the sleeping dragon, which one should never wake up, because it will then devour the world, and so on and so forth.</p><p>The two are very linked. Both the fear and the awe are two sides of the same coin. When American journalists come back full of stories of these miraculous robots &#8212; and I was reading a French news magazine, <em>L&#8217;Express</em>, just now, with a long, rather good article about AI and how advanced China was &#8212; there was even a story, maybe true, as far as I know, that in Shenzhen they now have drone taxis that fly people through the city &#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> eVTOLs. They do.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> So I could see how people come back again with the Marco Polo image of China. But it can very quickly flip into fear and hostility. So again, our entire conversation has been about double-edged things. This is also double-edged.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah, that fear and awe when it comes to robotics and technology is definitely apt, because the Europeans are at once awed by Chinese technology and also grappling with a massive influx of Chinese technologies, specifically electric vehicles, into their markets. They&#8217;re dealing with a double-edged sword in real time, which is that these robotics and technologies are so heavily subsidized by Chinese industrial policy that there&#8217;s just no way to compete. So certainly it&#8217;s a big issue. And there&#8217;s a military component as well. When are these robots going to be used for the military? When are AI-powered flying drones going to start going to the PLA? That&#8217;s going to be on the horizon.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> So do you think the United States is correct to try and limit the importation of Chinese electric vehicles? Is that the right policy, or should they let them in and try to compete?</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I don&#8217;t know. I don&#8217;t have a strong opinion about that. But what it does remind me of was that there was a similar problem with the Japanese. There was a period &#8212; I think it was the &#8216;80s &#8212; when Reagan was grappling with this exact same question: should we let the Japanese car companies into the United States? At the time, Reagan decided to tariff the Japanese. His policy was basically to put up a barrier for Japanese car companies. And the consensus is that it helped the American manufacturers. What ended up happening was that a lot of Japanese car companies, like Toyota, created their own American branches. That&#8217;s actually why I am speaking English, because my parents worked at Toyota. I don&#8217;t know if people know that background, but I moved from Japan to the United States, because my parents were in the auto industry in Japan. After these tariffs came up, Japanese car companies started to manufacture cars within the US to route around these regulations. And that was the reason why my parents were able to move to the United States.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> People forget now that in the early 1980s, when this was an issue, you had US congressmen in front of the TV cameras taking the hammer to Japanese cars and smashing the windows, showing that they were going to resist the economic invasion of Japan.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Exactly. That&#8217;s what Biden did. Biden succumbed to the political pressure to basically protect the auto industry. We&#8217;re going to have to see whether his tariffs and Trump&#8217;s tariffs work. But I think it&#8217;s a little bit strange that we&#8217;re in a weird timeline where the point of these electric vehicle tariffs was to allow the American manufacturers to catch up in electric vehicles, but that&#8217;s just not the direction Trump wants them to go. And these automakers are not really heading in that direction. So it&#8217;s a weird timeline. It&#8217;s a little bit different from the &#8216;80s, where there was a kind of revival of car manufacturing in the United States.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> We haven&#8217;t really discussed yet &#8212; but this is being reported very much as a US-China visit, which it is, and something that concerns Americans and Chinese, but it deeply concerns the surrounding countries of China, and notably South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and then, by extension, a little bit further, Southeast Asia. We know that they&#8217;ve been looking at this summit with a considerable amount of worry.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah, it&#8217;s important to keep in mind that Takaichi, the Prime Minister of Japan, scheduled a meeting with Trump before the summit, specifically to preempt Trump&#8217;s visit and to make sure they could get some guarantee that Trump&#8217;s not going to change anything on Taiwan policy, which I think they got. But the Japanese are looking at this the same way we have sort of been discussing. It&#8217;s a blessing and a curse. It looks like Trump is pretty disciplined. But he&#8217;s also too transactional a leader for the Japanese to be comfortable with him. How do you think the Japanese are thinking about this?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I think they&#8217;re extremely worried. In the short run &#8212; for the Japanese and the Koreans and the Taiwanese &#8212; there&#8217;s a certain amount of relief. Could be worse. But the problem persists, in that they are very vulnerable, and they depend entirely for their security on the United States. Takaichi, for one, is trying slowly to change that by making it constitutionally easier and preparing Japanese public opinion for a more independent defense policy. But that&#8217;ll take time &#8212; much longer than the Trump administration. So my impression is that their intention right now is to play for time, flatter Trump, hope that he won&#8217;t do anything crazy, and see out the next two years in hope of a more dependable US administration. But that doesn&#8217;t solve the problem either, because it may even lull them &#8212; and that goes for the Europeans, too. It&#8217;ll lull European countries and Japan and South Korea back to sleep. If a decent Democrat, maybe a slightly hawkish Democrat, were to come to power, or even Marco Rubio, or somebody like him, who would reaffirm the American commitment to defend its allies, the result could be that that would slow down attempts such as what Takaichi is doing.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Do you actually think that, though? It&#8217;s true that it would be more reassuring if Rubio were President, but it doesn&#8217;t change the fact that the Chinese military and the nuclear arsenal is growing very rapidly.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, I do think that. But it is a democracy, and she has to get public opinion behind the idea. If the Japanese and Koreans could feel that they could depend on the United States a bit more than they do now, that could make that task a bit more difficult. That&#8217;s all I&#8217;m saying. It&#8217;s not going to change the fear of China.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> This is just the beginning of another three years of relationships and interactions between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. It&#8217;s not even the one interaction this year. They&#8217;re going to meet multiple times this year. Within those three years, you can imagine a lot of scenarios where Donald Trump needs the Chinese, the way he needed this time with Hormuz and the strait. Donald Trump doesn&#8217;t admit this, and when he was interviewed about this, he constantly said, I didn&#8217;t ask, we don&#8217;t need China to help us unblock this strait. But you can imagine that he&#8217;s a pretty reckless President. He can get into scenarios where he needs the Chinese to cooperate. And the Chinese, if they&#8217;re smart, just wait for a time when they have Trump&#8217;s ear because of this summit. They just wait for a time when Trump needs something from them, and they say, why don&#8217;t you change your policy a little bit on Taiwan? Why don&#8217;t you tweak your language?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> That&#8217;s a very good point. And that could have happened this time. Trump clearly did talk about Iran. We know that because he mentioned that they discussed the Straits of Hormuz needing to be open. So it clearly came up, but Trump didn&#8217;t get what he wanted. He didn&#8217;t get a promise from the Chinese that they&#8217;d put pressure on Iran to open it. But I think you&#8217;re absolutely right. The more Trump feels that he needs the Chinese to get him out of his own mess, the more likely it is that the Chinese will start putting more pressure on him to change his rhetoric on Taiwan. I think that&#8217;s a real danger. And I&#8217;m sure that the Japanese and the Koreans and the Taiwanese are quite aware of that.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Taiwan on the Eve of the Summit]]></title><description><![CDATA[Transcript:]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/taiwan-on-the-eve-of-the-summit-ec7</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/taiwan-on-the-eve-of-the-summit-ec7</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980742/89814a6e288a632264040d3c340e285a.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p>Transcript:</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>What is the One China policy, and how do the U.S. and China interpret it?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>The United States and China do not see eye to eye on this issue. The United States has a One China policy, which is different from China&#8217;s One China principle. The way to start is to understand Beijing&#8217;s position, which is that there&#8217;s only one China in the world, that Taiwan is part of China, and that the CCP in Beijing is the only legitimate government.</p><p>The U.S. One China policy, formally guided by the Three Communiqu&#233;s, the Six Assurances, and the Taiwan Relations Act, says essentially the United States doesn&#8217;t take a position on Taiwan&#8217;s status. It does not support Taiwan independence. It acknowledges that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China, but it is open to any outcome provided that it&#8217;s arrived at without force or coercion, and that it&#8217;s democratically acceptable to the people of Taiwan.</p><p>What&#8217;s tricky about the One China policy is that it was never articulated in complete form by any one president. It has emerged through accretion, through 50 years of diplomatic wrangling, with different presidents emphasizing and de-emphasizing different parts. It&#8217;s a living thing. It&#8217;s sort of a totem that symbolizes America&#8217;s resolve and restraint. And what&#8217;s challenging now, as President Trump prepares to head to Beijing, is that China wants to exploit his lack of appreciation for these historical delicacies to undermine the world&#8217;s confidence that he will sustain and defend the policy.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>Do you think that Henry Kissinger, at the time in the &#8216;70s, made a mistake to give in on the One China policy in exchange for the status quo that we have today?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>I do not, because what Kissinger communicated &#8212; what&#8217;s known as the Shanghai Communiqu&#233;, the first of the three communiqu&#233;s, which are the part of the One China policy that was negotiated bilaterally with China &#8212; was actually very legalistic, and didn&#8217;t give anything away at all.</p><p>When Kissinger went to China to explore what became the opening in 1971, the PRC was at one of its most vulnerable points in history. It had experienced a rift with the Soviet Union; the two had almost gone to war. Here was this opportunity that had fallen almost out of the sky &#8212; that the Americans were willing to reconsider over 20 years of unremitting hostility and political isolation. Nevertheless, Zhou Enlai explained to Kissinger that there could be no relationship between the United States and the PRC unless the Taiwan issue was resolved. But the PRC held a weak hand, and ultimately they gave Kissinger a document whereby the United States got the substantive relationship with the PRC that it wanted without giving anything at all away.</p><p>The key passage is that the United States acknowledges &#8212; quote unquote, acknowledges, <em>[unclear: &#8220;ren shadao&#8221; &#8212; most likely the Chinese &#35748;&#35782;&#21040;, r&#232;nshi d&#224;o, &#8220;acknowledge,&#8221; as contrasted with &#25215;&#35748;, ch&#233;ngr&#232;n, &#8220;recognize&#8221;]</em> &#8212; that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. But the United States doesn&#8217;t say what position that is.</p><p>There were people on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the Kuomintang, who said there&#8217;s only one China and Taiwan is part of China, and we are the legitimate leaders. And so the United States never took a position on who was right. Beijing has chosen to translate that language differently, so it can claim that Kissinger gave away more than he gave away. But actually, the entire U.S.&#8211;China relationship that developed subsequently was built on sand, because it was based on a deliberate, legalistic translation error. The United States acknowledged, but it did not recognize.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>You mentioned the ambiguity that was at the inception of the U.S.&#8211;China relationship with Kissinger. But there&#8217;s another ambiguity that we typically hear when it comes to U.S.&#8211;China and Taiwan, which is this idea of strategic ambiguity. Can you talk a little bit about that, and sort of when that comes online?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>The United States is ambiguous about a number of things in its One China policy. One of the things that we&#8217;re ambiguous about is what Taiwan&#8217;s legal status actually is &#8212; at the end of the Pacific War, to whom did Japan surrender the island of Formosa and the Pescadores, which are now Taiwan&#8217;s outlying islands? We are ambiguous on that. That is not what is meant by strategic ambiguity. Strategic ambiguity means: what would the United States do if the mainland used force or economic coercion to try to bring Taiwan under its control? Congress expressed its sense in 1979 in the Taiwan Relations Act: any such move would be a grave threat to U.S. interests. And it states pretty much as strongly as an American law, short of an explicit treaty commitment, can state that Congress would expect the president to do something substantial in response. It says the United States must maintain the ability to prevent that militarily, and must help Taiwan maintain the ability to prevent that.</p><p>But Congress can&#8217;t predetermine how a future president will respond. And that is ultimately the strategic ambiguity question. The reason why the United States has this policy and hasn&#8217;t pursued a formal military alliance with Taiwan is, first of all, that is foreclosed by the communiqu&#233;s. But secondly, and more importantly, the United States wants to create dual deterrence. Yes, the primary object of deterrence is Beijing &#8212; you don&#8217;t want Beijing to attack &#8212; but you also don&#8217;t want Taipei to feel that it&#8217;s so secure in its backing from the Americans that it can do something extreme and provocative, like declare independence, which would trigger a war.</p><p>The fact that ambiguity deters Taiwan &#8212; Taiwan doesn&#8217;t want to make too many provocations because they don&#8217;t know if the Americans would be there if they started it &#8212; indirectly eases the pressure on Beijing to take action, because Beijing is in no rush.</p><p>It can wait as long as it wants to solve this problem, with some confidence that Taiwan won&#8217;t surprise them one day by declaring independence. It cuts both ways, at the same time giving the United States optionality. The difficulty is, this position made a lot of sense when the U.S. was vastly militarily, technologically, and economically stronger than China. That&#8217;s no longer the case. And as the relative power balance equalizes, it looks more and more like a get-out-of-jail-free card. If the United States really doesn&#8217;t want to come to Taiwan&#8217;s defense, because the cost and the risk of doing so would be high, and if it sends those signals, then Beijing may get the wrong message that it can squeeze, or salami-slice, its way to bringing Taiwan to heel through incremental steps. That, I think, is the way we are going. And one of the arguments of the book is the One China policy is sort of set in stone.</p><p>For all these reasons I describe, we can&#8217;t change it without risking catastrophic miscalculation, but we need to change how we communicate it. Otherwise, we are inviting Beijing to push on an open door in the gray zone &#8212; all of these ways that they can push against Taiwan with economic pressure, with legal pressure, with military pressure, that&#8217;s short of actual kinetic force.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>Can I ask you a provocative question? What would be wrong with the United States simply declaring that they would come to the rescue of Taiwan, whatever happens, if it were threatened &#8212; not only because to protect Taiwan, but because it also involves Japan and South Korea? So it really involves the whole strategic arrangement in East Asia.</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>This is an option that has been discussed for many years. It&#8217;s known as strategic clarity. And the idea is that it will improve the confidence of the people of Taiwan and eliminate doubt in Beijing about our intentions. It&#8217;s possible to do, but it would accomplish less than people think it would. It would have costs that are not fully appreciated.</p><p>Let me explain. What Joe Biden said as president on four separate occasions, when asked if he would defend Taiwan: &#8220;Yes, I would treat them just as I would treat a NATO ally. That&#8217;s the commitment we made.&#8221; Each time, the press said, did he misspeak? But he couldn&#8217;t have spoken more plainly. Then the State Department said our longstanding position has not changed. Did the U.S. position change, or did it not change? On the margin, Biden was signaling to Beijing: if you test me, you can expect that I would respond as I would if you tested me over Japan. But in a sense, indirectly, he weakened deterrence, because the value of strategic ambiguity is that it deters Beijing and Taipei at the same time. And if you are seen as giving Taipei carte blanche, particularly at a time when the leadership in Taipei are all personae non gratae in Beijing because they&#8217;re seen as extreme separatists, you risk antagonizing or provoking Beijing by saying that we may give cover to Taiwan leaders if they start talking about independence.</p><p>And that may weaken deterrence &#8212; because if Taiwan were to declare independence tomorrow, China would probably do something extreme, whether or not they felt ready militarily, simply because this is such a sensitive issue in the domestic politics of mainland China that the CCP would have no choice. Strategic ambiguity is the most reasonable position history has given us, and the costs of changing it are high.</p><p>The other reason why changing strategic ambiguity is potentially problematic is, entrapment does happen in history. But when states want to get out of a commitment in which they are entrapped, they usually find an excuse. If the United States really didn&#8217;t want to come to Taiwan&#8217;s defense, it would find some pretext, no matter what it had promised to Taiwan. The bigger problem here is not that Taiwan doubts we would come to their aid in a high-end contingency. It&#8217;s that we have no doctrine at all &#8212; at least no public doctrine &#8212; for deterring China&#8217;s pressure on Taiwan in the gray zone. And the gray zone scenarios are where it&#8217;s at. This is Beijing&#8217;s primary vector for pressure against Taiwan. Incremental gray zone pressure is how they change the facts on the ground, dominate and transform the regional order, and seize control of Taiwan&#8217;s semiconductor manufacturing base intact.</p><p>If the United States has a policy to prepare for the high-end contingencies but no policy to deter the gray zone aggression, this issue is going to be settled by a crisis rather than a war. And it will be a crisis in which the United States is humiliated and has to choose between walking away, or accepting a war or an economic crisis which are its fault. This is a bad set of options. We need to think about the plans that Xi Jinping is actually pursuing, not some of these tail-risk, extreme scenarios that are less likely to happen.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>So, when you talk about gray zone aggression, what I think you&#8217;re referring to is basically everything that China has been doing to Taiwan over the past few years that is short of an amphibious invasion &#8212; which includes all these drills, missiles firing over Taiwan, rehearsals of blockades, right? Those are what you&#8217;re referring to as the gray zone tactics. And from the book, it seems like strategic ambiguity doesn&#8217;t really have an answer to address that. It seems to mostly be referring to what the United States will or will not do in the case of an amphibious invasion or some kind of direct, more violent approach to Taiwan. Why is that the case? Like, why do you think that, given how strategically important Taiwan is to the United States, successive administrations just haven&#8217;t found a coherent answer for how to deal with gray zone tactics?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>Partly because many of the key gray zone tactics have been pioneered just in the last few years.</p><p>Xi Jinping is building a broad menu of options to move against Taiwan, and they include high-end military options that have to be taken very seriously, including the most breathtaking nuclear force expansion since the early Cold War. He&#8217;s building 11 aircraft carriers. The world&#8217;s largest fleet of fighter jets and bombers is already built. He&#8217;s now expanding the world&#8217;s largest missile arsenal, the world&#8217;s most impressive drone industrial base by far. He&#8217;s ramping production of submarines, of amphibious ships &#8212; go down the list. That means he is developing the capability to bombard Taiwan, to decapitate its leaders, to cyberattack it, to cut off its satellite and undersea cable connections, to invade and occupy it, to mount a counter-insurgency, to partially blockade it, or to fully blockade it.</p><p>And the United States needs a set of preparations so it can deter all of those moves. But he&#8217;s also building dozens and dozens of vectors of pressure in the space short of war. They include legal pressure on companies not to comply with U.S. law relating to Taiwan, or Taiwan law, where it claims that PRC law is supreme. It involves pressure on third countries to deport Taiwan nationals accused of political crimes to China. It involves massive dredging of sand from Taiwan&#8217;s waters &#8212; Taiwan&#8217;s exclusive economic zone &#8212; to bring back to China; tampering relentlessly with the undersea cables connecting to Taiwan; cyberattacks; information operations; on and on and on.</p><p>The goal of this all-domain pressure campaign is to isolate Taiwan within the international community, to make the people in Taiwan feel that they are facing a challenger that is so vast in scale, that touches every part of their lives, therefore that there is no hope, that they are overwhelmed. And then, if and when China chooses to have a contingency, the rest of the world will struggle to articulate a plausible, legitimate case for why it should come to Taiwan&#8217;s aid. In other words, it&#8217;s the Hong Kong model. One of the reasons for this is that Beijing doesn&#8217;t just want Taiwan as a matter of direct sovereign control. They want the world to accept it. For the CCP, this is fundamentally not just about Taiwan, but the definition of what China is and the legitimacy of the regime. This has been the core, the crux of the issue, going back to 1949. One of the things that Beijing intends to do if we have a crisis is immediately call for a UN General Assembly resolution and try to get the UN General Assembly &#8212; thanks to its partners in the developing world &#8212; to take its side.</p><p>And ultimately, the outcome Beijing wants is for the United States to accept that the PRC is supreme over Taiwan, because that will be the ultimate symbol of U.S. submission to the transformation in regional order broadly.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>Except that the difference with Hong Kong is that China taking Hong Kong did not directly affect the security or the fortunes of Japan and South Korea and other countries in the region, whereas Taiwan does. In the age of Trump, nobody is sure anymore of American security guarantees.</p><p>How would they react to this new situation? Do you think that they would be reassured by your idea of structured ambiguity? Or in what way &#8212; what do you think they would like the United States to do?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>Let me just take a beat to explain where my own views differ on structured ambiguity. The idea of structured ambiguity is, you maintain the policy, but you clarify two aspects of it. The first is, the fact that we are strategically ambiguous about what we do in the high-end scenarios doesn&#8217;t mean that we&#8217;re passive in the gray zone. China is doing all these things that I describe to change the facts on the ground around Taiwan, and the United States and its partners should respond to these moves in a proportionate way.</p><p>Now, there isn&#8217;t a direct way to respond proportionately in the same way. If China, say, sends a bunch of sand-dredging ships to dredge sand from Taiwan&#8217;s waters, we&#8217;re not going to do that from China&#8217;s waters. But we can respond in a different domain &#8212; say, by deepening our political and military relationship with Taiwan in a way that we deem to be proportionate. And Beijing may claim that it&#8217;s disproportionate, but we should pursue that in a reactive and measured way. The basic idea is, there should be an equilibrium or a balance in the gray zone, and they should understand that if they move, we will respond in a proportionate way that shows resolve and restraint.</p><p>And then the second part of structured ambiguity is explaining to China that if we get wind of preparations to do something big and dramatic, like what Russia did in Ukraine in 2022, we won&#8217;t just stand idly by and wait for them to start shooting before we get our house in order. We will reserve the right to act preemptively in order to secure an overall stable equilibrium. I think it&#8217;s important to communicate this so that Xi Jinping doesn&#8217;t feel we&#8217;re inviting him to push in the gray zone. Otherwise, I think we will get the crisis.</p><p>Now, President Trump &#8212; President Trump intrinsically understands the value of ambiguity. He uses ambiguous threats all the time, against his political enemies, against international adversaries. He gets it. What I don&#8217;t think he has mastered are the finer points of the One China policy. I think China has no idea what Trump would do if it initiated a high-end contingency. Maybe he would abandon Taiwan, but maybe he would also try to assassinate Xi Jinping, as he did in Iran.</p><p>I think the uncertainty and the erratic character of President Trump is one of the reasons why China has shifted the locus of its preparations and pressure tactics from the kinetic, high-end traditional military space to the gray zone &#8212; because they don&#8217;t want to give Trump a pretext to do something that is wildly disproportionate and overreacting.</p><p>But they know that if they salami-slice, he lacks the attention to detail to respond effectively.</p><p>And also, most importantly of all, Donald Trump is very sensitive to the stock market. If China creates a situation where responding effectively to China&#8217;s moves involves unsettling the stock market, then Trump may not push back. And so far, I think everything we&#8217;ve seen in the last year and a half indicates that China&#8217;s strategy is working &#8212; prime example being the Strait of Hormuz.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>When you were talking about the structured ambiguity argument, I was thinking about an example from recent memory.</p><p>When Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022, there was a massive response, right? That was an example where China had basically shifted the status quo by breaking what is, I think, typically called the median line &#8212; just this kind of implicit line between Taiwan and China where Chinese ships and other military equipment were not supposed to pass. They passed it, and they continue to pass it.</p><p>Walk me through an administration going through the Pelosi case with a structured ambiguity policy. What would that have looked like in that case?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>It&#8217;s a good question. A couple of contextual reminders about that case. This was in the summer of 2022 &#8212; if I recall right, it was July of 2022; it might have been August. And China was just months away from the National Party Congress, where Xi Jinping was hoping to get a third term. It was also still zero-COVID. A substantial share of China&#8217;s population was locked in their homes. That, of course, was not just about COVID. It was about Xi Jinping&#8217;s broader discomfort with risk as he headed into that all-important political meeting where his skin was on the line. In many ways, he originally asked President Biden for Pelosi not to go. He assumed that Biden could make Pelosi not go. Then it became public, and Biden said, I can&#8217;t, I can&#8217;t make her not go. And Xi Jinping felt that it was a personal affront. It was a provocation at one of the most sensitive points of his political career, and that he had asked as a personal favor, and that the Americans were doing this to test him.</p><p>And clearly the PLA had built the preparations to do that exercise &#8212; I think they called it Joint Sword. And this was an excuse to do something that they had already wanted to do. But this is not a standard example of gray zone activity, because from China&#8217;s point of view, it started with an American provocation.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>From what it seems, there&#8217;s already violations in the gray zone, right? And so what does that look like &#8212; I mean, if somebody were to adopt your policy, if an administration were to adopt your policy, does that mean that they need to start reassessing now, given that the next time a ship crosses the median line, which is probably in the next few days&#8230;?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>I think the way to think about this is, the term &#8220;status quo&#8221; is the wrong framework for what&#8217;s happening. There is no such thing as a status quo in the Taiwan Strait &#8212; or at least Beijing doesn&#8217;t think there is. There&#8217;s an evolving situation, shaped by norms and patterns of behavior, that is always changing, because the technology is changing, the economic patterns are changing, the political personalities are changing. There is just an overall situation, and China is incrementally trying to pull that situation to be more favorable. And in some domains, those actions can&#8217;t be easily reversed. The United States needs to ensure that the situation is evolving so that, on the whole, there is peace and there is stability. I would say &#8212; rather than looking backwards at the gray zone pressure that has already happened &#8212; we should be more concerned about some of the things that China could do, particularly if they start demanding that aircraft coming and going from Taiwan share manifests, or start telling cargo ships coming and going from Taiwan, &#8220;We want you to submit to inspections.&#8221;</p><p>That, I think, is the most dangerous vector. Because if China can seize control over who and what comes and goes, if they can establish that as a precedent, they get to screen Taiwan&#8217;s relationship to the global economy. Then Taiwan is checkmated, because they will be able to turn that dial all the way to black. And at some point, the U.S. will have to escalate, or China gets control of the fabs. So I think I am mainly applying this idea of structured ambiguity to these economic pressure tactics. The idea is that if you use incremental measures to take control over Taiwan&#8217;s economy, or to salami-slice your way to something that looks like a quasi-blockade or something like that, we have tools to respond in a way that&#8217;s proportionate.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>But why do you think, in terms of American domestic politics &#8212; if Trump doesn&#8217;t have a grasp of the details, the average American voter certainly doesn&#8217;t &#8212; do you think&#8230; why should they not be&#8230; say, if America wants to make a deal with China at the cost of Taiwan, well, so be it. In the case of Iran, the argument for attacking Iran is, otherwise they can nuke our cities, which is probably nonsense, but at least it&#8217;s a clear rationale. In the case of Taiwan, it&#8217;s a little unclear, because defending a democracy is probably no longer all that valid &#8212; certainly not in the age of Donald Trump. So how should it be sold politically to the American public that there should be a more robust defense of Taiwan? Is it only about the semiconductor industry? What do you think should make your idea of structural ambiguity politically potent in America?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>A lot of the structured ambiguity stuff will never need to be communicated to the American people, because it has to do with the covert military-to-military relationship.</p><p>And though we don&#8217;t have all the details in the open source, it&#8217;s quite possible that structured ambiguity has already been in effect for five years or so. Because we now know that there are a substantial number of U.S. military trainers on the ground in Taiwan, who are helping to organize, train, and equip Taiwan&#8217;s elite armed units to resist invasion and other scenarios.</p><p>And that is a dial that we can turn, that we can calibrate based on what Beijing does. We can send more advisors. We can equip them better when we send them. There&#8217;s also, I am sure, lots of U.S.-to-Taiwan government-to-government interaction that is happening informally that wasn&#8217;t happening 10 years ago, and that can be increased as well.</p><p>Beijing is probably aware of a large amount of that, but that&#8217;s not advertised to the public. A lot of managing structured ambiguity has to do with this private signaling &#8212; also U.S. defense deployments in Japan and the Philippines. There&#8217;s a whole bunch of other ways: cyber, information operations. There are other ways you can do this quietly.</p><p>How to explain this to the American people? I think there are three big reasons that Taiwan matters, other than the fact that they&#8217;re a democracy. The first is the chips. The chips are the key bottleneck in the AI revolution. I think the United States has a vital national interest in not letting the People&#8217;s Republic of China win the AI race. I think the PRC has a view of AI which is that it should entrench the regime&#8217;s power. I think it would have a chilling effect on our democracy, on our institutions, on our economic security, on the future health of our economy, on those of our allies, on the security of our nuclear deterrent. Losing to China in AI would be catastrophic.</p><p>If you lose the fabs &#8212; if China gets the fabs intact &#8212; then, A, that is an alarming outcome. You also want to prevent a depression and a financial crisis: if there&#8217;s any kind of altercation and the fabs are destroyed, that is also bad. So you don&#8217;t want China to win in AI, but you also don&#8217;t want the devastating economic shock. If you can avoid it, then you want to prevent China from taking Taiwan and using it as a forward operating base. Because if they can use Taiwan as a springboard for their air and naval power, they can dominate Japan, Taiwan <em>[unclear: speaker lists &#8220;Taiwan&#8221; here despite Taiwan being the subject of the scenario &#8212; likely a verbal slip; may have meant Korea or the Philippines]</em>, the Philippines, and others, hollowing out our alliances in the region.</p><p>And then the final reason is, it&#8217;s about regional economic order. Ultimately, China doesn&#8217;t want to invade and occupy Japan and the Philippines, but they want countries in their region to engage with the global economy only when Beijing says so. And that would mean that Beijing would be able to weaponize their economies against the United States. If we ever wanted to re-industrialize, for example &#8212; China made more ships last year than the United States has made since the end of the Second World War. The United States basically can&#8217;t make ships. In order to learn how to build ships again, we need help from our Korean friends.</p><p>If Taiwan were to fall by force or coercion, I can imagine a world where China says to the Koreans, &#8220;No, we actually don&#8217;t want you helping the U.S. with that.&#8221; What are the Koreans going to do? And China would not have to invade and occupy South Korea to achieve that goal. But the problem with these military and economic explanations is that, while I actually think they&#8217;re more compelling than the chips in some ways, they&#8217;re abstract ideas. And the benefit of talking about the chips is that they&#8217;re a physical, tangible thing that everyone holds in their hand every day when they pick up their smartphone. This is something that, when I go on radio around the country and I talk to people left, right, and center, everyone seems to get &#8212; that we live in a technological society. If we lose the chips, our modern way of life can&#8217;t be sustained.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>But there is another scenario, which is perhaps more in the future, where China might regret what it wishes for. Because Trump may not be so unhappy if, for example, China were to threaten Taiwan seriously, and the Japanese and the Koreans, no longer sure of American protection, would go nuclear &#8212; which I think is not unlikely in the future.</p><p>Now, what would China prefer: to have the United States play a sort of ambiguous role as the policeman of East Asia, to make sure that doesn&#8217;t happen and that Taiwan is protected and Japan and Korea are too? Or that a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan will become more assertive in the absence of the United States?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>It&#8217;s a fair question, and it&#8217;s a question I discuss in the book. I do think that if Taiwan were to fall by force, you would see both Japan and South Korea, alongside several other countries, sprint for the bomb. And if you&#8217;re Beijing, for very justified historical reasons, you would want to think twice about that. On the other hand, I think that what Beijing is trying to show is that it can achieve supremacy in the region without firing a shot &#8212; by seizing control over the sinews of commerce, the sea lanes that keep the region supplied.</p><p>Ultimately, China is a continental power, but most of the other economies in the region are not. They are island economies that are almost entirely dependent on imports for energy, largely dependent on imports for food. They&#8217;re dependent on imports for pretty much all of the natural resource inputs they use to do any industrial production, including nuclear weapons. South Korea doesn&#8217;t have an independent nuclear fuel cycle. If South Korea wanted to sprint for the bomb, where would they put the fuel? Where would they put the waste?</p><p>If I&#8217;m China, I&#8217;m thinking, I want to establish the norm that United Airlines and FedEx and UPS, and Maersk and MSC &#8212; the companies that carry the people and stuff through international waters and airspace &#8212; submit to my command.</p><p>And if I can establish that in the South China Sea, and I can establish that in the East China Sea, and I can establish that around Taiwan &#8212; including on the far side of Taiwan, in the Western Philippine Sea &#8212; in time, I can extend that across the region. The example that I cite, which I think is extremely disturbing, is in February of 2025, when the PLA Navy sent some ships down off of Sydney Harbour and fired some <em>[unclear: &#8220;lead&#8221; &#8212; likely &#8220;rounds,&#8221; possibly &#8220;live munitions&#8221;]</em> into the water one morning, with no advance notice. They were not a threat to anyone, but no one knew what the hell they were doing there. And so all flights between Australia and New Zealand were cancelled for the day. That was Beijing sending the message: you guys are island economies, you depend on these private airlines that will not fly if they think it&#8217;s unsafe. We, at a time of our choosing and in a place of our choosing, can create the kinds of risks that will make them not want to go.</p><p>And the Hormuz case illustrates this perfectly. If you think Iran &#8212; a country without a navy, without an air force, without a leader willing to show its face &#8212; is able to take 20% of global oil supply offline just by threatening to fire some drones at a ship, imagine how China could hold these shipping lanes at risk if it wanted to. In a world where China can control the sinews of commerce, it may not even matter if Japan and South Korea have nuclear weapons. In theory, they could nuke Beijing, but only at devastating costs to themselves. China would have so many tools of economic coercion to use against them before they could possibly justify escalating to nuclear force. I think this is a whole new vector of economic coercion and pressure between states, which is going to become absolutely central to China&#8217;s practice of statecraft globally. And we do not yet have an answer for it. And nuclear weapons only partially solve the problem.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>How do you think the current war in Iran is affecting the policies on Taiwan on both the Chinese side and the American side? Do you think it&#8217;s going to change thinking? And how do you think it&#8217;s going to affect the summit?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>I think the United States has shown off many of the finest aspects of its military power: its offensive cyber, its use of AI for intelligence collection, assessment, targeting, some of its logistics, the sophistication of its air defenses, its electronic warfare.</p><p>In many ways, the purely military operation against Iran has been very successful. But it has also illustrated its lack of stomach or preparation for prolonged economic war. And it has indicated that, at least in this case, it didn&#8217;t have plans to work with its allies to form a united front against Iran.</p><p>And I think, therefore, it has tempted Beijing to shift its focus from these high-end military scenarios, where the U.S. might actually be quite capable, to these more nebulous gray zone scenarios involving economic coercion, where the United States seems to lack the ability to form and maintain coalitions, and seems to lack the stomach for sustained economic pain.</p><p>So I think that the war has just <em>[unclear: &#8220;pushed season, is persuaded&#8221; &#8212; likely &#8220;further persuaded&#8221; or simply &#8220;persuaded&#8221;]</em> Xi Jinping that the gray zone is the right place to be. I think Trump, to his credit, has been unwilling to take a truly humiliating deal with the Iranians. But I&#8217;m not sure that time is on his side. If you look at the dynamics in the oil market, I think he may believe that he needs China&#8217;s help to get Iran to an acceptable deal. I don&#8217;t think that Trump is going to trade away Taiwan at the summit, but I do think that Beijing will want to spin the summit as Trump trading away Taiwan, whatever Trump says or doesn&#8217;t say. That will be China&#8217;s next phase of propaganda.</p><p>In other words, Trump&#8217;s love of strategic ambiguity sort of cuts both ways. In a sense, it deters China, but in a sense, it scares the daylights out of U.S. allies, who don&#8217;t know whether he&#8217;s reliable. China would like to use the summit to show Taiwan and others that Trump is not reliable.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>And that China is more reliable. I think that&#8217;s the other side of this. Because China&#8217;s weakness was always that the U.S. alliances were stronger than Chinese alliances. But according to some polls that I was reading in the Asahi Shimbun, in Southeast Asia now, more than 50% of the people in Vietnam and other countries say they trust China more than they trust the United States.</p><p>So you could say that the behavior of the United States is actually strengthening Chinese alliances as well.</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>China doesn&#8217;t have treaty alliances in the same way that we do, but I take the <em>[unclear: audible cutoff &#8212; likely &#8220;point&#8221;]</em>. It has not been a great success of statecraft, and the long-term cost of the Trump administration&#8217;s erratic and bullying behavior, I think, will take many years to be felt.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>What do you think is the most dangerous aspect of the Trump administration&#8217;s approach? Globally, policies toward its allies? And, for example, the Trump doctrine &#8212; its attempt to assert supremacy over the Western Hemisphere. There are so many different aspects of the Trump administration that I feel are uniquely damaging to international norms that I think have an impact on Taiwan.</p><p>So I&#8217;m just curious &#8212; to you, what have you found to be the most alarming? Just to give you a recent thing that I remember: Trump just musing about how he and the Ayatollah, the new Ayatollah, might co-run the Strait of Hormuz. And I&#8217;m reading your book about freedom of navigation in the Pacific. There are just so many different alarming things. What do you think is, for you, the most alarming? And in general &#8212; a president who is &#8220;America First&#8221; &#8212; is that compatible with your framework?</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>Let me start by saying that I&#8217;m a Democrat, and I find many aspects of this administration&#8217;s policy distasteful or alarming for the obvious reasons. I try to call it as I see it. This book argues that Taiwan has to be a nonpartisan issue. We need to create a space in our political debate that recognizes that this is an issue that matters so much to the United States that if we allow it to become a political football, we are lost.</p><p>And I&#8217;m encouraged when I go to Congress &#8212; and frankly, across the U.S. government &#8212; by the depth of appreciation, all across the political spectrum, of why Taiwan matters and how much it matters.</p><p>I think the biggest mistake that this administration has made is its disrespectful treatment of our allies, and its threats that U.S. security commitments that have lasted for decades could be conditional. I think we need allies to manage the China challenge in the long term. And I&#8217;m all for burden-sharing and restructuring relations with allies. This happens all the time. This is routine. But you have to do it in a way &#8212; similarly to renegotiating or having hard conversations with a family member or a partner. You have to do it in a way that reassures the other side that there is a foundation of mutual trust and dependency that is unbreakable and ironclad. And I don&#8217;t think the Trump administration has done that. And that&#8217;s particularly visible in the case of our European allies.</p><p>On the other hand, in their defense, they have done some things right. In the reorganization of the Pentagon, in the changing of our acquisition system, in revitalizing our defense industrial base &#8212; they are moving much faster and, I think, more effectively than the Biden team. They are leaning very heavily on AI; they are betting much of the future of American power and statecraft on AI. That may or may not be the right bet. But if it does pay off, they will look quite clever. And historians may forgive them for other issues that they handled without decency or competence. But it&#8217;s the alliance piece that worries me most. We don&#8217;t have a NATO equivalent in the Indo-Pacific. In Europe, at least, they have each other &#8212; at least the Netherlands has Italy, has Poland, has the Baltic states. In the Indo-Pacific, it&#8217;s a hub-and-spoke system that we set up for peculiar historical reasons. And Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others don&#8217;t have deep relationships with one another, with years of accumulated trust, to handle these kinds of challenges.</p><p>And now, as we cast doubt on our own reliability, we are leaving them highly exposed. I think we should move towards a more coalition structure in the region. But for that to happen, Japan will have to lead. And many of the details of this will have to be worked out by U.S. allies by themselves.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>There&#8217;s a very good book to be written about why there should be a revival of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere &#8212; led by Japan.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>That&#8217;s provocative.</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>Coming from you, I&#8217;m going to take that one as a joke.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong></p><p>No, I&#8217;m half serious. Because I do think that the ultimate answer in Asia &#8212; East Asia &#8212; is that there should be a kind of equivalent of NATO; that there should be a military alliance of Southeast Asian nations and East Asian nations.</p><p>Obviously, it wouldn&#8217;t be the Co-Prosperity Sphere, but it would have to be some kind of alliance. And just as Germany is key to any kind of more-or-less independent European defense arrangement, it would have to be Japan. And &#8212; for obvious reasons, it&#8217;s still very difficult to envision, to envisage, this. But it seems to me that&#8217;s the only option in the end, because unless it&#8217;s a continuation of Pax Americana, what else could it be? Because, as you say, they are very exposed.</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>I completely agree. I take the point &#8212; but maybe give it another name, and no horrific human rights abuses this time.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong></p><p>Okay. Thanks so much, Eyck. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Eyck Freymann:</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for hosting.Will Trump cut a deal with Xi that concedes ground on America's Taiwan policy? That is the question hanging over the US-China summit in Beijing this week.&nbsp;</p><p>To talk through what's at stake, Ian and I are joined by Eyck Freymann, a Hoover fellow at Stanford and the author of <em>Defending Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War with China</em>. Eyck makes the case for a more proactive form of US deterrence against Beijing than the current paradigm of "strategic ambiguity" allows called "structured ambiguity."</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why So Many Asians Study Classical Music]]></title><description><![CDATA[Ian Buruma: The president of the college where I teach part of the time, Bard College, Leon Botstein, once said to me, &#8220;The Chinese are the saviors of Western classical music.&#8221; What he was referring to was the prominence of musicians, usually with an East Asian background &#8212; Korean, Chinese, and Japanese &#8212; in Western orchestras, conservatories, and so on.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/why-so-many-asians-study-classical-a11</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/why-so-many-asians-study-classical-a11</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 10:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980743/b54938eb5b822ae7d691a790a80bc1de.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> The president of the college where I teach part of the time, Bard College, Leon Botstein, once said to me, &#8220;The Chinese are the saviors of Western classical music.&#8221; What he was referring to was the prominence of musicians, usually with an East Asian background &#8212; Korean, Chinese, and Japanese &#8212; in Western orchestras, conservatories, and so on. How would you start by explaining it?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Hello, thank you for having me. He was very kind to blurb my book, <em>Musicians from a Different Shore</em>, when it came out. So I know he has a lot to say about the subject, and I know that statement is deliberately a little hyperbolic. So I&#8217;m not sure I would entirely agree that the Chinese, or East Asians in general, are the saviors of classical music. But it&#8217;s definitely true that East Asians are numerically overrepresented in the field, especially in the United States.</p><p>If you look at the demographics of major music conservatories, or orchestra rosters and so on, there are definitely a lot more East Asians represented than in the overall population of the country. So that numerical overrepresentation of East Asians &#8212; that&#8217;s definitely a thing.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> Can I ask &#8212; my experience is similar to yours. You start your book with a kind of memoir of growing up in Japan and having a piano in your house. I also had a piano growing up in my house. And just like you, I felt it was quite normal. I didn&#8217;t really notice it as something out of the ordinary. In fact, when I was reading through your book, I just realized that this topic is something I&#8217;ve always been wondering about, but haven&#8217;t been able to articulate.</p><p>So I had a more personal question for you: when did this become something that wasn&#8217;t just normalized for you? When did you begin to estrange yourself from this phenomenon &#8212; the overrepresentation of Asians in classical music &#8212; and take it on as an analytical object of study?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> So how did I get here, is what you&#8217;re asking?</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> What was the point in time when you were like, I could write a book about this?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> It&#8217;s kind of a long story. As you say, I grew up in Tokyo &#8212; I grew up in the &#8216;70s in Tokyo &#8212; and I played a lot of piano growing up. And just as you say, it seemed like a universal thing, especially among middle-class urban girls. I was pretty serious about it, and I was moderately good at it, so I thought that&#8217;s what I was going to do in life. I thought I was going to go into a music school. I&#8217;m not sure if I had a concrete idea of being a concert pianist &#8212; I don&#8217;t think I even knew what that meant &#8212; but all I knew was that was entirely my identity.</p><p>Things started to change a little when I was eleven years old. I moved to California with my parents because of my father&#8217;s job, and we lived there for a few years. At first I didn&#8217;t speak a word of English, so it was really hard. I was thrown into just regular public school in Cupertino, California. So life was hard. But then I adapted, I assimilated, I learned to speak English. And then a few years later, we had to move back to Japan, which was also hard.</p><p>But once I moved back to Japan, I was still playing piano, but I was no longer just the girl who played the piano. Now I was a girl who spoke English. I had this whole new identity, and a whole new set of things I could do better than many other people. So that gave me a new kind of confidence, and the idea that maybe I don&#8217;t have to play the piano &#8212; maybe there are other things I could do in life.</p><p>This was also around the time I became kind of a budding feminist, through reading and so on. I realized that in order to have an independent life and career in this male-dominated society called Japan, I needed some kind of tool for empowerment. So I decided not to go to a music conservatory, and I studied and got into the University of Tokyo. I still kept taking piano lessons privately, not as seriously, but I enjoyed the piano itself. I kept taking lessons until I graduated from university, and then I moved to the United States to go to graduate school. And all through my graduate school years and beyond, I hardly touched the piano at all.</p><p>Now I was becoming a scholar of American studies, which is all about the critical study of race, class, gender, nation, imperialism, colonialism, et cetera. My doctoral dissertation topic was about white women and Orientalism. So I became a devoted reader and fan of Edward Said and all these theories of Orientalism. And in that context, I could not reconcile my past as a devoted classical pianist who was really into Rachmaninoff and Chopin &#8212; basically all these dead white European men. And then by day, I was a scholar of American studies critiquing all these dynamics of race and colonialism. So I had put my piano past into the closet, so to speak, and compartmentalized my lives and identities almost completely.</p><p>Until &#8212; after I got my doctorate, and I&#8217;d published my first book based on the dissertation, and gotten tenure at the University of Hawaii &#8212; I was starting to think about what to do next as my scholarly project. It suddenly dawned on me that my personal interest and background in classical music, and my scholarly interest in issues of race, gender, nation, et cetera, could be combined into one project.</p><p>That moment happened when I happened to be watching TV and Seiji Ozawa conducting the Vienna Philharmonic New Year&#8217;s Concert came on. And I was like &#8212; that was my moment. So that&#8217;s a very long-winded answer to your question of how I came to this topic. I had left it for I don&#8217;t know &#8212; ten, fifteen years &#8212; until Seiji Ozawa appeared on my TV screen. That&#8217;s when I decided I should combine my scholarly interest and musical background together into one project. So that was the early 2000s.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> It&#8217;s very interesting what you&#8217;re saying. Edward Said himself was a classical pianist as well. And he talked about Orientalism in the Orient, where he really meant the Middle East. So why do you think the topic at hand &#8212; namely, the prominence in Western classical music &#8212; is pretty much confined to East Asia, that is to Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China, and not to Southeast Asia or India?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> I think that has to do with the history of how Western music &#8212; basically, what we&#8217;re commonly calling classical music &#8212; was introduced to East Asia, as opposed to other parts of Asia.</p><p>As I write in my book, in the case of Japan during the Meiji era, the Japanese government took initiative and made very specific policies to introduce Western music into Japanese society. It came through military band music, and it also came through the Christian church and missionaries. It was disseminated through public education &#8212; through the composition of Western-style school songs, adapting Western harmony and melody and oftentimes using Japanese words.</p><p>So through these mechanisms, in places like Japan, Western music or Western-style music became a lot more popular, a lot more disseminated through the masses, rather than staying the pursuit of the elite. The same thing happened slightly later in the Korean peninsula, and then later in China as well. And it has to do with colonial history too. Western music came partly directly from Europe and the United States to Korea and China, but a significant number of Chinese and Korean musicians who studied Western music studied either in Japan or with Japanese teachers. So there are these multiple complicated layers of colonialism through which Western music was introduced to these Asian nations.</p><p>I think because of the different history of colonialism in Southeast Asia and South Asia, the route through which the music came, and also the segment of the population it reached, was different between East Asia and the rest of Asia.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> Could another explanation possibly be that in India, for example &#8212; or indeed in Iran or Persia &#8212; their own classical tradition was still very much alive, whereas in China and Japan and Korea it does still exist (there is <em>gagaku</em> and so on), but as a popular thing, the classical music tradition has dwindled considerably?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> It dwindled very rapidly. It&#8217;s quite interesting &#8212; as I&#8217;m doing this research about the culture of piano lessons in Japan now, I&#8217;m realizing even more than I used to that in the early years, when piano lessons were becoming popular &#8212; I would say even before World War II, the 1920s and 1930s &#8212; a lot of women from well-to-do families were studying piano, but they were also doing things like <em>nihon-buyo</em>, traditional Japanese dance. So there was a period when a lot of people were doing both &#8212; kind of traditional pursuits and then Western music.</p><p>But then very quickly, it was overtaken, overwhelmed by piano, violin, ballet, and these Western pursuits, especially after World War II. I&#8217;m realizing &#8212; especially during the US occupation and beyond &#8212; the aspiration for things Western and things American in Japan was just so much stronger. That was very strong: this aspiration for things Western in the texture of everyday life, the kind of music people were listening to, the things they wanted their children to pursue, et cetera.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> When you say that young Japanese women of a certain class would do flower arrangement and Japanese dance and that kind of thing at the same time as learning to play the piano &#8212; there may not be a contradiction there, because the idea, I think, was that in order to be an educated young Japanese woman or Korean woman, and to have a good marriage and so on and so forth, you had to be cultured and cultivated. Which is a very German idea, really, much more than American &#8212; though I think it had an influence in America too. It&#8217;s that idea of <em>Bildung</em> of the nineteenth century, that to play an instrument is essential to be a bourgeois person. So do you think the German influence in Japan, as well as in America, plays a big role?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yes, especially in terms of classical music &#8212; because even to this day, the Austrian-German influence among classical music fans in Japan is very strong. There&#8217;s a very strong inclination toward the German tradition in terms of which composers most people listen to, which conductors are most respected and adored.</p><p>Orchestra culture in Japan, for instance, is all about Beethoven. I&#8217;m exaggerating a bit, but in terms of what people were listening to and playing &#8212; orchestra culture in Japan really emerged out of university or student orchestras, because it took a while for professional orchestras to get established, and the orchestra culture really grew in places like Keio University. And by far the most popular composers were Beethoven and other German traditions.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> Yes, I was thinking more in terms of class &#8212; that in the nineteenth century, for German Jews too, the way to join the bourgeoisie, to become more upper-middle class, playing an instrument was an essential thing. And that&#8217;s now almost disappeared in the United States. But in East Asia, it seems that particular tradition has survived. At what stage did it also become a marker of class?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> I think it was always a marker of class. Before World War II, piano was still becoming more common, but it was still a very expensive instrument. Most middle-class people could not purchase one or have access to one. Then I would say afterwards too &#8212; it&#8217;s really in the 1960s that an average middle-class person could aspire to buy a piano, because manufacturers like Yamaha and Kawai succeeded in producing high-quality, mass-produced upright instruments.</p><p>So now, an average salaried family could purchase an upright piano for their children. And also with the development of pedagogy &#8212; like the Suzuki method that I know you&#8217;re familiar with, and the Yamaha music school pedagogy &#8212; your parents or grandparents, your family, didn&#8217;t have to be a musical family. You could be a complete layperson, and for relatively reasonable tuition you could get pretty decent music lessons. So that really popularized music lessons for a lot of people in Japan. From the 1960s onwards.</p><p>And 1979 &#8212; I think that&#8217;s the peak of piano production, the manufacture of pianos as well as sales in terms of numbers. And then it starts going down. So the 1960s and &#8216;70s &#8212; that&#8217;s really the full blossom in terms of piano specifically.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> Before we get to the bourgeoisification of piano &#8212; could you correct or confirm my understanding of how classical music entered East Asia? It&#8217;s surprising that it seems to be structurally quite similar across China, Japan, and Korea &#8212; that the general pattern was that it initially began as a kind of tool of states trying to adopt Western classical music almost as a way of nation-building. Can you speak a little bit about this? Because it&#8217;s a little counterintuitive to think that a country like Japan or China, in their effort to build nations, wants to learn about Beethoven or Bach. Why is that the case?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> It wasn&#8217;t initially Beethoven and Bach. The key is that it was initially the military band &#8212; that was the entr&#233;e. So in order for the Meiji government, in an effort to build a strong industrial, militarized nation &#8212; they felt they needed a kind of disciplined military and other workforce. And they somehow decided that military bands instilled this kind of discipline and rhythm.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> But there was also the Rokumeikan culture of upper-class Japanese &#8212; sort of dancing and waltzes and so on.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yeah. So aspiration for Western, especially European, bourgeois &#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> There were two elements. There&#8217;s a class element to it. But there was also a very practical, militaristic element to it. And then there&#8217;s also a religious element to it, right? There was also the missionary aspect.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yeah, exactly. So it&#8217;s a mix of utilitarian and also cultural, social &#8212; all of that come combined.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> Got it. And then one step before we get to the more commodification of classical music, including Yamaha and the companies we&#8217;re all familiar with now &#8212; there&#8217;s a period where all three countries, Korea, Japan, and China, repudiate that tradition in some aspect, right? You have interviews with musicians who are going through the Cultural Revolution, where that was an extreme. Can you talk a little bit about that darkening period?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yeah. The Cultural Revolution in China is really a dark moment in the history of China, but especially the history of Western music in China. So Mao Zedong&#8217;s Cultural Revolution &#8212; anything to do with what they saw as Western bourgeois culture was persecuted. So people who were studying or practicing, performing, composing what they considered Western music were sent off to the faraway countryside or sometimes imprisoned. Some really tragic things happened to the lives and careers of these musicians. And so one could say that really stalled the development of Western music in China during that period.</p><p>But even before then &#8212; during the revolutionary years in China and also during Japan&#8217;s colonization of Korea and other Asian nations &#8212; it&#8217;s very complicated, because there were a lot of these anti-colonialist movements in these areas against Japan. And the kind of songs that these Koreans, Chinese people, workforce masses, soldiers composed and sang were often Western-style songs that originally sometimes came through Japan. So they were using Western-style music that some of them learned from Japan to fight against the Japanese.</p><p>I think that&#8217;s a very interesting twist in history, and one of the examples of the multiple meanings that any music has. Western music &#8212; just because the instruments, the compositions, et cetera, originated in Europe or the West &#8212; doesn&#8217;t mean that&#8217;s all the music means. Western-ness is not the only meaning the music has. People &#8212; Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, or anybody who adopted it for whatever reason, through whatever route &#8212; make their own meaning out of that music and use it for their own ends, whether nationalistic goals or spiritual goals, beyond the original intentions of the composers or the cultural, national origins of where it came from.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> But the Cultural Revolution, I think, was a reaction unique to China. When Japan in the 1930s had a reaction against the West, Western classical music was never banned, because German and Italian composers were still okay, right? So what exactly was banned in those years after 1937? When they had the banning of enemy culture, was it only American and English?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yeah, a lot of music. Some of the Japanese musicians who loved Western music, they changed the programs of their performances. This is a little bit different from Western classical music in Japan during that time &#8212; but in the 1920s and 1930s, Hawaiian music was very popular. There were a lot of Hawaiian music bands, some of whom were Japanese immigrants who were living in Hawaii and learned Hawaiian music. They were performing Hawaiian music in Hawaii. Some of them came back to Japan, or moved to Japan, because they were so popular. Hawaiian music was very big and popular in Japan at the time.</p><p>But after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian music was banned. A lot of them changed the names of their bands. They used similar tunes, similar kinds of instruments, but they changed the names of their brands. So they didn&#8217;t use words like Hawaii or aloha or <em>marijuana</em> [marimba?]. They changed it to some more generic name. And then they changed the lyrics to more Japanese, nationalistic-sounding lyrics. They made a lot of adaptations. And I think similar things happened with so-called classical music.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> Can we talk about the Suzuki method? Did you learn &#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> I think I &#8212; I don&#8217;t remember if it was called the Suzuki method, but I just think it&#8217;s an incredible story, and it&#8217;s an example of the kind of reverse flow of culture, of classical music back to the West. Can you just explain a little bit of what the Suzuki method is?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yes. The Suzuki method is a very effective method of music pedagogy that was initially designed by this violinist and violin pedagogue, Shinichi Suzuki, who studied in Germany in the 1920s and then moved back to Japan. He had this philosophy that music should be &#8212; and is &#8212; accessible to everybody, regardless. It doesn&#8217;t have to do with one&#8217;s innate talent or your family background. Everybody, with proper methods, will be able to learn music and do it well, through things like immersion and strong parental guidance. He initially developed a structured series of pieces for kids to learn, initially for violin, and then a similar method was adapted to other instruments &#8212; piano, cello, flute, et cetera.</p><p>This became extremely successful, especially after the late 1950s, when a bunch of American violin teachers came to Japan to study with Mr. Suzuki. They were amazed by the level of playing among young Japanese kids who were playing in complete, perfect tune, complete unison in big groups. So these American pedagogues &#8212; violin teachers &#8212; studied with Suzuki and brought it back to the United States and other parts of the world. Later on, the Suzuki method actually became even more popular outside of Japan than in Japan proper. It&#8217;s a very structured and effective method of music pedagogy.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> I think Jimmy Carter&#8217;s daughter, right? You mentioned that Jimmy Carter&#8217;s daughter was a student of the Suzuki method.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Many prominent professional musicians today &#8212; people like Sarah Chang &#8212; being started with the Suzuki method, especially among violinists. A lot of people started playing the instrument through the Suzuki method.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> But the Suzuki method doesn&#8217;t quite explain why even today, classical music seems to be so prominent in households in East Asia, whereas in the United States it&#8217;s become a kind of niche thing for specialists, and popular culture has completely swamped it. Why do you think that is? Why has it survived much more in East Asian countries?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> I think classical music still carries a lot of cultural cachet in East Asia, much more so than in the United States.</p><p>And also &#8212; now that I&#8217;m studying the culture of piano in Japan today, I get the sense that the meaning of piano lessons today has changed compared to, say, when I was growing up in the 1970s and &#8216;80s. Not as many children study the piano in Japan today. For one thing, there are far fewer children in Japan today than decades ago overall. But also kids&#8217; pursuits have diversified a lot more. There are many more lessons &#8212; like English lessons, [tucker?], et cetera &#8212; that kids do. So piano lessons are far less universal now than they used to be. But it&#8217;s still very popular. It&#8217;s one of the top two pursuits &#8212; lessons that kids take today.</p><p>I think a lot of it has to do now with the fact that learning an instrument, especially piano, is associated with strong academic skills. A lot of people believe in the Mozart effect &#8212; they believe that if you play a lot of music while you&#8217;re pregnant, the baby will come out good with cognitive development, et cetera. And a lot of people believe &#8212; I think not wrongly &#8212; that learning to play an instrument like piano develops a lot of skills that are applicable to other things in life, especially academic and other professional skills.</p><p>So I think that kind of motivation is driving piano culture now, more than aspiration for Western culture or veneration of Beethoven. The thing that people like to see in music lessons today is different from, say, the 1970s.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> I wanted to ask, Mari, whether you had thoughts about the flip side of this &#8212; that in the United States, classical music attendance has been falling consistently. There are regional orchestras that are reducing performances or cutting wages. And the Trump administration, in their effort to eliminate the National Endowment for the Arts, was also threatening a lot of symphonies. What do you make of that process in the United States? Or maybe you might know a little bit more about that than I do &#8212; could you describe what we&#8217;re seeing in the United States with respect to classical music over the past decade?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> I think the place of classical music in American culture in general has changed a lot. It&#8217;s not even that recent of a phenomenon. I have written a book about Leonard Bernstein, who was a huge star &#8212; he was <em>the</em> American musician of the twentieth century. He was hugely popular, a very big celebrity even beyond classical music fans, because he was so multi-talented and charismatic, and just so popular in so many different fields. But even during his heyday, the share of classical music recordings in the overall recording market was shrinking very rapidly. Through his Young People&#8217;s Concerts series and so on, Leonard Bernstein could pack the hall. But even then, the recording industry and the media industry generally were shifting more and more of their weight into popular music. So that has been the case for decades.</p><p>Things like orchestras are a very difficult thing to run financially, because even if every single concert is sold out, it would only pay for about 30% of the cost of the musicians. That&#8217;s just how the operation is. So I think it&#8217;s becoming more and more difficult, especially with the changing media landscape and the way many people listen to music. It&#8217;s a difficult thing to sustain as an economic enterprise, in a lot of cases.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> There may be another reason too, which is a political one &#8212; that in the first decades after World War II, there was a sort of consensus in Europe and the United States that it was, in some ways, the duty of a government, and of public broadcasting and education, to elevate the cultural level of the masses. And so to subsidize music as well as other things. Whereas right now, in an age of populism &#8212; and right-wing populism &#8212; everything that is considered to be elitist&#8230; But that&#8217;s also said amongst people on the left, that anything elitist has to be discouraged, no longer subsidized, and so on. And of course classical music, opera and so on, which is very expensive, is very much associated with the elites.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> That&#8217;s true, which is very unfortunate. Because I&#8217;m working on another research and writing project, which is kind of a sequel to my book <em>Musicians from a Different Shore</em>. So about twenty-some years after the publication of the book, a lot of things are changing in the classical music industry, especially in the United States. I&#8217;ve gone back to many of the same musicians I interviewed twenty-some years ago, and I&#8217;m also interviewing a lot of other musicians today and writing about that.</p><p>From that research, I can say that I think what we call classical music is very much alive. It&#8217;s very vibrant. A lot of very talented, very visionary, very audacious young &#8212; and less young &#8212; musicians are doing great things in music, either in terms of composition or performance, conducting, directing, producing, et cetera. They have very creative ideas and are doing a lot of new things. Many of them are playing Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, et cetera, brilliantly. But they&#8217;re also doing a lot of other things, like creating new music, using the traditions and instruments &#8212; instruments not just in terms of musical instruments like the flute, but the tools of classical music &#8212; to do great new things.</p><p>And I find that a lot of music organizations like orchestras &#8212; especially regional orchestras and regional opera companies &#8212; are oftentimes doing very interesting things, more so than the more established big organizations. Because the smaller the organization, the fewer board members you have to convince, so you can actually do more interesting things. Bigger organizations tend to be less nimble in terms of trying out new things.</p><p>So I think a lot of great, innovative things are happening in so-called classical music. But it takes a while for that to reach a wider audience, or for the general audience to get that message, or even just have a chance to experience it and learn about it.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> Right. At the same time that there is this anti-elitist wave in the West &#8212; and here, Chang, I think you should come in &#8212; in China that does not seem to be the case.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> I was looking at the statistics in China around classical music today, and it has been growing at a really rapid pace. There are currently 2,600 or so youth symphony orchestras in China, which is crazy &#8212; and 50% of them had been established in the preceding five years, which means they didn&#8217;t really exist before roughly 2018. So it&#8217;s really only in the past six years that this has been the case.</p><p>There are stories &#8212; and a lot of them are from state media, so I think someone needs to do some more independent reporting on this &#8212; but state media are reporting on orchestras in like the poorest regions of China. And all of them are tied to the Education Department. So it&#8217;s a government-affiliated approach.</p><p>In my understanding &#8212; Mari, I&#8217;m really curious how you understand this &#8212; but, one, Leon Botstein, Professor Botstein, may have a point. There&#8217;s certainly an initiative that is growing in China. My sense is that, similar to what you said, Ian, about how there was this kind of initiative after World War II to educate the masses &#8212; part of this is certainly educating the masses. The Education Department&#8217;s role is to raise the spiritual quality of the masses. So that is certainly a part of it. There&#8217;s also, I think, this general fascination &#8212; that, Mari, you mentioned &#8212; with the West, just the cultural cachet of Western music. It seems that, at least maybe less within the central government, but these local governments are on board with supporting Western classical music. Are you aware of the recent boom in classical music in China?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yeah, definitely. In the last ten, fifteen years &#8212; the rise of orchestras all over China, and also the building of big concert halls everywhere in China. A lot of American music schools, for instance, music conservatories &#8212; they often say that they really could not survive without, quote unquote, &#8220;the China market,&#8221; in a lot of ways. American orchestras or soloists would go tour in China because they can pack the halls and they can make a lot of money. American music conservatories send their faculty to China to give master classes and lessons, in the hopes of recruiting students to come study in the US. Some of them, like Juilliard for instance, even set up a branch of the Juilliard campus in China. And other organizations have launched various kinds of partnership programs and enterprises with China.</p><p>So yes, one could say that the classical music industry is very much dependent on China as a market &#8212; as a source of students, listeners, et cetera. Also, piano manufacturers like Yamaha &#8212; for a while, China was a very important market. I think it has changed quite rapidly in the last few years, because the government&#8217;s position on music education has drastically changed in the last few years. But yeah, a lot of people, a lot of performers, go perform in China, go recruit students in China, et cetera.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> Can we change the subject a little bit to another aspect of your book, which is the gender issue, and the prominence especially of female musicians from East Asia or Asian Americans &#8212; the influence of their looks, and that there&#8217;s a certain exotic image that is being projected. How did that evolve?</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Independent of music or classical music, there has always been historically these gendered and sexualized perceptions of Asian women in the United States. Asian women have stereotypically been viewed as exotic, sensual, also diminutive, subordinate, weak, et cetera &#8212; all these things that white male gaze wanted to project upon them, regardless of the reality of Asian women. But these gender, sexual stereotypes of Asian women have also been applied to how Asian women musicians have been perceived and treated in the classical music industry.</p><p>I have encountered a lot of Asian female musicians who felt that in music schools in the United States they were not treated as seriously by their faculty, and some of them experienced outright harassment by their faculty. They were not given as rigorous training, or expectations as high as other male musicians, et cetera. And &#8212; I guess this happens somewhat less frequently now, but like twenty-some years ago, when I was researching and writing the book &#8212; it was also still quite common for the media representation of these Asian women musicians to use very explicit, sexualized language, to focus more on their looks than on their playing, or to project that kind of filter onto their perception of these musicians.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> Can I ask a question about authenticity? This is regarding your last chapter. I wanted to give you an example from something I know a little bit more about, which is the Chinese interest in the Greco-Roman classical tradition. This is the classics in a different sense.</p><p>There&#8217;s this kind of tension I noticed between people who are actually studying the classics &#8212; Chinese who are actually experiencing studying Western classics &#8212; versus the meanings that society ascribes to that action. Oftentimes when I talk to Chinese classicists, they don&#8217;t really see Western classics as white or Western. They just see it as kind of pure &#8212; like the <em>Odyssey</em> is such a beautiful story, and so I want to continue to read it and continue to study it in college. But then, especially in this age of populism, there are populists who want to search for roots of identity. And so they oftentimes co-opt the classics as theirs &#8212; that Greek and Latin is a part of the West, and the Confucian tradition is a part of the East. And so we Chinese must learn the Confucian tradition, and you Americans must learn the Western canon. There are these debates going on.</p><p>I was surprised to learn from your book that there are people who believe that about classical music as well &#8212; that there&#8217;s something innate about Europeans, white Europeans, who might have better access to classical music. So I was wondering whether you could speak to how you navigate that tension between the interviews you conduct and the kind of impressions people have of what&#8217;s going on.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> This is complicated. This is a complicated topic for classical music specifically, because classical music is a genre of music that places a lot of weight on origins. Unless you&#8217;re playing contemporary music, basically what classical musicians do is perform music that was literally written and published. There is a score. And it is generally considered that the performer&#8217;s job is to faithfully realize the composer&#8217;s intentions.</p><p>So in order to do that, the performers should really understand deeply the origin and the context of where that music came from &#8212; the composer&#8217;s biography, the culture he was living in most of the time, and all of the stylistic and other elements that make up that music &#8212; and faithfully recreate it. That&#8217;s the job of the performer in the case of classical music. That&#8217;s the commonly held belief. So it&#8217;s very different from other genres of music, like jazz, which is very improvised &#8212; that&#8217;s a very different kind of music.</p><p>So when I interviewed musicians about what they think about this issue &#8212; by which I mean how they understand the relationship between the European origin of the music they play and their own non-European identity, how they reconcile or think about the relationship between these two &#8212; I was surprised by the wide range of answers my interviewees gave. Some musicians said very firmly that they did not believe one&#8217;s racial, cultural, ethnic background was a factor &#8212; as long as you are a serious musician who understands and studies the music deeply, and you relate to the music in an authentic way, you can achieve the composer&#8217;s intentions. Whether you&#8217;re Chinese or Korean or Japanese, you will be able to play Beethoven just as well as a German musician. So in that sense, music transcends borders. It&#8217;s universal. A lot of people say that very firmly.</p><p>But on the other hand, I was also quite surprised by the number of people &#8212; and these are not just people who didn&#8217;t make it; they&#8217;re not saying it because they couldn&#8217;t make it in the classical music world. Some of these answers came from people who are very well known, prominent professional musicians. Some of these people said music is like a language. There is something quite Germanic, essentially Germanic, about German music. There is something essentially French about French music. And there&#8217;s a big difference between somebody who was born and raised in Germany, or whose family have been living in Germany for generations, or somebody who&#8217;s a native French speaker &#8212; those people would have a different relationship to German language or French language. And the same goes for music as well.</p><p>So if you grew up in Japan listening to Japanese music, and then studied French music or German music or Italian music, you have a different relationship to that body of music. It doesn&#8217;t mean you can&#8217;t do well &#8212; it&#8217;s just that you have a different relationship to it. So I&#8217;m calling these people kind of &#8220;particularists,&#8221; as opposed to the &#8220;universalists,&#8221; in terms of how they understand the nature of music as a form of language.</p><p>I don&#8217;t know where I myself stand on this question. I think you can draw a lot of analogies between music and language, as well as other things like food. I do believe there are cultural differences across different things. To what extent your upbringing, your ethnic, racial background, has to do with your understanding of a product of another culture &#8212; I don&#8217;t know if there is a clear answer to it.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> Race in America always comes up in many ways. It&#8217;s a bogus thing, because I remember an American woman saying something that one does hear quite a bit &#8212; that Asian musicians, East Asian musicians, are technically perfect, they&#8217;re fantastically good, but they don&#8217;t really understand the soul of Western music because they haven&#8217;t been raised in it. And the same woman who said that herself was raised in Southern California, where she&#8217;s just as far removed from the German and French and Italian origins as any Asian.</p><p>What you&#8217;re saying reminds me of another experience I had, which was in the &#8216;80s. I was having dinner with a Korean writer &#8212; he was a bit of a nationalist &#8212; in Seoul, and we were sitting in a traditional Korean restaurant. Suddenly we heard a tape of classical music played by Kyung-Wha Chung. He went silent, and he said to me, &#8220;This is the soul of Korea. This is the Korean blood showing through her music.&#8221; And she was playing Bart&#243;k or something like that. There are a lot of bogus ways to approach this subject, is my point.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yeah.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> So you interviewed Asian musicians. If Asian musicians actually at the top of their craft are telling you, &#8220;Yeah, there really is something about this music that we Asians can&#8217;t access&#8221; &#8212; how does that particular view square with what I think you&#8217;re arguing in the book, which is that Asians in classical music are not just joining some tent, they&#8217;re also reimagining, reinventing? We just spent some time talking about the Suzuki method. I feel like language is not exactly the right analogy, because then what the Suzuki method would be is like Americans adopting a Japanese person speaking English. There&#8217;s something about music that&#8217;s a little bit more porous culturally, and can be brought in and incubated in a different culture or context.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Yeah. So what I was trying to get at in that chapter about authenticity is that musicians can and do have a wide range of ideas, positions about this question of authenticity and how their racial, ethnic identity relates to the European origin of the music. And because, as I said earlier, classical music is a genre of music that places a lot of emphasis on its origins, there can be a lot of different ideas about it. But I don&#8217;t think the goal of classical music or classical musicians is necessarily &#8212; the ultimate goal is not necessarily to play Beethoven like Beethoven would have. Maybe some people want that, but not everyone is trying to play Beethoven the way Beethoven would have.</p><p>After all, it&#8217;s all an interpretation, and a performance of the interpretation. Just like anything else, in order to interpret something very deeply, you have to do a lot of studying, a lot of thinking, a lot of analysis. And then out of that, you create your own interpretation and performance of it. So I think the ultimate goal is not necessarily to play German music like a native-born German would, or play French music as if a Parisian would do, but to come up with your own understanding of what that means and do it your way. Because otherwise everybody would end up playing the same piece of music the same way. And what&#8217;s the point of that?</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> Yes. That raises the question of whether there really is such a thing as a national style of performing. I think you were talking earlier of a national style in composition &#8212; because Verdi operas clearly are rooted in Italian popular music and so on. But the idea that there should be a national style in performing sounds to me very suspect.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> I think with certain instruments, there actually &#8212; it&#8217;s not so much because, well, I don&#8217;t know if it&#8217;s so much national, but there are traditions of pedagogy. There are certain kinds of like a Russian style of pianism that&#8217;s different from, say, French style. But the thing is, because of globalization and the flow of people, et cetera, a lot of people &#8212; for instance, prominent Japanese piano teachers were trained in Germany or the United States. Some of them are more German style, and some of them are American style. Same with violin pedagogy. Certain prominent violin teachers &#8212; like Dorothy DeLay, who taught at Juilliard for a long time &#8212; her style was different from, say, another violinist from France or Belgium or wherever. So I think there are styles of pedagogy that get passed down through generations of students, but it doesn&#8217;t necessarily correlate with national or ethnic identities.</p><p><strong>Chang Che:</strong> Great. Thank you so much, Mari. I really, really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Ian Buruma:</strong> Thank you.</p><p><strong>Mari Yoshihara:</strong> Thank you for having me.Why are Chinese, Korean, and Japanese musicians so overrepresented in Western orchestras? Mari Yoshihara, author of <em>Musicians from a Different Shore</em>, joins Ian Buruma and Chang Che to trace how Western classical instruments, pedogogy and cultural traveled from Meiji-era military bands to suburban living rooms in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul. We also talk about why classical music still carries cultural weight in East Asia even as its glow seems to be fading in the West.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Year Inside ByteDance's AI Lab]]></title><description><![CDATA[From 2025 to 2026, Zhang Chi was an AI researcher at ByteDance Seed, the division behind Doubao, China's most-used chatbot.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/a-year-inside-bytedances-ai-lab-f86</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/a-year-inside-bytedances-ai-lab-f86</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 11:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980744/c8a840c76c286987f537b4b01d89b826.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From 2025 to 2026, Zhang Chi was an AI researcher at ByteDance Seed, the division behind Doubao, China's most-used chatbot. Now a assistant professor at Peking University, he joins Chang for a rare insider account of life at one of China's top AI labs. He talks about ByteDance's two-hour nap culture, the shortcuts Chinese labs take to catch up to the US, the ubiquity of Claude Code, and why he thinks the gap with American frontier labs is widening.</p><p>Transcript:</p><p>Chang Che: How did you get into AI?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I spent four years in Hangzhou &#8212; I studied at Zhejiang University. I majored in computer science, and I sort of started getting interested in AI after Andrew Ng&#8217;s Coursera course on machine learning. I found it pretty interesting, especially the digit recognition, the very introductory digit recognition project. I moved to the University of California, Los Angeles, and spent sort of four or five years doing my PhD in AI with Zhu Songchun. Then in 2021, after I graduated, I moved back to Beijing and spent, I guess, 2.5 wonderful years at BIGAI, the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence, and then I joined ByteDance and became officially a large language model engineer. After a year there, I decided that I would like to do more of the research part of AI, and then I moved back to Peking University and started this tenure-track assistant professorship.</p><p>Chang Che: For listeners who don&#8217;t know, Zhu Songchun is a really renowned AI scientist. He was involved in a lot of the early &#8212; what in the AI field is known as the data-driven approach, which is the approach that current large language models are built on: this idea that you can sort of derive patterns [and intelligence] from data. He moved back to China around 2020 to start his own institute at Peking University, which is where Zhang Chi &#8212; is it fair to say that you sort of followed him back to China?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, I think it&#8217;s fair. [NB: A reminder that when prominent Chinese scientists return to China, they also tend to bring their talented students]</p><p>Chang Che: Zhu Songchun is well known for being opposed to this paradigm of drawing on neural networks &#8212; which the field calls the scaling hypothesis: the idea that you can use a large amount of computing to improve intelligence. And he doesn&#8217;t think that this is the right path towards artificial general intelligence. Do you agree with that view, and has your time at ByteDance, where you were working primarily on building large language models, changed your view on that?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I sort of agree with Zhu Songchun that this data-scaling thing is not the whole picture of AI, but to be fair, or from a practical standpoint, I think this data-driven scaling thing is the only method that works across this entire field. So it&#8217;s something that &#8212; it&#8217;s not enough, it&#8217;s not everything, but it&#8217;s sort of like a very important component in building an AI system that actually works. So the short answer is, I agree with his standpoint, but to be fair, I believe it&#8217;s also one way towards this general AI, this goal of general AI.</p><p>Chang Che: When you were at BIGAI, what were you primarily doing? Because this was before the rise of ChatGPT, right?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, before ChatGPT came out, no one really knew a unified approach to everything. The entire thing was divided into multiple subgroups. There was a group focusing on CV &#8212; basically computer vision &#8212; natural language processing, cognitive reasoning, simulation, multi-agent systems.</p><p>Chang Che: So basically different branches of AI.</p><p>Zhang Chi: I forgot to mention a robotics division. It was like six divisions, and we were trying to use his theory to develop models and methods that could actually work in the specific field.</p><p>Chang Che: And so what changed after ChatGPT?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah. So basically, after ChatGPT came out, initially people didn&#8217;t believe it. People believed that it was something that worked but would not work as well as expected. So initially, at BIGAI, people just realized that this thing called ChatGPT could be useful in some ways, but people still didn&#8217;t believe that it could be useful in reasoning, robotics, multi-agent systems &#8212; basically, it wouldn&#8217;t work in every area. But as time went by, people gradually realized that it might be a way, and people started to use this transformer model for everything. For robotics, there was this visual language model; basically, everyone uses transformers or this large language model as the foundation for multi-agent systems. So people gradually realized that it could be something that works in almost every area. And so basically after a few years, every team used that model. People still have their tasks of interest, but basically everything was based on transformers at &#8212;</p><p>Chang Che: BIGAI.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, exactly.</p><p>Chang Che: Tell me, just chronologically, what were the years that you were at BIGAI?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I think I joined initially as an intern before I officially graduated from UCLA &#8212; that was 2020. I joined in 2020 and I left in 2025. So basically a year of internship, and then through 2.5 years as a research scientist.</p><p>Chang Che: So in 2025 you joined ByteDance. Tell me a little bit about what ByteDance was looking for at that time.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, so I think I can talk a little bit about the history. There was this AI lab called ByteDance AI Lab, at ByteDance, before the ChatGPT era. I didn&#8217;t know fully about what they were doing, but they were definitely doing some kind of research. Some team members of AI Lab later left and joined this Seed department. So basically, I think Seed was officially launched in &#8212; I guess 2024, or maybe late 2023. Now it&#8217;s the main AI department. Before that, it was this AI Lab, but it was basically dismantled later, and everyone in the lab basically joined Seed in a way or another. In late 2024, there was this DeepSeek moment. So before the DeepSeek moment came out, ByteDance, the Seed department, was basically trying to catch up with GPT-4o, and then by December 2024, the team, by their own standard, believed they&#8217;d caught up to GPT-4o. But then came this DeepSeek moment, and the team realized that their model was not good enough. So when I joined in early 2025, basically the entire department was trying to implement this reinforcement learning thing and trying to have their own thinking model. That&#8217;s kind of the history.</p><p>[NB: According to another ex-ByteDancer, Zhang Yiming, the founder, was furious after ChatGPT was released in 2023. (&#8220;We&#8217;re an AI company; how could we not have come up with this?&#8221;) and he launched Seed, a massive AI catch-up initiative inside ByteDance which Zhang is saying had &#8220;succeeded&#8221; by late 2024&#8230;until DeepSeek.]</p><p>Chang Che: So you&#8217;re saying that within ByteDance, they thought that they had already reached the same level as GPT-4o, which is OpenAI&#8217;s latest model &#8212;[not the latest model sorry I misspoke]&#8212; and then they realized that one of their own Chinese models really showed that they were not there yet.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Same level by their own standard.</p><p>Chang Che: Right. Because at the time, as I recall, at least a lot of the benchmarking and AI leaders in the United States were saying that China was significantly behind. I remember the numbers used to be like one to two years, or one year, or six months &#8212; these were some of the things coming out. But then the DeepSeek moment really changed that. And so you joined ByteDance at the DeepSeek moment. What was your job at ByteDance to improve in the reinforcement learning direction?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, I focused on math and coding for the past year. So we basically used a programming language called Lean. It&#8217;s a formal language that can express math in code. The good thing about Lean is that it&#8217;s automatically verified. So as long as you can express math in Lean and it passes the compiler and is taken as a correct solution, you can basically think of it as a right proof of the problem. So I was working on this project &#8212; the goal of the team back then was to create their own model that could reach gold-medal performance at the IMO, the International Math Olympiad. So my job was basically making that happen.</p><p>Chang Che: One question I had about this point was: why did ByteDance care so much about math? I understand that math and these kinds of brute-logic questions were one of the weak points of early large language models. Another way to ask this question is: how much of the resources were diverted towards making large language models good at math versus others at ByteDance?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Okay. So there was a more significant effort in using informal language to prove math problems, or solve reasoning problems or logic-based problems. But there was also a comparably smaller part devoted to this formal part. So it was more like a side project &#8212; not completely a side project, but back then it was like, imagine ByteDance suddenly has a math model that can solve IMO, it would be a perfect thing to brag about, for their capability in large language models. So I guess it was basically the logic of what the team leader, what the division leader, would think about for our team. So it was more for publicity.</p><p>Chang Che: Can you give us a sense of where your department sat within the broader &#8212; how many divisions there were in Seed working on things beyond the math improvement section, and then where Seed sits in the broader ByteDance ecosystem, because ByteDance is massive, right?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Definitely one of the hundreds of departments in ByteDance, but currently the company invested most of their money in AI research, and it&#8217;s basically the foundation of their apps towards customers. The Seed department provides models for their apps to customers &#8212; everyone knows Seedance, right?</p><p>Chang Che: In case people don&#8217;t know what Seedance is, it&#8217;s the video generator. Recently it blew up in China because it was used to build a lot of microdramas &#8212; these sort of small dramas on your iPhones, on your smartphones, that you can watch. It&#8217;s very good at generating real life. So that&#8217;s kind of the model that was also a part of Seed. So there were people that were building that at Seed.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, so in the Seed department, I think the largest part of Seed is the LLM subdivision, and we also have a world model subdivision &#8212; that was also a legacy of AI Lab, like the AI-for-science part in Seed. I believe there are others &#8212; I cannot enumerate every one of them, but the team I was affiliated with is Seed LLM. There&#8217;s also a VLM part of this Seed division. And in LLM there are many teams, each one specializing in a specific stage of LLM training. For example, there&#8217;s a pre-training team, a post-training team, and there was this math team, which was the team I was in. I believe there&#8217;s also an evaluation team. I guess basically each team is devoted to different stages of LLM training and deployment.</p><p>Chang Che: And was Liang Rubo, the CEO of ByteDance, involved in the Seed team? Or &#8212; ByteDance is so big &#8212; who was the leader of the Seed team?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Liang Rubo is the CEO, and then Wu Yonghui, who joined roughly at the same time as I did, is now the official leader of the entire Seed.</p><p>Chang Che: I&#8217;m curious how the Seed team thought of this competition. Did they conceive of their competition mainly as domestic players like DeepSeek?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I guess the team leaders would like to position Seed models as a top-tier model across the globe &#8212; that basically involves ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini. But very unfortunately, I don&#8217;t think we caught up. So the more realistic expectation is to be number one in the domestic market, which I don&#8217;t think is realized either.</p><p>Chang Che: How intense is it at ByteDance to be an LLM researcher in 2025, 2026? How stressful is it? Are you guys meeting in the morning every day, and the leaders go, &#8220;We have to beat OpenAI&#8221;?</p><p>Zhang Chi: From my perspective, I think the environment or atmosphere is pretty chilled out in one way. The only other thing is that everyone is basically benchmaxxing. So the leaders of teams would focus primarily on how the model performs on the specific benchmark, particularly for the benchmark that a leader is responsible for. So everyone has a very &#8212; I think &#8212; implicit pressure. If you can&#8217;t really match or reach the top performance on the benchmark, that basically means you didn&#8217;t do a great job, and that would affect your evaluation in the future. I think no one really pushes you into doing anything, but you sort of have to make sure that you did something useful for the company.</p><p>Chang Che: So you&#8217;re saying that there were clear benchmarks, and what was success? Success was basically that you were beating Google&#8217;s Gemini and OpenAI and Claude on these benchmarks, and failure was that you guys weren&#8217;t?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Basically. But it&#8217;s okay to just catch up &#8212; don&#8217;t be too far behind.</p><p>Chang Che: And within those benchmarks, how was ByteDance doing while you were there?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, I think everyone was doing sort of benchmaxxing, but it doesn&#8217;t translate to good performance in real-world use cases.</p><p>Chang Che: Right. So you&#8217;re saying that benchmaxxing is this idea that you&#8217;re kind of playing to the scoreboard rather than actually having a good, capable model overall.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah. I think on paper, every big tech company in China has a good model that can sort of catch up with the latest frontier models in the US, but it turns out that from my understanding &#8212; from my experience interacting with those models &#8212; I don&#8217;t think they&#8217;re good enough.</p><p>Chang Che: Do you have a sense that this kind of benchmaxxing is happening across the board in China?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Personally, I don&#8217;t have much firsthand experience working in other companies, but I guess, as far as I know from friends working in those companies, everyone is sort of doing the same thing. On one hand, everyone is trying to benchmaxx, but on the other, they should have their own private evaluation set that really tells them how they&#8217;re doing. I guess for those frontier models like Claude and Gemini and GPT, one very good thing is that they have rich interactions with users across the globe, and they have some ways to ask their users to tag their answers, and they can use those responses as additional training data and gradually improve their model. So I guess that&#8217;s one really big advantage for them.</p><p>Chang Che: Can you walk us through what a typical week at ByteDance looks like?</p><p>Zhang Chi: From my own experience, working at ByteDance, particularly in the math group, it&#8217;s really not a big pressure for everyone. So basically we show up at 10:30 &#8212; some people show up at 11:00 &#8212; and we leave at around 9:00, 9:30. And then we have around two hours of sleep time at noon. So it was roughly nine hours of work, but that also includes dinner time.</p><p>Chang Che: You guys have naps? You guys have afternoon naps?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Within the company we have naps &#8212; like, for two hours, a nap. So basically starting from 12, and then to 2:00 PM, no one will arrange any meetings, so you can do whatever you want. You can have a nice sleep or whatever. You can also go out to walk or whatever. And that also includes dinner. So ByteDance offers free lunch and dinner. You basically spend an hour or an hour and a half at dinner, and then you get back to work at basically 7:30. You can spend another two hours on work and leave at 9:30, and after 9:30 you can have a free ride home. And we don&#8217;t really have many meetings. There was basically one group meeting a week. Other meetings, you just arrange for yourself. So for the other times, you don&#8217;t have meetings. You just work on your own and do really useful things, and basically realize your OKRs or KPIs.</p><p>Chang Che: Sometimes I wonder about the differences between ByteDance and, say, a company like DeepSeek. One difference that I&#8217;ve noticed is that ByteDance is such a commercialized, such a big company that&#8217;s actually churning out products for customers. You also mentioned that Seed is not independent of this &#8212; that the large language models that they push out, like Seedance, the video generator, are integrated with a lot of these products. How much of that impacts your day-to-day work at ByteDance, because these kinds of pressures don&#8217;t exist at, for example, DeepSeek, which isn&#8217;t really so integrated with consumer-facing products? So I wonder whether you &#8212; yeah, so one of the first questions is, how much of that is present in your work, just keeping in mind the kinds of products that the large language models will have to integrate with downstream? And is that an annoyance? Do you find that a problem, or is that a good thing?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I think, except for the math team &#8212; for the pre-training team, for the post-training team, they should be fully responsible for the models that they deliver. So for them, it would be great pressure to catch up with the frontier model. So for them, I guess the pressure will be completely different from ours. Those teams need to be responsible for the models that are deployed online &#8212; also how the model performs, where the failure cases are, they need to fix them. But for the math team, it was formed initially as a research-oriented team, and the single goal of the team was to reach good performance at IMO last year. After we achieved silver-medal performance in 2025 &#8212; that was basically July or August &#8212; after that, I started to find that the team was becoming more responsible for delivery. Like, we needed to sort of join the main forces in pushing the model&#8217;s performance in math. The team started to carry some responsibility for the model&#8217;s performance in specific areas, and we started to do things that are not that research-y. I think from then, things got a little boring and not that interesting.</p><p>Chang Che: Who won the gold when you said silver?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Gemini won the gold. OpenAI claimed that they won the gold, but it was sort of an unverified thing.</p><p>Chang Che: What do you feel explains the difference between your models and Gemini and models like OpenAI&#8217;s in these kinds of performances? Is it a scaling thing? Is it something that just takes time? Or is there some kind of ingenuity that you guys don&#8217;t know about?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I don&#8217;t think it was about ingenuity. I think it was more about engineering and scaling. Let me tell you: rumor has it that Google can train or perform a full round of LLM training, both pre-training and post-training, in three months. Like, one iteration every three months. But ByteDance &#8212; probably we can only do one iteration in half a year. So it&#8217;s quite some difference. The good thing about Google is that they have many more researchers and cards, basically TPUs. They sort of outsource some of their data-labeling efforts to experts around the globe. Then they have more TPUs, that also translates to faster iteration in the larger model. So to be fair, I don&#8217;t think any Chinese company can catch up with them soon.</p><p>Chang Che: So what you&#8217;re referring to there is the quality. So when you say that the training takes longer, that presumably has to do with the chips, right &#8212; the semiconductors that you guys have at ByteDance? Can you tell us a little bit more about that? Like, what&#8217;s the current stack of chips that ByteDance uses? Are they using primarily Nvidia chips, or what is the current stack?</p><p>Zhang Chi: We basically use Nvidia chips. We use this Chinese version of the H20. That&#8217;s definitely legal. And then I knew that the company was procuring the B300, something like that. I don&#8217;t know &#8212; maybe in international markets, but definitely not in mainland China. So that part I don&#8217;t have too much to say about, honestly.</p><p>Chang Che: Do they have H100s, the sort of premier chips?</p><p>Zhang Chi: They definitely have them, but &#8212; I think before it was banned, they definitely had some H100s.</p><p>Chang Che: Right. And do you know where they are, physically? Like, do they have clusters in different parts of China and abroad?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I don&#8217;t have any specific information about how many cards, like H100s or H200s, they have and where they are. But ByteDance has many data centers, and most of the data centers &#8212; including Alibaba and, I guess, Tencent &#8212; these data centers are in Inner Mongolia, or basically northern China, because it&#8217;s cold enough.</p><p>Chang Che: Because of the difficulty of procuring chips, was there a sense of scarcity &#8212; a scarcity mentality &#8212; at ByteDance?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, I think the fastest chips are reserved for the most important teams, for example, pre-training and post-training. But other teams, I guess, we use H20. I think the company is trying to buy more chips, but as far as I know, every tech company in China is facing this challenge of where to get more chips, including Alibaba and Tencent.</p><p>Chang Che: Did you hear about the news that companies are being pressured by the Chinese government to use domestic chips? Is that something that you&#8217;re privy to? Is that true?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I knew that Seed has these domestic chips, but I don&#8217;t think any team trying to accelerate is actually using those chips. I don&#8217;t think teams that look for faster iterations would use those chips because it&#8217;s really hard to make full use of them. And there are many challenges. I think some teams, when we talk about model deployment &#8212; I guess some teams would consider those chips, but definitely not for training.</p><p>Chang Che: I see. So basically for the cream-of-the-crop models, you don&#8217;t use the domestic chips, but for other use cases and commercializing or whatever, that&#8217;s potentially true. But isn&#8217;t that what DeepSeek is doing? Isn&#8217;t DeepSeek trying to build its next version of its large language model on Huawei chips? That&#8217;s what I have heard.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, the news said that they&#8217;re going to release their next version of the model later this month, and presumably it&#8217;s going to be deployed partly on Huawei chips, but I&#8217;m not sure about it.</p><p>Chang Che: Do you get pressure from the government to go in a certain direction in AI development? Is there discussion within the company like, &#8220;Sorry, that&#8217;s kind of the direction we have to take because the government says so&#8221;? Do you feel that pressure, or do you feel like it&#8217;s pretty insulated and you guys are mostly working on just benchmarks and trying to make the best large language model?</p><p>Zhang Chi: We didn&#8217;t face that challenge. I think the company is basically a fully commercialized one. Although it&#8217;s in China, it definitely receives some pressure from the government, but I guess the primary goal right now is to catch up. The fastest way is to use the most advanced chips.</p><p>Chang Che: I think it was a quote &#8212; I don&#8217;t know who said it &#8212; but basically the idea is that so far the Chinese models have been really good at catching up to the American versions; they haven&#8217;t really provided many new innovations. Would you agree with that?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, I definitely do. I don&#8217;t even agree with the assumption that Chinese models are catching up &#8212; I believe we&#8217;re still far behind. I guess the gap is getting larger, very sadly.</p><p>Chang Che: So say more about that. Why do you think that is?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I&#8217;ve been using Claude lately, and also Codex &#8212; Claude Code, Codex, vibe coding. I find it to be extremely useful. Some parts of me don&#8217;t want to grow any PhD students right now &#8212; I can just use Claude Code and Codex for my students, and I can tutor them and give them instructions on doing what I want. And by doing that, I can save quite a large amount of money. But on the other hand, what I think about is that if I don&#8217;t grow this new generation of students, who would do the research after I get older? That&#8217;s kind of a dilemma. But if I really want to use the Chinese models for the jobs I&#8217;m interested in, I don&#8217;t find them to be really practical, and I don&#8217;t find them to be useful at all. So it&#8217;s sad news.</p><p>Chang Che: So you&#8217;re saying that the difference is significant in coding, in these kinds of agentic versions of AI that are coming out now.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah.</p><p>Chang Che: Why do you think that is? Because I remember like a year ago we were saying China was a few months, or maybe six months, behind, but now it seems like with these agentic versions of AI, there seems to be less optimism in the Chinese community that they&#8217;ll catch up &#8212; or maybe that&#8217;s just you. But I have heard some pessimism as well from other people. Why do you think that is?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I think it&#8217;s primarily because of this healthy loop of user feedback. You use more of their model, and they get more of your feedback, and then train a better model. So it&#8217;s like a healthy iteration.</p><p>Chang Che: So it&#8217;s like a first-mover advantage.</p><p>Zhang Chi: But Chinese models started not as good, so no one really uses them for like really important things, and so they don&#8217;t have really good feedback, and so they can&#8217;t have better data, and the models continue to be not that good. I guess that&#8217;s the primary reason. And I think on the other hand, since those companies are really on the frontier, they can spend more resources on getting more useful data. But Chinese companies are basically in a catching-up position, so they don&#8217;t really have that time and resources to do other advanced things in building models. They have to first catch up, which is still some distance. So I guess it&#8217;s going to be some pressure for them.</p><p>Chang Che: I don&#8217;t know if you had heard about the Claude Code leak. ByteDance and some companies started to analyze that.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, so actually one of my colleagues was doing a modified version of Claude Code. We called it TongTong &#8212; Tong was like the brand of BIGAI, the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence. So we basically had a modified version of that. But I guess the most important thing is not this framework of Claude Code &#8212; the most significant part of it is the API that it really calls. So you can change the API for Qwen or DeepSeek, but I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s going to be really useful compared to using Claude&#8217;s model or maybe OpenAI&#8217;s model.</p><p>Chang Che: So you&#8217;re saying that it&#8217;s not enough that the Claude Code source code was leaked?</p><p>Zhang Chi: It was far from enough. People basically call it a harness. I think the most important thing is still the model in the backbone, the foundation model that it calls.</p><p>Chang Che: So recently you have decided to leave ByteDance to take a position at Peking University. Was there something about the industry that had disillusioned you, or did you just feel that you wanted to do more research-focused stuff rather than commercial?</p><p>Zhang Chi: After spending a year at ByteDance, I gradually realized that LLM engineering in a company isn&#8217;t that really interesting. You basically use this off-the-shelf framework of either supervised fine-tuning or reinforcement learning. After those frameworks were built, what is left to do is basically getting your data clean enough and good enough for the model &#8212; there wasn&#8217;t really a lot to do in general. So I started to feel that my time was wasted in a company because I was not doing many interesting things. I was thinking about, maybe I should transition back to research. So I left, and I joined the university roughly a month ago, and I started to find it much more interesting. I talk to students about new ideas and how we can implement them. In numerous discussions, I find that there are so many things that we can do to improve the current LLM landscape. But the sad thing is that the company is not investing in those areas yet &#8212; but maybe after you get it done, get it to work, they would try to buy you out.</p><p>Chang Che: What do you mean by that?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I mean, after you show some promising results, they might try to hire you. They might try to ask you to implement that system or implement that idea in the company&#8217;s internal framework.</p><p>Chang Che: So the picture that you were drawing basically is that the Chinese LLM companies, including ByteDance, Alibaba &#8212; but mostly let&#8217;s focus on ByteDance &#8212; they&#8217;re so focused on catching up to the leading LLMs that they&#8217;re sort of laser-focused on one road, and they&#8217;re not really opening their eyes to maybe other potential avenues of approach. Is that a fair characterization?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, I think it&#8217;s fair.</p><p>Chang Che: So at the risk of getting really technical, what are you doing at Peking University that you feel is innovative and is something that maybe LLMs are missing and can improve on?</p><p>Zhang Chi: We are basically doing algorithmic improvement in LLM inference. So I think most people in this industry know that it&#8217;s not LLM training that costs the most amount of money &#8212; it&#8217;s LLM inference. Inference could be slow, inference could take a lot of resources, inference needs to handle concurrency and all of those problems. But the thing is that what the company is really doing is just adding more cards to solve this problem, which is a fast and effective way. But from my understanding, there are many aspects where you can improve on the algorithm side. If your algorithm can improve or increase the inference efficiency &#8212; let&#8217;s say not by a lot, maybe five percent &#8212; that should save a lot of money for a company.</p><p>Chang Che: It&#8217;s a kind of efficiency. Isn&#8217;t this kind of the same argument that DeepSeek had purported to make &#8212; that we were able to sort of improve our algorithm in a way that we don&#8217;t actually need that many chips to build such a strong, powerful model?</p><p>Zhang Chi: At least they showed this perspective in their V3 model and their R1 model. For them, it was basically some improvement in model architecture, but I guess there are other areas where you can do this improvement. And I sort of think that&#8217;s the future for LLMs if people really want to commercialize them, because currently chip prices are so high, and companies are basically spending money to buy users and they&#8217;re not really profiting from it.</p><p>Chang Che: So I think you basically had suggested that you feel like the gap in capabilities between the US and China is actually growing rather than closing. Is that a fair assessment? And do you feel that view is shared by others in the Chinese AI world who are involved in building LLMs, or is that something that you hold?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I think students around me and colleagues around me would agree with that. But I guess for those leaders in the recently publicly listed companies like Zhipu or MiniMax, I think leaders in those companies wouldn&#8217;t agree with me. I guess they would say that they&#8217;re catching up.</p><p>Chang Che: So why do you think the gap is widening? I&#8217;m sure the chip sanctions is certainly one of them. Do you feel like that&#8217;s the driving reason?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I think there are many aspects of it, but I think the general answer is that we&#8217;re not iterating fast enough, which is definitely tied to chips.</p><p>Chang Che: And anything else? Any other factors you feel are pertinent?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I don&#8217;t think we&#8217;re getting high-quality data, and I guess many people in the companies would try to do it in a fast way instead of investing in their data pipeline. By &#8220;fast,&#8221; I can&#8217;t be too explicit about how they&#8217;re fast, but &#8212; Claude recently has posted that it detected many distillation attempts. [NB: this is referring to Chinese companies relying on US chatbots to extract data.] I guess that&#8217;s one way that some companies try to be fast. By doing that, they&#8217;re trying to really circumvent the challenge of building their own data pipeline, which is a very big problem right now. So I guess that&#8217;s one part. And the other part is definitely chips. And also, I guess we still lag behind in infra &#8212; that includes chips but also involves training frameworks and all of this infrastructure basics in a company. For example, when I interned at Google, their infra was just so good. You can use a graphical interface for writing code, and you don&#8217;t really care about what their infrastructure looks like, and you just run the code and it&#8217;s really smooth. There&#8217;s a huge difference between the infrastructure at Google and ByteDance.</p><p>Chang Che: Can you explain a little bit what distillation is?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Basically, when you want to have high-quality data, there are two ways. One is that you find a really good data labeler, someone that can write a really great explanation for, let&#8217;s say, a math problem. They can write a very long, very detailed, correct explanation, and also how they derive it and how the explanation leads to the answer. The other way, which is simpler, is that you just try to ask Gemini or Claude or GPT, and most of the time, if the question is not hard enough, they will give you the right answer, and you just copy that answer. You put their answer into your training data and try to train the model on those data. So it&#8217;s kind of the easy way, because as you can imagine, calling ChatGPT or Claude or Gemini doesn&#8217;t really take you a lot of time and money. But if you try to ask the data labeler, it costs some money and it costs some time, and it&#8217;ll be much slower in iteration. So I guess a lot of companies in China go the easy way.</p><p>Chang Che: I had a question about the idea of being sort of AGI-pilled. How prevalent do you feel that idea is &#8212; that scaling and LLMs will be able to lead to some kind of generalized artificial intelligence or super intelligence? How prevalent is that belief, do you think, among the ByteDance leadership, for example?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Speaking of AGI, I don&#8217;t think this data-scaling thing will lead us to this general artificial intelligence, but I do believe that it&#8217;s going to be very useful. I started to think about the difference between Claude Code and engineers. My understanding is that Claude Code, or basically these coding agents, are good enough to build most of the aspects of, let&#8217;s say, your app. But what&#8217;s most important, what&#8217;s left for programmers, is this creativity &#8212; that you can really find the demands of people and try to build a useful thing for them. But on execution, you can delegate your coding agents to do that. I&#8217;m very concerned about Chinese companies&#8217; positions in these areas. I don&#8217;t find them, including ByteDance, to be good enough &#8212; especially their coding agents &#8212; to be good in any of these areas that I&#8217;m interested in. But it doesn&#8217;t mean that it&#8217;s not going to be used for some people, because there are white-collar workers that basically do some paperwork. So I guess that could be useful.</p><p>Chang Che: What would you say is an advantage, if there is one, of the Chinese ecosystem versus the American?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I think China&#8217;s advantage is in manufacturing. So we can really build into embodied systems &#8212; the intelligence of language models, I guess, will be really useful. On the other hand, I initially believed that China has lower labor costs, so we can get more data, but it turns out that it might not be true, because those American companies can outsource their data-labeling jobs to people around the globe. On the other hand, I don&#8217;t know how they did it, but their data quality seems to be higher than ours. I guess because they had their own data pipeline, but we sort of spent too much time on distillation. I guess we have like the top technique in distillation, but it maybe doesn&#8217;t really translate to an advantage in a way or another.</p><p>Chang Che: We were sort of blurring the lines between large language models, like ChatGPT, and the embodied systems that are currently being developed for robotics. So help us draw that line for us.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, so currently you hear a lot of news about Chinese embodied AI and basically embodied robots. Especially Unitree, which is going to go public. And most of the companies are doing basically locomotion. Some of them are doing manipulation. Locomotion basically means moving, and manipulation means grasping, like hand movement to do a human&#8217;s everyday job. But they don&#8217;t really think about building intelligence into these embodied robots. I think some companies are thinking about it, but I don&#8217;t have a clear picture of who is doing what. But from my understanding, it&#8217;s still in its early stage. I guess gradually, if you want to differentiate yourself from others, sooner or later someone will try to claim that they&#8217;ve done it.</p><p>Chang Che: My understanding is that robots like Unitree&#8217;s, which are ubiquitous in the US &#8212; you can see videos of these robots, they&#8217;re very sleek, like, they&#8217;re all a little bit silvery and short &#8212; they actually don&#8217;t have a brain in the sense that they don&#8217;t have an LLM equipped to them, or what they call a VLA, a vision-language-action model, right? They&#8217;re mostly moving &#8212; at least when we see them in the Spring Festival and they&#8217;re dancing, that&#8217;s not really done by a large language model or the kind of conventional AI that we&#8217;re talking about. That&#8217;s being done by strictly coded rules, pre-programmed. So what you&#8217;re saying is kind of the next step is, how do we imbue these machines with intelligence, with dexterity, so that they know how to pick up a cup in whatever scenario the cup is? Do you feel like China &#8212; my instinct is that China has an advantage here just because &#8212; you mentioned this too &#8212; there&#8217;s just so many use cases and environments in which Chinese robots are already quite ubiquitous, right? So there&#8217;s a lot of ways of collecting the data for this. Do you think that China has an advantage in embodied intelligence?</p><p>Zhang Chi: From my understanding &#8212; on one hand, China is really good at manufacturing. So Unitree has this huge advantage in building their motors. And on the other hand, I guess currently Chinese language models are good enough for these simple tasks. Though it might not specifically involve actions &#8212; it&#8217;s currently still language models &#8212; but I guess it wouldn&#8217;t take very long for people to try to add this action part into their transformers. So I guess it&#8217;s not going to be a very hard thing. But I guess I question a little bit more about the use cases of these humanoid robots. If you want to perform some specific tasks, it&#8217;s not necessary that you have a humanoid version of a robot. You can have some other simpler forms of robots that can also do the tasks &#8212; a dog, or something else. But basically I guess it&#8217;s not going to take very long for people to think about that.</p><p>Chang Che: So who do you think is leading that? Who&#8217;s the DeepSeek &#8212; who&#8217;s going to have the DeepSeek moment of embodied AI in China in the next few years?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I really don&#8217;t have an answer, because most people know Unitree, but Unitree is only good at building the motors, which translates to their advantage in locomotion. But I don&#8217;t think anyone is very good at manipulation, and we probably need robots that are specifically designed for specific tasks.</p><p>Chang Che: But that&#8217;s the direction that you&#8217;re working in, right, at Peking University?</p><p>Zhang Chi: Some researchers at BIGAI, at the institute, are working in that direction.</p><p>Chang Che: If 2025 was the DeepSeek moment, what do you think is the lesson of 2026? We&#8217;ve just started, it&#8217;s April, and agentic AI is huge now. OpenClaw is everywhere in China, and I&#8217;d love to hear your thoughts on OpenClaw and that sort of frenzy in China.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yeah, I actually had my own OpenClaw, and for me &#8212; to be honest, it was not really useful for me, because I don&#8217;t think I care too much about it, but I think privacy is still an issue. I&#8217;m not really comfortable handing all of my personal information to the agent. But on the other hand, some of my students are more optimistic about it. I can tell this story &#8212; one of my students basically uses OpenClaw as a supervisor of their training, of the model training process. It basically tries to debug the program itself if it runs into some problems. For example, there are some GPU issues, or some training just stalls, and it tries to kill the process and finds the bug and reruns it. So it was like a magic moment. I guess the group is basically thinking about vibe research. We can just basically give them instructions and ask them to, let&#8217;s say, set up a cron job, basically a monitoring job &#8212; every hour or every 30 minutes, it will check the status of your training program, something like that. Then we can just go to sleep.</p><p>Chang Che: So is everybody in AI in China now using Claude Code?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I don&#8217;t think so, because for me, I&#8217;m more comfortable using Copilot. I&#8217;m coding, and Copilot suggests some edits, but I also use this agent mode.</p><p>Chang Che: But they&#8217;re using American agent modes. Everybody is using agentic AI from the US, basically.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Yes.</p><p>Chang Che: So is that going to mean that in the future, whenever ByteDance rolls out another large language model, it&#8217;s going to be partially built by Claude Code? Like, in Claude &#8212; they&#8217;re like, &#8220;we use Claude Code to build some part of Claude.&#8221; Is the future of Chinese LLMs going to be partly Claude-Code-coded?</p><p>Zhang Chi: I think so, because there are some international divisions of ByteDance, and they can use Cursor. That basically means that it can be built by Claude Code. That&#8217;s legal &#8212; that&#8217;s also possible for the international divisions of the company.</p><p>Chang Che: Great. Okay. Best of luck, and thank you so much for doing this, Chi. I really appreciate it.</p><p>Zhang Chi: Thank you for having me again.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Takaichi Goes to Washington]]></title><description><![CDATA[The main item on Sanae Takaichi's agenda during her recent visit to the White House, on March 19, was China: to shore up Japan's relationship with the U.S.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/takaichi-goes-to-washington-e24</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/takaichi-goes-to-washington-e24</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980745/44756e619750854e76bdfbdf8a7c7c94.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The main item on Sanae Takaichi's agenda during her recent visit to the White House, on March 19, was China: to shore up Japan's relationship with the U.S. ahead of Trump much-anticipated summit with Xi Jinping. But the Iran war scrambled her plans. Ian and Chang talk about how Japan has now found itself caught in the middle of Trump's war in Iran, the shadow of China on the US-Japan relationship,&nbsp;and the unintended consequences in East Asia of Pax Americana's irreversible deterioration.</p><p><strong>Show Notes</strong></p><ul><li><p>Japan&#8217;s fear of what Trump with do when he meets Xi Jinping: could Trump trade something on Taiwan for a deal with Xi?</p></li><li><p>Why Takaichi is constitutionally limited in sending warships to the Strait of Hormuz</p></li><li><p>Japan stuck between Iran and the United States</p></li><li><p>Why the United States and Japan are at odds over Takaichi&#8217;s November comments on Taiwan</p></li><li><p>Takaichi&#8217;s push to revise Japan&#8217;s pacifist constitution and prepare for a post-Pax Americana world</p></li></ul><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Today we&#8217;re going to be talking about Sanae Takaichi, the prime minister of Japan&#8217;s recent visit to the White House. From my understanding, part of the motives was that Takaichi wanted some reassurance before Donald Trump&#8217;s more high-profile scheduled meeting with Xi Jinping. I think now it&#8217;s been pushed back to May and June because of the Iran war.</p><p>Takaichi wanted to make sure she was the last person to talk to Trump just before the meeting because she&#8217;s nervous that Trump is unpredictable and he might do some crazy deal with Xi Jinping bilaterally without consulting Japan. What do you think was the motivating force behind the meeting, Ian?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Yes, I think that&#8217;s absolutely true. She also is taking a leaf out of Abe Shinzo, her predecessor, her mentor&#8217;s book. She&#8217;s very keen to get as close personally to Trump as possible. And this is partly because Japan is so completely dependent on the United States for its security, even more so than the Europeans are. So any opportunity to cement a personal relationship with this very mercurial figure, she sees as essential. Now, of course, she didn&#8217;t know that the Iran war was going to intervene, which made her visit to the White House far more perilous. First of all, Japan is very dependent on Middle Eastern oil and therefore on the flow of oil and tankers through the Straits of Hormuz. Japan has had a fairly good relation with Iran for many years. And she also knew that Trump was going to put a lot of pressure on America&#8217;s so-called allies to try and clear up the mess that he himself has made. He&#8217;s contemptuous of the Europeans for having refused to get involved in this war.</p><p>She knew before she left for Washington that he was likely to put pressure on Japan. And indeed, he had already said that Japan should take part in this and send minesweepers and that kind of thing. And this was going to put her into a very, very tight spot because she doesn&#8217;t want to alienate Trump in any way. On the other hand, she is constitutionally unable to take part, to send Japanese naval ships while combat is still going on. It&#8217;s forbidden by the constitution. So she would have to turn him down on that.</p><p>I think the Japanese were terrified that this visit, because of the Iran war, would end very badly for Japan and end up with Trump ranting and raving at her that they weren&#8217;t a dependable ally.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah. There&#8217;s something so on point about 2026 and meeting with Donald Trump &#8212; your plans for your summit just completely go out the window because the United States decides to go into a war with Iran.</p><p>I think Japan probably feels like they&#8217;re on the back foot quite a bit. Before the Iran war, they were afraid that Trump might give some tacit security agreement about Taiwan that might undercut what Takaichi said in November last year. I think that is still hovering over the visit, and we can talk about that.</p><p>There&#8217;s been some really interesting drama with the Director of National Intelligence&#8217;s threat assessment. They released a threat assessment that basically said that Takaichi strayed from the political line. Did you see that? I remember we were talking about it before and you thought that she just said the quiet part out loud.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Well, we don&#8217;t know exactly why she said what she said at that time. Some people say it was an off-the-cuff remark to a comment made in the Japanese diet and that she hadn&#8217;t prepared it and was therefore perhaps incautious. I do think she said out loud what she and many other Japanese politicians think, including again her predecessor Abe Shinzo.</p><p>But I&#8217;ve always taken a slightly different view from many people on this. I think she said it partly because of Donald Trump. It wasn&#8217;t just the fear of China and China&#8217;s might and Japan&#8217;s vulnerability, in which Taiwan plays a very major role &#8212; because if Taiwan were to be seriously threatened or indeed invaded, that would be a threat to Japan.But the Trump factor, I think, plays a big part. She does want to change the Japanese pacifist constitution. She wants a stronger military profile. But up until now, the Japanese were resigned to being dependent on American protection and American nuclear protection. With Donald Trump, they can no longer be sure of that. And so I think she was sending a signal to the Japanese to shape up and say, look, we have to start preparing for a different world &#8212; in a way a little bit like the Canadian Prime Minister Carney, who said we no longer live in the post-war world. We&#8217;re now entering a completely different era in which we can no longer depend on the United States as the guarantor of the security of the so-called free world. Things have to change. And in his case, he said middle-ranking countries have to start getting together and taking care of their own security and no longer rely on the United States in the long run.</p><p>Now, I&#8217;m sure that the Japanese think that too, but with even more urgency because there is no NATO in East Asia. The Japanese and the South Koreans are entirely dependent on the United States.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I think there&#8217;s an interesting dynamic at play here where Trump&#8217;s pressure on allies to step up with their own security is having unintended consequences. Takaichi is making these claims in some ways in reaction to what Trump is doing &#8212; Trump 2.0, which is to basically say we&#8217;re America first and everyone else needs to step up with their security &#8212; that is what angered China. China called Trump immediately after Takaichi&#8217;s comments and Xi Jinping spent, I think, half an hour talking to him about how this is not okay. And Trump had to basically call Takaichi and say, you&#8217;ve got to tone it down.</p><p>So these reverberations across the global order that he doesn&#8217;t know about &#8212; the global order is fracturing, people are reacting &#8212; it&#8217;s causing these instabilities that he&#8217;s causing, but he&#8217;s also having to ameliorate somehow. He&#8217;s got to tell Takaichi to tone it down.</p><p>That backdrop is interesting because it clearly shows Trump hasn&#8217;t &#8212; in general, the US hasn&#8217;t really taken a side in the current China-Japan dispute. The US-Japan relationship always tries to present an extremely united front, but we know that there&#8217;s always a lot of distance between the two. And this was a clear distance, with China-Japan relations being so bad right now and Trump trying to maintain a trade deal with China.</p><p>One thing we were looking for in the summit is how that would play out. And I don&#8217;t know about you, Ian, but it seems to me like they kicked the can down the road. The questions and the readouts don&#8217;t seem like there was much progress on that front. It looks like Trump made a comment that the China-Japan relationship is &#8220;edgy&#8221; right now and he didn&#8217;t really say anything else. What do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Well, it always has been slightly edgy. Think back to 2009, when almost for the first time since World War II, the Liberal Democratic Party was not in power and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan was in power. Prime Minister Hatoyama tried to reset, in a fairly cautious manner, Japan&#8217;s foreign policy goals. His idea was that Japan had to become slightly more independent, move more towards a new relationship with Asia and be an equal partner with the United States. And there was talk of moving US military bases from Okinawa and that kind of thing.</p><p>The Japanese conservative establishment, associated with the Liberal Democrats who have been in power for most of the time since World War II and still are, were very much against this. They wanted to stick to the status quo, meaning Japan would remain dependent on American support, American security. Washington took the side of the conservatives and tried to stop Japan&#8217;s new initiatives to focus more on Asia and less on the special relationship with the United States. So that really came to an end then.</p><p>Trump is very different. Trump himself is not a real proponent of Pax Americana, of the post-war order. He wants to break it. And what he seems to have in mind is to basically divide the world into spheres of three superpowers. Russia has its sphere, which might include Ukraine &#8212; probably does in Trump&#8217;s mind, which is why he takes Putin&#8217;s side usually against Zelensky. He feels that is part of Russia&#8217;s legitimate sphere. He sees a future in which China has its sphere, and that would include East Asia and its periphery. And the United States controls the Western Hemisphere. I think that&#8217;s how he sees the world &#8212; that the only powers that matter are the three superpowers, and the peripheral powers, the middle powers, in Carney&#8217;s words, should simply listen to what the big powers tell them.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Now, this makes the relationship with Japan and Korea edgy because they are clearly very much in China&#8217;s periphery. And yet they have this security relationship with the United States. In some ways, if this is indeed the way Trump sees the post-Pax Americana world, the Japanese and the Koreans are a nuisance. Which is why he tells everybody to take care of their own security and the American taxpayer will no longer pay for this.</p><p>Now the question is how China sees this development, how China sees the post-Pax Americana world. On the one hand, they welcome it &#8212; they want China to be the great power in East Asia. They don&#8217;t want the Americans there interfering. On the other hand, if the choice is between the United States being the policeman of East Asia and keeping its allies &#8212; Japan and Korea and Taiwan &#8212; in order, or handing over the responsibility for security to the Japanese, they might very well, or at least some Chinese might very well, prefer Pax Americana. They&#8217;re more afraid of a remilitarized Japan than they are of America continuing to play its role.</p><p>I would imagine that these are things that are debated or thought about in very small circles in Beijing. I don&#8217;t know the answer to this. But that is why Xi Jinping would call Donald Trump and say, keep Japan in order.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I agree. I do think we can separate the longer-term question of who is going to guarantee East Asian security &#8212; either the US or Japan &#8212; from just the question of Taiwan and what positioning the US should have on Taiwan at this moment.</p><p>Right now, the strategic ambiguity policy that America has towards Taiwan has been there a long time, and it&#8217;s starting to fray. Famously, Biden had made some gaffes about saying that he would defend Taiwan. From China&#8217;s perspective, it seems to be a really great opportunity while Trump is still president. As you say, he has asserted this Western Hemisphere idea &#8212; he&#8217;s already hinted at this idea that we&#8217;re going to have control over the Western Hemisphere, by which he&#8217;s also implying that China can have control over the Eastern Hemisphere.</p><p>In this case, he&#8217;s just so primed to trade some economic deal for some improvement on the Taiwan issue &#8212; some tacit shift. Trump recognizing that he opposes Taiwanese independence &#8212; even that small statement, to try and inch him towards that &#8212; I think would be a major win for the Chinese. That is hovering over the May-June meeting. And that&#8217;s a really scary thing for Japan and Korea. I think that was clearly the main goal for Takaichi: to back him off that.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Yes, it is. Well, also thinking about Taiwan &#8212; the Americans have defended Taiwan for various different reasons. For a long time, Taiwan was a military dictatorship, but the Americans stood by Taiwan because of anti-communism, because they wanted to oppose communist China. They wanted to stop communist China from becoming too powerful. Then when Taiwan became a democracy, the rhetoric changed somewhat and it was about defending a democratic government and defending democracy against a powerful dictatorship. And it was of course also about defending the security of Japan and South Korea by having open sea lanes.</p><p>But the idea that Taiwan should be defended because it&#8217;s a democracy &#8212; I don&#8217;t think that enters Donald Trump&#8217;s mind. I don&#8217;t think he cares at all about Taiwan being a democracy. He would be perfectly happy for China to take over if it weren&#8217;t for other security concerns and indeed Japan.</p><p>Now, what is Takaichi&#8217;s strategy? I think in the longer run, she is positioning or trying to position Japan for a post-Pax Americana world, which is why she wants the constitution to be changed so that Japan can actually send troops into combat if necessary. She wants to beef up the military. She wants Japan to be much more independent in that way. But she also knows that this will take a long time. So kicking the can down the road is the short-term strategy &#8212; or tactic, maybe. And that is what she was doing in Washington. It was simply playing for time.</p><p>In the same way that the Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte, whenever he sees Trump or speaks about Trump in public, covers him in oily flattery so that Trump is less likely to break up NATO. And she does exactly the same thing. When she said to Trump in the White House, or at a press conference, that Donald is the only one who can guarantee peace and prosperity of the world, and telling him how handsome he is and so on &#8212; she was obviously very carefully briefed by the Japanese foreign ministry. Pile it on. Just keep him happy. Flatter him. Tell him how good-looking and how great he is.</p><p>Everybody knows that this can work in the short term, and indeed it does seem to work. He does respond to flattery. When Rutte did this, he backed off from Greenland and NATO and so on. And in this case, even though Japan hasn&#8217;t sent any ships to the Straits of Hormuz, he came out of the meeting saying Japan was great and a great ally and was doing its bit to help America on Iran and so on. So it really does work, but it only works in the short term because he can change his mind five minutes later. And she knows that, but every five minutes is valuable.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So let&#8217;s talk about Iran. As you&#8217;ve already mentioned, Japan is extremely exposed to Middle Eastern oil through the Strait of Hormuz. They take over 90% of their crude oil through the strait. Japan has already released its emergency stockpile of oil &#8212; I think they have about 200 days of that &#8212; but it&#8217;s a delay tactic.</p><p>Japan is a prime candidate for what Trump has been on about: getting allies to contribute by bringing warships into the Strait of Hormuz. Takaichi had already been asked about this before she came to the US. She had said in the diet that she was going to tell Trump what Japan legally can and cannot do under the constitution.</p><p>I don&#8217;t know how well you know what they&#8217;re technically allowed to do. My understanding is that, ironically, when she said Taiwan could potentially be an existential threat or some survival crisis &#8212; that would be the trigger for Japan to be able to send their military. By defining the Iran war right now as something that&#8217;s a survival-threatening situation, which I don&#8217;t think can be done &#8212; do you know what is feasible under the current constitutional framework?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Well, it keeps changing. Again, Abe amended it and reinterpreted the constitution to mean that they could take part in collective defense. But basically, constitutionally, they&#8217;re only allowed to use any kind of force if Japan is under direct threat. If another power were poised to invade Japan or attack Japan directly, they could constitutionally use military force to defend themselves. What they can&#8217;t do is send any kind of military to take part in combat outside Japan.</p><p>What Abe did in his reinterpretation &#8212; I can&#8217;t remember the exact phrase &#8212; but I think he interpreted the constitution to say that Japan could take part in military operations if it was part of a collective defense. But again, Japan has never sent ships or used any kind of military in any combat abroad.</p><p>What they can do is send minesweepers and so on when a war has been concluded, to clean up. They can send medical personnel, they can help out in some ways, but never to engage in direct combat. I don&#8217;t think even if the oil supplies were directly threatened by Iran, that means they can constitutionally send troops to the Middle East to actually take part. They can&#8217;t do that.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah. It doesn&#8217;t seem like she even made a commitment about minesweepers or surveillance or intelligence &#8212; those things that might be allowed under the constitution.</p><p>But what was really fascinating was that just yesterday or two days ago, the Iranian foreign minister said that they would let Japanese ships through the Strait of Hormuz. So there&#8217;s this fascinating dilemma now for Japan. As you say, they have had a diplomatic relationship with Iran. Iran has offered Japan safe passage through the strait. At the same time, Japan has to think about sucking up to Trump, because what they really care about is China.</p><p>It&#8217;s a fascinating situation because they have 90% of their crude oil through the strait. They would love to just have straight passage now, but the optics of that look awful in front of Trump, who you want to pretend you&#8217;re on his side. What do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Yes, well, that&#8217;s exactly why I think they were terrified when Takaichi went to Washington. They were terrified it would go very badly wrong and end up with him ranting at her the way he did to Zelensky. And she solved it basically through flattery. But of course, that&#8217;s not a long-term solution. It worked this time.</p><p>But those dilemmas that you mentioned have not gone away.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I think Japan is trying to play both sides. There are diplomatic channels towards Iran asking for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for Japanese ships. At the same time, Japan signed on to a pledge with five European nations expressing their readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts on Hormuz, which is vague, but that&#8217;s in the broad theme of &#8220;we&#8217;re on the side of the allies.&#8221;</p><p>I don&#8217;t really know what Japan is doing and what it will end up doing. The main question I have is: are they going to take Iran up on their offer to have Japanese ships just go through the strait? And how would they be able to sell that to Donald Trump?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>That&#8217;s indeed a huge question. I suppose one thing they could do &#8212; Trump seems now to be thinking, and of course he wants to walk away from this war as quickly as possible because it could damage him very badly in the midterm elections with gasoline prices going sky high and so on. He&#8217;d love to walk away and claim victory. Then what he would say is, the Europeans and others, you clean up the mess. You&#8217;re dependent on the oil going through the Straits of Hormuz, so it&#8217;s up to you now. I think he&#8217;d love to do that.</p><p>The Europeans, reluctant though they may be, would at least still be able to use some kind of military force to try and open the Straits of Hormuz if Iran insists on keeping it closed. The Japanese cannot do that. But what they could do is, once the conflict is over and Iran agrees that ships will be allowed to go through the strait again, there&#8217;s probably still quite a lot of work to do to clean up mines and all kinds of stuff that could still cause a great deal of damage. There they can play a role. They can send minesweepers because that would not be a question of taking part in combat.</p><p>But I agree that the dilemma &#8212; on the one hand, making sure that the Japanese can still get oil; on the other hand, looking like a loyal ally of Donald Trump&#8217;s &#8212; is going to be very, very difficult.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> What did you think about the comment that Trump made when the journalist asked him, &#8220;Why didn&#8217;t you notify Japan about the Iran attack?&#8221; Trump was like, &#8220;Well, we wanted it to be a surprise. Who knows better about surprises than Japan? Pearl Harbor. Why didn&#8217;t you notify me about Pearl Harbor?&#8221;</p><p>It&#8217;s such a ridiculous comment. clearly it just popped into his head and he just said it out loud. But to be fair to him, I think he was just trying to say that he wanted this war to be a surprise. He didn&#8217;t want to notify allies because he was afraid that it might leak. What do you think?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>That is what he was trying to say. From what I have read, Takaichi was angry at the Japanese journalists who asked the question. And I think that&#8217;s very unfair to the journalists because it&#8217;s a completely fair question. You cannot, as a responsible superpower, simply go to war &#8212; not only without notifying your allies, especially if you&#8217;re going to ask those allies to help you later, but also without notifying Congress.</p><p>even in the Iraq war, ill-conceived though it may have been, President Bush did try to get the allies on line. He did involve Congress. He did try to pave the way to make it look legitimate. Trump did none of that.</p><p>So it&#8217;s a completely legitimate question, and the response &#8212; &#8220;Well, it has to be done in secret and we&#8217;re not going to tell you&#8221; &#8212; this has become the stock response to any question, including from the American press, about what America&#8217;s goals are. People are not asking Trump to give away military secrets or to discuss tactics. But it&#8217;s legitimate to ask the administration what the strategy is and what they&#8217;re trying to achieve. And this is where they&#8217;re very cagey, because this changes from day to day, sometimes from hour to hour. Sometimes it&#8217;s regime change, sometimes it&#8217;s about oil, sometimes it&#8217;s about nuclear weapons.</p><p>So it&#8217;s an entirely legitimate question to ask: A, what the strategy is, and B, why the allies are not involved in this, even though the allies are asked to take part.</p><p>Now, how serious is a crack like that about Pearl Harbor? I think the Japanese take it in their stride because you expect it from Trump. If Joe Biden had said something like that, or even Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan, it would have been all over the world press and there would have been a diplomatic incident, probably. But in this case, people shrugged their shoulders. He&#8217;s said so many outrageous things and it doesn&#8217;t come as a surprise.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> That&#8217;s true. The tolerance has just gotten a lot higher.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>I think people think it&#8217;s entirely in character.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So to summarize: the US wanted Japan to pitch in and send warships to the strait. They did not make a decision on that. In a way, Japan came out of this relatively the winner in that they didn&#8217;t have to make any commitments on Hormuz. Although they&#8217;ve already made the deal to invest billions of dollars in the United States, and that is still on schedule. Several of the nuclear plants that they&#8217;ve agreed to have already started to break ground. Japan is trying to play up their end of the bargain &#8212; this is from the previous negotiations with tariffs, even though the Supreme Court has struck down the tariffs as unlawful, Japan is still going on with that. But the last question I have is: did Japan get the reassurances that it wanted on China with Donald Trump? The only real empirical outcome that Trump mentioned is that he off the cuff said, &#8220;I&#8217;ll speak Japan&#8217;s praises to Xi.&#8221; I don&#8217;t know what that means. But of course, the general vibe of the summit was extremely jovial and happy. They sent a picture of Takaichi almost in a dancing pose. do you think Takaichi has come back to Japan with the reassurances that she wanted?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>No, because I don&#8217;t think such reassurances are possible with this president, because he changes his mind all the time. I think it&#8217;s very important that we discuss in our podcast now and in future, that we reflect on the post-Pax Americana world, because that is what we&#8217;re entering now and everybody knows it.</p><p>It probably had to happen anyway, but Trump has sped it up because he&#8217;s not committed to it. For the time being, the United States is still guaranteeing Japanese security. But we don&#8217;t know how long that&#8217;s going to last.</p><p>I think she was probably happy at the end of her visit to Washington because things didn&#8217;t go badly. But the long-term problem, and this concerns the Chinese as much as it does the Japanese, is that we&#8217;re faced with two different futures in Asia. One is that Pax Americana continues, which is highly unlikely, but it&#8217;s possible that for a while it will still continue. Or in the longer run, Japan and South Korea will become nuclear powers. And the question then is: which would China prefer? Of course they&#8217;d prefer for America to leave and Japan not to become a nuclear power. But I think that&#8217;s unlikely to happen.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah. It seems to me that Trump, as you say, doesn&#8217;t believe in Pax Americana, but on the other hand just wants Asia to stay the way it is. Based on the pattern of what happened in November, Trump didn&#8217;t say, &#8220;Yeah, go Japan, you&#8217;re taking your security seriously.&#8221; He could have said, &#8220;Look, this is a good sign that Takaichi and the Japanese government are taking their security seriously. This is the world that we&#8217;re entering.&#8221; He could have had this forward-looking vision that is consistent with his post-Pax Americana theory. He could have picked up the phone with Xi and said, &#8220;I&#8217;m sorry, you&#8217;re going to have to deal with it.&#8221; He could have told Xi, &#8220;Do you want Japan or me? You can only pick one. You can&#8217;t have none.&#8221;</p><p>But instead, he immediately hung up the phone with Xi and the same day called Takaichi and said, &#8220;You&#8217;ve got to tone it down. Tone down your rhetoric.&#8221; It seems like he wants to have his cake and eat it too. Do you think I&#8217;m interpreting that right?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Yes, probably. But it&#8217;s very difficult to discern any kind of strategic logic in what Trump is thinking or doing, because I don&#8217;t think he has a strategy. It appears that he doesn&#8217;t really think very much beyond next week. The way he sees the world is how it&#8217;s going to look on TV and how he&#8217;s going to look. And that can change very, very quickly.</p><p>I don&#8217;t think he thinks strategically. Strategies can of course be wrong. But most presidents have had a strategy. I don&#8217;t think Trump really has one beyond this very vague idea of dividing the world into &#8212; basically divvying it up between three superpowers. I think that&#8217;s vaguely in his head. But apart from that, I don&#8217;t think he has a real strategy.</p><p>It&#8217;s very difficult for a country like Japan to deal with that. They&#8217;re stuck with a status quo, but they realize it&#8217;s not going to last. Again, I have very little sympathy for a lot of Takaichi&#8217;s politics, but I sympathize with her dilemma and I sympathize with her attempt to gradually move Japanese public opinion towards thinking seriously about what the post-American world will look like.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So in a way, her flattery line in the beginning of the summit where she says that Trump is the only one who can guarantee peace around the world &#8212; maybe she&#8217;s saying, look, the ball is in your court. Next time you&#8217;re with Xi Jinping, you can choose to sell us out or you can choose to stay the line. In a way, it&#8217;s up to you &#8212; which is true, right?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong>Yes, that is true. But I don&#8217;t think one should read too much into it. I think the first goal was to keep this great big bully happy so that he doesn&#8217;t do more damage. As a diplomatic maneuver, that worked.</p><p>The problem is &#8212; and this again is very much like Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO &#8212; he&#8217;s been criticized for flattering Trump in such a gross manner. But from his point of view, you could say, well, his job is to keep NATO together and you can only keep NATO together with American leadership. Okay, him rather than me, but somebody has to flatter this man.</p><p>On the other hand, there are those who say bullies always respond to people who stand up to them. And it&#8217;s a mistake to simply flatter him because you can play for time that way, but you don&#8217;t solve anything. And both are true. That is probably true. On the other hand, you can&#8217;t afford to alienate him unnecessarily. And I think both Rutte and Takaichi have concluded that it&#8217;s better to play for time than anything else because they have no other options.</p><p>Hang on until the midterms, hang on until the next presidential election &#8212; things might change again. I think that&#8217;s the idea.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> All right, that sounds like a good place to end it.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Takaichi's New Japan]]></title><description><![CDATA[Japan expert Tobias Harris on Sanae Takaichi, one of the most powerful Japanese leaders in a generation]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/takaichis-new-japan-faf</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/takaichis-new-japan-faf</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 05:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980746/fafc8d46ea4ff3514e3a3d92aec20611.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In February, Sanae Takaichi won the biggest electoral victory in the Liberal Democratic Party&#8217;s 70-year history. With a constitutional supermajority, an ambitious industrial policy, and a willingness to speak bluntly about Taiwan, Takaichi is remaking Japan&#8217;s domestic and foreign policy at a moment when the country&#8217;s alliance with the United States has never felt more uncertain. Tobias Harris is the author of <em>The Iconoclast</em>, a political biography of Shinzo Abe, and the founder of the consultancy Japan Foresight. He joined us to discuss what Takaichi&#8217;s rise means for Japan and the region.&nbsp;<br><br>Follow Tobias Harris at his Substack: https://observingjapan.substack.com/</p><p><strong>In this episode:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Why Takaichi is so popular among young voters and women</p></li><li><p>Did Takaichi bring in new voters or flip existing ones?</p></li><li><p>Will Takaichi overshoot her mandate?</p></li><li><p>Japan&#8217;s nuclear future and the U.S. alliance under Trump</p></li><li><p>Is Takaichi&#8217;s industrial policy just Abenomics 2.0?</p></li><li><p>Takaichi&#8217;s policy on immigration</p></li><li><p>Japan-South Korea relations and Takaichi&#8217;s possible visit to Yasukuni Shrine</p></li><li><p>Takaichi&#8217;s Taiwan statement and the future of China&#8217;s economic coercion</p></li></ul><h2>Transcript</h2><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Perhaps we can start with this: Why do you think Takaichi is so enormously popular personally in Japan, and it seems especially with the younger generations, which is counterintuitive for a politician of the right &#8212; although perhaps less and less so in many different countries. But what is your explanation? How has she managed to turn around a party in such trouble through what seems to be personal charisma?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I think there are a few explanations. Part of it is the fact that she is getting a dividend for being Japan&#8217;s first female prime minister. For many people &#8212; and just anecdotally, from many conversations &#8212; Women of all generations look at her and they either see, in the case of younger women, a role model, or older women, closer to her age, see someone who had to overcome many of the same obstacles that they overcame in their own professional lives. There&#8217;s something inspiring about her reaching the premiership. People don&#8217;t want her to fail. There are a lot of people rooting for her.</p><p>Some of it is just that there are a lot of right-wing voters and those voters were unhappy with leadership of the LDP before her. They were unhappy with former Prime Minister Ishiba, who they saw as too moderate. Prime Minister Kishida, who they saw as too moderate too. And they see her as one of theirs. So of course they are very excited. When I&#8217;ve written about her in the past, I&#8217;ve described her essentially as a zealous follower of the new conservative view. So you have a lot of that.</p><p>And then for younger people, they see a leader who looks very different than her predecessors. She has a frank way of speaking. She&#8217;s very blunt. She&#8217;s very sincere. She&#8217;s very diligent, and they see a different kind of leader. They see a leader who&#8217;s maybe saying the right things about some of the issues they care about, particularly inflation. So there&#8217;s maybe &#8212; Call it a rational exuberance. There&#8217;s this excitement about her and a willingness to believe that she&#8217;s going to be different, that she&#8217;s going to make headway on some of these problems. All of that , I think, has resulted in her having these extraordinarily high approval ratings, now almost six months into her government.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> It&#8217;s interesting you say it&#8217;s partly because she&#8217;s a woman, because she&#8217;s not a feminist. She hasn&#8217;t really done &#8212; There&#8217;s no sign that she&#8217;s going to be great for women in Japan. The other question I was thinking about is that it seems that being tough on China and even talking about Article 9 of the Constitution and so on is more popular with the younger generation than with the older ones. Do you think it has to do with the fading of World War II memories? And could that have something to do with the popularity of, it&#8217;s a while ago now, manga like Kobayashi Yoshinori? Do you think that it shows that young people, at a greater distance from the past, are beginning to have different views on Japan and Japanese power and the use of Japanese power?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I think there&#8217;s absolutely something to that. It was very striking during the general election campaign. You had the opposition &#8212; not just the left-wing Japanese Communist Party opposition, but even the mainstream, this centrist reform alliance that emerged right on the eve of the election &#8212; talking about these old left-versus-right categories and positioning themselves as neither left nor right, saying &#8220;we&#8217;re centrist,&#8221; but still thinking in terms of these old categories really stretching back to the beginning of the post-war period. I thought it was very striking how This was a party that had no support among young people at all. If you look at the exit polling, this was a party that offered nothing to the young, almost conceded that it wasn&#8217;t going to appeal to the young &#8212; essentially hoping that they could appeal to more older voters to make up for the deficits they had with the young.</p><p>What you saw with Takaichi&#8217;s appeals was very much not talking left or right, just moving beyond that and saying, &#8220;I&#8217;m looking at the future. I&#8217;m looking at The issues that Japan faces to have the kind of future that we want.&#8221; I think that is in some ways a response to the fact that certainly for younger voters, these ideological categories don&#8217;t have the same heft to them. They don&#8217;t carry the same meaning. They don&#8217;t think about them as much. And some of that reflects that certainly on national security &#8212; which was the left-right issue for all those decades &#8212; especially post-2022, this has been a long-term erosion, so it&#8217;s not just post-2022, but Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine had a seismic impact on Japan. It was a huge wake-up call to the realities of what war could look like. &#8220;We could be the ones hiding in our subways from missiles overhead. Russia is next door. China is growing. North Korea and these countries are aligning.&#8221;</p><p>There&#8217;s a sense that the issue has essentially been settled. The right wing won that debate. Japan needs to be stronger, needs to spend more on its own defense. As an advisor to the prime minister said in December, &#8220;there&#8217;s no one to help us but ourselves, ultimately.&#8221; That thinking is widespread. I don&#8217;t think you&#8217;re going to find a lot of opposition to that among the young. And she has definitely profited from that in terms of her popularity.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Did she bring in younger voters who were otherwise non-political and weren&#8217;t voting in elections, or were there voters who had voted for a different party and she flipped them?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I think it&#8217;s both. There&#8217;s been this assumption for a long time that turnout among young voters is low , and so elections are going to be decided by older voters. In absolute terms, of course, younger people don&#8217;t vote nearly as much as older people do. But as a result, if you can get a marginal increase in younger voters, it makes big differences. Last year, if you looked at turnout in the upper house elections, you got something like a five percentage point increase in younger voters. And it basically made the difference between the LDP controlling the upper house and not.</p><p>You had a bunch of young voters who came out and voted for a couple of anti-establishment parties of the right to various degrees. Sanseito, the anti-globalist party, got a lot of attention, but also the Democratic Party for the People, which is more center-right than far right. You have to be careful not to clump these two together. But both of these parties have had very strong support among the young and brought them out last summer.</p><p>What happened this time is that Takaichi got new young people out to vote, and then she also flipped a lot of the young voters who did come out last time and voted for these other parties and brought them over to the LDP. One of the questions before the campaign was: will these young voters be willing to vote for the LDP, which they see as stodgy and out of touch? Will the Takaichi factor matter more than the LDP factor? And as it turned out, it did quite a lot.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So you&#8217;re saying that there&#8217;s more hope for the American Democratic Party.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> Yeah, perhaps so, with the right messenger, I guess.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Except the Democratic Party is also seen as pretty stodgy. It&#8217;s interesting to compare Japan to Germany in this respect, because it seems that pacifism is now more and more associated with old farts. And it&#8217;s the young who are beginning to say, &#8220;Look, that&#8217;s out of date and we have to adapt in a changing world.&#8221; In Germany, for example, it was the Greens that were most supportive of helping Ukraine and not the old Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. Do you think that there is a clear parallel there?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I think You see it just in the opinion polling. The polling after this episode with Takaichi and the Diet, talking about a Taiwan crisis and that Japan would probably end up being involved &#8212; the age group that was most skeptical of that and most divided on the value of that was, of course, older people. And you realize too, Older people have memories of a different China. Younger people only really know China as this overbearing power, economic power, growing military power. Older people will remember Japan helping China and years where they&#8217;re cooperating economically and getting along. They&#8217;re just very different views of these things.</p><p>But young people are much more inclined to be China hawks. They&#8217;re much more open to the idea of constitutional revision. They&#8217;re much more open to the idea of spending more on defense. All of these things that have been controversial &#8212; they just don&#8217;t have the baggage. It&#8217;s not part of their worldviews. And so it&#8217;s very hard for parties of the left that are still very opposed to these developments to make inroads among young voters, because it just seems out of touch. This is not the world we&#8217;re facing. We have to be adaptive. We have to respond to the conditions that we face now.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> How conscious do you think she was when she made her statement on Taiwan &#8212; which was controversial and people think was undiplomatic &#8212; how conscious was she of the United States and Donald Trump when she made that statement? In other words, You&#8217;ve made the case that more and more Japanese feel that they have to look after themselves, and obviously Trump under the United States is less and less dependable. Was that one reason, do you think, that she felt she had to tell the Japanese that things are serious and they have to shape up?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I think It&#8217;s hard to read exactly. There have been different explanations given for how premeditated that was &#8212; versus was it because of questioning and she, in the moment, basically fell back on a position that she has said before, There&#8217;s an argument that she really thought this was assumed and everyone just understood this, and that she wasn&#8217;t making some grand statement that things are different and we have to change. The evidence is there on both sides of the argument.</p><p>But the fact remains that there&#8217;s an appreciation certainly among national security elites in Tokyo that there does need to be more work by leaders to get the Japanese people to understand that if something were to happen with Taiwan, the likelihood that we&#8217;re going to be involved somehow is very high. You&#8217;ve had these articles in newspapers about war games showing the likely casualties &#8212; Japanese civilian casualties and things like that &#8212; trying to focus minds about the reality. What does it mean when we say &#8220;Ukraine today could be Taiwan tomorrow&#8221;? Really getting people to appreciate that and be aware of the reality of that. There&#8217;s still probably more work to do, but her saying that has certainly put it more front of mind than really at any point in time where people are really thinking about what this could actually mean if something were to happen.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I had a question about the distance between how a leader reads their mandate versus what actually happened in an election for them to win. I&#8217;m thinking about the US case, and there were voters last year who voted for Trump who may just have had issues with their grocery prices. They were not expecting the massive immigration raids and the assault on Venezuela and Greenland. There&#8217;s generally a difference between how political leaders think &#8212; because of the vantage point that they have, they&#8217;re thinking a lot more about national security &#8212; whereas voters tend to be maybe thinking more about economic issues. Do you feel like there&#8217;s a risk that Takaichi might overshoot, misinterpret her mandate?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> When you win to the extent that she did &#8212; and it&#8217;s really worth stressing, the LDP is 70 years old, and she won the biggest victory the party has ever won. That&#8217;s a big deal. No LDP leader in history has done as well in an election as she did. So naturally I think the temptation is going to be: &#8220;I&#8217;m vindicated.&#8221; And also because of the circumstances in which the election came about &#8212; she didn&#8217;t have to do it. There was a lot of pushback in the LDP, people saying maybe this isn&#8217;t the right time, maybe you need to accomplish a little more in office, maybe this is too risky. So the fact that she did it anyway and it pays off in ways that I think even the LDP was surprised by &#8212; there&#8217;s an argument in her mind, I&#8217;m sure, that the voters chose her, the voters decided to give her this majority, and the expectation is that she&#8217;s going to use it and run with it and act on it.</p><p>But there&#8217;s always the risk that she oversteps, There are some real hard constraints out there in the world. Even if she&#8217;s overcome domestic political constraints for the moment, Trump still has to be managed. That is a difficult thing for whoever the Japanese prime minister is. The bond market is waiting and watching to see what she does. That is something that is going to have to be managed. So there are real constraints out there.</p><p>But in terms of the things that she can control, the risk that she decides &#8220;I&#8217;m vindicated, I&#8217;m going to run with it&#8221; &#8212; I think absolutely. It&#8217;s also worth noting the victory is not entirely because of her popularity , and that&#8217;s the cautionary note for her. The size of the victory &#8212; I think It was clear that her popularity was going to get that majority in some form. The degree to which they won, though, depended a lot on the fact that the opposition&#8217;s voters rejected this alliance that was made between the Constitutional Democrats and Komeito before the election. Something like 30 to 40 percent of people who voted for the Constitutional Democrats in 2024 did not vote for the candidates they were offered this time around. That&#8217;s not because they were all switching over to the LDP &#8212; They just rejected these strategic decisions, and that cleared the way for LDP candidates to win in places that I don&#8217;t think the LDP expected didn&#8217;t expect to win.</p><p>The LDP, for all of its success, still only got 49 percent of the vote in single-member constituencies. So there are wrinkles in this victory, even if the absolute seat total is dramatic.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> On handling Trump, it seems to me that Japan is in a real bind, and so is South Korea. If we&#8217;re thinking of this in the longer term and not just in the next year or so, the Europeans, following Mark Carney&#8217;s speech, are beginning to realize that in the longer term they really do have to start thinking of a different world in which they&#8217;re no longer dependent on American security guarantees. But the Europeans have the EU, they have NATO, they have nuclear arms in France and Britain. The Japanese and the South Koreans only have their security treaty with the United States. How are they going to deal with this? If I were to lay a bet, I would say within the next 10 years, Japan is going to be nuclear-armed.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> Ten years &#8212; the longer the time horizon, the likelihood is going to rise because these discussions are already happening. They&#8217;re happening quietly and maybe less quietly. You had this episode in December where an advisor to the prime minister, unnamed, told the press that yes, we have to have a discussion about having nuclear weapons. So it&#8217;s happening. The thinking is there.</p><p>In Japanese elite discourse, they talk about &#8220;Plan Bs&#8221; and &#8220;A-pluses,&#8221; trying to think about alternatives. Certainly In the near term, they don&#8217;t have any illusions about alternatives. They recognize that in the near term, there is not really an alternative when it comes to deterring China in particular , but just in general, keeping a strategic balance. They know there&#8217;s not an alternative to the United States.</p><p>What you&#8217;re seeing &#8212; and in some ways Takaichi&#8217;s domestic strength could be a liability &#8212; is that in the past, you&#8217;ve had Japanese governments that could say, &#8220;Well, we&#8217;d love to help you out, but we don&#8217;t have a big majority or the public&#8217;s not behind us. And after all, we have this pesky coalition partner, Komeito, that&#8217;s going to raise a stink if we push too hard on this stuff.&#8221; She doesn&#8217;t have any excuses anymore.</p><p>She&#8217;s going to meet with Trump next month and Trump is going to have a lot of demands. She&#8217;s not going to have the option of saying, &#8220;Well, the public&#8217;s not really behind me.&#8221; It&#8217;s like, &#8220;You won this fantastic victory. It&#8217;s time to act.&#8221; And there&#8217;s going to be a lot of demands. Every US ally in some ways faces the same calculus, but I think it&#8217;s very acute for Japan, precisely because they are essentially on their own in a lot of ways.</p><p>There is this fundamental asymmetry where Japan needs the United States. It knows that Its entire strategic worldview is centered around the idea that the United States is going to be there to help keep Japan secure, and that US markets are going to be open to Japan. This has been the bargain going back to the early 1950s. This was the very foundation of this relationship.</p><p>What they&#8217;re realizing is that with Trump, the United States has made clear that &#8220;we don&#8217;t need you, we don&#8217;t need anyone. We don&#8217;t need institutions, we don&#8217;t need norms &#8212; all of this is up for negotiation.&#8221; It&#8217;s even a big change &#8212; You could say, &#8220;Well, has any US government really needed Japan?&#8221; And actually, certainly in recent years, the Obama administration really appreciated having Japan as a partner in the region, enhancing US relations with countries in Southeast Asia, doing things that the United States couldn&#8217;t do. Japan was respected, was listened to, it had a lot of economic power . It did have and increasing military power. All of these things have made Japan quite a valuable partner.</p><p>And now you have a United States that&#8217;s saying, &#8220;Yeah, all of those things are great, but we need more. You want us to stay involved? The price is getting higher. Nothing is sacrosanct anymore.&#8221; That makes life very uncomfortable for a Japanese government. It&#8217;s going to be very uncomfortable for Takaichi when she finds that there are going to be a lot of demands coming her way. And frankly, there&#8217;s an undercurrent &#8212; the Japanese people aren&#8217;t blind to this. You&#8217;ve had people calling the trade agreement from last year an unequal treaty. They see the kind of things that Japan is being expected to do by this administration just to keep the United States doing the things that it&#8217;s always done.</p><p>It&#8217;s an uncomfortable situation, and she&#8217;s going to really &#8212; if the United States pushes too hard, she could find herself squeezed between public opinion that is uncomfortable with some of this and the reality that there&#8217;s not really an alternative in the near term to keeping the US onside.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So what do you think about the recent tariffs now that the Supreme Court has invalidated some of the tariff numbers? Do you think that has an impact on the way that Takaichi is going to discuss the investment that she&#8217;s pledged to Trump.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> Well, also because you realize that The negotiation was about the Liberation Day tariffs, but it was also about the automobile tariffs, which are not affected by the Supreme Court decision at all.</p><p>They&#8217;ve already pretty much said that the Supreme Court did its thing, but there&#8217;s not anything they can do about that. They&#8217;re going to keep the deal. They have enough on their plate just figuring out how this investment framework is going to work They&#8217;re not going to mess with it by suggesting that the deal should be altered because of the Supreme Court.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> You mentioned that Takaichi doesn&#8217;t really have any excuses because she&#8217;s got such a supermajority in the lower house. How likely do you think it is that Article 9 &#8212; the effort to revise the constitution, the post-war rule that restricts Japan from having a military &#8212; how early do you think we could see an effort to try and be revised? <strong>Tobias:</strong> On the one hand, I think the barriers to revision are probably lower than they&#8217;ve ever been. Back in 2016, Abe had two-thirds majorities in both houses, which is the threshold you need to revise. Everyone got very excited that maybe now this time it&#8217;s going to happen. And even though Abe wanted to get it done and he believed in it and actually put forward some proposals for amendments, it didn&#8217;t happen.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Why didn&#8217;t that happen?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> It&#8217;s just a heavy lift. When it comes to what you want to spend political capital on, he just ultimately wasn&#8217;t going to. And I think there was a real fear that if you attempt to do it and it fails &#8212; particularly the amendment he proposed was revising Article 9 so that you make the status of the Self-Defense Forces clear, you write &#8220;the Self-Defense Forces shall exist&#8221; into the Constitution &#8212; there was a fear that if they do this and it either doesn&#8217;t pass the Diet or it doesn&#8217;t pass a referendum with the public, which needs a simple majority to pass, then isn&#8217;t the obvious implication going to be that the Self-Defense Forces are not legitimate , because the amendment failed?</p><p>One of my favorite little bits of trivia from those days: there was a delegation that met with David Cameron &#8212; I think they went to the UK and met with David Cameron in the wake of the Brexit referendum. And they said, &#8220;Talk to us about this process of having a national referendum.&#8221; And he told them, &#8220;Don&#8217;t do it unless you&#8217;re absolutely sure you&#8217;re going to get at least 60 percent. Anything less than that is too risky. Don&#8217;t do it.&#8221;</p><p>So there&#8217;s a real concern that unless they&#8217;re very confident they&#8217;re going to get it done, the risks of trying and failing are high. It&#8217;s not going to happen this year. She&#8217;s got other things to do.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> But public opinion has probably changed since Abe had those ideas, right? It would be more sympathetic now to a change than even then, wouldn&#8217;t you say?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> It would, yeah. It&#8217;s just &#8212; what does the public want the government spending its time on? I think It&#8217;s as much about priorities as anything else, because ultimately, constitutional revision is not really going to change Japan&#8217;s defense capabilities all that much. They&#8217;ve already found ways of doing just about whatever they want under the scope of the Constitution as it&#8217;s written. The Constitution as it&#8217;s written, according to an interpretation that is now nearly 70 years old, allows them to have nuclear weapons. They do not need to revise the Constitution to have a nuclear arsenal.</p><p>So at this point, it really is as much about a cultural victory &#8212; showing that after all these years, part of the Constitution has been written by Japanese hands. It is more of their document. It&#8217;s really a question of how much she wants to do this.</p><p>My guess would be that, assuming Takaichi&#8217;s numbers don&#8217;t plummet, in a year or two&#8217;s time, does she start starts thinking about this as a real legacy issue ?. I still think we&#8217;re looking at a few years before it&#8217;s really possible for her to push this.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Could you walk through Takaichi&#8217;s domestic agenda in terms of what she&#8217;s hoping to do with industrial policy? I wonder whether there&#8217;s a framework for how we should understand that approach. I&#8217;ve been thinking about it in terms of something similar to the US&#8217;s CHIPS and Science Act and IRA. I&#8217;m curious how you approach it.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> It&#8217;s a great question. I have been trying to bang the drum since she took power against this idea &#8212; there&#8217;s this assumption that what she wants to do is just Abenomics 2.0: reflate the economy, spend a lot of money, loose fiscal policy, loose monetary policy, and just get the economy growing at a really fast clip.</p><p>Really, I think it&#8217;s actually a fundamental misunderstanding, because for Abe, it was, &#8220;Yes, we&#8217;ve got to overcome deflation. We&#8217;ve got to get wages up. We&#8217;ve got to get spending up. We&#8217;ve got to get all the arrows pointing in the right direction.&#8221; For her , actually &#8212; and she&#8217;s been very clear about this &#8212; she has said that Abenomics failed on its most important task of getting businesses investing, getting Japan&#8217;s industrial capacity and the advanced sectors of the future to a higher level. That is what she cares about.</p><p>She&#8217;s been pretty consistent about this for a really long time. In some ways You get a feeling that she sees this as Japan&#8217;s last chance &#8212; that if Japan is not able to compete in chips and AI and robotics , these advanced sectors, if Japan is not able to compete with China, with Europe, with Korea, with the United States in these sectors, then essentially Japan will fall behind and actually end up dependent on other countries. She&#8217;s very fearful of Japan&#8217;s dependence on others.</p><p>She talks about wanting 100 percent self-reliance on energy, which has been the Holy Grail for Japanese leaders going back for decades &#8212; Japan is resource-poor , they&#8217;ve got to find a way out of this. She wants Japan to be 100 percent self-sufficient in food. Again, this has been a long-term dream. But it&#8217;s also: Japan can&#8217;t be dependent on others for chips. It can&#8217;t be dependent on others for digital services. She wants Japan to compete in all of these areas.</p><p>What she recognizes in a way that Abe actually did not is that if Japan wants to be competitive in these sectors, it needs national champions. It needs to be willing to spend money to build industrial capacity. They have this project in Hokkaido &#8212; Rapidus &#8212; they&#8217;re building this chip maker with public money, and they&#8217;re trying to crowd in private investment. They put forward a lot of public money, and then they try to get private companies to sign on as clients, to invest, to basically support the project too. The idea is they&#8217;re going to do that in a bunch of different sectors: put a bunch of public money in and try to get private companies to then sign on and invest and help build out capacity.</p><p>The risk, of course &#8212; well, one, building national champions is hard. Rapidus at this point still hasn&#8217;t actually built anything or really sold anything yet. But also Japan&#8217;s fiscal capacity is not unlimited. There are real limitations and real risks if it has to issue more debt to do this. There&#8217;s a real danger that even if this is the right idea, executing it will already have been may be too late because interest rates are not zero or negative anymore. Borrowing costs are only going up. And if this doesn&#8217;t work, the cost for Japan could be very dear.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> How is that industrial policy different from what MITI [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry] used to do &#8212; picking winners and having the state heavily involved in building up Japan&#8217;s industrial strength?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> In a lot of ways it is a throwback. MITI used to allocate capital and allocate investment credits and help with licenses. The tools are a little different, but it&#8217;s definitely a throwback. People at the successor ministry, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, feel that life is good. There are high METI officials in Tokyo who are in her circle. This is very much a government that is driven by those priorities , those old industrial policy priorities.</p><p>To some extent, the building-national-champions approach is maybe a little different. Where MITI was managing competitiveness and figuring out how many companies were in a sector and trying to organize the shape of competition &#8212; because they&#8217;re really thinking about these new sectors where it&#8217;s not like you have a bunch of Japanese companies competing for market share in automobiles or steel. These are frontier industries. And I think that makes what they&#8217;re trying to do a little different in some ways.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> One thing that Abe did recognize, though, is that for Japan to remain competitive, they need foreigners &#8212; they need immigration, they need tourism, and so on. She has projected herself in many ways as Abe&#8217;s disciple, but her policies on immigration and tourism and foreigners in Japan in general seem to be rather the opposite.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> Certainly She has pivoted to a harder line towards policing Japan&#8217;s growing resident foreign population, possibly slowing the numbers of arrivals. I don&#8217;t think she wants to turn tourists away.</p><p>The question is how much is her conviction versus this is the political moment, that she was facing threats from parties to her right that were making a big issue out of this and reaping a lot of political advantage from calling attention to the problems with the foreign population in Japan and lawbreaking. There&#8217;s a lot of misinformation and maybe actual disinformation about Japan&#8217;s foreign population.But she&#8217;s responded to that. She really has responded to the fact that the public is concerned about this. Young voters especially seem concerned about this. She certainly wants to make a show of cracking down.</p><p>The question is: who is she going to listen to ultimately when it comes to making policy? Big business really wants access to foreign workers. They need them. Employers are having trouble getting enough workers. They have supported the effort to open Japan, if not to migration, then at least to guest workers. If she were to really move to limit their ability to have foreign workers, she would hear about it. Big business would make a lot of noise about that. So there is a question of how much in substance she can actually do to reverse the increase in Japan&#8217;s foreign population, versus making a show &#8212; &#8220;we&#8217;ve found all these visa overstayers and we&#8217;re going to kick them out and we&#8217;re going to have these controls at the border&#8221; &#8212; things that will maybe convincing voters that they&#8217;re taking it seriously but not actually changing the reality that there is a need for foreign workers in a lot of sectors.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Has she successfully undercut the Sanseito by taking that &#8212; at least rhetorical &#8212; position?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> Certainly. In the election she did. That was one of the questions: is Sanseito able to compete even when you have a more conservative LDP leader? As it turned out, Sanseito did not do well. They still increased their presence in the Diet, but nothing like what they were aiming for. They were aiming for something like 30 seats and they won half of that. Clearly she took some of the wind out of their sails.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Can I go back to clarify a question about her industrial policy? It seems to me that there&#8217;s this effort to basically do what China does &#8212; pick out national champions and key technology sectors. There&#8217;s also a strong investment angle to that. And then there&#8217;s also what Takaichi ran on, which was to improve cost of living for ordinary voters. Do you feel like one of the risks is that this comes into tension? I&#8217;m thinking back to what Trump ran on &#8212; cost of living &#8212; and then he went on to do Liberation Day. Do you feel like that might happen here as well?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> There&#8217;s absolutely a risk in that. A portion of her support , going back to the beginning of our conversation, is young people in particular expecting that she&#8217;s going to actually do something about inflation, about the cost of living crisis. And if people don&#8217;t feel that they have more money in their pockets, if they don&#8217;t feel that their circumstances are improving, some of that popularity is going to erode. To the extent that If her industrial policies end up increasing the size of the deficit, if they do end up having to depend on bond issuance to do that, you&#8217;re running the risk that the reaction from bond markets is going to be that interest rates should rise. What we&#8217;ve been seeing is that when interest rates have risen, the yen weakens. And a weaker yen means higher inflation. So you could end up with a situation where on the one hand, she does some policies to help people with the cost of living &#8212; there&#8217;s this talk about cutting the consumption tax on food and new handouts and new distributions &#8212; so she does things that puts more money in people&#8217;s pockets through tax policy, but on the other hand ends up running larger deficits, higher interest rates, weaker yen. You end up basically giving with one hand and the inflation tax takes it away with the other. There&#8217;s a real risk where you&#8217;re running to stand still and no one ends up better off at the end of the day.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> On foreign policy, the LDP, when it was especially under really conservative prime ministers &#8212; and she&#8217;s of course one of them &#8212; their relations with South Korea were pretty good when South Korea had conservative governments. How do you think she&#8217;s going to cope with that? Because it&#8217;s interesting &#8212; and in a previous podcast we talked about that &#8212; it&#8217;s interesting that She, as a conservative Japanese prime minister, seems to have done everything to get on well with a liberal president in South Korea, and vice versa. How do you see this developing?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> It&#8217;s been one of the more remarkable developments of her tenure. Who would have thought &#8212; Progressive Korean president and conservative Japanese prime minister has generally not been a good combination. That was what we saw when Prime Minister Abe had this downward spiral of relations with President Moon of South Korea. What you&#8217;re seeing now is the dividends from when the Biden administration was helping bring Japan and Korea together &#8212; a shared appreciation that you have shared interests, you face similar threats, and you have to find a way to work through this.</p><p>The fears of abandonment by Trump, the fears that this really is a different strategic environment and we really have to find a way to get together and work together because otherwise we&#8217;re really on our own &#8212; in both countries, both governments, that feeling is acute. It helps that President Yoon has been very pragmatic and very flexible and very eager to find a way to get along with Takaichi. In some ways It&#8217;s almost a game-theoretical setup: if Korea cooperates, Japan will cooperate. And as long as they continue to do that, they see that they have enough interests at stake that there&#8217;s a lot to lose if they can&#8217;t figure it out.</p><p>The question is what happens if it gets tested. If some politician in one country or the other does something about Takeshima/Dokdo, or you have some lawsuit in Korea about a history issue, or Prime Minister Takaichi decides to go to Yasukuni Shrine &#8212; and she very noticeably alluded to that on election night as she was basking in the glow of her victory. What happens when you get one of these stressors that we&#8217;ve seen in the past? Is the recognition of shared interests strong enough to overcome that? Is it strong enough to induce some restraint? That&#8217;ll be the real question. And Yasukuni is going to be a pretty good test for it.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> What is your judgment as far as South Korea is concerned? If it&#8217;s true that the memories of World War II in Japan are beginning to fade and people are much less sensitive about it &#8212; which means that pacifism is also retreating &#8212; do you think that the sensitivity in South Korea to something like the Japanese prime minister going to the Yasukuni Shrine would be less now than it would have been some decades ago?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I don&#8217;t know South Korean public opinion well enough to make a really deep judgment on that. And clearly, I do know enough about South Korean public opinion to know that You have major polarization just among young voters. So It&#8217;s hard to even generalize about young voters, where you have a real left-right split and a gender split as well.</p><p>It&#8217;s hard to say specifically. I think We have seen that the hold of the memories from the period of colonization by Japan have not relaxed. We really saw this during the standoff over compensation for forced laborers. There&#8217;s still real feeling about that. Certainly on the left, the feelings are still very strong that you can&#8217;t trust Japan. We saw this when Takaichi was taking power &#8212; the Korean press was very concerned about what she would be like. I&#8217;m guessing you still have some doubts there, that people are not quite entirely convinced that Korea can really trust her.</p><p>I think If she went, you&#8217;d still see some pretty vociferous reactions from the public, even if the public is maybe not 100 percent united on the issue.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I was thinking of the Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorski. I can&#8217;t remember the date, but some decades ago In a speech he said, &#8220;It&#8217;s no longer the case that we are afraid of German militarism. On the contrary, we&#8217;re afraid that Germany won&#8217;t do enough to defend Europe.&#8221; You can&#8217;t see a South Korean foreign minister saying something like that in the near future.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I don&#8217;t think we&#8217;re quite there yet. But you do have healthy communication between the two militaries and the two defense ministries. They have really resumed regular communication after some low points in recent years. South Korea maybe isn&#8217;t cheering on Japan&#8217;s rearmament process, but I think you&#8217;re also maybe less inclined to see South Koreans say that Japan is the greatest military threat that South Korea faces. I don&#8217;t think you&#8217;re going to see that kind of thinking anymore either.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Let&#8217;s just bring China into this. Just to refresh people&#8217;s memory, This comment that Takaichi made last year about how Japan&#8217;s security is tied to Taiwan triggered a really big backlash from China. China has restricted tourism. They&#8217;ve restricted some Japanese firms. They&#8217;ve also restricted rare earth access for Japanese companies. These are really big economic sanctions. There&#8217;s a little bit of performative outrage that the Chinese system often performs when these issues come up, but there&#8217;s also an effort to try to change people&#8217;s behavior &#8212; this is meant to change Takaichi&#8217;s calculation. Would you say that the election is basically a resounding referendum , that that&#8217;s not the case at all? And in fact, iIt may have made Takaichi more popular that China was reacting this way?</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> I think China has these tools and does use them to try to change political behavior. They have built out this economic coercion toolbox precisely so that they can try to do that.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> And it works sometimes &#8212; look at what happened with Trump.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> Right. What&#8217;s actually kind of amazing is how they&#8217;ve been relatively restrained. It&#8217;s been very much one thing at a time. It&#8217;s not like they&#8217;re going guns blazing at Japan. The tourism &#8212; okay, that&#8217;s a message first. It&#8217;s clearly graduated escalation, gradually trying to impose costs on Japan. But I think there&#8217;s also a real appreciation that they don&#8217;t want to harm China&#8217;s economy either. They can&#8217;t just do whatever they want. There are things that Chinese companies depend on importing from Japan. There&#8217;s a lot of different factors at play.</p><p>Just in terms of the structure of the conflict, though, This has the makings of something that is not going to end anytime soon, because ultimately neither side is in a position to concede here. China can&#8217;t concede the point. You have a Japanese prime minister say openly that if China uses force, we have to get involved because our security is at stake. It was bad enough for China when a former prime minister said that &#8212; when Abe, after he left office, talked about a Taiwan crisis being a Japan crisis. But for a sitting prime minister to say that, and to say that in the first days really of her premiership, clearly that&#8217;s not something China can easily swallow, given their position on Taiwan and that this is an internal matter. Conceding that a Japanese prime minister can say that &#8212; they can&#8217;t allow that.</p><p>In some ways, Takaichi painted herself into a corner, too. By saying &#8220;this has been our policy all along, so I wasn&#8217;t announcing a new policy,&#8221; that puts her in a situation where if she concedes, she can&#8217;t, because then she&#8217;s conceded that she&#8217;s allowed China to change Japan&#8217;s policy through economic coercion. She&#8217;s basically stuck now: &#8220;I didn&#8217;t say anything different. This was prevailing policy. Therefore, I don&#8217;t have to do anything. I don&#8217;t have to apologize. I don&#8217;t have to say anything different.&#8221; And China is not going to concede the point. They are going to be stuck in this cycle , it seems like, for a while &#8212; until some external factor changes that leads them to find some way of compromising that makes everyone feel that they didn&#8217;t actually give anything up.</p><p>For Takaichi, the real question is what happens between Trump and Xi Jinping. Do you end up with a situation where, If the US and China are drawing nearer each other, Japan feels like it&#8217;s being could be left out and isolated by the US and China making some by a deal that disadvantages Japan ?. That is a risk that a lot of people in Tokyo are concerned about. But in the meantime, they&#8217;re locked into this struggle because neither can concede easily.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> No, Thank you very much. That was very interesting.</p><p><strong>Tobias:</strong> Thank you. Thanks for reaching out. Obviously there&#8217;s a lot going on, so happy to talk about all this.</p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[China-maxxing: Why Young Americans are Rethinking China]]></title><description><![CDATA[In November, the left-wing political commentator Hasan Piker took his first trip to China, live-streaming the trip to hundreds of thousands of viewers on the streaming platform Twitch.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/china-maxxing-why-young-americans-a3c</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/china-maxxing-why-young-americans-a3c</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 11:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980747/7e65d4157aa7bdc146b968c942a86f8d.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In November, the left-wing political commentator <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hasanabi">Hasan Piker</a> took his first trip to China, live-streaming the trip to hundreds of thousands of viewers on the streaming platform Twitch. Hasan is a self-described socialist and a staunch critic of American capitalism, and he told me he had long wanted to see for himself how a Communist government ran a country. He wasn&#8217;t disappointed.&nbsp;</p><p><strong>In this episode:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Why Hasan sees China differently than liberals; growing up in Turkey</p></li><li><p>First impressions of China, Tiananmen flag-raising ceremony</p></li><li><p>The incident where Hasan got stopped by security at Tiananmen</p></li><li><p>Hasan&#8217;s thoughts on Chinese (and American) censorship&nbsp;</p></li><li><p>Surprising similarities between America and China</p></li><li><p>Hasan&#8217;s Chinese fan base and how the red pill pipeline is going global</p></li><li><p>What Hasan would advise a future Democratic president on China policy</p></li></ul><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I wanted to ask you about your trip to China and your general thoughts and impressions.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> You said there&#8217;s been a change of attitude about a lot of people with regard to China. I have not had a change of attitude about China. So for me, it was more so just seeing what I was already talking about in action and seeing it in real time, whether it be the development or whether it be what I suspected were rumors about everyday Chinese existence &#8212; either great exaggerations in western press or outright fabrications.</p><p>One of the examples I always use is I went with a bunch of people who had these kinds of negative opinions about China, these fears. Given its presentation, I think, in the western world, for the uninitiated it&#8217;s kind of like the Democratic People&#8217;s Republic of Korea &#8212; a hermit kingdom. If you recall, JD Vance said, even as recently as a couple months ago, that it&#8217;s a nation of peasants. I think that&#8217;s still by and large the average American&#8217;s attitude towards China. And instantly, as soon as we landed in Beijing airport, the people that I was with who had previously thought that it&#8217;s illegal to even show Winnie the Pooh were shocked to find out that the first vending machine that we saw was a Disney vending machine, and there were Winnie the Pooh figurines.</p><p>It&#8217;s little things like that. I already knew they were greatly exaggerated &#8212; the social media ban over referring to Xi Jinping as Winnie the Pooh being turned into this major story in the western news. That&#8217;s why a lot of people will still do that thing when they&#8217;re talking about China, even well-intentioned liberals.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> This was your first time in China. Tell me about how you were able to overcome that narrative. I&#8217;m curious where your views of China formed.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I grew up in Turkey. I&#8217;ve had a very different approach to western narratives. I grew up not being too trustful of the western State Department narratives about enemies of America. And that skepticism, I guess, leaked into my analysis of China as well, where I was like, is this actually real? So I sought out further information.</p><p>I think one of my first interactions with this kind of anti-China coverage was around ghost cities. That transformation also happened at the same time when I was learning more about socialism as well, developing my own personal worldview. So that was what caused me to be doubly skeptical, I guess, of the official narratives. But I remember reading into ghost cities and what the actual intentions behind building these robust infrastructure and development projects were. And the approach from the Chinese government was obviously they wanted to increase the amount of development around housing. There was a specific purpose for it from what I understood. And that made a lot more sense to me &#8212; it wasn&#8217;t just to create economic activity necessarily, although that certainly helped give people jobs, and have investments for people to put their savings into.</p><p>But it was also for people to live in, right? It was housing, which is a major issue in the western world. It was a radically new approach from my perspective. I don&#8217;t know if these ghost cities are necessarily being built out in the way that we think they are in the western world. I think they&#8217;re just building housing, especially as there were developments happening on the edge of cities that were expanding rapidly as well. As far as I can remember, that was one of the first instances where I was like, is this as bad as the way people are presenting it? Or is there an alternative reason for why they&#8217;re doing it? And then it just expanded from that point on.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> One thing that I&#8217;ve been interested in thinking about with you is just how younger Americans think about China and how different their views are, because it strikes me that for younger Americans, a lot of them &#8212; especially the ones who I think are engaging with China &#8212; are less political or at least less ideological.</p><p>They don&#8217;t have these kinds of ideological blinders. There&#8217;s a certain kind of cultural vibes, aesthetic that comes out of China that you can see on Little Red Book and these kinds of social media apps that I think older politicians in America don&#8217;t have any sense of, but I think younger Americans are tuned into. I wanted to get your thoughts on it.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Yeah, I think IShowSpeed is a great example of this. His audience is primarily kids and teenagers. And he probably went through a transformational experience personally going to China. I talked to him about it. He&#8217;s like, it&#8217;s one of his favorite places that he&#8217;s ever visited. He thought the experience was unbelievable &#8212; going in thinking that it&#8217;s gonna be this scary place, because that&#8217;s what a lot of Americans think. They think it&#8217;s somehow unique, that the people are gonna be different, that the culture is gonna be totally different, that it&#8217;s not going to be as welcoming, that there is this constant fear of mass surveillance.</p><p>People talking about social credit, right? It&#8217;s understandable that the average American would be like, what the hell is going on over here? They&#8217;re communists. I&#8217;ve been taught to fear communism my whole life. And then you go there and you&#8217;re like, wait a minute, they just chill.</p><p>Another one that I thought was really interesting was the Nelk Boys. They&#8217;re a Canadian podcast group that is deeply in the manosphere. Donald Trump, I believe, credited his victory to a group of broadcasters. One of them was the Nelk Boys. That&#8217;s how right wing these guys are, right? And they went to China. And I think it was Kyle who was telling the other Nelk that the experience was eye-opening, because they thought it&#8217;s gonna be so scary. And then it was like, we partied freaking hard. And we learned that as long as you don&#8217;t say anything about the leadership or the party, you could do whatever you want. It&#8217;s just like us. That was their takeaway.</p><p>Obviously, it&#8217;s not exactly like America, but I would say that my experience was also somewhat similar in that regard. I do think there are a lot of similarities between China and America in ways that I think most people would not ever think would be so similar. Car-reliant infrastructure, even though they have public transit obviously. And also treats &#8212; they love their treats, just like we do.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> What do you mean?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Commodity consumption, more so than other OECD nations that I&#8217;ve been to, in Europe and all these other places. Culturally speaking, there&#8217;s more of an emphasis on purchasing goods. There is a focus on almost the veneration of commodities and consumption in the way that you see in America, which is really interesting because it is&#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Not a very Marxist thing.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> It&#8217;s not, but I like that personally. I do think it&#8217;s one of the things that the western capitalist world has actually nailed fairly well. Treats are an important part of making sure that you have a happy base of support.</p><p>China has nailed that.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I wanna talk a little bit more about your trip, but before we get there &#8212; what was the kind of trigger, when you decided to go?</p><p>And was it a kind of formal thing related to Speed&#8217;s visit?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Ha. According to the Chinese netizens, that&#8217;s why they call me Lemon Bro, because they say I&#8217;m sour about all the love that IShowSpeed got in China. Because I was always one of the few big content creators that is not super anti-China, especially in my realm.</p><p>Many of the political commentators are like, China is our enemy, they&#8217;re the worst country on the planet, all this stuff. I spend a good deal of time cutting through that. But I&#8217;ve always wanted to go. I&#8217;m fascinated by countries that are outside of the American sphere of influence and considered foreign adversaries. IShowSpeed&#8217;s trip made it a lot easier for me to sell it to my friends, because they were like, he did this, he had a great time, I think we can do it as well.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> He kind of opened the door.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> They were still resistant. Even after all of that, they were still like, I don&#8217;t know.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Were they afraid that something might happen to you?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Not to me, just in general, because they didn&#8217;t know anything. I kind of understand it &#8212; if you&#8217;re an American and you&#8217;ve learned so much about how scary and dangerous China is, you&#8217;re gonna get in there and you&#8217;re gonna be like, am I allowed to say whatever I wanna say? What could happen to me? It&#8217;s a very real fear in the back of your mind when you&#8217;re visiting for the first time, I think.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I&#8217;ve lived in China for the past five years since 2020. I think technologically, it&#8217;s just a nightmare getting all the new apps.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> We did all that ahead of time.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So you guys just had people help you out?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> We had friends who had lived in China. And on top of that, we hired help. We literally paid for a group to show us around. An MCN or something, there was someone from the tourism bureau walking us around in the cities. We had time to ourselves as well because we wanted to explore. But basically it would have been impossible for us to do a comprehensive multi-city trip without getting a tremendous amount of logistical help from a Chinese company.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> You mentioned that you had interacted with the cultural bureau. Did they give you any sort of hints about things not to say, or were you guys aware of things to <s>k</s>eep in mind of what not to do?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> No, not really, but also, it wasn&#8217;t the cultural bureau. It was an MCN, a private company. They had a local tour guide wherever we went, for each individual city.</p><p>There wasn&#8217;t any warnings about what you can and can&#8217;t say. I was also live-streaming on Bilibili as well while I was there.</p><p>I learned through the process of going through that experience that there are certain things that people look at you weird about when you say something about it &#8212; mentioning Xi Jinping, mentioning Mao Zedong in any way. And I wasn&#8217;t even making fun of them or anything. I would talk about Xi Jinping or Mao Zedong in a historical context, as a matter of history, right? And even then, there was definitely a little bit of tension. But I did find in my experience that there was an environment of self-censorship for sure, both amongst the people who are not tourists but are living there as foreigners, and certainly even amongst the local population as well. That environment of self-censorship changed dramatically once we left Beijing.</p><p>We went to Shanghai. It was much more loose. And then from Shanghai onward to Chengdu and Chongqing, it was nonexistent almost. It was really interesting to see &#8212; the more inland the cities were, the less tense it was. Beijing, I will admit, as much as I love the history of Chinese development, as much as I&#8217;m fascinated by it &#8212; I will say, Beijing, you feel like you&#8217;re being surveilled.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Hahaha</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> But Chengdu and Chongqing was awesome. Definitely the two dopest out of all the cities that we went to. I think it was Chengdu where they said that there was a big Taoist culture and temples and whatnot. The vibes were dramatically different city to city. And I would say that Chengdu was the most chill.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> What do you think about the self-censorship? You&#8217;ve expressed admiration for the political economy of China and bringing so many millions of people up through poverty. But I think that there&#8217;s a view among liberals that this kind of socialist system also comes hand in hand with this kind of self-repression.</p><p>How are you thinking about that now that you came back?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> It&#8217;s interesting. I don&#8217;t know how much of it is cultural differences. I don&#8217;t know how much of it is more so just a byproduct of existing in a system such as this one versus &#8212; I feel like western liberalism has a social libertarian streak in it where people want to be offensive. People want to constantly prod people on issues. This is foundational, I feel, to western society. I don&#8217;t necessarily believe that any sort of social repression has to exist in a socialist or communist structure of governance.</p><p>Overall, though, I think it&#8217;s not something that I personally like. I grew up in Turkey, and then I now live in America. So very clearly, free speech is something that I value. Turkey didn&#8217;t have it. America is supposed to have it. But in general, I do think it&#8217;s heavy-handed. I don&#8217;t think it needs to exist in a different economic organization of society.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> The other thing about China, in addition to the repression, is that there&#8217;s just a lot of history that a lot of Chinese don&#8217;t know. For example, I bet that the fans of Speed who were interacting with Speed, most of them probably wouldn&#8217;t know about Tiananmen, 1989. There&#8217;s a lot of things like that in China.</p><p>So I guess to summarize your view &#8212; would it be safe to say if you were to think about some kind of future governmental system in America, it would look closer to China but without the repression? And you think that&#8217;s possible?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> No, I&#8217;m more so focused on controlling the flows of capital, right? I think that&#8217;s one aspect of Chinese development that has been profoundly successful. It&#8217;s actually a reality that even western countries are now having to reckon with, right? The alleviation of poverty, a focus on education &#8212; even if sometimes it has downsides as well, this hyper focus on education.</p><p>But those are the things that I am not only familiar with, but those are things I think are valuable lessons we can learn to integrate into our system. But no, not the social repression or restriction of speech in any way, shape or form.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I&#8217;d love to get some more memorable moments from your trip. And I think that a lot of Americans maybe don&#8217;t realize how different Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Chengdu are, even though they&#8217;re all kind of first-tier cities. But they have clearly very different vibes, and there&#8217;s even kind of like beef.</p><p>So tell me a little bit about what you noticed.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I noticed that there&#8217;s a little bit of a rivalry as well, for sure. It was fascinating to see the diversity of it all, because I think it&#8217;s beyond the differences between Texas and New York City. Because at the end of the day, there isn&#8217;t an almost totally different dialect in Texas as opposed to New York City, right? Whereas because China is so vast and these cities have been around for a very long time &#8212; much longer than America has been around &#8212; it&#8217;s almost like a collection of different countries inside of one country.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Any memorable moments from your trip that stuck out to you?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> They let us work in a wonton shop in Chongqing &#8212; straight up work the lunch rush. I was the busker, bringing people in. My friend Will was literally whipping up wontons in the back, and we were serving the people of Chongqing wonton soup, wonton dumplings.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> And they knew that you were influencers?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Yeah, there were cameras. I was literally pulling random people off the street to come into the shop. That was a really cool experience. Seeing the tunnels was a crazy experience as well, the bomb shelters&#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> For listeners, during the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese used to bomb Chongqing. And so Chongqing has these bomb shelters that have been repurposed into bars and turned into restaurants.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> But for me, the most fascinating thing was just seeing a country run by a communist party have Gucci stores, basically. Because it&#8217;s something that people yell at me about all the time, where they&#8217;re like, you&#8217;re a Gucci Marxist, you&#8217;re a Gucci communist, or champagne socialism. Seeing both of those worlds exist at the same time where there is obviously still income inequality, but ultimately, the productive forces are almost entirely centrally controlled in this totally unique mode of development &#8212; that was the ultimate fascination for me.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I wouldn&#8217;t say that productive forces are totally centrally controlled, but I would say that there&#8217;s a complex mix and interaction between the state and the private sector that produces the overall productive forces.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> But what I mean is, they ultimately control the flows of capital, and they move it in a certain direction. It&#8217;s not as hands-on, I would say, in comparison to some of these other communist projects.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> You had mentioned at some point you kind of see China as where Japan was in the 1980s or &#8216;90s when Japan was also this kind of East Asian technological powerhouse. Did you see that when you were in China? I know you&#8217;re excited about high-speed rail and I want to get your thoughts on high-speed rail, but anything else that you felt was particularly like, damn, we don&#8217;t have this in America &#8212; that China is like the future?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Absolutely. Pretty much everything. All the cities that we went to were so modern. Very clean, very modern. Seeing all of that from an American perspective, looking at the trajectory of a country that is very clearly still developing but has areas that have already developed.</p><p>Because I think ten, twenty years ago the argument was, this is all &#8212; what do they say &#8212; tofu dreg buildings, they&#8217;re all fake. They&#8217;re building all these things just to flex on us or to make it seem like they have these constructions taking place in China. And then you go and you&#8217;re like, this is a real metropolitan city.</p><p>It&#8217;s one that I would say is even more modern than American major cities.</p><p>It feels like there is a promise of more growth. You can feel that the Chinese trajectory is on an upward trajectory. Whereas when you go to any city in America &#8212; I live in Los Angeles. It was raining earlier today, my internet was going in and out. There&#8217;s this feeling of living in a big city in the United States where there&#8217;s a downward trajectory.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I wanted to ask about the incident where you were stopped at Tiananmen.</p><p>Tell me a little bit about that &#8212; what actually happened?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> That was the only time, and it was really funny because it happened the first day we were in Beijing. So we land in Beijing, we get into our hotel &#8212; very nice hotel, one of these famous international hotel chains, right?</p><p>And the next morning we have to wake up at 4:00 AM. It&#8217;s like minus 30 degrees.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Is that for the flag-raising ceremony?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Yep.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I think that China and the US are similar in this way, because there&#8217;s this kind of patriotism that&#8217;s kind of unique to the two countries. We love to sing the Star-Spangled Banner at every sports event, and Chinese too &#8212; they do this thing every single day. People come from all over just to see the flag-raising ceremony.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> It blew my mind. That level of patriotism is higher than American patriotism. American patriotism is like bubblegum &#8212; you experience it while you&#8217;re watching a football game and an F-35 flies over or something.</p><p>So what I thought was really interesting about it is that I asked people my age, Chinese people that are somewhat more liberal that live in big cities, how they felt about it. And they&#8217;re like, why would I go to the flag-raising ceremony? But when we went there, it was people who were either 7 or 70 and nothing in between, and they were coming from all different parts of China. I asked the auntie next to me, where are you coming from? And they were like, I traveled for 24 hours to get here to watch this flag get raised in the morning. Basically a five-minute experience sitting in the cold.</p><p>We start off our trip in Beijing, which is, I wouldn&#8217;t say, as welcoming as the other cities are &#8212; even though it was very welcoming, the people are very welcoming &#8212; but there&#8217;s an environment of tension.</p><p>We&#8217;re going to Tiananmen Square, which is a very important place. As our guide told us, the most important place &#8212; the beating heart of 1.4 billion Chinese who wish to come to Tiananmen Square to see the flag-raising ceremony. She was really patriotic.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> She was very strict.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Much more so, for sure, than the other cities and the other guides that we had. So, yeah, she gave us this big spiel. And that spiel actually came after one of my friends made the mistake of being like, isn&#8217;t Tiananmen Square where the thing happened?</p><p>And she got tense: &#8220;Tiananmen Square is really important for the People&#8217;s Revolution. Historically, this place that was for the super wealthy changed ownership over warlords and emperors and it was given to the people. So it&#8217;s a very important place for all Chinese people, 1.4 billion Chinese people.&#8221;</p><p>So we&#8217;re just kind of sitting there, and I was like dude, you shouldn&#8217;t have said that. Anyway, it was 4:00 AM. We are shocked, to say the least, because there are tens of thousands of people walking in these massive lines that have come from all around China to get to Tiananmen Square.</p><p>And obviously, that&#8217;s the most security theater we&#8217;ve ever encountered, because there are checkpoints upon checkpoints and constant face scanning, to even get to Tiananmen Square for this flag raising.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> For people who don&#8217;t realize, going to Tiananmen Square today is like three times harder than going through airport security.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> They do not mess around at Tiananmen Square with their security. So we get in, and I&#8217;m really excited. I&#8217;m like a six-foot-four white guy. I think the only white guy at Tiananmen Square on this random Monday morning. I&#8217;m jumping up and down, I&#8217;m super stoked. The rest of the group is not as excited as I am. My producer &#8212; because we&#8217;re livestreaming &#8212; in the chat shows a meme of me, my face as Mao Zedong. And I&#8217;m not even thinking that&#8217;s going to be seen as anything &#8212; it&#8217;s not going to be seen as a slight, because it&#8217;s not even offensive. My intention is not to offend.</p><p>So, all of a sudden, boom. We have a young police officer walk up to us. And he was a little bit stern with us. He&#8217;s trying to talk to us in Chinese and we&#8217;re like, we don&#8217;t know what you&#8217;re saying. And he&#8217;s like, show me your phone. So we show him the phone and we&#8217;re filming from the phone too, we&#8217;re livestreaming from the phone. And we&#8217;re trying to explain to him, there&#8217;s nothing on the phone, because we didn&#8217;t even understand what was going on at the time. And it was like a one-minute conversation. And then he just let us go. And then we kept livestreaming and it wasn&#8217;t that big of a deal. It was a very funny first interaction with Beijing and China as well. Because we did happen to go to the one location where there are no jokes allowed.</p><p>But outside of that, there was no other instance where there was any sort of stress or pressure whatsoever.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I&#8217;m curious about your audience in China. Were you able to interact with people who were big fans of you?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Yeah, definitely. It was really interesting. There was one experience where someone came up to me and was like, I&#8217;m a huge fan of you, I&#8217;ve been watching for years.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Which, first of all, is remarkable that they have to go through the firewall to see you.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> From what I gathered, VPN usage is very liberal out there. Maybe there are times when the government stresses it more. But the only time when someone stressed that VPNs are not allowed was the border patrol in China when we were first walking in. They were like, what do you do? And I was like, I&#8217;m a Twitch streamer, all this stuff, right? And they&#8217;re like, what is Twitch? And I was like, don&#8217;t you have a VPN? And they were like, no, VPNs are not allowed. But it was the police, the border police saying that. But I very quickly found out everybody uses it.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> VPN use is pretty widespread in first-tier cities among a certain young population. It gets a little bit diffuse &#8212; the kinds of people that would go to the flag-raising ceremony, I think they&#8217;re probably pretty underrepresented in VPN use.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> If you have any sort of appetite for western content, I hear it&#8217;s fairly easily accessible. But as I was saying &#8212; There was a guy in Chengdu who said, I&#8217;m a huge fan of you. And I immediately assumed that this person was either American-born Chinese or was a Chinese guy that went to school in America at some point. And no, he was like, no, I&#8217;m born and raised, I never left China. I was like, okay, that&#8217;s crazy cool. He was like, you got me out of the red pill pipeline.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Hasan, I think that you&#8217;re aware that this kind of debate around feminism and red pill men in China is as intense as it is in the US, which is a fascinating phenomenon.</p><p>We also see this in South Korea. But there isn&#8217;t a Hasan Piker in China. There isn&#8217;t somebody like you who can pull people away from the red pill, which is oftentimes connected with nationalists and this concept of the &#8220;Little Pinks&#8221; &#8212; these ultra-nationalist Chinese youth. And so it makes sense to me that you are playing that role for some people in China, which is really remarkable.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> It was definitely a shock to me. I can understand why someone who is Chinese, born and raised in China, is fascinated with American culture and they see my commentary and they&#8217;re like, this guy isn&#8217;t so anti-Chinese. And then they start listening to other stuff. But the fact that they were getting content from people who are expressly and outwardly anti-China in ways that are fairly hateful &#8212; that was so shocking to me.</p><p>The gender wars are very much alive and well everywhere around the world. I don&#8217;t know if it&#8217;s as bad as it is in South Korea. I feel like, because everything is so heavily controlled by the government &#8212; the flows of information are very restricted by the government if they have ambitions that people need to repopulate, for example, they&#8217;ll be like, we need to focus more on traditional lifestyle. The American version of that is pretty crazy. I don&#8217;t know how anyone who is Chinese could find that appealing. Because it&#8217;s very nationalistic, very pro-America. The red pill content creators here in America &#8212; they&#8217;re very pro-America, they&#8217;re very pro-West. They feel a sense of western superiority. They make racist memes about Chinese people and stuff like that.</p><p>So that&#8217;s why I&#8217;m like, how does that not get you out of it?</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Oftentimes these kinds of masculine red pill figures in China &#8212; the equivalent would be some kind of ultra-nationalist, anti-feminist, misogynist person.</p><p>They tend to have a kind of affinity towards each other, even though they&#8217;re both kind of racist and anti&#8230;each other. This is the same reason why nationalists kind of prefer to deal with Trump sometimes over somebody like Biden.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Are they nationalists, like pro-China nationalism?</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah, pro-China.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> That&#8217;s why I&#8217;m so shocked by it, right? Because if you&#8217;re a pro-China, ultra-nationalist, guy, and you get your notes and your content from a guy who is very clearly anti-China &#8212; that&#8217;s shocking to me. Ideologically, I&#8217;m so far removed from that. I&#8217;m so totally on the opposite end of that spectrum that if I saw someone who was super nationalist in China, as opposed to communist or whatever, I would be like, this is a little strange for me.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> They disagree with that, and I&#8217;ve talked to nationalists who find that off-putting. But these red pill influencers are magnets for lost men who can&#8217;t really find a place in their society, who feel like culture has shifted significantly to the left, especially around women&#8217;s rights.</p><p>And so what happens is they see this kind of affinity with the way that they are attacking the enemies domestically. And they find that to be more resonant with them. And they kind of airbrush &#8212; they sort of move that anti-China stuff to the side. That&#8217;s my general impression of it.</p><p>I&#8217;m sure that you have been criticized going and coming back. What have you been hearing?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Some people say I&#8217;m paid by the Chinese government, and I always laugh and say I wish. But that&#8217;s usually the number one thing &#8212; you hate America, you love China, you went to China to do propaganda for China. Things of that nature.</p><p>That&#8217;s pretty much it. Normal people that aren&#8217;t political operatives &#8212; they just think it&#8217;s fascinating. They&#8217;re like, how was it? That&#8217;s usually the conversation I have with normal people. But political operatives will be like, you are an enemy of the state, and you are a propagandist for China. Even though I&#8217;ve been very critical of numerous aspects of Chinese governance, and am more so fascinated by the difference in their governance when it comes to the economy &#8212; how they manage the economy.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So let&#8217;s talk about some of the criticisms. What are you critical of when it comes to the government? We&#8217;ve already talked about repression. Is there anything else?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Obviously, Xinjiang &#8212; dragnets, mass surveillance initiatives, things of that nature. I think it&#8217;s super heavy-handed. I understand the argument from the Chinese government, but I just think it&#8217;s a human rights violation.</p><p>I also understand why people in Hong Kong are resistant to the One Country, Two Systems approach, because once again, it comes back to social repression. People don&#8217;t see Chinese control in a positive way, especially if they&#8217;ve been living under a western system, because the western system gives you more freedoms in terms of what you can say. It makes you feel like you have a say in the process.</p><p>And that&#8217;s important for a lot of people, understandably. A big part of my argument in the West is that the two options are oftentimes not reflective of the real material needs that we have &#8212; Democrat versus Republican. But that&#8217;s besides the point.</p><p>The very fact that you have this pressure valve of the democratic process, and the very fact that you have at least this established, almost social libertarian culture &#8212; that&#8217;s very alluring for people. And they don&#8217;t want that to go away. It&#8217;s understandable that you don&#8217;t want it to go away. So it&#8217;s things like that I am critical of.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> You don&#8217;t want that to go away either, right?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Yeah, no, I don&#8217;t want that to go away. And I&#8217;m pretty critical of the American government currently moving in that direction. It would be very hypocritical of me to say, no, that&#8217;s fine. Although sometimes I do go back and forth, because the brain rot here is pretty severe. So sometimes I&#8217;m like, maybe we should be a little bit more restrictive. But then I know that restriction is going to inevitably go in the direction of what the American government wants.</p><p>And we&#8217;ve clearly seen what that looks like with Israel and commentary surrounding Israel. Both under the Biden administration, 3,500 student protesters being arrested. And then now with the Trump administration accelerating pretty severely with surveillance lists that the Department of Homeland Security now has for anti-ICE protesters, anti-Israel protesters as well. So it&#8217;s pretty terrifying. I fundamentally am at odds with any sort of social repression of that sort.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I wanted to share a little bit about my thought process. For reporting on China, it&#8217;s become harder over the years as a reporter to cover China. We oftentimes will write critically about certain things that China does, right?</p><p>And so we&#8217;ll write about trade protectionism or the security state. And then when the West starts to do that and more, it becomes harder to write about China from that perspective. That being said, I think that there are still significant differences, right? China &#8212; if you look at the ranking of free speech, there&#8217;s a list of countries.</p><p>And I think America is somewhere in the 50s, which is already pretty low. But China is at 178 of 180. That&#8217;s still a categorical difference, right? And the thing about Don Lemon &#8212; he got arrested, and that&#8217;s still playing out, but that is a national story. Whereas in China, there&#8217;s so many Don Lemons. It happens all the time.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> The same with Turkey. There is no free speech in the Turkish constitution at all.</p><p>And I can&#8217;t go back to Turkey because I&#8217;ve written extensively about the Turkish coup that happened. I wasn&#8217;t even all that critical of the Turkish government, but it&#8217;s not great. I know that if I go back, I will have issues. I might go to jail. And because I&#8217;m a Turkish citizen as well, I know the American government is not trying to get me out. They&#8217;d be like, you can keep him, right?</p><p>That&#8217;s why I said Ai Weiwei&#8217;s approach to it has been fascinating, because he&#8217;s experienced Chinese state repression. And he is a dissident &#8212; a person who was incredibly critical.</p><p>And then for him to also experience it in the West, especially after October 7 &#8212; it&#8217;s been really fascinating to see that unfold, where he&#8217;s like, these guys are hypocrites too. At least China is also offering something to the citizens. Because from my Chinese relatives and my friends that now live here, when I talk to them, it was always like, there are certain things you can&#8217;t say that you all know. As long as you don&#8217;t do that, you&#8217;re fine. You have this knowledge that the government will take care of you. There is a social cohesion around that.</p><p>But if you obviously want to become a dissident, or if you see something that is truly an issue &#8212; in the case of Ai Weiwei, it was the earthquake, right? There was this massive earthquake and all these students had died and he wanted to criticize the government over it.</p><p>And the government was like, you can&#8217;t do that, we&#8217;re going to put you in prison and we&#8217;re going to beat you up. And then he wanted to criticize the fact that he got beaten up. And he wanted to make a performance art piece out of it. I feel like the American government hasn&#8217;t gotten to that level yet. But I think the reason why is because America has been the hegemonic superpower. And I have this belief that the First Amendment, as a foundation or principle, is almost afforded to a country like that. Because we are not considered disruptive enough. I, as a person, can be a socialist, a communist, whatever I want to be in America, because I can&#8217;t cause any instability in the eyes of the state, right? Because the state is so powerful. Whereas I feel like it stems from a place of insecurity, basically a place of vulnerability.</p><p>When you think speech and being a dissident is a problem that exposes a weakness in your own mechanism of governance. Maybe I&#8217;m wrong about this, but I do think that there will be a loosening of restriction if China becomes more of a power player around the world, in terms of speech.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> The reason why it&#8217;s hard for me to think that is the case is because I feel like the repression now has been worsening over my five years that I&#8217;ve been here. It&#8217;s gotten worse in China.</p><p>Since the pandemic, when China was locked down, there&#8217;s a whole host of things that you just could not say about the government. And the government became a lot more censorious during that period and it never really relaxed after that. So a lot of people in Shanghai &#8212; I don&#8217;t know if you knew &#8212; but Shanghai was under lockdown. There was a period where for two months we didn&#8217;t have enough food. We couldn&#8217;t even get basic medicine. And people were trying to basically express their issues online, which is the only way that they could possibly do it. And the government censored that. And so a lot of people died during that period, and it&#8217;s still not a topic that can be discussed in China.</p><p>And so there&#8217;s examples of this where the government has gotten worse over time. But the irony for me is that China has gotten richer and more successful in that same period. It&#8217;s been a curious thing. I also share your intuition, which is that surely when you become more powerful and more successful, you should open up the space for free expression.</p><p>But what I&#8217;ve noticed in the past few years in China has been this kind of strange paradox where the government has become more successful but they&#8217;ve started to tighten up more and become more oppressive.</p><p>And I think that it has to do with the way that they relate to the world, especially the United States. In times when they felt that the United States was in a more collaborative posture, they were more willing to open up society, let people talk. But then now they feel like when the US is more anti-China, when the government voices are more anti-China, there&#8217;s more repression domestically. I&#8217;ve talked to a lot of dissidents who say that they feel their experience with the security state always gets worse whenever Nancy Pelosi visits Taiwan, or when someone says that we&#8217;re gonna have to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack, or when politicians say these things that create tension within the relationship diplomatically &#8212; that creates more repression domestically.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> No, it totally makes sense. I&#8217;m going to Cuba with a humanitarian aid flotilla. And much has been said about Cuban governance and the repressive nature of the Cuban government, right? And I think it&#8217;s a lot more understandable, especially when I judge it by the American standards of moments of repression of political speech in American history, in times of war, right? Whether it be the Cold War, World War I, World War II. There have been a lot of instances where the American government has considered speech to be disruptive and has punished people criminally, right? Draft dodgers, conscientious objectors, things of that nature. People were branded as communists. Or even civil rights leaders, right? Sometimes they were directly assassinated.</p><p>So the way I see it &#8212; it&#8217;s almost seen as a necessity by some of these countries that exist in the periphery or outside of the scope of America, that have been branded as foreign adversaries. Because there&#8217;s so much outside interference from America that&#8217;s super direct too. It&#8217;s not like they hide it, especially with Cuba. The government, as a mechanism of sovereignty, tries to do its very best to just clamp down on dissent. Maybe in some instances, they also like that, where it&#8217;s like, we can use outside intervention as a reason to say you can&#8217;t say certain things. So that&#8217;s the way I interpret it. Because at the end of the day, all manner of leadership still want to at least manage their nation-state. It&#8217;s not like people are doing it specifically so they can eat lobster rolls or whatever as the people suffer. They want to thrive, they want to have sovereignty.</p><p>This is one of the lines of self-defense that these countries engage in, which is why I think China is in a unique situation, because it is becoming this incredibly powerful force around the planet.</p><p>Therefore, I almost see it as a burden to have any sort of limitations on speech, or at least have such strict controls over the speech of its own citizens. Because especially given the surveillance mechanisms that exist, figuring out what&#8217;s valid criticism or valid dissent coming from within versus hatred being fomented by outside influences like the CIA is probably fairly easy to distinguish.</p><p>The more powerful you become, the more ridiculous it almost becomes that you would have such a strong censorious approach.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I was reading some of your commentary about China, and you do mention there&#8217;s a history in China of foreign intervention, right? It&#8217;s been invaded many times by the British and by the Americans. And Shanghai is still &#8212; you can see the remnants of the concessions in Shanghai. So China has always felt like their regime is kind of vulnerable to foreign adversaries. And so what you see in China and in a lot of authoritarian countries is that they see this through that lens in any kind of situation where the regime is in trouble. So when there&#8217;s a protest among the citizenry, they assume that there is some kind of black hand, American forces that are sowing discord.</p><p>And I think that kind of paranoid thinking &#8212; I don&#8217;t know if it&#8217;s maybe it&#8217;s just propaganda &#8212; but I think that there&#8217;s a kind of confident, patriotic Chinese person who thinks, we did so much for you guys. If you guys are actually pissed off at us, it must be because the CIA has helped. I&#8217;ve seen this before. And I don&#8217;t think that kind of thinking is amenable to what you&#8217;re saying about this kind of gradual enriching process that softens the public sphere.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> No, I get it. There&#8217;s also validity for that fear due to the historical reasons. But also on top of that, here, it&#8217;s valid to say, hey, the uncertainty surrounding the lockdowns is terrifying for the average person, right? Then on the other hand, you&#8217;ve got the New York Times writing about it. So then when the New York Times is writing about it, they&#8217;re like, see, they&#8217;re trying to foment instability in the country. So we gotta be extra hard in cracking down on this sort of speech. This is not even a justification for the actions of the government. I&#8217;m just saying that I can see why, if I were to put myself in the shoes of someone leading a country branded as a foreign adversary, that kind of stuff plays a role in the heavy-handed approach the government takes.</p><p>And then, they probably don&#8217;t mind that this is a repressive force that makes it easier to control the public.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So I wanted to get your thoughts on &#8212; do you think that China is socialist, in your definition and value system?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I&#8217;m much more pragmatic than someone who is an orthodox Marxist, and that&#8217;s why I stress the controlling-the-flows-of-capital thing in terms of the way that the Chinese economy has developed. Do I believe that China is a transitional socialist state? I think it&#8217;s an attempt in that direction. It&#8217;s not a communist state.</p><p>Obviously, there&#8217;s no such thing &#8212; it&#8217;s never really existed. But I think the state has found this very unique structure where they still take some of the valuable lessons of decentralization in terms of developing stuff, right? Manufacturing goods, especially light goods. It feels like it&#8217;s much less restrictive in terms of what you can produce. I explain it as the Chinese government wears capitalism like a sleeve almost, where there&#8217;s still control over the productive forces &#8212; a lot more control over the productive forces than what you get in comparison to the American system, where we have subsidies.</p><p>But if a company wants to use subsidies to engage in stock buybacks, they can do so, right? Whereas in terms of the five-year plans that they set in motion, they&#8217;re like, we&#8217;re gonna move on from real estate, right? That&#8217;s what happened in the last decade. They were like, all right, we built a lot of housing, we&#8217;re moving on from real estate. We&#8217;re gonna move into what direction? Renewable energy and also electric vehicles. So then boom, all of a sudden, flows of capital move in that direction. And then everyone&#8217;s like, it&#8217;s time to build, it&#8217;s time to make EVs. I feel like that&#8217;s a unique system that doesn&#8217;t exist in the western world at all, which is why they constantly complain about it and say China is actually cheating in international trade. And it&#8217;s a major point of contention with the European markets, because they&#8217;re impossible to compete with.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> One thing that I feel is really different about China from what you would expect in a kind of Anglo-American socialist perspective is that all of this government intervention and interaction with the productive forces &#8212; so to speak &#8212; they don&#8217;t tend to end up in <s>just</s> ordinary people&#8217;s hands. What you mentioned about high-speed rail &#8212; high-speed rail is public. So there is an argument to be made that there&#8217;s a lot of investment in public infrastructure, and that is a kind of common good. But EVs, right? This intense focus on EVs and climate change &#8212; these are long-term things that drive China&#8217;s technological edge. It probably looks cool, right? When China&#8217;s government supports robots &#8212; if you saw the Spring Festival two days ago, there&#8217;s this enormous push about robots.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I don&#8217;t much care for robots and stuff, but everybody here thinks it&#8217;s super cool.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So one thing that I think is almost contradictory to the view that China is a socialist country is that Xi Jinping has said himself that he does not like welfarism and he wants Chinese citizens to &#8220;eat bitterness,&#8221; and he doesn&#8217;t like this kind of direct cash transfer.</p><p>So a lot of this is abundance. It&#8217;s China focusing on the supply side and not on the demand side. I was wondering whether you were aware of that.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> <s>No,</s> I fully agree. I don&#8217;t think welfare is necessarily a socialist concept anyway. I think it might have been Lenin who said &#8212; no, it was definitely Lenin who said, you&#8217;re gonna still work, right? At the end of the day, it&#8217;s a totally different approach. Welfare is a social democratic approach that in many instances offers a lifeline. My focus is more so about having some kind of control over capital. We have these mechanisms in America as well. We just never apply them &#8212; the Defense Production Act and things like that will only be seen as a last resort. And in most circumstances, they&#8217;re never deployed. We have eminent domain. We rarely ever use it unless it&#8217;s super necessary, I guess. And I feel like the Chinese system is more efficient for that reason, because the state is more powerful than capital. Whereas in America and in the western world, capital dominates the state.</p><p>So the state will dish out funds at the behest of capital, rather than at the behest of a vision that they might have. That&#8217;s what I mean as far as dominating the forces of capital. However, I&#8217;m sure there&#8217;s a distribution process that still rewards people who are within the party structure. But at the end of the day, it&#8217;s still done for a different purpose. The industrial focus is done with a higher purpose in mind. And the surplus value is then still allocated back to development projects &#8212; building out the tier-one cities, and then also building out the tier-four cities and modernizing the countryside, for example.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Right. My view of China is that there&#8217;s this constant focus on development and making things look nice and things that the public can share, like roads and bridges.</p><p>And there&#8217;s a lot less &#8212; there&#8217;s almost no appetite for a kind of redistributive policy that provides spending cash for ordinary citizens. That has been a really big pain point for a lot of leftists in China &#8212; people who have similar views to you.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I&#8217;ve heard that there is a Maoist resurgence almost, where there are more people saying, the class struggle continues in China.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Absolutely.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> That&#8217;s fascinating, because the established cultural attitude is not capitalist inherently, whereas in America, the solution when there&#8217;s a problem is more capitalism. Whereas in China, the solution when there&#8217;s a problem is, let&#8217;s do socialism, let&#8217;s do more socialism. And that is fascinating to me &#8212; someone who grew up in both Turkey and then the United States of America, a person who has only known one way of doing business is severely limited in their political approach to fixing problems &#8212; it&#8217;s always like, we gotta bring in private enterprise, private enterprise is the solution to this.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I want to get your view about what kind of a message you might have to an establishment Democratic figure, somebody &#8212; I think that you had talked to Lina Khan [former FTC chair] about their attitudes towards China. Now that you have come back from China, what would you say to her?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I don&#8217;t really talk to American politicians about China at all, because no one knows anything about China. And they not only don&#8217;t know anything about China &#8212; if they are curious about what&#8217;s going on in China, they have a very different approach than I do that I think is not as open-minded, or even&#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> A security mindset, right?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> National security concerns trump all. And this is analysts that I talk to who are not even analysts in America &#8212; analysts around the globe all share the same concerns. When it comes down to talking about China, they can be the most woke person. They immediately shut it out where there is a sense of Orientalism in their approach, 100 percent, where they think, no, they&#8217;re just different. Their attitude is different, their worldview is different. You can&#8217;t trust them. That&#8217;s oftentimes the sense I get. Which is great for me because it has helped me make better predictions &#8212; even with the tariff war that was taking place with China.</p><p>The Chinese government is pretty open about what they&#8217;re going to do, especially when it comes to matters of international affairs, where they&#8217;re just like, this is unacceptable, this is our red line, don&#8217;t cross it, right? And I&#8217;m also more aware of what kind of manufacturing behemoth they are than the average American analyst is, who is constantly talking about how China is in a state of collapse any moment.</p><p>That&#8217;s given me an upper hand, I guess, in terms of my analysis. But usually I don&#8217;t talk to American politicians about China as much. But I think I&#8217;ll probably be talking to them a lot more in the next five years, because the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/10/opinion/china-ai-ev-trump.html">New York Times article</a> was like, I just came back from China and they&#8217;re dominating us. I never thought I would read that in the Times.</p><p>So I think that is going to open up more opportunities for people to look at what they&#8217;re doing differently and what kind of lessons we can learn from their development.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> That&#8217;s my last question. There&#8217;s a kind of trend, as you&#8217;ve noticed, of people &#8212; including you &#8212; going to China and coming out and being like, I saw the future. Tom Friedman has done it. Several people in the New York Times have done it. This has intensified since last year.</p><p>I wanted to get your thoughts on the timing of that. Why do you think it&#8217;s happening this year? Is it reflective of something about America that you&#8217;re noticing?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> It&#8217;s American material conditions deteriorating. It&#8217;s an inevitability. It feels like you&#8217;re a party apparatchik visiting an American grocery store for the first time after leaving the USSR and going, wait, this is available for everyone? What the fuck. That&#8217;s what it feels like if you go to China. You&#8217;re like, what do you mean, you&#8217;ve got an abundance of different options of travel? People aren&#8217;t even using the airlines that much, because even though China is so vast, high-speed rail is so accessible. When you go there, you&#8217;re like, it doesn&#8217;t make sense.</p><p>We thought that this was a country that was extremely poor not that long ago. How did this development take place in such a short period of time? They must be utilizing their resources a lot better than we are here in America. And I think it&#8217;s impossible not to have that be your main takeaway. You would have to have been propagandized so exceptionally to go to China and say that what they&#8217;ve done in the last four decades is anything short of a miracle. If you were to look at that and be like, no, this still sucks, and I think the American way is actually the right approach &#8212; you would have to be deluding yourself. Five years ago, even six years ago or ten years ago, when I used to talk about China, they would say all the tier-one cities are fake, right? It&#8217;s just bells and whistles.</p><p>Now, when I came back from China, I thought it was fascinating that they were like, the tier-one cities are actually much nicer than ours, but you didn&#8217;t go to the rural countryside. You didn&#8217;t see how underdeveloped the rural countryside is. And it&#8217;s true &#8212; the countryside, obviously, there are certain parts of the Chinese countryside that aren&#8217;t as developed as the tier-one cities, certainly.</p><p>But in comparison to the trajectory of development in areas that are still being built out, they clearly have a positive trajectory. As opposed to going to Buffalo, New York, going to all of these forgotten towns in the heartland of America, where you realize that there was industry here in the past.</p><p>And it&#8217;s gone now. They&#8217;re ghost cities. That&#8217;s how I felt traveling around the country, there used to be people here, there used to be commerce here, there used to be economic activity here.</p><p>Now it&#8217;s all gone.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> So here&#8217;s a hypothetical for you. Let&#8217;s say that there&#8217;s a Democratic president in the next few years, 2028. And they are thinking about China and they call you up and they say, Hasan, what can you tell me about what we can do concretely in terms of policy, either domestically or foreign policy-wise, with regards to China? What would you recommend them?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I would immediately reverse the decades of anti-China hawkery and move to a cooperative agreement with China.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> What do you mean by that? Economically?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> Economic cooperation, which already exists, obviously. But I would take a much less hawkish approach.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> You&#8217;d take the tariffs down?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> All of that stuff, I think, is so frivolous. And in any case, it&#8217;s almost helped Chinese development in that area as well, because then they just find a way around it. And then the indigenous production is an inevitability. I find it ridiculous to try to approach foreign nations as adversaries. I believe in internationalism. So I would tell them, no more. We&#8217;re only focusing on international cooperation from this day on &#8212; if I had the magic wand to somehow overcome decades, if not centuries, of hatred that the average American has, and oftentimes the economic interest that they have in complete domination of all of these other countries.</p><p>Within the confines of permissibility, I would say that I probably would move the IMF-World Bank structure that has existed, that has dominated the Global South, to a more tolerant approach as well. No more focus on austerity, no more forcing developing nations to have to work with foreign capital and foreign investments, and just allow them room to develop. I would try to get America to become more Chinese, is what I&#8217;m saying. If you wanna quote-unquote beat China, you have to become more like China.</p><p>Now, do I think that we have enough time to even engage in such competition? No, I don&#8217;t. So I think international cooperation is the way. Maybe I&#8217;m wrong, maybe I&#8217;m foolhardy about this. But I do think that, as you&#8217;ve said as well, it kind of feels like China wants things to just be stable on the international front. They value stability quite a lot more than they want to engage in any sort of militant posture against the United States of America.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> One context that is important is that this kind of anti-China posturing &#8212; there are many sources, but one of the genuine sources of anti-China posturing has been cybersecurity. China has been really aggressive in the past few years on spying. There have been major spying efforts in the US, and that has really alarmed a lot of policymakers.</p><p>So when you talk to people in the Trump administration, in the first term, when they were initially starting up their anti-China posture, which has kind of continued to now, they cite these genuine concerns about espionage. Have you thought about that?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> I&#8217;m very aware of it. There was a New York Times report about how the Chinese government has basically infiltrated the telecommunications grid in its entirety.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> What do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> From what I understand, even the New York Times takeaway was they were more so invested in trying to figure out which of their people were compromised &#8212; as far as the actual ambassadors or agents they have. That&#8217;s what they were more so tracking, rather than finding compromising information.</p><p>But I think all of that is a direct consequence of the militant posture that America engages in, where I don&#8217;t think that there&#8217;s any reason for countries to truly engage one another in this militant fashion, even countries that have been historically considered foreign adversaries.</p><p>Maybe I have a naive approach to it, but I always think about the European continent, which was at war with one another for centuries until not that long ago, including World War II.</p><p>And now there is a mutual understanding, a security cooperation there, and a much more tolerant approach to these nation-states. And I feel like we can expand on that mentality across the board &#8212; not just through different continents, not just through the European Union, but I have a more global approach to that kind of security arrangement that revolves around mutual respect and understanding of <s>both</s> differences, and isn&#8217;t so heavily focused on trying to go to war with one another all the time.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Thanks, Hasan.</p><p><strong>Hasan:</strong> No problem.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Inside Xi Jinping’s Military Crackdown]]></title><description><![CDATA[China&#8217;s top generals are falling like flies, and at unprecedented speeds.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/inside-xi-jinpings-military-crackdown-52c</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/inside-xi-jinpings-military-crackdown-52c</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980748/5139e7e45d35e0d1216a9c908e5e6cc0.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China&#8217;s top generals are falling like flies, and at unprecedented speeds. As Xi Jinping dismantles the upper ranks of the People&#8217;s Liberation Army, questions are mounting about corruption, loyalty, and the stability of China&#8217;s political system.<br>Neil Thomas, an expert on Chinese politics at Asia Society, unpacks the logic of Xi&#8217;s military crackdown.</p><p>Neil's articles: https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/neil-thomas</p><p>Follow him on X: https://x.com/neilthomas123?lang=en</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>About a week ago, we got the news&#8212;announced by the Chinese military and also reported on Tsinghua&#8212;that two generals, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, were purged. As someone who&#8217;s been following this closely, I&#8217;m curious how you reacted to the news?<br><br><strong>Neil: </strong><br>I&#8217;d say I was surprised, but maybe not shocked, given just how much of a knife Xi Jinping has taken to the PLA <em>[People&#8217;s Liberation Army]</em> high command.</p><p>Over the last few years, there have been rumors that Zhang Youxia might have been in trouble for two or three years now, dating back to 2023, when the first big &#8220;tiger&#8221; of the PLA fell&#8212;the defense minister Li Shangfu, who disappeared from public view for several months and caused a huge international story at the time.</p><p>Li had worked for many years in the PLA&#8217;s procurement department. He was a deputy to Zhang Youxia during Xi&#8217;s first term, when Zhang ran that department. That department sat at the nexus of the major corruption scandal in the PLA during Xi&#8217;s term, centered on Rocket Force procurement&#8212;huge inflows of money and weapons programs. The Pentagon has reported that China is trying to increase its nuclear arsenal from the low hundreds to around 2,500 warheads by 2030.</p><p>So even though Xi has been trying to crack down on corruption, there&#8217;s been a huge increase in opportunities for corruption during his tenure. What was shocking, though, was how quickly Zhang&#8217;s purge happened. In the past, there&#8217;s often been a kind of theater: someone disappears from public view, misses key political events, and then there&#8217;s endless speculation&#8212;inside and outside China&#8212;about what happened to them.</p><p>This time, Zhang missed a speech at the Central Party School in early January that he should have attended, and just days later came the announcement that he was formally under investigation. That speed&#8212;from first indication to official confirmation&#8212;was unusually fast, and that was shocking.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>When very high-ranking military officials are purged, is it ever <em>only</em> about corruption? Or is it ever even mainly about corruption? Or do you always have to look for a political reason?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>That&#8217;s a fantastic question, and one we don&#8217;t have a definitive answer to. At this level, there&#8217;s always a political dimension. If Xi felt there was a political need to keep Zhang around, it wouldn&#8217;t matter if Zhang was corrupt or skimming money on the side.</p><p>But Xi is now in a position where almost anyone is expendable&#8212;especially in the military, which has been the focus of elite purges in recent years. The fact that he can do this shows how powerful he is in Beijing.</p><p>I don&#8217;t think it was purely political in my view, triangulating all the evidence I&#8217;ve seen. There wasn&#8217;t an attempted coup or a major clash over invading Taiwan in 2027, as some of the more entertaining social-media rumors suggest. The PLA was very corrupt before Xi took power&#8212;the buying and selling of posts was routine&#8212;so I&#8217;d be shocked if Zhang Youxia wasn&#8217;t implicated in some of that.</p><p>What was probably most offensive to Xi is that corruption in procurement and the Rocket Force continued <em>after</em> he took office and <em>after</em> he promoted people he trusted, like Zhang, into positions of responsibility.</p><p>Corruption is no longer just a criminal offense; it&#8217;s a political sin. Xi is on a mission to reform the Party into a more effective and internally accountable institution&#8212;one that can escape what he sees as the historic cycle of dynastic rise and fall, avoid the fate of the Soviet Union, and rule China indefinitely.</p><p>That, I would argue, is his number-one domestic political priority.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Neil, how do you chronicle the different stages of this purge? You mentioned the Rocket Force in 2023, and now we have this shocking news, which feels like a crescendo&#8212;Zhang is basically number two in the military, right? Do you see this as chapters in one book of military purges, or how do you taxonomize these different developments?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>I think it&#8217;s a purge that has gained momentum as it&#8217;s expanded through the military leadership.</p><p>In 2023, we saw Li Shangfu, the defense minister, purged&#8212;most likely over charges related to his time running the procurement bureaucracy. During Xi&#8217;s second term, the Central Military Commission announced investigations into procurement abuses covering the five years Li Shangfu led that department. That&#8217;s pretty strong circumstantial evidence, especially alongside the removal of Rocket Force generals at the same time.</p><p>Then in 2024, we saw the downfall of Miao Hua, the top political commissar in the PLA&#8212;the Party&#8217;s enforcers inside the military, whose job is to ensure the PLA doesn&#8217;t turn against the Party. His fall, and then in 2025 the downfall of He Weidong, the number-two general after Zhang Youxia, are murkier.</p><p>Both had served earlier in their careers in the 31st Group Army, headquartered in Fujian, where Xi Jinping spent decades of his early career. It&#8217;s possible they were promoted because of personal ties or shared experience. But how they fell&#8212;we just don&#8217;t really know. There were accusations that they undermined the chairman responsibility system, which is code for Xi&#8217;s personal control over the military.</p><p>They were also connected to senior generals from the Jiang Zemin era, like Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who famously turned the PLA into a personal fiefdom by buying and selling posts. <em>[These were two generals who were brought down in the first few years after Xi Jinping took power in 2012.]</em></p><p>That brings us to early 2026 and the simultaneous purge of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Liu Zhenli&#8217;s purge has received less attention, but he was the chief of staff of the Joint Command and the top operational commander. If you add all this up, the Central Military Commission started with seven members in 2022 and is now down to just two: Xi Jinping himself and Jiang Shengmin, the military&#8217;s top anti-graft investigator&#8212;not coincidentally, I think.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>I understand what you&#8217;re saying about Xi wanting to reform the Party, but to what extent does this point to a deeper problem inherent in dictatorship&#8212;that there are always tensions between military commanders and civilian dictators? This was true in Nazi Germany, under Stalin, and elsewhere. To what extent in China is this just inherent to the system?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>That gets to the heart of the dictator&#8217;s dilemma. Political science shows that the biggest threat to dictators usually comes from within&#8212;from elite rivals&#8212;rather than from mass uprisings.</p><p>In authoritarian systems, there&#8217;s no independent authority to mediate elite disputes. Ultimately, it&#8217;s the threat of violence that determines who can lead and which decisions are made. Xi&#8217;s grip on the military and internal security services has been critical to his consolidation of power over the past fourteen years.</p><p>China does have distinguishing features. It&#8217;s a revolutionary one-party regime, so the military has always been a Party army rather than a national one. There&#8217;s also been a separation between military and civilian bureaucracies dating back to Mao. Xi, as Party leader and military commander, is the only real link between the two.</p><p>Civilian leaders on the Politburo Standing Committee can&#8217;t issue orders to the military. That separation helps coup-proof the regime and solidify the top leader&#8217;s authority.</p><p>The big question is whether this purge spreads to civilian leadership. The result of this separation between military and civilian government is that Xi&#8217;s ties to civilian elites&#8212;people like Li Qiang or Cai Qi&#8212;are much deeper. They worked together closely for years. Xi never had that kind of relationship with Zhang Youxia.</p><p>If the purge stays in the military, we&#8217;re probably seeing the culmination of trends that will lead to a full leadership refresh at the 21st Party Congress in late 2027. If it spreads to the Politburo or Standing Committee, that would mark a qualitatively new phase in the anti-corruption campaign&#8212;one where no one is safe&#8212;and that would be deeply destabilizing.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Is it fair to assume that if you&#8217;re very high up in the PLA&#8212;or even in the Party more broadly&#8212;whether you want to or not, you almost <em>have</em> to be corrupt, simply because everybody around you is? And that if you refuse to participate, you&#8217;d actually be seen as untrustworthy by your peers?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>That was certainly the case in the pre-Xi era. You basically had to pay your way through the system&#8212;to pass promotion exams, to get appointed, even to very senior positions, including combat positions.</p><p>One of the big reasons Xi, in his first term, focused so heavily on revamping the PLA&#8212;through both purges and institutional reorganization&#8212;was that the United States and other Western intelligence agencies had developed very good contacts, very good sources, inside the PLA and in Beijing more broadly. They were often providing the money that officers needed to pay bribes in order to move up the system. The cadre benefited by getting promoted and becoming more powerful; the U.S. benefited by getting information and intelligence from them.</p><p>That entire ecosystem was broken fairly early in the Xi era. And it wasn&#8217;t a civilized or procedural crackdown, like something you might see in Western intelligence dramas that I enjoy watching. This was brutal. People were being shot in government compounds for betraying the country.</p><p>And I think that if Zhang Youxia or Liu Jianli&#8212;these generals&#8212;were really betraying the PRC and working with the U.S. or other foreign intelligence agencies, as some of the more extreme rumors suggest, they&#8217;d probably be in a much stickier situation than they are now. They&#8217;re under investigation, they&#8217;ll likely go to prison, but as far as we know, they&#8217;re still alive. And I take that as a signal, at least, that some of the crazier rumors probably aren&#8217;t true.</p><p>The harder question is how much those corrupt practices&#8212;buying and selling positions&#8212;are still the norm in the PLA during the Xi era. We have less clarity on that. We do know that Li Shangfu was accused, in his official charges, of both accepting and giving large bribes. It&#8217;s possible that included bribing Zhang Youxia to be promoted to replace him as head of the Equipment Development Department. We don&#8217;t know. It could also refer to corruption earlier in Li Shangfu&#8217;s career, when this kind of behavior was simply how everyone got ahead.</p><p>Anecdotally, my impression is that both the PLA and China more broadly are less brazenly corrupt than they were in 2012, when Xi took office. It&#8217;s incredibly hard to measure. But it&#8217;s clear there&#8217;s still enough corruption&#8212;especially in sensitive areas related to combat readiness&#8212;that Xi feels he needs to keep cleaning out the top brass.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong><br>Buying positions is one form of corruption, but the military has also historically been involved in all kinds of business activity&#8212;real estate, commercial ventures, self-enrichment. To what extent has Xi actually been able to deal with that side of the problem?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>Exactly. And that was another part of the crackdown that Xi launched early in his term, right? We know that those kinds of charges were being leveled at generals and other people in the PLA&#8212;the fact that they were leasing military land to developers, that they were diverting funds meant for arms purchases into their own pockets.</p><p>So we know that was happening. And we know it&#8217;s probably still happening, given the extent of the purges over the last few years. The PLA does still have some business interests, but it&#8217;s different from the late 1990s, when Jiang Zemin passed reforms that basically got the PLA out of the broader economy. So it doesn&#8217;t quite have the same commercial empire that it used to.</p><p>But another telling aspect of the purges in recent years is that it hasn&#8217;t just been generals, commanders, and political commissars who&#8217;ve been taken down. It&#8217;s also been dozens and dozens of executives at state-owned arms manufacturers, particularly those that produce rockets and nuclear weapons. These are state-owned enterprises that aren&#8217;t necessarily owned by the PLA, but they&#8217;re heavily embedded with the military. The PLA is their main customer&#8212;and in some cases their only customer.</p><p>The fact that so many of those executives have also been purged suggests that this kind of bribery is still pretty rampant, at least in the Rocket Force. And what&#8217;s interesting is that the purges so far haven&#8217;t just targeted the Rocket Force, but also the Army and the Navy. The Air Force had escaped a lot of scrutiny, and many Air Force generals were promoted to replace people who were purged elsewhere. But just recently, in the past few weeks, there&#8217;s been a new directive issued to investigate graft in the PLA Air Force as well. So it looks like the purge is continuing along these lines.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>What do you think about the criticism that these anti-corruption purges are just never-ending&#8212;that somehow the more you purge, the more corruption seems to come out?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>As far as Xi is concerned, I don&#8217;t think he sees that as a criticism. He sees the anti-corruption campaign as part of a broader effort to strengthen discipline within the Party and to carry out what he calls a <em>self-revolution</em>&#8212;<em>ziwo geming</em>&#8212;which is his answer to the problem of how to avoid the historic cycle of rising and falling dynasties that I mentioned earlier.</p><p>And it&#8217;s interesting that on this point, <em>self-revolution</em> is one of the very few&#8212;maybe not the only&#8212;areas where Xi has placed himself on the same level as Mao. He hasn&#8217;t appointed himself chairman of the Party, he hasn&#8217;t adopted some of the other trappings of Mao&#8217;s rule, but this idea of self-revolution is something he talks about through what&#8217;s known as the &#8220;cave dialogues.&#8221;</p><p>In 1945, Mao was in Yan&#8217;an and had a conversation with the famous educator Huang Yanpei. Huang asked Mao: how do you plan to carry out this Communist revolution successfully? How are you going to escape the historic cycle of dynastic rise and fall? Mao&#8217;s answer at the time was &#8220;people&#8217;s democracy,&#8221; which, clearly, was a bit of a bullshit answer, because it&#8217;s not what he ended up doing. But Xi has seized on that dialogue and elevated it within Party ideology.</p><p>Xi now says Mao&#8217;s answer was the first answer. <em>Self-revolution</em> is the second answer&#8212;the answer for a new era&#8212;to this fundamental problem the Communist Party faces.</p><p>And I think this was very much top of mind for Xi when he came into office in 2012. You had just had the Bo Xilai scandal, which laid bare internal rivalries and infighting within the Party, as well as a real sense of moral crisis&#8212;given that a top leader&#8217;s wife, Bo Xilai&#8217;s wife Gu Kailai, had murdered a British businessman.</p><p>There were corruption stories breaking every other week. On social media, you&#8217;d see stories about low-level officials&#8212;<em>watch bros</em> or <em>LV bros</em>&#8212;wearing Rolexes. There was a pervasive sense of moral decay within the Party, and a fear that the failure to rein in corruption, and the failure to deal with visible problems like pollution that were making life unhealthy and difficult in China, was eroding the Party&#8217;s ability to stay in power.</p><p>Xi had been in Beijing for five years before becoming leader. He was a leader-in-waiting on the Standing Committee and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission from 2010 to 2012. So he saw these problems and political maladies of the Communist system up close.</p><p>When he first came to power, I think anti-corruption in his first term was used primarily as a way to take out rival networks and eliminate potential political challengers. In his second term, it slowed down somewhat, partly because of the twin shocks of Trump&#8217;s trade war and the COVID pandemic. There simply weren&#8217;t as many high-level purges as in the first term.</p><p>Now, in Xi&#8217;s third term, after the 20th Party Congress&#8212;having established dominance over elite politics, removed rival networks, and emerged from those two major external shocks stronger than ever&#8212;I think he&#8217;s leaning into this broader vision of anti-corruption: remaking the Party, making it more accountable, ensuring that it stays connected to its Communist roots under his leadership and historic mission.</p><p>There&#8217;s clearly a political loyalty component to this, but also a belief that this is necessary to make China a stronger, more effective country&#8212;one that works for its people&#8212;and that this is what you need to be a great power.</p><p>We can obviously quibble significantly with the means he&#8217;s using. But one thing Xi often says about the Soviet Union is that when it collapsed, no one was man enough to stand up; no one was ideologically committed enough to resist Gorbachev. He&#8217;s also said the Soviet Party became divorced from the masses and stopped governing effectively. There were empty shelves in Soviet supermarkets in the 1980s&#8212;that&#8217;s very far from where China is today.</p><p>So Xi is trying to revolutionize the Party. I think this approach has many negative effects. It spreads fear. It might not work or last. But I do think his zeal here is sincere. The real question is whether it&#8217;s actually going to be effective.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I&#8217;m wondering what you think about the risks of this kind of constant self-revolution. One impression I&#8217;ve had living here is that moments like the White Paper protests showed real societal anger toward the leadership. And that moment really impressed on me the importance of having the rank-and-file police and security forces on your side.</p><p>In those situations, when people are out on the streets, the rank and file can be more malleable in their loyalties&#8212;they&#8217;re far from the leadership and often closer to ordinary people. So it makes sense to me that Xi Jinping is so serious about ensuring the political system is robust and loyal to his orders, especially when society tests him, like during the lockdowns and then during the White Paper protests.</p><p>It gave me this sense that if you really achieve what Xi is aiming for&#8212;a rigidly loyal security force and military&#8212;you might be able to get away with a lot. Society might be able to withstand a lot. It&#8217;s like a pressure cooker, and the walls of the pressure cooker are very thick, making it hard to erupt.</p><p>Xi is clearly taking this self-revolution idea to a whole new level. Are there risks you see with this approach?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>Absolutely. It&#8217;s created a much more brittle bureaucracy. Anecdotally, there&#8217;s a huge degree of fear and uncertainty in the lower levels of the system. There&#8217;s a lot of resistance and disagreement with the direction Xi is taking the country, both within the system and in broader society.</p><p>Some sectors are doing well&#8212;the high-tech industries are world-leading, and there&#8217;s a lot of money flowing into them&#8212;but other parts of the economy are really not doing well. House prices have been falling for years, and that&#8217;s people&#8217;s main source of wealth.</p><p>So there&#8217;s a lot of disagreement in society, and increasingly fewer ways to express it. Civil society, if it&#8217;s not dead, is certainly on its knees compared to the pre-Xi era. That does create risks for a leader.</p><p>That said, Xi has been very effective at stamping his authority on the coercive apparatus&#8212;both the military and the domestic security services, which underwent their own major purges in 2020, 2021, and 2022 ahead of the 20th Party Congress. He&#8217;s successfully installed his people in those agencies.</p><p>Opposition&#8212;both within society and within the Party&#8212;faces a formidable collective-action problem. It&#8217;s extremely difficult to organize without being detected. Everyone is monitored and surveilled, including senior serving and retired Party leaders. The General Office of the CCP knows where people are and what they&#8217;re doing. You can&#8217;t just meet a friend on the Standing Committee to chat about economic policy or military purges.</p><p>The White Paper protests at the end of the zero-COVID era were remarkable: simultaneous protests against COVID policy&#8212;and in some cases against the government more broadly&#8212;across multiple cities and social groups. But it&#8217;s also remarkable that this is the only time something like this has happened under Xi&#8217;s rule.</p><p>They were relatively small&#8212;probably a few thousand people across a few dozen cities&#8212;and they were allowed to happen for 24 to 48 hours. The system may have been momentarily shocked, but fairly quickly the security apparatus kicked into action and, from Xi&#8217;s perspective, successfully neutralized the threat. Nothing like it has happened since, despite all the economic problems we&#8217;ve discussed.</p><p>The presence of formidable surveillance technology makes it even harder than before for either society or elites to organize and exert political pressure on Xi at the top.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Can I ask about East Asian security? Until the Trump era, the United States was the main guarantor of security for countries like Japan and South Korea&#8212;and to some extent Taiwan. In the Trump era, that guarantee has become very frayed. Japan and South Korea are drawing closer together, and Japan may play a more prominent military role.</p><p>China, especially under Xi, has made clear it doesn&#8217;t want the U.S. to remain the regional policeman. But what do you think they fear more: the U.S. as regional policeman, or a resurgent Japan with a much stronger military posture?</p><p><strong>Neil: </strong><br>I think China is, at the moment, actually maybe a little more comfortable with the status quo than we might assume. Obviously, Beijing opposes what Takaichi is saying <em>[Her comments about supporting Taiwan in a security crisis], </em>but the United States is increasingly uncertain in its commitment to the Indo-Pacific. It&#8217;s focusing more on the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East. So if Japan is relying more on an unreliable partner in the United States, that kind of works as the best of both worlds for Beijing.</p><p>There&#8217;s obviously a live debate here in D.C., and I think it would be a mistake to conclude that the U.S. wouldn&#8217;t become involved if there were a Taiwan invasion or some other contingency. And in the future, there could even be a recommitment to Taiwan and a stronger military focus on the Indo-Pacific, depending on who becomes president.</p><p>But ideally, from China&#8217;s perspective, the U.S. would withdraw its commitment to the region while Japan continues trying to rely on an America that just isn&#8217;t really there. I do think it would be a nightmare scenario if Japan acquired nuclear weapons, for example, which is the direction it might pursue in an extreme scenario of U.S. withdrawal&#8212;though, again, I don&#8217;t think that&#8217;s the most likely outcome. China certainly doesn&#8217;t want that, because nukes in Tokyo and Seoul would make China&#8217;s strategic environment much harder and would likely precipitate some kind of regional crisis.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Neil, last question. What&#8217;s your best guess about what happens next?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>There are a couple of options. To appoint new members to the Central Military Commission, appointments need to be confirmed at a plenum of the Party&#8217;s Central Committee, which usually meets once a year. You could convene a special plenum just to refresh the CMC, but I think that&#8217;s very unlikely.</p><p>Xi has declined to fill vacancies created by previous purges, which is why only two of seven CMC members remain. There will likely be a regularly scheduled Fifth Plenum in October, which could be an opportunity to promote some remaining generals.</p><p>You don&#8217;t technically have to be a Central Committee member to sit on the CMC, though it&#8217;s been the norm for decades. The Central Committee has been hollowed out of PLA representation&#8212;there are very few generals left.</p><p>The most likely scenario is that Xi waits until the 21st Party Congress next year to fully replenish PLA representation and create an entirely new CMC&#8212;one that&#8217;s younger, more loyal, more directly tied to his leadership, and less connected to Jiang-era patronage networks. He&#8217;ll also likely promote officers more familiar with modern technology and joint warfare.</p><p>That&#8217;s the schedule going forward, as best as I can tell.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>If that&#8217;s right, and Xi plans to replenish the military at the 21st Party Congress, does that mean there&#8217;s much less chance of something happening over Taiwan before then?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>I think it&#8217;s unlikely. Removing top commanders&#8212;especially figures like Zhang Youxia, who had combat experience, and Liu Zhenli, who ran joint operations&#8212;weakens near-term readiness.</p><p>Joint commands are critical for any Taiwan scenario, coordinating the army, navy, air force, Rocket Force, and other units. The U.S. military is very good at this; China is still early in building a truly joint force.</p><p>China hasn&#8217;t fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A Taiwan operation would be vastly more complex&#8212;an enormous amphibious assault, arguably more complicated than D-Day in 1944.</p><p>So purging the top brass makes a near-term escalation less likely. Longer-term, if Xi succeeds in building a more competent and loyal leadership, the PLA could become a more effective tool for coercion and deterrence. But rebuilding leadership, experience, and morale takes years.</p><p>Even after the next Party Congress, it wouldn&#8217;t be immediate. From Xi&#8217;s perspective, it may make more sense to wait until conditions look more favorable&#8212;Taiwanese politics are shifting, the DPP president is becoming less popular, polls show slightly less enthusiasm for independence, and the West is distracted by other crises.</p><p>Let those trends continue, and it may be less costly to try to compel Taiwan to negotiate five or ten years down the line.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>So time is on Xi Jinping&#8217;s side?</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>From his track record, domestic political considerations are his number-one priority. Shoring up political control and cracking down on corruption in the military matter more to him than Taiwan in the near term.</p><p>We often assume Taiwan explains everything because it&#8217;s what we focus on most. It&#8217;s extremely serious, but it doesn&#8217;t always explain what&#8217;s happening inside China. Domestic political considerations are paramount.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong><br>Thank you very much.</p><p><strong>Neil:</strong><br>Thanks so much.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Drum Diplomacy: As Trump Sows Chaos Abroad, South Korea and Japan Edge Closer]]></title><description><![CDATA[We talked about:]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/drum-diplomacy-as-trump-sows-chaos-030</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/drum-diplomacy-as-trump-sows-chaos-030</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 15:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980749/7f79b81cac4f0e064f909908b8f71b5e.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p>We talked about:</p><ul><li><p>Complex history of Korea&#8211;Japan relations and the symbolism of Lee&#8217;s recent visit</p></li><li><p>How Trump&#8217;s unpredictability is unsettling the East Asian security order</p></li><li><p>China&#8217;s role in reshaping regional alignments in East Asia</p></li><li><p>The limits of U.S. security guarantees in the Trump era</p></li><li><p>What a more self-reliant East Asian security order might look like</p></li></ul><p><strong>Transcript:</strong></p><p>___________________________</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Today we&#8217;re going to be talking about diplomatic relations between Korea, Japan, and China. East Asia is quite tumultuous right now, given the changes in the international order. Donald Trump, in early January, executed an abduction of Venezuela&#8217;s President Nicol&#225;s Maduro, and in recent weeks there has been a diplomatic row in Greenland. All of this is happening while South Korea&#8217;s President Lee Jae Myung has visited Japan on his first major diplomatic trip there.</p><p>I&#8217;d like to talk to Ian about his initial thoughts on the visit last week. Ian, what were your first impressions?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Well, the visit was very unusual in several respects. For one, it&#8217;s probably the first time a South Korean president and Japanese prime minister have sat down and done K-pop renditions on the drums.</p><p>We know that Takaichi Sanae, the Japanese Prime Minister, is a great fan of heavy metal music, but it was an unusual sight. In some ways heartwarming&#8212;both were clearly trying their best to foster warm relations, which hasn&#8217;t always been the case between South Korea and Japan, and is very much welcome.</p><p>Now the question is why this should be. Why are they making such an effort? Especially since, traditionally&#8212;certainly since South Korea became a democracy&#8212;politicians on the left (in this case the president himself, from the progressive party) have been rather antagonistic toward Japan. They&#8217;ve been keen to bring up issues like the comfort women and the colonial period, etc.</p><p>It&#8217;s usually been the conservatives&#8212;including former President Yoon Suk-yeol, who&#8217;s now imprisoned for having declared martial law in a very inappropriate manner&#8212;who were more hawkish, more inclined to make common cause with Japan, and more hawkish on Taiwan as well. So here we have a progressive, left-wing South Korean leader who is clearly keen on better relations with Japan.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Before we get there, maybe we should go back a little bit and talk about Lee Jae Myung and how he became president. These are both quite new leaders in each country. Can you talk a little bit about him&#8212;just summarize what party he belongs to, the traditional political positions his party holds?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> He&#8217;s the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, the progressive party. The left has usually been associated&#8212;like the left in most countries&#8212;with trade unions and that kind of thing. But one of the key distinctions between left and right is that the left has been more inclined to have diplomatic relations with North Korea, to try to find a diplomatic solution rather than immediately saber-rattling. They&#8217;re also more inclined to have better relations with China&#8212;more accommodating&#8212;whereas the right, the conservatives (who are more pro-Japanese on the whole), are much more hawkish on North Korea and China.</p><p>This makes it such an interesting development: the leader of the left is trying to dampen down the anti-Japanese tradition of left-wing Korean parties and wants warm relations with Japan as well as talking to the Chinese. President Lee visited China before he visited Japan and was not completely accommodating&#8212;a lot was left unsaid, for example on the Taiwan question. He did acknowledge there is only one China (which a conservative leader might not have done), and that &#8220;one China&#8221; of course includes Taiwan. But clearly he wanted good diplomatic relations without giving the Chinese very much, and neither side gave the other very much either. Still, Xi Jinping is clearly very keen to court South Korea, and he does it by using history&#8212;one of the ways he does it. This notion that we were all fighting the Japanese empire, that you were a colony of Japan, we must be wary of revived Japanese militarism, you have to be on the right side of history. I think Xi even used those words&#8212;he says the same thing to Americans often.</p><p>So the Chinese very much want to isolate Japan. And I think Lee Jae Myung&#8217;s visit to Japan showed that the South Koreans are not going to fall for that. The efforts to have better relations actually came from both sides&#8212;it was interesting that Takaichi personally went out to welcome the South Korean president and bowed deeply when he arrived.</p><p>So clearly the Chinese are trying to isolate Japan. The South Koreans and Japanese&#8212;so far without being completely committed&#8212;are trying to make common cause.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> When President Lee Jae Myung became president last year, there&#8217;s a typical ritual where the new South Korean president visits the United States as their first diplomatic maneuver. But Lee instead visited Japan first to meet Ishiba [former PM Shigeru Ishiba], which was kind of a shift in the usual order. It shows he&#8217;s quite serious about his relationship with Japan.</p><p>With regard to Takaichi&#8217;s motives, I think it&#8217;s pretty clear that&#8212;given the diplomatic row with China (for listeners who don&#8217;t know, there&#8217;s been this freeze in China-Japan relations since last October when Takaichi made comments supporting Taiwan in the case of a security crisis in the Taiwan Strait, which was basically a red line for the Chinese government)&#8212;the Chinese have since imposed serious economic sanctions against Japan.</p><p>So I can see why Takaichi is very keen to reconnect with the South Korean president<strong>.</strong> As you say&#8212;well, actually before we go there, maybe we should talk about why liberals in South Korea tend to have a frosty relationship with Japan.</p><p><strong>Ian</strong>: That really is a historical question. Many South Koreans&#8212;this is still a delicate topic in South Korea itself&#8212;but many members of the South Korean elites (bureaucratic, academic, business) in the days of the Japanese Empire, when Korea was part of the empire (it wasn&#8217;t strictly a colony; citizens were treated as second- or third-rate, but part of the empire), a large number of Koreans cooperated with the Japanese, collaborated&#8212;sometimes not for particularly bad reasons. Like all colonial powers, the Japanese did some good: they built infrastructure, universities; they had a big impact on the economy.</p><p>After Japan&#8217;s defeat in 1945, this caused a great rift in Korean society. First, of course, it split North from South, but inside South Korea there was a rift somewhat like the splits you still see in countries like Italy and Greece, where elites that collaborated with the Nazis often came back to power, while those who resisted were sidelined.</p><p>There was a lot of bad blood from occupation, colonialism, and war. In South Korea, many members of the old elites who collaborated with Japan&#8212;after 1945, with the connivance of the United States&#8212;came back into power. The best example is the South Korean strongman Park Chung-hee (assassinated in the 1970s), who had been an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army. Many who worked with him had roles in the Japanese Empire.</p><p>Those who resisted&#8212;dissidents under military rule and later politicians who came to power&#8212;saw themselves as on the right side of colonial history, as patriots who resisted collaboration. People who were part of the collaborationist elite&#8212;including Park, his daughter, other conservative politicians&#8212;had better relations with the Japanese than those in progressive or left-wing parties.</p><p>This is what makes the current rapprochement (if that&#8217;s what it is) between the Japanese Prime Minister and the South Korean president so remarkable.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> There&#8217;s an interesting backdrop: during the Biden administration, one of the greatest legacies of his four years was brokering better relations between Korea and Japan. When President Yoon was in power, he spearheaded the decision to resolve the forced labor issue&#8212;what&#8217;s the term? The fund to compensate forced labor victims?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, there are two main sticking points. One is the comfort women, and the other is the larger number of Koreans forced to work in Japanese industry, coal mines, etc., under intolerable conditions. There are continued demands that Japanese companies that employed them as slave laborers compensate them, and that the Japanese government compensate former comfort women&#8212;women forced or tricked into prostitution for the Japanese Imperial Army.</p><p>The Japanese response has always been that they paid a large sum to the South Korean government in a formal arrangement under Park Chung-hee (himself a former Imperial Japanese Army officer), so there was no need to revisit it. The fear among the Japanese is that opening that can of worms means endless demands for compensation. &#8220;It&#8217;s been done; we&#8217;ve paid the money; let&#8217;s move on.&#8221; That&#8217;s the Japanese attitude on slave laborers.</p><p>The companies don&#8217;t want responsibility for similar reasons&#8212;no endless lawsuits&#8212;and they say responsibility lay with the government, not company policy. On comfort women, the Japanese government says the opposite: this was not government policy; private entrepreneurs and businessmen were responsible for recruiting the women.</p><p>A famous Japanese historian, Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki, dug into archives and found documents showing it was Japanese government policy&#8212;especially during the occupation of China, where soldiers&#8217; rapes were stirring up resistance. To curb mass rape, they organized prostitution and brothels, recruiting from Koreans, Taiwanese, Southeast Asians, etc. Some women were tricked with job promises, others went willingly for money, others were forced.</p><p>It&#8217;s a murky, fraught issue, easily used for political ends&#8212;and often is.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> The brokering of the alliance between US, Korea, and Japan during the Biden administration was predicated on a breakthrough. Yoon made it so South Korean companies would pay to compensate forced labor victims, and that was the beginning of the reconnection. Then we had that photo of Yoon, Kishida, and Biden at Camp David. How big was that in the scheme of Japan-Korea relations, you think?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yoon himself, regardless of forced labor, was a foreign policy hawk on China, Taiwan, North Korea, and wanted better relations with Japan. He found a way to appease South Korean opinion while pursuing what he wanted.</p><p>Traditionally, the American attitude has been that there should be a strong security relationship in East Asia, guaranteed by the U.S.&#8212;security treaties with Japan (if attacked, U.S. defends) and South Korea (lots of U.S. bases, tripwire against North Korea). Taiwan has no formal treaty, but ambiguity about U.S. response. All three relied on U.S. guarantees.</p><p>That&#8217;s now changing under Donald Trump, who seems to believe the world should be run by superpowers in their spheres: U.S. in the Americas, Russia in its sphere (including Ukraine?), China in its. That leaves Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan out in the cold if he&#8217;s serious. They can&#8217;t rely on the U.S. the way they could under Biden.</p><p>That&#8217;s probably the main reason both Japanese and South Koreans&#8212;whatever their political backgrounds&#8212;are keen to cement closer relations. Only serious cooperation&#8212;including military&#8212;between Japan and South Korea (and by extension Taiwan, Southeast Asia, possibly India) can balance China without active U.S. participation.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> What do you think about Lee Jae Myung visiting China before Japan? Is it just keeping enemies close?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> It&#8217;s a very traditional Korean balancing act&#8212;one power against another. He wants to be friends with China to keep them from getting aggressive, while needing friends with Japan. Korea has always been a bit like Poland&#8212;stuck between larger powers (Russia, China, Japan, the Japanese Empire). One way Koreans dealt with dominant powers (especially China historically) was paying tribute.</p><p>I think he&#8217;s serious about closer ties with Japan, but he has to pay tribute to the emperor in Beijing to keep them off his back. Anyone leading North or South Korea has to play this balancing game. The Chinese use it by saying, &#8220;You&#8217;re better off with us&#8212;look what the Japanese did to you; stick with us and you&#8217;re on the right side of history.&#8221; But I don&#8217;t think they&#8217;re buying it, which is why he went straight to Japan after China.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Another contemporary reason Lee might want to say hi to Xi on his way to Japan: China can weaponize supply chains, as we&#8217;ve seen. One key trump card is rare earths, used in electronics. Korea is an electronics powerhouse&#8212;Samsung, Hyundai&#8212;highly reliant on Chinese rare earths. Lee doesn&#8217;t want to be on the wrong side like Takaichi accidentally put herself.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Even Takaichi&#8217;s diplomatic gaffe&#8212;and in some ways, of course, it was a gaffe&#8212;she was saying things out loud that other Japanese leaders had also believed but were always wise enough to keep to themselves and not rile up the Chinese unnecessarily.</p><p>But I don&#8217;t blame her quite as much as some critics have. To what extent it was a spontaneous response to a question in the Diet or whether it was calculated, I don&#8217;t know. But that too, I think, was partly the result of shifting power relations. Former Japanese prime ministers could afford to be more diplomatic and not say things like &#8220;the fate of Taiwan directly involves Japan&#8217;s security, and we would perhaps have to do something to protect ourselves&#8221; and so on.</p><p>Many of them believed that&#8212;and they&#8217;re quite right&#8212;but they could afford to be discreet and quiet, not upsetting China, because they knew America had their back. As long as the security treaty with the United States was entirely reliable, they could afford to be diplomatic.</p><p>And I think&#8212;this is only speculation because I don&#8217;t know what goes on in Takaichi&#8217;s head&#8212;but in the current atmosphere, the Japanese realize, just like the Europeans, that they can no longer reliably count on the United States. Under Trump, the U.S. is too erratic and whimsical, and wedded to this idea of dividing the world into power blocs. So she can&#8217;t really afford to be that diplomatic anymore. She has to spell it out to the Japanese people: &#8220;Look, we&#8217;ve got to get serious here.&#8221;</p><p>In that sense, she&#8217;s no different from Mark Carney in Canada and other Europeans who are beginning to say the same sort of thing.</p><p><strong>Chang: </strong>Do you think there&#8217;s been a fundamental break in East Asia&#8217;s security architecture thinking? Where would you date it?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s fundamental yet. The U.S. bases are still there; the security arrangements are still intact. So I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s a fundamental break. But again, because of Donald Trump&#8217;s rhetoric and his behavior and what he thinks of as his long-term goals, it means that sooner rather than later, the East Asians and the Europeans have to start thinking about a post-American era. They can&#8217;t afford to be taken by surprise. Ever since 1945, in the American-controlled world order that we lived in, West Europeans and East Asians could afford not to be blunt or frank about things like military defense and security because the Americans took care of it. The Pax Americana allowed the Europeans and the Japanese to fall asleep in some ways and bask in their prosperity. Nobody wants to pay more tax toward building more tanks and fighter planes and so on.</p><p>All that is changing, and it needs leaders to tell people that the world has changed&#8212;that it&#8217;s no longer as comfortable as it was. The Europeans and the Japanese and the South Koreans have to do more to take care of themselves. In Japan, that means having a serious discussion about the constitution&#8212;changing Article 9 perhaps, which would mean Japan could take part in combat abroad. It has all these consequences. But none of this had to be faced as long as the United States could be depended on, as long as Pax Americana was alive.</p><p>So there is a fundamental shift in thinking&#8212;not yet a fundamental break. But the thinking has to start before that break could come at a very inopportune moment.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> There&#8217;s a similarity in the way that the United States&#8212;not just under Trump, but previous administrations&#8212;has treated the security bargain between Europe and East Asia, and especially Japan: they need to pull their own weight. That has always been the kind of theme, and Donald Trump has made that the case in Europe. Ian, could you talk a little bit about what you think is different in the East Asian case compared to the European case? One thing I remember you mentioning to me before is that in East Asia, unlike Europe, the one country that can really take a leading role in the security architecture is Japan&#8212;and Japan is constitutionally constrained from doing so.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, and not only constitutionally&#8212;it&#8217;s also a question of public opinion. One of the foundation stones of the post-war Pax Americana, both in NATO and in East Asian security arrangements, was that Japan and Germany should never become aggressive, belligerent powers again.</p><p>I can&#8217;t remember who said it&#8212;I think it was George Kennan about NATO&#8212;but the idea was to keep the Americans in and the Germans out. Most Japanese and Germans were perfectly happy to go along with that. Their memories of World War II were pretty awful. They did not really want this to happen again, either.</p><p>They were quite happy to let America take care of security so they could concentrate on their economies. They had no desire to be a military power again or to play a big military role. And to this day, I think that is probably the opinion of more than 50% of the people in both Japan and Germany.</p><p>Now, as you said, if Europeans are going to stand on their own feet&#8212;and if East Asian countries are to balance the great power of China without the guarantee of American intervention&#8212;then Germany, as the biggest economic power in Europe, and Japan, as the biggest power in East Asia, will have to take leadership roles in whatever security architecture emerges.</p><p>The problem is that neither the Japanese nor the Germans are comfortable with doing so yet. Even though I think there&#8217;s a generational issue here. It&#8217;s interesting that Takaichi&#8217;s remarks on Taiwan&#8212;which so upset the Chinese&#8212;were relatively popular in Japan, especially among young people.</p><p>So I think the younger generation in Japan would be much more open to a discussion about revising Article 9 of the Constitution and changing the pacifist constitution than people over 50, who either still have memories of the war (or fewer and fewer do) or grew up with parents who had those memories.</p><p>Something like that may also be true in Europe: Germans are gradually waking up to the fact that they can&#8217;t just bask in American protection and not think about these things. It&#8217;s interesting that in Germany, the most fervent supporters of real support for Ukraine came from the Greens&#8212;the progressive party&#8212;not from the Christian Democrats. So things are changing.</p><p>Until not so very long ago, most Europeans&#8212;again, this is generational&#8212;would have been deeply uncomfortable with the idea that Germany could play a major military role again. That, too, is changing.</p><p>Just as most Europeans don&#8217;t mind so much when Germany wins a soccer championship, they don&#8217;t really mind the idea that Germany might take a leading role again. But in East Asia and Southeast Asia, I think that&#8217;s a more open question.</p><p>Despite President Lee&#8217;s visit to Japan and their relatively warm relations, many Koreans would not at all be comfortable with Japan taking a leading role. The Taiwanese would be perfectly comfortable, as far as I can see. In Southeast Asia, it&#8217;s harder to tell. I think the Singaporeans and the Filipinos probably could go along with Japan taking a more active role in military affairs. Indonesians&#8212;maybe, it&#8217;s harder to know.</p><p>But if East and Southeast Asia were to build a new kind of security arrangement to balance China, it would have to mean that Japan takes an active role. And so all these things are going to come into play: public opinion in Japan and public opinion in other countries.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> We should maybe bring up this term that we&#8217;ve sort of been toying with&#8212;the idea of an East Asian NATO. Do you think it&#8217;s harder to imagine an East Asian NATO, as you say, because of that historical baggage people have with Japan&#8212;compared to a self-sufficient European security architecture?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, I think it is more difficult&#8212;because essentially what it would mean is reviving echoes of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was the Japanese imperial venture during the 1940s. At the time, of course, many Southeast Asians went along with it because they saw it as a way to use the Japanese to liberate them from European or American colonialism.</p><p>But yes, I think it would be more difficult in the Asian context than in Europe&#8212;though not impossible. Minds are being concentrated, I think, by the fact that America is so erratic and by the fact that China is increasingly aggressive.</p><p>In the end, those kinds of fears and prejudices might diminish as people see the necessity for some kind of security cooperation&#8212;which might include India. And yes, I also think this kind of architecture would require generational change within Japan and Korea and the major powers.</p><p>But I think that&#8217;s already happening. Like everywhere else in the world, active memories of the past fade. What&#8217;s left are movies, comic books, school textbooks, and so on&#8212;but the memories themselves do fade. So yes, it means generational change, but I think that&#8217;s gradual and already visible.</p><p>The generation that experienced the war in Japan was very much in favor of Article 9&#8212;overwhelmingly. There was a nationalist minority that wanted to change it, but they were never in the majority. I think people under 30 or under 40 in Japan now&#8212;more than 50%&#8212;would be open to changing it.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Just to add an economic dimensions to the post-American order. I was reporting for The New York Times in Seoul in 2022, and my experience at the time was that&#8212;this was during the period when the Biden administration was pushing South Koreans to join sanctions against China on semiconductors. One of the big questions was whether Samsung was willing to stop&#8212;Samsung has a few semiconductor plants in China, and the U.S. was basically trying to prevent Samsung from continuing to work with the Chinese.</p><p>Throughout that period, the general sentiment&#8212;especially from Samsung businessmen&#8212;was &#8220;Absolutely not, we&#8217;re not doing that.&#8221; But the South Korean government ultimately stepped in and stopped Samsung from doing so because they felt the pressure from the American side.</p><p>So generally, when it comes to these kinds of economic relationships, it&#8217;s usually the Americans who are the most gung-ho about imposing economic sanctions, severing ties, and pulling back from China. Meanwhile, these middle powers&#8212;or smaller powers&#8212;tend to be a lot more pragmatic and willing to work with whoever is there. China is nearby; it&#8217;s right next door.</p><p>I think we&#8217;re going to see a lot more willingness to participate sector by sector with China. And that&#8217;s a great outcome for the Chinese, because they&#8217;ve always despised this kind of light-versus-dark, democracies-versus-authoritarians framework. They hated that binary, and they&#8217;ve been constantly trying to push the world to see it as much more multifaceted and multicolored&#8212;where the Americans are actually the ones who are the hegemon and the bully in the world.</p><p>And it&#8217;s starting to look more and more like that.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Well, and there&#8217;s another difference with Europe: China is a serious economic power. The Japanese, the Koreans, and the Southeast Asians all have a stake in the Chinese economy&#8212;and to some extent depend on it. This is not true in Europe vis-&#224;-vis Russia.</p><p>Russia is not a serious economic power. They have a lot of oil and resources, sure, but it&#8217;s not an economy that other European countries can&#8217;t do without. And so that does make the situation in East Asia more difficult in some ways than in Europe.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Great. Thank you Ian. I think that&#8217;s a good place to end.As Trump threatens the sovereignty of NATO allies, the leaders of South Korea and Japan appeared together in Nara, playing drums in a highly choreographed display of diplomatic comity. Ian and Chang talk about the historic significance of this unlikely rapprochement, why it is happening now, and the prospect of an East Asian security architecture without the help of the United States.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The American Dream Is Fading. What Comes Next For China's Youths?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Across the world, the promise of stable growth that underwrote many economies is unraveling.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-american-dream-is-fading-what-9f6</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/the-american-dream-is-fading-what-9f6</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 20 Jan 2026 02:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980750/83a798162212423b043ec74fe07c40b4.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Across the world, the promise of stable growth that underwrote many economies is unraveling. From Nepal to Bulgaria to Mexico, young people fed up with the status quo are rebelling. While many have turned to populists for help, China's youth are turning to a very different figure. The anthropologist Xiang Biao, who has become a voice for China's "lost" generation in recent years, speak to us about what went wrong with Chinese and Western elites, and his ideas for redefining politics. This conversation was recorded live in Tokyo.</p><p>Related links:&nbsp;</p><p>Xiang's work on Zhejiang Village migrants: https://www.amazon.com/Transcending-Boundaries-Zhejiangcun-Migrant-Village/dp/9004142010</p><p>Xiang's writings:&nbsp;<br>https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-19-4953-1</p><p>https://www.readingthechinadream.com/xiang-biao-excerpts-from-self-as-method.html</p><p>https://www.readingthechinadream.com/xiang-biao-hello-stranger.html</p><p>Xiang Biao is the Director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Germany and previously a professor at Oxford. He has also become one of the most recognized public intellectuals in China in recent years. Last month, I followed Xiang on a tour across China. As we walked along the streets of Beijing, he was routinely stopped by fans. At a university in Hubei, students packed lecture halls to hear him speak. Afterwards, they lined up for autographs and ask him for advice on deeply personal matters&#8212;how to navigate unemployment, cope with family trauma, or whether their boyfriend was wrong in an argument.</p><p>I first heard of Xiang Biao in 2020, when he helped popularizei the Chinese term &#8220;involution,&#8221; or <em>neijuan</em> (&#20869;&#21367;). Neijuan refers to a type of extreme competition in which a system traps participants in a cycle of endless exertion without reward. Xiang has cultivated a brand out of proposing vivid metaphors to describe Chinese reality. He described <em>neijuan</em> as a &#8220;spinning top that must keep whipping itself to stay up.&#8221;</p><p>At a time when the Chinese government seems incapable of offering youth an alternative source of hope, Xiang has managed to break through. He is working with similar source materials to those of Western populists, but he&#8217;s channeling discontent in creative, though somewhat unorthodox ways. I wanted to find out what he is doing.</p><p>Xiang recently visited Tokyo, where I am based now, so this conversation was recorded live at the One Way Street Bookstore in Ginza. We hope you enjoy the episode.</p><iframe class="spotify-wrap podcast" data-attrs="{&quot;image&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;subtitle&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;description&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://open.spotify.com/embed/episode/6Rtf2sfTZBdBjZy97oIeE3&quot;,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;noScroll&quot;:true,&quot;isVideo&quot;:false}" src="https://open.spotify.com/embed/episode/6Rtf2sfTZBdBjZy97oIeE3" frameborder="0" gesture="media" allowfullscreen="true" allow="encrypted-media" loading="lazy" data-component-name="Spotify2ToDOM" scrolling="no"></iframe><p><strong>Summary of Interview:</strong></p><ul><li><p>Xiang&#8217;s one year of mandatory military school after the crackdowns in Tiananmen Square <strong>(03:41)</strong></p></li><li><p>Xiang&#8217;s fieldwork in Zhejiang Village in Beijing <strong>(07:36)</strong></p></li><li><p>Xiang&#8217;s discontent with the Chinese &#8220;new enlightenment&#8221; intellectuals of the 1980s <strong>(10:43)</strong></p></li><li><p>Parallels between post-Cold War American elites and 1980s Chinese elites <strong>(15:10)</strong></p></li><li><p>The roots of youth unhappiness in China and West <strong>(21:11)</strong></p></li><li><p>Is youth disillusionment not the Communist Party&#8217;s fault? <strong>(30:29)</strong></p></li><li><p>Xiang&#8217;s concept of &#8220;the nearby&#8221; and rebuilding one&#8217;s attention to local life <strong>(37:22)</strong></p></li><li><p>Parallels between Xiang&#8217;s philosophy and Robert Putnam&#8217;s <em>Bowling Alone</em><strong>(43:40)</strong></p></li><li><p>Xiang&#8217;s issue with claims of universal values, the Nobel Peace Prize selection, and lectern-style politics <strong>(51:17)</strong></p></li><li><p>The spirit of the &#8220;nearby&#8221; in Zohran Mamdani&#8217;s politics <strong>(01:00:06)</strong></p></li><li><p>Similarities between American involution and Chinese involution <strong>(01:01:12)</strong></p></li><li><p>Why young Chinese aren&#8217;t protesting like their counterparts in other countries (01:02:38)</p></li><li><p>The role of intellectuals in an age of political disaffection <strong>(01:07:38)</strong></p></li><li><p>Curriculum reform at Chinese universities on the &#8220;nearby&#8221; (<strong>01:10:25</strong>)</p></li><li><p>Where Xiang hopes to lead his intellectual movement <strong>(01:13:45</strong>)</p></li></ul><p>____________<br><strong>Chang:</strong> Xiang Biao, welcome to Tokyo and the <em>Into Asia</em> podcast.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Thank you. Very happy to be here.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I want to begin in the year 1990. This is the year you entered Peking University. It&#8217;s also the year after the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the subsequent crackdowns. In your book <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.jp/Self-Method-Thinking-Through-China/dp/9811949557">Self as Method</a></em>, you wrote: &#8220;the political atmosphere was very ambiguous and unclear&#8212;no one dared say anything.&#8221; Can you describe what that climate was like, and whether it influenced your trajectory or your intellectual interests?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>The 1980s was a time that was often described as an era of &#8220;cultural fever.&#8221; There was a lot of debate, including many radical views, which you could read in official newspapers and also see on TV programs.</p><p>Then 1989 came. Peking University decided to send all first-year students to a military academy for training for a whole year. So I spent my first year, from 1990 to 1991, in a military academy. So I arrived in Beijing in 1991.</p><p>After one year in the military academy, we were really eager to enter a university campus for the first time&#8212;and it was Peking University. We had all these images of its association with the May Fourth Movement, with library debates, with all kinds of radical and unorthodox views.</p><p>We expected a very lively atmosphere of debate and exchange. But in 1991 it was very quiet. There were hardly any seminars. I remember the very first public talk was about how to prepare for your English-language test. So I felt a bit sad at that time.</p><p>Then in 1992, Deng Xiaoping made his Southern Tour, saying that China must open up again. The whole nation plunged into this market economy. Suddenly there were lots of talks about how to make investments.</p><p>There were many more lectures and seminars, but they were about how to prepare for TOEFL, how to prepare for GRE, and how to go to the U.S. for study, and so on. The courses were, to be frank, very boring. It was a politically very careful and conservative period. Everyone thought: now we have to be pragmatic, we have to &#8220;jump into the sea&#8221;&#8212;<em>xiahai </em>&#19979;&#28023;&#8212;which means joining market forces. That was my undergraduate experience.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>You mentioned the military school. What did you do there?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>What we did was a lot of bodily discipline. For instance, you were supposed to stand in the proper posture for thirty minutes without a single movement. Or you practiced how to hold and aim your rifle in the right position&#8212;but without any real bullets. You never fired, you never pulled the trigger. You just learned how to carry it and how to aim. So it was very tedious.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>You entered what is really a critical stage of your life&#8212;when you&#8217;re supposed to absorb and learn about the world&#8212;at a time when the political system contracted and became much harder. Yet you somehow found a way to satiate your intellectual interests. Can you talk a little bit about how you managed to do that?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>I could not do anything during the first year in the military academy. But once I came back, I was very disappointed and disillusioned&#8212;first by the total quietness on campus, and then by this feverish mentality of &#8220;jumping into the sea&#8221; and making money.</p><p>What did I do? I did something slightly unusual for an undergraduate. Starting in my second year, in 1992, I began my own fieldwork in a migrant community in Beijing, more than two hours away by bus from the university campus.</p><p>Actually, it was not far from Tiananmen Square. It was a migrant community formed by peasants from southern China&#8212;actually from my hometown. So I had no problem communicating with them because we shared a very distinct southern Chinese Wenzhou dialect.</p><p>They gathered there to make garments and sell clothing. All of this was supposedly illegal at the time. You were not supposed to set up workshops in cities without a special permit. Every year&#8212;before National Day, before the Chinese New Year&#8212;they were periodically ousted by the local police and government.</p><p>But soon after being chased away, they would come back and restart their businesses. Over the years they grew very quickly. By the time I began my fieldwork in 1992&#8212;about six years after the first families arrived&#8212;the population was already more than 10,000 people. The community had started in 1986.</p><p>Over the following years, I observed how it grew very fast and became economically very successful.</p><p>You asked how I found space to do my own observations about what was going on in society. It was through fieldwork&#8212;through having a space like that, which was not political. It gave me a lot of material, a lot of fuel, for me to think. <br><br><strong>Chang:</strong><br>And freedom.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yes freedom, but this freedom was not freedom defined as antithetical to what you were supposed to follow. It was freedom of practice, freedom of experiment&#8212;or you could say, freedom of experience.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>For listeners who may not know: Xiang Biao published a book, based on his dissertation and fieldwork on Zhejiang Village called <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Transcending-Boundaries-Zhejiangcun-Migrant-Village/dp/9004142010">Going Beyond the Boundaries</a>. A</em>nd he became a kind of young intellectual star. He was already quite well known in the 1990s for this work&#8212;precisely because he was able to do serious intellectual work at a time when many intellectuals felt that nothing of substance was possible.</p><p>There&#8217;s also an interesting background here. You weren&#8217;t satisfied with the intellectuals of the &#8220;cultural fever&#8221; era of the 1980s. This was just after the Mao years, when intellectuals had been labeled the &#8220;Stinking Old Ninth,&#8221; the lowest tier of society&#8212;one of the so-called black categories. <em>[NB: intellectuals were not part of the original five black categories, but during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong expanded them into nine with intellectuals at the bottom.]</em></p><p>Then suddenly they were very free, discussing subjectivity, human rights, and all these ideas associated with a new Enlightenment. What was it about that era that left you unsatisfied?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>When I was a high school student, from age fourteen to eighteen, I was very excited to read all kinds of things: discussions about alienation, discussions of property relations, discussions about the essence of Chinese culture. Some of these topics were carried over from the May Fourth Movement: a radical rethinking of the nature of Chinese civilization.</p><p>Even as a high school student, I felt that this discourse was quite removed from what I saw and heard from my parents, neighbors, and teachers&#8212;my parents were middle school teachers, my grandmother was an illiterate housewife, and my grandfather, a retired factory worker.</p><p>Their primary concerns at the time were inflation and food prices, because in the 1980s the rationing system was gradually being replaced by a market system. <em>[NB: in the late 1980s, inflation spiked 20 percent nationwide, one of the destabilizing conditions that fueled the Tiananmen protests.]</em> I remember very vividly how they talked about going to the food market. The state-run stores had hardly any food. It was very cheap, band you had to queue for a long time to buy things according to ration coupons. At the same time, peasants would bring their own produce to sell. That wasn&#8217;t entirely legal, but it happened anyway. The prices were much higher, but the quality was also much better.</p><p>So people were discussing these very concrete questions: high quality but high price, or low quality but more affordable. But when I read all these books, and when I listened to discussions at school, nobody told me how to think about the kinds of questions my neighbors were asking. That probably indicates my greatest dissatisfaction with the 1980s intellectual atmosphere&#8212;its elitist tendency.</p><p>And this also explains why I was particularly fascinated by illiterate peasants: how they could travel so far to Beijing, the capital city, overcome all kinds of obstacles, and create their own businesses.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>When you talk about 1980s intellectuals and your criticism of them, you remind me of the way American right-wing&#8212;or MAGA-aligned&#8212;intellectuals talk about the liberal intelligentsia or technocrats. You&#8217;ve told me before that since the Cold War, you feel that intellectuals have grown increasingly out of touch.</p><p>You&#8217;ve described Western academia&#8212;fields like postcolonial studies and race and gender criticism&#8212;as important and valuable, but also as speaking in the language of radical systemic critique that became &#8220;abstract, repetitive, and disconnected from life.&#8221; Are these similar criticisms?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>There is some similarity. First of all, we should talk about the post-1990s academic world&#8212;why post-1990s? Because after the Cold War, there was no longer a real debate about which path human society should take. The &#8220;end of history&#8221; thesis meant that socialism was no longer seen as a viable alternative.</p><p>As a result, political economy and class questions were no longer central topics of debate. Questions became narrower, turning toward identity politics and symbolic gestures rather than larger policy questions.</p><p>At the same time, universities became increasingly managerial institutions. They became producers of credentials, capital, and certificates, rather than spokespeople for social consciousness. Tenure-track positions and academic career trajectories became more competitive. Young scholars had to spend more time on narrow, technical work. That&#8217;s the background explaining why academia after the 1990s became removed from real life.</p><p>Yet within their own system, academic discourse became increasingly radical in its rhetoric and language&#8212;to the extent that people not only felt alienated, but sometimes even scared, because the language sounded very revolutionary.</p><p>Second, you mentioned whether my impression of the 1980s resembles contemporary populist resentment and criticism. I do see the connection. But we must remember that populism has a long tradition. The progressive movement in the nineteenth-century United States laid the ideological foundation for Roosevelt&#8217;s New Deal in the 1930s. Without that populist movement, the Democratic Party would not have had its social base.</p><p>That populism brought universal suffrage, public education, libraries&#8212;it also laid the groundwork for the civil rights movement in the 1960s. So if we take a long historical view, populism has often been a positive force.</p><p>The problem today is that populism in the Trump era has become a crude, raw resentment, without articulating a progressive alternative, and it plays into strongman fantasy politics. That is a serious issue. The real question is how to rescue the progressive elements of populism under current conditions.</p><p>So what I want to say is populism itself is not necessarily a bad thing. The question is how to speak a language that touches the public soul, mobilizes collective capacity, builds a united front, and focuses not on the most progressive or maximalist ideas, but on feasible action plans to begin with. That was the strength of nineteenth-century populism.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Do you think elites affiliated with the Democratic Party before Trump&#8212;people like Joe Biden or Jake Sullivan, these meritocrats&#8212;were disconnected from the American people?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>That comparison might not be entirely fair, because in the U.S. case these people hold real political and military power. They can make a phone call and order a bombing.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>So maybe the correct analogy would be academics.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yes, that comparison can be made&#8212;and it&#8217;s valuable precisely because the Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s and U.S. intellectuals after the 1990s and 2000s are often very committed and sincere scholars. They believe in what they are saying. They see real enemies, and they devote their careers to their causes.</p><p>As I mentioned, the university system exacerbates certain unhealthy research practices, but that is a secondary issue. What is more interesting is how should we take their sincerity seriously? Their sincerity is real. If they were simply lying, we wouldn&#8217;t need to worry too much. But they are sincere intellectuals who position themselves as representatives of social consciousness and believe they are speaking truth to power.</p><p>Yet they face such a backlash now. We must learn some lesson from that.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Let&#8217;s move on to youth problems&#8212;something you&#8217;ve been grappling with over the past few years. The first thing I want to say is that young people are quite unhappy&#8211;</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Everywhere.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Yes<em>,</em> haha. It&#8217;s not just a China problem. Surveys show alarming levels of anxiety, depression, neuroticism, and loneliness among youth in developed Western societies as well. You focus mostly on Chinese youth, but to what degree do you think this reflects global unhappiness, and how much is specific to China?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Obviously its both. Chinese youth are part of a global picture, but with specific Chinese characteristics.</p><p>What&#8217;s interesting is that if you look at objective criteria&#8212;economic and material well-being&#8212;Gen Z and those slightly older are the most materially abundant generations in history.</p><p>In China, there are also tensions across generations, which contribute to confusion and anxiety about how to live with and communicate with parents. Historically, however, Gen Z and those born in the 1990s actually experienced the smallest generational gap since the nineteenth century.</p><p>Think about people born in the 1940s and their children born in the 1960s or 1970s&#8212;the worlds they lived in were completely different. The older generation was often illiterate; some women still had bound feet.</p><p>My parents&#8217; generation experienced enormous change. They never imagined having passports or traveling overseas as tourists. For my generation and the next, their lifestyle, material conditions, and expectations about how the world works are largely the same.</p><p>Yet psychologically, the gap is the largest. I bring up this paradox to shed some light on the current unhappiness. Why are they so unhappy when they are materially well-off and they actually are continuing their parent&#8217;s lifestyle? <br><br>It indicates that their unhappiness is not their fault, its that in society, the old model of organizing the economy and society is no longer sustainable. It has to change. Yet young people don&#8217;t know how to live through this transition. That&#8217;s the real question: what transition means, and how individuals should live within it&#8212;or even lead that transition.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I think what you&#8217;re pointing to is that: on an absolute level, you&#8217;re right that financial conditions have improved, but many young people feel they can&#8217;t move forward or do better in the future.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong> Right.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> We&#8217;ve seen youth protests across Southeast Asia, Mexico, Madagascar, Bulgaria, it&#8217;s remarkable how widespread this youth discontent is. Factors like job scarcity, inequality, and cost of living are common everywhere. But you&#8217;ve also said the Chinese case is unique or more extreme. What makes it different?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>I wouldn&#8217;t say it&#8217;s unique. I&#8217;d say the Chinese case manifests general contradictions in a particularly sharp way.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I personally feel like it&#8217;s just more extreme.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yes. In some aspects more extreme so therefore it really deserves our attention. It&#8217;s not unique in a sense that it is isolated from the world, but more representative, casting a sharper light. There are many contradictions [that characterize the youth problem in China]. One key contradiction is between heightened self-consciousness&#8212; produced by longer education and material abundance&#8212;and the lack of accumulated lived experience and practical tools to handle the reality that the economy cannot continue to grow at the rate that their parents experienced, and also that their parents taught them to expect.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I thought you were going to say that in the 1990s and 2000s, there was a clear template for becoming wealthier. But the contradiction is that this didn&#8217;t necessarily lead to a satisfying well-lived life. It&#8217;s not just about getting rich. So economic accumulation advanced faster than social life&#8212;which is the idea of the &#8220;nearby,&#8221; as you call it.</p><p>So I think the contradiction is between material accumulation and young people&#8217;s need for something beyond material goods. Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>That&#8217;s part of it, but for me the question is more practical. It&#8217;s not that people hafe money and then ask &#8220;What&#8217;s the meaning of life?&#8221; The immediate cause of unhappiness is people are going:</p><p>&#8220;I have studied for twenty-two or even twenty-five years. I studied hard. My parents told me that if I behaved well and studied hard, I would find a middle-class job in the city and live better than they did. I fulfilled my part of the promise. What do I get? No job&#8212;or no quality job. That&#8217;s not the life I was promised.&#8221;</p><p>And this problem is not only a question of bad luck. It is structural, right? If the whole society can no longer provide as many good job opportunities as the parents once enjoyed. And it&#8217;s not like I&#8217;m going to die immediately, because I can still find some precarious job. My parents still have savings. They can still give me a roof. If you look at life in China, things still appear quite normal for most people on the surface.</p><p>And materially, the world is actually suffering from overcapacity and overproduction. So we are not short of goods. There is enough to keep everyone fed and clothed. And then people start to think: what have I been doing? Why did I follow that kind of promise? What did that promise mean? And what kind of promise should I look for now&#8212;or should I stop looking for promises altogether?</p><p>It&#8217;s not that now you have to convert to some transcendental faith to satisfy a spiritual need. But what you need instead is a new type of practice&#8212;a new way of relating yourself to neighbors, to colleagues, to your neighborhood&#8212;and a rethinking of how everyday life should be organized. I think the solution will come from this kind of practice, combined with reflection, but not as a purely spiritual or mental exercise.</p><p><strong>Chang: <br></strong>Let me give you a more conventional&#8212;or perhaps a popular&#8212;view of why youth are disillusioned in China today. One view is that after Deng Xiaoping, the economy opened up, became more marketized and privatized, and society grew very quickly.</p><p>During this period, there was a lot of optimism about the future. There were studies showing that many Chinese believed their hard work would lead to economic security and rewards&#8212;that a kind of American Dream, so to speak, was operating.</p><p>Then the question becomes: who ended that dream? One view is that it was the Communist Party. Beginning around the mid to late 2010s, society started to contract. Xi Jinping began to crack down on civil society as well as the marketplace, prioritizing security over economic growth. Jack Ma and the tech titans were jailed. <em>[NB: Sorry, they weren&#8217;t jailed. Many were quietly disciplined; some <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/high-profile-chinese-dealmaker-bao-fan-released-detention-after-two-years-source-2025-08-08/">detained</a>.]</em> Relations with the West worsened. China began to close itself off.</p><p>For many people who hold this view, the crystallizing moment was the pandemic&#8212;when, during the lockdowns, the Party chose an extreme form of control, rather than the kinds of debates that took place in Western societies about keeping the economy going. After the lockdowns, we entered a period of stagnation that China is still in today.</p><p>So the Party clearly had a hand in this downturn. Why isn&#8217;t youth disillusionment tied more directly to the responsibility of China&#8217;s political leaders?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>I think definitely youth unhappiness is tied to the general situation in Chinese society and the economy, and Chinese society and the economy are directly tied to the Party&#8211;</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Political leaders steer the economy and politics.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>But my contribution would not be to make a normative assessment, because a normative assessment is something everyone is entitled to make. My work is to think more analytically: how does this structural condition emerge?</p><p>Empirically speaking, the Party has always had control of the economy, since 1949, but at different phases it manifests itself very differently, with different consequences. How should we understand that?</p><p>If you look at the last forty years as a whole, it is largely a story of success&#8212;with lots of problems, of course. But by and large, if you look at poverty decline, increases in living standards, infrastructure, and technological advancement, it is a story of success. And in my thinking, the Chinese success comes from something that is an important lesson for many third world countries: very strong state capacity&#8212;state capacity to organize the economy and society, a coordinating power.</p><p>This connects to another issue. In the academic world, so-called liberal thinking often starts with the question of how we can resist public power, because public power always has a tendency to abuse&#8212;which is absolutely true. But if you go to Africa or Latin America, the biggest question is often: how do we have more functional, better public power&#8212;public power that can organize the economy and society more effectively?</p><p>China organized very efficiently, but with a lot of inequality and control. Yet for a long time there was enough energy coming from society, bubbling up here and there&#8212;especially in Shanghai and Guangzhou, but also places like Chongqing and Chengdu. You could see a match between a rigid top-down framework and bottom-up energy. There were tensions, but they matched, and the whole thing grew.</p><p>What has happened now is that the bottom-up energy&#8212;the content that generates from society&#8212;is really declining. But the framework that coordinates this energy itself has become more rigid, more powerful. So society is left with a huge, very sophisticated framework of monitoring and coordinating, but without enough real activity to coordinate. Very often it becomes control for the sake of control, monitoring for the sake of monitoring&#8211;<br><br><strong>Chang:</strong> Are you talking about the surveillance system?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong> That&#8217;s part of that yeah, but there are many other mechanisms: fiscal transfers, how resources are redistributed, how the banking system is managed. These are less visible, but in some ways more powerful.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>And you see that happening both in China and other places as well?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>In this regard, I think other places are quite different. Elsewhere you also see declining growth rates because the previous models are not working, but in many places there is still a lack of basic coordinating power.</p><p>So society becomes chaotic. In China, unhappiness is not so chaotic, and people say this is partly because it is controlled. That&#8217;s true&#8212;it is controlled. But in other places, which don&#8217;t have that capacity, unhappiness can lead to uprisings. And I must say that uprisings contain very valuable potential energy. But uprisings themselves are not going to lead to anything substantial. We have to work on that.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Let&#8217;s make this more concrete&#8212;or to start using your own vocabulary. In 2019, you appeared on this very popular celebrity TV series <em>Thirteen Invitations</em> (&#21313;&#19977;&#36992;). You&#8217;re in Wenzhou, your hometown, being interviewed by an intellectual named Xu Zhiyuan, who also runs the bookstore that we&#8217;re in. In that conversation you were toying with this idea of &#8220;the nearby.&#8221;</p><p>And I think this connects to what you were saying about grassroots energy. This concept went viral. It was viewed around sixty million times on the main platform. It was shared everywhere on Little Red Book <em>[China&#8217;s instagram]</em> and other places. People started using &#8220;the nearby&#8221; in art exhibitions in China. There was a bookstore was named after &#8220;the nearby,&#8221; so it clearly resonated. What is &#8220;the nearby&#8221;?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>First of all, when I proposed the idea, it was associated with an observation: the disappearance of the nearby. It&#8217;s a kind of negation.</p><p>What is the disappearance of the nearby? Young people&#8217;s perception of the world is increasingly occupied by two extremes. One extreme is the self: my academic scores, looking for a job, my romantic relationships, relationships with parents, even health. Now there is a lot of anxiety about health and the body&#8212;very near.</p><p>And then, at the other extreme, you have social media. Every day you&#8217;re glued to it, receiving all kinds of dramatic messages about incidents happening in different parts of the world&#8212;events you don&#8217;t have direct access to. You don&#8217;t really know what&#8217;s going on, but you receive them packaged in emotionally charged, and sometimes ideologically divisive ways.</p><p>This is what I observed. Young people&#8217;s emotions become very unstable. One day you receive certain messages and you feel very low. Tomorrow you see something different and you suddenly feel high. So you swing constantly. The mind is occupied by the very near and the very far.</p><p>What is in between? Who are your neighbors? Who cleans your street? How is your condominium managed? Who lived here before&#8212;and where did they go when they were asked to leave to clear the land to build these apartments that you now live in? These people and activities disappear from your consciousness.</p><p>That is the disappearance of the nearby.</p><p>Why did it go viral? Partly because it described a reality people recognized. But I think that&#8217;s only a small part. The real reason people wanted to talk about it is that they wanted something they could hold on to in their lives. It evoked a desire. It wasn&#8217;t only naming an existing truth. People feel their lives are suspended&#8212;everything becomes uncertain, feeble, abstract. They want something concrete&#8212;something they can see themselves in, something they can put their hands on, and act on.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I also felt it became especially popular after the pandemic. You&#8217;ve described Chinese society very vividly in this respect: you once told me that Chinese people often don&#8217;t want to be where they are now&#8212;they always want to go somewhere else.</p><p>The pandemic lockdowns crystallized that problem, because everything was severed. You couldn&#8217;t leave your house. You relied on delivery for everything. I remember in Shanghai during the lockdown, I got to know my neighbors for the first time. Before that, why would I need to know my neighbors? I could just order what I needed. I took the train, I didn&#8217;t talk to anyone next to me.</p><p>But during the pandemic, it became a realization for many people in China that we need some connection to our surroundings. Otherwise, what happens in a crisis? That&#8217;s when I heard a lot of people saying they appreciated your work. That&#8217;s when I heard &#8220;Xiang Biao&#8221; everywhere&#8212;after the pandemic.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yes&#8212;two things. First, absolutely, during the pandemic, people suddenly realized how much their lives relied on delivery. This also explains why there was hunger in places like Shanghai during the pandemic. Partly the system didn&#8217;t manage it well&#8212;that&#8217;s the main reason. But also, many young people didn&#8217;t keep much food at home because they relied so much on instant delivery. That made everyone vulnerable.</p><p>But I think the deeper reason the pandemic made people more aware of the nearby is that people wanted more control of their lives. The pandemic disrupted a particular way of managing your life, the virus made you no longer the master of your daily activities. So there is a desire to come back, to be more grounded.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>When I mention your work to my editors in the U.S., they tend to associate you with Robert Putnam&#8217;s book <em>Bowling Alone</em>. Putnam is the well-known political scientist at Harvard who argued that in the second half of the twentieth century in America, social organization declined significantly.</p><p>He looks at many metrics: church participation dropping, bowling clubs&#8212;people literally bowling alone, which is his metaphor&#8212;unions deteriorating, and political organizing slowing down. Putnam became, in a way, the poet laureate of declining civil society in the United States.</p><p>And you now seem to play a similar role in China&#8212;though I know you may not want to use the phrase &#8220;civil society.&#8221; But your <em>Thirteen Invitations</em> interview evoked the kind of hunger you just described: a hunger for deeper connection and control&#8212;similar to what Putnam&#8217;s book evoked when it first came out.</p><p>First, are you familiar with Putnam&#8217;s work? There are similarities in the structural forces. For example, Putnam talks about technology&#8212;television&#8212;as one driver of social deterioration because it&#8217;s enormously attention-absorbing. In China, smartphones and the internet are enormously attention-absorbing too, right?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>There&#8217;s no longer one screen shared by families. Everyone has their one small screen&#8211;</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> <br>&#8211;which has probably made things even worse right? But China has been an enormously capitalistic, market-oriented society since the 1990s. From the 1980s to now, what you see in China is a kind of accelerated version of a process of urbanization and the expanding role the market plays in a society.</p><p>What I think is different is that Putnam tends to focus on communal gatherings&#8212;groups of people: Bowling leagues, unions. You don&#8217;t really evoke that. You focus more on seeing, on encouraging young people to look at local society differently, to interact one-on-one with people. Your work isn&#8217;t <em>Mahjong Alone</em> or <em>Sipping Tea Alone</em> in the teahouse, right? So why this difference between you and Putnam?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>We are facing some fundamental issues of modernity. But I think, partly from Tocqueville, American democracy is really about associational life. That idea is very attractive, but it&#8217;s also a description. The idea that democracy doesn&#8217;t come with one single system; it comes with many associations, and public issues emerge from below. That is a U.S. characteristic.</p><p>But when you ask why (<em>laughter) </em>I don&#8217;t go in the direction of &#8220;mahjong alone,&#8221; it&#8217;s because I&#8217;m more interested in Chinese young people&#8217;s thinking agency. I&#8217;m not simply describing how lifestyles changed. This is not just a descriptive project.</p><p>Putnam&#8217;s work is empirically very rigorous and very solid. He describes how television, women&#8217;s participation in the workforce, suburbanization, and middle-class migration to suburbs weakened public life&#8212;no public transport, no neighbors.</p><p>Some of that may be relevant in the Chinese context, some not. But what really urged me to talk about &#8220;the nearby&#8221; was not to say that life is declining or decaying, or to feel nostalgic. I felt that young people themselves are actively unhappy.</p><p>They actively say: why am I constantly in the swing of emotion? I feel lonely. I&#8217;m so sensitive. I want to be a nice person, but precisely because of that, I don&#8217;t dare to talk to people anymore. I&#8217;m constantly worried I might offend someone or drag my interlocutor into discomfort. There is a lot of hypersensitivity involved.</p><p>That is the problem I wanted to tackle. I want not only to describe what is going on, but to provide some tools&#8212;some handles&#8212;that people who are already conscious, or half-conscious, of their dilemmas can use to move forward.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Putnam can easily evoke a kind of nostalgia&#8212;for the church or the union. You don&#8217;t really evoke a nostalgia. Is there something in the past you imagine returning to when you think about &#8220;the nearby&#8221;?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>I don&#8217;t. But my readers often bring up nostalgic reference points themselves. They talk about neighborhood life when they were young&#8212;how you could easily enter a neighbor&#8217;s home without appointments. You would meet neighbors, eat together, even sleep over.</p><p>Nowadays, children are picked up by parents, put into cars, and driven from one tutorial class to another. So there are nostalgic reference points. But nostalgia is not analytically important for me.</p><p>First, many young people can&#8217;t even feel nostalgia because they never had those experiences. They grew up without a nearby.</p><p>Second, going back is not a practical solution. In China, you cannot imagine returning to a 1970s-style neighborhood. So the challenge is we have to be creative&#8212;to think of new ways to organize our life.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>There&#8217;s another motivation in your work on the nearby. You often push back against national-level discourse&#8212;debates about the &#8220;China model,&#8221; China&#8217;s relationship with the West, these grand national questions that young people scroll through on social media. You don&#8217;t seem to like these overly nationalized discussions.</p><p>You sent me an email a couple weeks ago about the Nobel Peace Prize. I think you were disillusioned by the results this year. You were referring to Donald Trump wanting to win the prize and how instead it went to the Venezuelan opposition leader [Mar&#237;a Corina Machado] and many people in the MAGA world discredited the results. <em>[NB: This interview took place less than two weeks before the U.S. captured Nichol&#233;s Maduro.]</em></p><p>You wrote to me saying:</p><blockquote><blockquote><p>Society can no longer rely on heroic slogans and icons to build consensus. We are reaching the point that the specific selection [referring to the Nobel Peace Prize] is not only biased but also discredits the general principles and values altogether. These selections appear to prove again that universal values are little more than empty words. I believe universal values do exist, but need to be articulated differently from what is done now in order to make them real in public perceptions.</p></blockquote></blockquote><p>That stuck with me, because it suggests a retreat from some kind of public square where universal values are articulated, professed, pronounced and fought over. And there&#8217;s a fatigue there, that I can read in your email, one I feel maybe is relevant to our moment as an American. The populist era is very much characterized by this fatigue. Can you elaborate on what you meant?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yes. That is precisely what you said: the question is how we rebuild the public. What is &#8220;the public&#8221;? We tend to think of the &#8220;public&#8221; as represented by thinkers, heroes, activists&#8212;people who articulate general principles on our behalf. And what institution is more powerful in representing a global public consciousness than the Nobel Prize committee?</p><p>But if you look at some decisions, for example, giving a prize to someone who openly called for foreign military intervention&#8212;that can be given a Nobel Prize? <em>[NB: Machado didn&#8217;t call openly for U.S. military intervention before the U.S. captured Maduro, though she <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-machado-calls-more-us-action-against-maduro-2025-06-18/">implied</a> it. Then she <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f8Ca-OAgI9k">praised</a> Trump for Maduro&#8217;s seizure and gave him her Nobel Peace Prize. I initially thought Xiang didn&#8217;t like the way Trump politicized the Peace Prize, but he clearly objected to Machado&#8217;s selection.]</em></p><p>The post&#8211;Second World War global architecture for building public consensus has been dismantled. That architecture was based on universalism and elitism&#8212;you have some heroes and institutions who know the best way to articulate certain principles. But now I think the situation is changing.</p><p>First, the West itself is declining. The U.S. and Europe face serious domestic challenges, showing that the cherished principles based on the European and U.S. practices can no longer manage the social contradictions today. Therefore it does discredit these universal claims which is coming from Western history.</p><p>Second, global geopolitical tensions have intensified, partly because of the rise of the Global South, just the population growth and economic growth in places like India, Indonesia, and China. So it means that there&#8217;s such a large population, whose lives cannot be defined, articulated by ideals originating in a small corner of the world.</p><p>Third, you have technological change and the rapid massification of higher education&#8212;especially in the Global South&#8212;meaning many young people in Nigeria, Kenya, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Nepal, Bangladesh, as we witnessed, they want to articulate their lives in their own ways. These voices are by definition very diverse, by definition they are not coherent, and cannot easily be accommodated into some standard universalistic claim which originated in the 19th century.</p><p>What does this mean? It means that the old consensus is not necessarily wrong in its content, but it probably can no longer capture the most important concerns that people on the ground have today, nor the way those concerns are expressed.</p><p>I simply don&#8217;t understand how the Nobel Peace Prize selection committee could make that kind of decision, and the way they select representatives of the global ethos, for me, is very questionable. Therefore, the message of my email is that we need to find a new way of engaging in global communication.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I also feel like we don&#8217;t have a consensus one a national level either.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Oh yeah yeah. In Europe and the U.S., that&#8217;s very obvious. Sometimes the divide within countries is more frightening than divisions between countries.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Your focus on the nearby makes me wonder whether this concept can be applied, for example, in the United States. I&#8217;ll give you a very concrete example. Thanksgiving has become a horrific time in America these days, because national debates&#8212;around abortion, gun rights, whether you&#8217;re for Trump or against Trump&#8212;have moved into the home. There was a time when that was not the case.</p><p>When I was growing up in Michigan, national politics were not so toxic. But now a lot of my friends say they hate going back to their hometowns for Thanksgiving, because we&#8217;re always talking about politics, always talking about national politics.</p><p>Local politics has deteriorated. Local journalism is very weak.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Precisely.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>This isn&#8217;t really a question. It&#8217;s more a thought&#8212;that your idea of the nearby also resonates with me as an American who has lived through increasing political polarization. There&#8217;s like an &#8220;involution&#8221; in national politics, the more effort you put in, the less you feel you get back. There are too many people participating, and very few seats of power.</p><p>Basically, it all comes down to the presidency. Everyone is fighting over the presidency, and people place all their hopes for how society should behave on who the president is.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>No, I would be very happy to explore this further. I think the recent election in New York probably gives us some sense of hope, and also a reference point for thinking about the applicability of the idea of the nearby. [<em>NB: I think Xiang associates New York City, despite how big it is, with his preferred brand of local, touch-the-grass style politics, while debates at the national level often become more abstract and elitist.</em>]</p><p>That election was genuinely political, in the sense that people made decisions, took risks, and took responsibility for their own votes. They participated in debates and actions that would shape their shared future.</p><p>There is a sense of a shared future: I participate, I make a decision, I take responsibility, and I care about the consequences&#8212;rather than simply declaring my position in order to distinguish myself from my enemies.</p><p>That is a future-building, community-building kind of politics. And that, I think, is very much the spirit of the nearby.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I personally see a lot of similarities between young Chinese disillusionment and young American disillusionment. In fact, here&#8217;s a quote for you. This is from <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Why-Liberalism-Failed-Politics-Culture/dp/0300223447">Patrick Deneen</a>. He is one of the leading intellectuals of what in America is called the New Right&#8212;the intellectual wing of the MAGA movement. He&#8217;s describing the disillusionment among his students. He says:</p><blockquote><blockquote><p>&#8220;Far from feeling themselves to constitute the most liberated and autonomous generation in history, young adults believe less in their task at hand than Sisyphus rolling the boulder up the mountainside. They accede in the duties demanded of them by their elders, but without joy or love&#8212;only with a keen sense of having no other choice. Their overwhelming response to their lot&#8230;is one of entrapment and &#8220;no exit,&#8221; of being cynical participants in a system that ruthlessly produces winners and losers &#8221; (Why Liberalism Failed 2018)</p></blockquote></blockquote><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Hahaha wow. I&#8217;m very surprised by the similarities. Do you think it&#8217;s quite accurate?</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I think it really reflects the meritocracy in America. Deneen is a professor at Notre Dame University, so he&#8217;s talking about people trying to enter elite universities, trying to become part of the American elite or meritocratic system. The way he describes it&#8212;the cutthroat competition&#8212;feels very similar to what we call &#8220;involution.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yeah yeah yeah</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>But my point is that while the symptoms are similar, what&#8217;s very different about America is that there&#8217;s a tendency to pull disaffected people into politics&#8212;into a different kind of politics. That doesn&#8217;t really exist in China. The Party is not very good at organizing young people, and so instead you have people&#8230;like you, [<em>Xiang laughs</em>] who are pushing them toward practices outside the political space.</p><p>So let me ask you this: disaffected youth exist everywhere, right? In America, many of them have begun to vote for Trump and the MAGA movement. In other places&#8212;Nepal, Mexico, Madagascar, Bulgaria&#8212;they go out onto the streets and protest.</p><p>This is a familiar pattern of thinking for me: my situation is bad, so clearly there&#8217;s something wrong with political leaders, and therefore we should replace them or criticize them. This happened in China in the 1980s. Why aren&#8217;t Chinese youths thinking this way today, do you think?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>There is a reason: they just see that practically, there&#8217;s no such possibility, obviously unattainable. But there is also a very big social difference between the way disenfranchisement is felt in the U.S., China, and other parts of the world.</p><p>In China, development over the last forty years&#8212;and probably even since the 1950s&#8212;has been very inclusive, which may sound paradoxical. Chinese society has become very unequal, that&#8217;s true. Inequality has increased dramatically. But it is still a society where families at the bottom feel that if they invest a lot of money in their child&#8217;s education&#8212;now most families have only one child, at most two&#8212;there is still a chance to move up.</p><p>So nobody really feels directly excluded from the game of growth. That inclusiveness was real, I would say, at least up to the 2000s, because in my work on migrants, for example, I could see life had changed. And even now, at least ideologically and in terms of perception, they feel they are part of the game.</p><p>But now the future feels very uncertain. There is a sense of fatigue and disruption, and this feeling is widespread. I would say that the young people who feel this most strongly are actually relatively well-off, urban, middle-class, and educated&#8212;especially in tier-one and tier-two cities. They are the ones who feel the most disappointed. People at the bottom face much greater hardship, but they feel this disillusionment less intensely. So disillusionment is widespread, but it has a different character.</p><p>But I understand that in other societies like the U.S., the feeling that you are thrown out of the game&#8212;that you are excluded&#8212;that feeling is stronger. People who vote for Trump are not saying, &#8220;I&#8217;m gaining less than others.&#8221; They feel that they were totally screwed, that they are no longer part of the system at all.</p><p>That sense of being victimized and excluded produces deep resentment, and a particular kind of political energy and agency that we don&#8217;t see in China. This is not only because of political control. So this means we need different intellectual strategies on how to talk to young people in China&#8212;people who don&#8217;t feel completely excluded.</p><p>They are still in the game, but they are exhausted. They no longer want to carry on. That&#8217;s the situation.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>That&#8217;s a good segue into my next question. What do you think intellectuals should be doing in this era, specifically for young people? In the past, there was a very different group of intellectuals who believed democratization was the path forward for China. You clearly don&#8217;t feel that way. So what is the role now?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>I think the role of intellectuals must change with reality. The biggest change, in my view, is the rapid massification of higher education in China. It began in 1999, so it&#8217;s very recent&#8212;only about twenty-five years.</p><p>This year [2025], more than 60 percent of high school graduates can go to college, something unimaginable forty years ago. These students are materially supported by their families, and their capacity for reading, thinking, and writing is no less than people like me, even though I&#8217;m older.</p><p>And so they ask all kinds of very deep and relevant questions. So in this era, if intellectuals still think their role is, first, to offer a systemic critique of the whole society; second, to act as truth-tellers revealing truths that others supposedly cannot access; and third, to set a clear direction for the future and ask everyone to follow it&#8212;I think that no longer works. <br><br>And even if everything you say is correct, young people don&#8217;t want to hear that. They want to be autonomous thinkers, to be sovereign in defining and understanding their own lives.</p><p>So intellectuals should no longer be preachers or teachers. They should become facilitators. You listen to young people, really understand what they are worried about, in very concrete and diverse settings. Then you analyze and offer tools&#8212;concepts, theories, perspectives, questions&#8212;that can travel back to them and help them think about their situation in their own way, but in a way that will be more productive and clarifying.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Maybe we can be a bit more concrete about your prescriptions. You&#8217;ve participated in curriculum reforms at Chinese universities. My understanding is that you encourage students to engage with local figures they interact with every day&#8212;for example, the security guard near their apartment, or the person who sells them breakfast in the morning. <em>[NB: Xiang sees &#8220;the nearby&#8221; as a new framework for young people to engage with their surroundings differently and he wants to &#8220;facilitate&#8221; this.]</em></p><p>These are people who, in an earlier era, when everyone was busy working and making money, tended to be ignored. Now you want students to engage with them and develop relationships. Is that right? Could you elaborate a bit?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yes, this is part of a whole set of curriculum experiments. We want students to try to understand the people around them whom they hardly don&#8217;t pay attention to.</p><p>Many students say they can&#8217;t do this because they are so shy. They describe themselves as having what Chinese call &#8220;social phobia,&#8221; <em>shekong &#8211;</em></p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> &#8211;a widespread problem in China.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong> yeah so we say: okay, don&#8217;t worry. If you really can&#8217;t talk to them, if you&#8217;re too scared, then first ask yourself why you find that person interesting. You can observe from a distance if you can&#8217;t speak to them. Pay attention to their way of talking, their actions, and how they affect you. Reflect first on your own feelings&#8212;fascination, nervousness, confusion.</p><p>Then we come back to discuss it. Teachers play an important role, and classmates also need to act in particular ways. This is intellectual work. It&#8217;s not just social work. It&#8217;s about learning how to analyze and narrate your experience, and how to make your experience more generative.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Many young people since your interview on <em>Thirteen Invitations</em> have taken this idea and made it their own. I&#8217;ve spoken to young people who said that after your interview, they started filming their hometowns&#8212;especially after moving back because they couldn&#8217;t afford rent in big cities&#8212;and posting videos on Douyin or TikTok.</p><p>Others have started keeping notes or diaries about local malls, about conversations they have with people, and they feel their lives have been enriched by this. So here&#8217;s my last question: where do you think all of this is leading? What&#8217;s the end game?</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>I don&#8217;t have a clear vision or goal, but I know we shouldn&#8217;t stop here. As you said, people are developing a feeling for the nearby. That&#8217;s important because it gives you a sense that you are living in a concrete world&#8212;one where you can act and talk to people. You feel less powerless and vulnerable.</p><p>If another pandemic or crisis were to happen, people might be better able to organize quickly, help themselves, and resist unreasonable demands. In fact, much of China&#8217;s reform history worked this way&#8212;<em>shang you zhengce, xia you duice [&#8220;When there are policies from above, there are countermeasures below.&#8221;]</em>&#8212;so there are official policies, but there are always unofficial responses and people know how to circumvent real rules and regulations.</p><p>Still, formal policies are still important because they maintain the general framework and enable the coordinating capacity by the state. But below, many things happen. Right now, that bottom-up energy is weak. The idea of the nearby is, first of all, about rebuilding subjectivity&#8212;the feeling that I can do something, I can talk to people, and I know how to protect myself.</p><p>Then what are the next step? There&#8217;s no roadmap. But my idea is that when people engage in more activities like that, they may begin to develop some demands at the local scale. When we were together in Beijing, you saw the urban design program at Beijing universities. <em>[NB: In December, Xiang and I visited a mental health support group led by rank-and-file bureaucrats</em> <em>at Peking University. They shared with us some guerilla-style tactics on how to convince their superiors to change local traffic design and other ways to better their community.]</em> Students were making very concrete proposals&#8212;redesigning traffic lights, for example. These are very technical, but they are already acting effectively, and grassroots governments do respond within their scope.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>And these are people within the system&#8212;within the university system. <em>[NB: In Chinese, this is called </em>tizhinei<em>, &#8220;within the system&#8221;]</em></p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Yes, we have to build alliances. The idea of the nearby is to cross the boundary between inside and outside the system. This is not an era where you can build a space completely outside the system and push from there&#8212;it won&#8217;t work. <em>[NB: Xiang is effectively saying the only way to change China is from within]</em></p><p>I can&#8217;t prescribe where this will lead, but I do believe it&#8217;s important to follow these activities. I hope I can continue proposing ideas that make people feel more powerful than they think they are, at least in everyday life.</p><p>And gradually, it becomes hard to say whether the system itself is changing. If everyday life on the ground is already changing, can the system really remain exactly the same?</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>So basically, co-opting the system from the bottom up, to do things that serve people in local communities.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong><br>Some people may empirically disagree about the feasibility of working with grassroots actors inside the system. But from my observations, it is entirely possible&#8212;and in fact necessary. Grassroots officials need to get things done. They want orderly, relatively happy communities, but they lack language and tools. If we can offer new language and programs that they can show the upstairs&#8212;ways of doing things differently&#8212;then there is a real possibility of changing the grassroots landscape.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>The perennial optimist, Xiang Biao. I think that&#8217;s a good place to end. Thank you so much.</p><p><strong>Xiang:</strong></p><p>Thank you</p><p>Thanks for reading Recent Works by Chang Che! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Taiwan’s Forgotten Role in Japan’s War]]></title><description><![CDATA[Lau Kek-huat is a Malaysian-born documentary filmmaker based in Taiwan.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/taiwans-forgotten-role-in-japans-79a</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/taiwans-forgotten-role-in-japans-79a</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980751/191c63cf1e6b96bf126498e9a8a39a49.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Lau Kek-huat is a Malaysian-born documentary filmmaker based in Taiwan. His latest film, <em>From Island to Island</em>, won the prestigious Golden Horse Award in 2024. The film examines the role of Taiwanese in Japan&#8217;s Pacific War and explores why memories of World War II diverge across the Chinese-speaking world.&nbsp;</p><p>Lau joins us to discuss his latest film and its differing reception across Asia.</p><p>Follow his work, including his film at: <a href="https://reurl.cc/6bGRDr">https://reurl.cc/6bGRDr</a>&nbsp;</p><p>We discuss:</p><ul><li><p><strong>How Taiwanese conscripts in the Imperial Japanese Army were deployed</strong> across Southeast Asia as translators and intermediaries, using proximity to local dialects (Taiwanese/Hokkien).</p></li><li><p><strong>How KMT rule and the White Terror shaped Taiwan&#8217;s postwar memory</strong>, leaving younger generations with an image of their grandparents as victims, while obscuring their roles in perpetuating violence.</p></li><li><p><strong>The postwar fate of overseas Taiwanese: </strong>stripped of Japanese citizenship, rendered stateless, and forcibly repatriated to a homeland some had never lived in.</p></li><li><p><strong>How Japanese occupation deepened ethnic tensions</strong> among Chinese, Malay, and Indian communities in Malaya, producing fractured wartime memories that persist today.</p></li><li><p><strong>Interview process:</strong> What Lau learned interviewing staff at Hiroshima&#8217;s Holocaust museums, the difficulty of interviewing Japanese and Taiwanese veterans and how some recalled their time in Southeast Asia.</p></li><li><p><strong>Taiwan&#8217;s pro-Japan consensus today</strong>, Southeast Asia&#8217;s lingering distrust of Japanese military power, the unresolved politics of comfort women.</p></li></ul><p><strong>Ian:</strong> So my first question to you would be: what motivated you to make this particular film?</p><p><strong>Lau: </strong>Okay, hello to everyone. I&#8217;m so happy to be here. Regarding the question&#8212;how did I start this documentary&#8212;at the beginning I didn&#8217;t plan for the film to be so long, like five hours. And it wasn&#8217;t about the darker history of Taiwan&#8212;Taiwanese soldiers in the Japanese army&#8212;at first.</p><p>In the beginning, I read a thesis by a professor from Chengchi University. The thesis is about overseas Taiwanese who lived in Southeast Asia before World War II. They were already living in Southeast Asia before the war. But when the war broke out, they were treated as alien enemies, because they were citizens of the Japanese Empire. So they were sent to internment camps&#8212;in Japan, in Australia, and also in India.</p><p>At first, I tried to approach those people. They were still living in Taiwan&#8212;some had come back from the Australia camp, others from the India camp. At the same time, I was researching the World War II background&#8212;how Taiwan was involved in the war. As a Malaysian, growing up, we don&#8217;t read much about World War II in the history textbooks. But we do hear from the grandparents&#8217; generation&#8212;they keep telling us how traumatic it was when Japan invaded Malaysia and Singapore. Even then, I didn&#8217;t imagine that within the Japanese army there were Taiwanese involved. We didn&#8217;t know about that.</p><p>When I was doing research, I tried to match the timeline&#8212;when Taiwanese soldiers were dispatched to Southeast Asia, and then the Malayan campaign and Singapore campaign. And then I realized they were already there from the very beginning of the war in Southeast Asia. That&#8217;s when I thought I should include all this knowledge I found, and put it into the film.</p><p>The film expanded from 90 minutes, to 2.5 hours, and then to five hours long, because there were so many things I discovered along the way.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, and just for the listeners, we should point out that this is a story&#8212;rarely told&#8212;of Chinese being involved in a war against other Chinese, or at least Chinese speakers. Taiwan was part of the Japanese Empire, and as such Taiwanese were drafted into the Imperial Japanese Army. In Southeast Asia, they were involved in many things as interpreters and so on, and were often witnesses to torture sessions. And the Chinese of Southeast Asia were the targets of a lot of Japanese aggression.</p><p>So this is a Chinese-versus-Chinese story, isn&#8217;t it?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Indeed. If you look at Japanese army strategy at that time, they had to make use of a lot of Taiwanese people, because they spoke Taiwanese, which is very similar to Hokkien in Southeast Asia.</p><p>From the beginning, they knew they had to make use of this language fluency so they could manage and conquer Southeast Asia. They already tried this out when they conquered Hainan Island or some parts of China. They needed people who could understand the local language to run the government there. So from the beginning, a lot of Taiwanese soldiers were involved as interpreters&#8212;especially during massacres, and especially in interrogations, where they needed Taiwanese to do translation.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Yeah. It wasn&#8217;t just that they were useful. In the beginning of the film, you can see there&#8217;s also a kind of cultural attachment to the war in Taiwan. You can see celebrations, and people singing.</p><p>It&#8217;s really messy and complicated, the Taiwanese role in this kind of war&#8212;and you bring up so many of the complexities in the film. For listeners who haven&#8217;t watched it, I&#8217;ll just give a quick synopsis of this really long film. Basically, the film is centered on three main places: Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. The film is recreated through interviews and archival footage, and through really creative film techniques that bring letters and diaries back to life. There are also reenactments. And all of them give different perspectives on the war.</p><p>So we have Taiwanese soldiers who participated in the war. We also have Taiwanese who aided the Japanese in various ways&#8212;as translators and doctors&#8212;their memories of the war, how they understood it, and how their descendants grapple with it. And then we also have Malaysians and Singaporeans who recollect the war from their perspective, as well as their descendants.</p><p>And often there are horrific massacres that come up in the course of the film, ones that are not recorded in official ways. Lau, you said something earlier that I&#8217;m curious about: when you heard about these memories through your grandparents&#8217; generation, I can imagine how they might feel about the Japanese&#8212;but what was their attitude toward the Taiwanese?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Because after the war, we had a Malay-majority government. The history book narrative is mainly a Malay World War II narrative. So there&#8217;s not much about the Chinese suffering during World War II. We have to rely on grandparents&#8217; oral stories to remember it.</p><p>And after World War II, the Chinese community didn&#8217;t really have the strength or power to build out this narrative publicly&#8212;to collect testimony and make it part of official memory.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> And Singapore presumably would be different, right, with the Chinese majority?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> If you talk about &#8220;Chinese,&#8221; there are different groups&#8212;English-educated Chinese, and what you might call Chinese newcomers. The English-educated Chinese came to Southeast Asia earlier and were educated in English. They pledged loyalty more to the British colonial government.</p><p>The newcomers came later, and some still thought of themselves as from China and needing to return to China. When the Japanese army came, they targeted mostly the China-oriented Chinese&#8212;because those were the people who donated and supported the war against Japan in China. Before they came to Southeast Asia, they already saw this group as an enemy, because they were funding the war in China.</p><p>So before they came, they already had lists of names&#8212;Chinese they wanted to kill. And this is why the Chinese were the most suffering group during the war.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Were there any Taiwanese who actually joined the resistance&#8212;who switched sides?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> There were&#8212;especially Taiwanese who had already lived in Malaysia or Singapore before the war. Some were daughters, musicians. When they lived in Southeast Asia, they didn&#8217;t really differentiate themselves as Taiwanese. Mostly they would describe themselves as Hokkien, because we all speak Hokkien&#8212;alongside other groups like Cantonese and Hakka.</p><p>So it was easy for them to blend into the Chinese community in Malaysia and Singapore. Only when the war broke out did citizenship suddenly become something very important. Then it became: if you are Taiwanese, you are Japanese; if you are Indonesian or Malayan, you are treated differently.</p><p>I did hear testimonies that some people joined anti-Japanese guerrillas&#8212;that they supported, or tried to help, the Communist Party in Malaya.</p><p>Ian: And in Taiwan&#8212;you were saying in Malaysia, people don&#8217;t really learn much about the fate of the Chinese-speaking population. What about Taiwan? I assume that when Taiwan was still ruled by the KMT, the Japanese were depicted as the enemy. Since Taiwan became a democracy, how is that history taught&#8212;the history of the Japanese empire and Taiwan&#8217;s collaboration?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Taiwan is very complicated. After the war, the KMT took over Taiwan. Under KMT rule, those who were educated in Japanese, or who wanted to join the Japanese army, tried to hide their identities, because they would be targeted by the government. They hid their identity, they hid their memories.</p><p>During the long White Terror&#8212;from the 1950s to the 1990s&#8212;people involved with the Japanese army or Japanese government tried not to tell their descendants, not to tell anyone, their real identities.</p><p>In the 1990s, we started interviewing Taiwanese veterans, but the focus was more on what they suffered during the White Terror or the 2/28 Incident in Taiwan. It was a selective memory&#8212;remembering them as victims. But we didn&#8217;t really ask what they had been involved in before they came back from Southeast Asia, or what they witnessed in Southeast Asia.</p><p>So this part of history is long forgotten, and unknown to younger Taiwanese. When my film screened in Taiwan, for the younger generation it was a shock. They remember their grandfathers as victims; they don&#8217;t remember them as collaborators of the Japanese imperial army.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Lau, could you talk a little bit about the ending&#8212;where after the war, Taiwanese basically become stateless, right? Because they&#8217;re no longer Japanese citizens, and they&#8217;re not accepted by the Chinese population because they were collaborating. That&#8217;s a really complicated and interesting part of the film.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> After the war, Taiwanese lost their citizenship&#8212;they were no longer citizens of the Japanese Empire&#8212;and Taiwan was taken over by the KMT. But what we&#8217;re talking about is also a totally different official language. People who grew up in Japanese education suddenly became illiterate. They were trained to speak and write in Japanese.</p><p>Then suddenly, after KMT takeover, everything changed into Chinese, and you had to use Mandarin as the official language. For people trained professionally&#8212;doctors, and other professions&#8212;you suddenly lost the ability to use that knowledge, and you had to relearn Mandarin and Chinese.</p><p>And we have to bear in mind: during the war, they saw Chinese as an enemy language, because Japan was at war with China. So if you wanted to carry on with your profession, you had to pick up this &#8220;enemy language.&#8221; That&#8217;s psychologically complicated for Taiwanese.</p><p>As you mentioned, nowadays Taiwanese still have a kind of pro-Japan culture&#8212;Japanese pop culture, and so on. One reason is that the grandparents&#8217; generation compares Japanese rule to KMT rule. They would say Japanese rule was much better than KMT rule, because of the White Terror and the targeting of Japan-related people. That&#8217;s why memory in Taiwan is so divided&#8212;there are competing narratives.</p><p>Chang: There&#8217;s a section in the documentary where one Malaysian interviewee says that during the occupation there was already ethnic conflict between the Chinese and the Malays, and that some Malays started to support the Japanese. Could you speak a little bit more about that? What were Malays doing in support of the Japanese?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> In Malaysia, we have three main ethnic groups&#8212;Chinese, Malay, and Indian. During British colonial times, there was already a divide-and-rule system, which meant they made use of rivalry between ethnic groups, so people didn&#8217;t understand each other well.</p><p>During the Japanese occupation, Japan carried on with this strategy&#8212;and actually made it worse. They intensified rivalry between Malays and Chinese, and also Indians.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> How did they make it worse? Do you know any specific examples?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> They recruited Malays to join the Japanese forces. And many civil servants were Malay under British colonial rule, so they continued using Malays as policemen and government officers.</p><p>When Japan carried out massacres, you can see in war crimes court documents that many witnesses are Malay&#8212;because they were the ones who could bring soldiers to where they wanted to go. Japan made use of Malays&#8217; local knowledge so they could access Chinese communities and carry out killings.</p><p>This made the gap between Malay and Chinese worse. After the war, there were serious killings between Chinese and Malays, because there was distrust.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> And before the war, professionally&#8212;was the division that most Chinese in Southeast Asia were merchants and in business, and Malays were largely rural? Isn&#8217;t it quite like that?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> For Chinese, as I said, many supported the war in China against Japan. But identity was often based on the region you came from&#8212;Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese&#8212;depending on what language you spoke.</p><p>For Malays, they were the local ruling group, and local chiefs were important. They were more united by religion&#8212;Islam. They saw themselves as Muslims.</p><p>And in my film, if you remember, there&#8217;s Japanese propaganda. They tried to connect an Islamic &#8220;holy war&#8221; with Japan&#8217;s imperial war. They claimed the emperor was connected to Muhammad, so if Malays joined the Japanese army, they were doing the same holy war. This was unknown to many Malaysians.</p><p>When we released the film in Malaysia, we worried because it&#8217;s sensitive. In Malaysia today, religion is untouchable&#8212;it&#8217;s taboo. We don&#8217;t talk about it. But luckily we got through censorship, and this part screened. It shocked Malay audiences, because they could see it as provocation from a Chinese director&#8212;relating Islam to Japanese war propaganda. But we got through.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> That&#8217;s fascinating. But my question was really about professional roles. In Thailand and Indonesia, many Chinese or people with Chinese backgrounds were in business, associated with money, and that created resentment. Is that true of Malaysia as well?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Yes, it&#8217;s also true in Malaysia and in Singapore. Many Chinese were businesspeople. They were wealthy and had economic power, but they didn&#8217;t really have political power. Under British colonial rule there might be a &#8220;head of the Chinese community&#8221; appointed to govern Chinese affairs, but not much political power beyond that.</p><p>Meanwhile, Malays were more employed in government roles&#8212;as civil servants. Chinese were mostly doing business.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Sorry&#8212;I wanted to go back to the Taiwanese after the war ended. There&#8217;s a section near the end where you interview Taiwanese who had lived in Southeast Asia. After the war, most of them were resettled back to Taiwan, right? And some of them had never lived in Taiwan, so they didn&#8217;t want to go back. What is that about?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> They lived in Southeast Asia before the war. When the war broke out, they were captured and sent to camps, which meant their properties in Southeast Asia were confiscated by the government. After the war, they were forced to go back to Taiwan. They had no say in whether they wanted to stay or leave&#8212;they had to leave.</p><p>All of them were sent back to Taiwan, and they became Taiwanese in the political sense when they arrived. Later, under KMT rule, some tried to go back to Southeast Asia to reclaim property, but it failed, because it had already been confiscated. So most couldn&#8217;t resettle there again, and stayed in Taiwan.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> How were they treated by local, native Taiwanese? Were they treated badly?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Not really. They could still speak Taiwanese, and some still had families in Taiwan, so they relied on their relatives. There was also a lot of intermarriage within this group that came back from Southeast Asia, because they understood each other.</p><p><strong>Chang</strong>: Can I ask a journalistic question? As a journalist, I can imagine you had to knock on a lot of doors to get this story. And the film shows you were successful in interviews&#8212;people said yes, people were willing to be filmed. I&#8217;m curious: how difficult was it to get the story? What were some of the obstacles? You&#8217;re asking people about really difficult things. How often did people say, &#8220;I don&#8217;t want to remember this period of my life&#8221;?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> One of the most difficult parts was interviewing Japanese-Taiwanese soldiers. They were interviewed, but most of what they shared was about suffering during 2/28 and the White Terror.</p><p>But I guess I&#8217;m one of the first people to ask them: what did you see, or participate in, when you were in Southeast Asia? That shocked them, because no one really asked those questions.</p><p>In the beginning, a lot of them were friendly and willing to talk. But slowly, as they found out my Southeast Asia accent&#8212;or found out I came from Malaysia&#8212;they would reject the interview and refuse to see me. So I had to use strategies to approach them.</p><p>Many interviews you see in the film were not done by me. For example, there&#8217;s one soldier, Yang Fu-cheng. I found a young Japanese woman who came to Taiwan to study&#8212;she was about granddaughter age for these old soldiers. I listed three major questions I wanted to ask. The rest of the conversation was done by her. She approached the Taiwanese veteran as a grandpa, and asked, &#8220;Grandpa, what do you remember? What did you see? Please tell me.&#8221; I tried to create this intergenerational setup. I played a third-party role&#8212;observing and filming.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> And she spoke Japanese to him?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Yes&#8212;she spoke Japanese. I think language is one of the most important points. If you ask the same question in Japanese, Taiwanese, or Mandarin, they will answer differently.</p><p>If you speak in Japanese, you bring out their memories of youth&#8212;when they were young, joining the army, full of hope. If you ask in Taiwanese, the memories that come back are White Terror and 2/28. If you ask in Mandarin, they might scold you, because for them it&#8217;s an enemy language.</p><p>So with different languages, it&#8217;s like they become different people. That&#8217;s why I needed someone close to them, who understands the language close to them, to ask the questions. Some soldiers were interviewed by their own daughters. When they face their families, they&#8217;re more willing to reveal memories.</p><p>Another difficulty was interviewing descendants of soldiers, or of people preparing to join the Japanese army&#8212;like Simon in Penang. He knew his grandfather was from Taiwan, and his grandfather was sentenced to death after the war. He did a lot of bad things to local people. Imagine growing up in a community where everyone remembers your grandfather as a collaborator of the Japanese empire&#8212;it&#8217;s a shameful family story.</p><p>When I approached Simon, he had unsettled feelings. Sometimes he agreed to an interview, sometimes he rejected it&#8212;quite a few times. And as you see in the film, although he had heard stories about his grandpa, he had never seen the real documents.</p><p>When I showed him the real documents, it was a shock. It made everything concrete. Ethically, if Simon had collapsed emotionally and couldn&#8217;t handle it, I wouldn&#8217;t have put it in the film. If someone breaks down, I won&#8217;t put it in. Luckily, Simon could overcome it, and he could talk.</p><p>And Simon wasn&#8217;t the only descendant. Many descendants I approached stopped me in the middle of interviews, stopped the camera, and said, &#8220;Please leave my home and don&#8217;t come again.&#8221; That was a fairly common reaction.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I wish that was in the film, because it would give a sense of how difficult these topics are for some people. But the Simon interview was really memorable.</p><p>This is actually a question for Ian. Ian, you&#8217;re familiar with the German case, and there are interesting parallels. What&#8217;s striking is Simon grappling with the legacy of his grandfather. There&#8217;s a line where he says something like, &#8220;I have no choice&#8212;he&#8217;s my grandfather&#8212;I have to respect him.&#8221; And as soon as you go into his house, you see an ancestral shrine.</p><p>I wondered if there&#8217;s a cultural reason&#8212;filial piety, and the idea that Chinese culture emphasizes respecting elders. In Germany, I know the generation after the war was often much more critical of the Nazi-era generation. Do you see a difference between how Simon behaves and how Germans behaved?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> They may be more critical of German behavior under the Nazi period, but I think it&#8217;s human to have feelings about your parents or grandparents that are separate from what they may have done outside the family.</p><p>In other words, you had concentration camp commanders responsible for mass murder who were very kind fathers and took their children out for picnics on the weekend. It&#8217;s entirely natural for those children to remember these figures&#8212;who may have been hanged for war crimes&#8212;as their fathers. That&#8217;s a universal human thing, not related to one culture or another.</p><p>It&#8217;s the same in Japan. I once spoke to the daughter of somebody who was very high up in the Japanese imperial army in Manchuria, probably responsible for all kinds of crimes. And she remembered him as a doting father. Knowing what he did, she wasn&#8217;t trying to excuse him. She was just saying: the man I knew is not the man being accused of all these crimes. That&#8217;s a reality people have to accept.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> I agree. It&#8217;s human nature. Someone can be a killer and also a kind father at the same time&#8212;it&#8217;s not a contradiction.</p><p>But if you compare Germany and Asia: after the war, German governments put people on trial. Even now, they still put Nazi collaborators on trial. It sends a message to society: we have to face this, we have to acknowledge it.</p><p>That doesn&#8217;t really happen in Japan, or even in Taiwan. After the Tokyo Trial, it&#8217;s like the government didn&#8217;t really acknowledge it anymore. So it didn&#8217;t create an atmosphere where Taiwanese people feel: we were involved in this, we have to face it, we have to analyze it. Instead there&#8217;s an ambiguous space where people selectively remember some things and ignore others. That&#8217;s the difference between Germany&#8217;s public atmosphere and Asia&#8217;s.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, people always say that, but West Germany and East Germany were very different in how they dealt with war memory. And it took Germans at least a generation to come to grips with it, because in the 1950s they didn&#8217;t want to face it at all.</p><p>And the Japanese, in some ways, did. There were more movies and novels written in the 1950s by Japanese about their experiences during the war than was true in Germany. So a lot of this is political, more than cultural.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> During my research, I read a lot of memoirs written by Japanese soldiers. Before they passed away, many wrote about what they had seen and done, and reflected deeply on humanity and democracy.</p><p>But sadly, if I read memoirs by Taiwanese soldiers, most of the time it doesn&#8217;t reach that stage. They remain focused on suffering under KMT rule&#8212;the White Terror, 2/28. They hardly mention what they witnessed in Southeast Asia. As a human being, that&#8217;s regretful. Even in old age, people kept those memories as secrets, and passed away with them&#8212;without telling their families.</p><p>I interviewed one descendant of a doctor who was involved with chemical weapons in Southeast Asia. I found the name and went&#8212;</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Unit 731</p><p><strong>Lau</strong>: Yes, in Southeast Asia. I went to the family and interviewed the descendant. He told me that after his father came back from Southeast Asia, he became very silent. He didn&#8217;t talk much to the family. But he became a very kind doctor&#8212;he went to poor regions and treated patients for free, and did many good deeds.</p><p>They didn&#8217;t really know what he experienced in Southeast Asia.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yeah, I think there may be a difference between Taiwan and Japan, though. In Japan, even though it was an authoritarian government, it was their country that was responsible for all this. As a Japanese, you&#8217;d feel your country was responsible. Whereas Taiwanese&#8212;it was a Japanese colony. They had no political responsibility for what happened, really. And even their collaboration&#8212;they didn&#8217;t feel that same responsibility.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Indeed, that&#8217;s true. They weren&#8217;t really decision-makers. They weren&#8217;t central decision-makers. They were kind of forced to be involved. So we have to understand it. As I say, I&#8217;m not trying to point fingers&#8212;we&#8217;re trying to understand.</p><p>And I think it&#8217;s important for us to realize how we&#8217;re slowly involved in structures&#8212;how we become accomplices. When do we realize we&#8217;re slowly getting involved? That&#8217;s important to know, in human terms.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Back to the topic of Japan not confronting its atrocities in Southeast Asia&#8212;near the end of the film you go to Hiroshima, or one of your crew goes, and you interview the director of a Holocaust museum there. That was a really interesting interview. Can you talk about what you were hoping to ask him, and what he told you?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> I found out about this museum along the way. It surprised me&#8212;there are actually four or six museums in Japan that commemorate the Jewish Holocaust, but there are no museums talking about the Southeast Asia massacres. And as someone from Southeast Asia, I felt angry: why aren&#8217;t you letting young people know about this?</p><p>But I didn&#8217;t ambush the director. I sent him the questions before the interview. I listed the questions I wanted to ask and gave him time to prepare how he wanted to respond.</p><p>When I went to the museum, I hired a translator&#8212;she later appears in the film. She&#8217;s from Hiroshima. People who grew up in Hiroshima are heavily educated in peace education, to remember Hiroshima as a victim of the atomic bomb. So people in Hiroshima can be reluctant to talk about Japan as an invading country&#8212;it&#8217;s too heavy for them.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Let&#8217;s slow down. Can we go through how Japanese people&#8212;especially people in Hiroshima&#8212;are educated about what happened during the war?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I think it&#8217;s complicated. Quite a few people in Japan, certainly just after the war&#8212;and even the Japanese emperor, Emperor Sh&#333;wa, who was emperor during the war&#8212;later endorsed the view that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a kind of just punishment for what the Japanese had done.</p><p>Another view is that the bombings wiped out Japanese guilt. In other words, the Japanese did terrible things during the war&#8212;in China in particular, and in Southeast Asia&#8212;but the atom bombs were so terrible that in some ways they cancelled each other out. That&#8217;s another fairly common view.</p><p>There are also Japanese who feel they suffered more than anybody else, though I&#8217;m not sure that&#8217;s the dominant view.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Lau, how was Ayano educated growing up?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> For her education, she was educated mainly as Hiroshima being a victim of the bombing. She saw many pictures of victims. She remembers innocent people&#8212;women and children suffering during the atomic bomb.</p><p>They don&#8217;t really remember that Hiroshima was also an important military center.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> It&#8217;s a big base.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> The funny thing is: when I asked Ayano to be the translator for that interview, and I gave her the questions I wanted to ask, she refused to translate for me. For her, she said it was impolite to ask elder Japanese those questions, and she found it hard to translate into Japanese.</p><p>That&#8217;s why, as you see in the film, the interview is conducted by me in English. It wasn&#8217;t originally planned that way. Along the way, she refused to translate for me quite a few times. But even for young Japanese today, it takes time to slowly understand the situation and acknowledge it. That&#8217;s what happened for her as well during the filmmaking process. It was difficult for her in the beginning.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> But I don&#8217;t think Hiroshima being a big military base was the reason for the atomic bomb. They had run out of cities to bomb&#8212;most Japanese cities had already been completely destroyed. There was a list of cities left, and Hiroshima was one of them. So it wasn&#8217;t necessarily related to the fact that it was a military center.</p><p>But I think there&#8217;s another reason Japanese memories don&#8217;t involve Southeast Asia as much: Japanese who recognize war crimes focus mostly on what happened in China, because that&#8217;s where the bulk of the crimes occurred. China was clearly invaded by Japan.</p><p>Whereas the war in Southeast Asia is often seen as a war against European empires and American empires, like in the Philippines. So it&#8217;s seen as a conflict between colonial powers, or Japan against colonial powers. That&#8217;s why, to the extent there are feelings of guilt in Japan, they may be less pronounced regarding Southeast Asia than regarding China.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> There&#8217;s one more interesting thing. During interviews with veterans, there were two kinds of responses. The first kind: as I mentioned, they rejected interviews or stopped in the middle, saying they had headaches or were old, and tried to escape the scene.</p><p>The second kind: there was one veteran in Hiroshima. When I went there, he prepared Malay song lyric books, and he tried to speak Malay to me. He had been in Malaysia before, and he spoke Malay. He tried to welcome me as a friend. He said, &#8220;I know how to speak Malay, but my children don&#8217;t. I was once in Malaya, and you are the first person who came after so many years. I want to practice my Malay with you.&#8221;</p><p>He kept singing Malay songs in a really happy mode. He stood up, tried to dance, singing in Malay. The scene was chaotic for me&#8212;it was totally outside my imagination. I didn&#8217;t know what was happening. And you could feel the soldier&#8217;s nostalgia for his youth.</p><p>This happened with a lot of Taiwanese soldiers as well. They recalled Southeast Asia more like travel. They would say they drank coconut milk, met local girls, fell in love, saw nice houses and scenery&#8212;but they didn&#8217;t mention war scenes or killings. It&#8217;s strange, but it&#8217;s also a kind of soft way they tell their memories.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> But it&#8217;s not so hard to imagine. Most of those people were very young. They&#8217;d never been in another country. Not all of them saw war crimes. It&#8217;s easy to imagine that these are memories of youth and adventure. They never really thought about the horrible things that happened, or that they may or may not have witnessed. And to the extent they knew about it, they preferred to forget.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> A lot of that&#8212;especially when they mention Manila. Many of them went to Manila before they were sent elsewhere in Southeast Asia. They would say Manila was the most beautiful city they ever saw. Comparing Manila to Taipei at that time, Manila was a totally different cosmopolitan city.</p><p>And then imagine after the war&#8212;after the Manila massacre&#8212;the whole city was almost wiped out. But nowadays, in Taiwan, very few people know about the Manila massacre at all. Yet in these Taiwanese soldiers&#8217; memories, Manila is a beautiful city. They keep mentioning it.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> I wonder how many of those troops would have been involved in the massacre, because that came right at the end of the war. And it was the Japanese marines, I think&#8212;and it may very well be that a lot of those Taiwanese were there.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> If you look at the places where Taiwanese soldiers were sent, Manila was one of the biggest hubs. A lot of Taiwanese were there&#8212;</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Right, until the end.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> Even former president Lee Teng-hui&#8217;s brother was in Manila as well. We know many soldiers sent to Southeast Asia didn&#8217;t come back. But we don&#8217;t know about the Manila massacre, or how terrible the war was.</p><p><strong>Ian</strong>: Can I bring it a bit up to date? Relations between China and Japan are very tense. The Japanese prime minister has said Japan might have to use military force if Taiwan were attacked by China. If you think about this, and about attitudes in different parts of Southeast Asia&#8212;specifically Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore&#8212;how do people react? What is public sentiment toward Japan, and the idea of Japan using military force? What do Taiwanese think, and how does that compare to people in Malaysia?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> If you look at Taiwan, in mainstream media you see slogans like: &#8220;If Taiwan is attacked, Japan will help.&#8221; This kind of slogan is very popular, and Taiwanese people welcome it.</p><p>I guess this is one obstacle for us to recall World War II memory and to acknowledge it. Because if we discuss Japan&#8217;s military involvement in Southeast Asia, it would hurt diplomacy between Taiwan and Japan.</p><p>That&#8217;s why people shy away from discussing these issues&#8212;comfort women, and compensation for Taiwanese soldiers. The government isn&#8217;t really in a position to discuss it.</p><p>For example, we do have comfort women in Taiwan. And as you mentioned, in my film it was treated like a business&#8212;stakeholders, businessmen involved in the comfort women system. But we don&#8217;t talk about this structure at all.</p><p>Even today, there is a comfort women museum in Taipei, but it relies on fundraising every year; it&#8217;s not funded by the government. The government doesn&#8217;t want it to be a permanent museum for people to remember. If they run out of funds, they can&#8217;t operate. That shows what kind of memory the government wants people to have.</p><p>In textbooks, comfort women might be mentioned, but only very simply. Meanwhile, a lot of archives and testimonies have been collected by the museum. Taiwan is a developed country&#8212;we are rich enough to build a permanent museum&#8212;but we don&#8217;t really do that.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> And in Malaysia and Singapore, how do people there regard this?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> I think it&#8217;s even worse in Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia has mainly a Malay narrative of World War II. Different ethnic groups remember in different ways&#8212;Malays keep silence.</p><p>Chinese memory is mostly within the Chinese community. Some volunteer scholars try to write about it, but there isn&#8217;t funding to set up memorials. It&#8217;s only within the community. I think it applies to the Indian community too. We have separate and divided narratives of World War II memory.</p><p>In Singapore, after the war, there was more focus on national development. Even comfort women issues were only brought up more recently. There were comfort women in Singapore, but there isn&#8217;t really organized collecting of testimony or research. And Lee Kuan Yew even said openly it wasn&#8217;t necessarily a bad thing to have comfort women in Singapore, because he said the system stopped Japanese soldiers from raping local girls.</p><p>With that kind of thinking, people are effectively told not to bring up this history too much.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> Yes, but many people in Southeast Asia are worried about China. Are they so worried that they would welcome a stronger Japan, or would war memories still make it difficult for them to accept a stronger Japanese military?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> It&#8217;s different from Taiwan. Taiwan is pro-Japan in a very strong way. In Malaysia and Singapore, people are more doubtful about Japan&#8217;s intentions. We have traumatic memories passed down. We don&#8217;t really trust Japan that much, overall. Taiwan is different&#8212;there&#8217;s a group of people who believe a stronger Japan will help keep peace in the region.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> Lau, can I ask about how official history is remembered in Malaysia and Singapore, and what you feel hasn&#8217;t been confronted yet? In the Japan case, the contrast with Germany is a big topic in the film&#8212;the Japanese evasion of their role in Southeast Asia, as well as China. As a Malaysian, what do you think the Malaysian government hasn&#8217;t confronted yet, and what would you like them to confront?</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> First: how Malays were involved with the Japanese army isn&#8217;t really mentioned or discussed. And for the Indian community, how Indians joined the Indian National Army to fight for independence&#8212;joining with Japan to &#8220;free&#8221; Indians&#8212;this part of memory isn&#8217;t really discussed in Malaysia either. People think: this is just an Indian story, not something to discuss nationally.</p><p>And even for Chinese communities, some elements in my film challenge Chinese thinking as well. The mainstream Chinese narrative is that Chinese were totally innocent, and Japanese were evil&#8212;it&#8217;s a stereotype. &#8220;All Japanese are evil, all Chinese are innocent.&#8221;</p><p>But in my film, as you can see, there&#8217;s a village head who was forced to make a decision&#8212;if he handed over twelve girls, his village would not be massacred in return. People had to make hard choices. Even within the Chinese community, people faced moral dilemmas&#8212;who collaborates with Japan, who doesn&#8217;t. But we don&#8217;t really discuss that. We keep using memory for nationalist narrative, instead of focusing on individual memory and individual suffering.</p><p>That&#8217;s also what I&#8217;m trying to show with Simon&#8217;s grandfather. He was a musician before the war. He was recruited as a translator for the Japanese army, but that doesn&#8217;t mean he was born evil. During the time, normal civilians had demands and requests to the Japanese army. Simon&#8217;s grandfather was the person they approached, because he could speak Japanese. He was one of the only people who could speak Hokkien and Japanese.</p><p>People would bring gifts and ask, &#8220;Can you say some good words for us? Can you find out news about someone who was taken?&#8221; I&#8217;m trying to say: don&#8217;t think of him as born evil. He faced tests&#8212;moral dilemmas about what kind of person you want to be. He saw Japanese officers taking property from people, and he slowly got involved in the system. That&#8217;s what I&#8217;m trying to show.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> I have another question, just practically, about screening the film. I&#8217;m especially curious what it&#8217;s like trying to screen this film in Japan&#8212;whether you&#8217;ve experienced resistance&#8212;and also what it&#8217;s been like in Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan.</p><p><strong>Lau:</strong> It&#8217;s very interesting&#8212;there&#8217;s a lot I can share. There was resistance even in Taiwan. When I screened in Taiwan, some Taiwanese audience members were shocked and frustrated. Some raised their hands and asked me: &#8220;Who do you think you are, a Malaysian? Why do you come and dig out our history?&#8221; I did face that in Taiwan.</p><p>At the same time, when I screened in Malaysia and Singapore, some audience members saw me as Taiwanese. A Singapore audience member raised his hand and said&#8212;very angrily&#8212;&#8220;You Taiwanese, please tell me exactly how many Taiwanese were here during World War II.&#8221;</p><p>I&#8217;m the same person, the same director, the same film. But in Taiwan, I&#8217;m treated as Southeast Asian; and in Malaysia and Singapore, they see me as Taiwanese. That&#8217;s identity politics. They project an identity onto you.</p><p>When I travel to different countries, people see me as the opposite identity. You can see how dominant national war narratives are&#8212;how quickly people project &#8220;enemy&#8221; onto you.</p><p>In Japan, there was also resistance. People asked: &#8220;What evidence can you show? Is it really true, what you show in the film?&#8221; Some accused me of political motives&#8212;again, projecting politics onto you.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> That&#8217;s a sign that you did a good job. Thank you, Lau. I really appreciate the talk.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> No, it was wonderful. Thank you very, very much.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Japan’s New Leader Meets China’s Red Line]]></title><description><![CDATA[Transcript:]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/japans-new-leader-meets-chinas-red-c4e</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/japans-new-leader-meets-chinas-red-c4e</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 04 Dec 2025 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980752/deba1ba5e26468d978d7099932531490.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p><strong>Transcript:</strong></p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Hello, I&#8217;m Ian Buruma. Today we&#8217;re discussing the first female Japanese prime minister, Takaichi Sanae. She&#8217;s a hardliner on foreign policy and a social conservative. Her hawkish views on China have unsettled Chinese leaders enough to cause a serious rift between the two countries less than a month after she was elected to lead the governing Liberal Democratic Party.</p><p>We&#8217;re delighted to discuss the new prime minister and her policies with Matsuda Tokujin, professor of law at Kanagawa University. He has written articles for many publications, including the <em>Los Angeles Times</em>. Professor Matsuda, there are great tensions today between China and Japan. This is nothing new&#8212;there is a long history of these tensions&#8212;and we&#8217;ll get into the details in a minute. But what were your first reactions when you heard about the Chinese response to Takaichi rather hardline views?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>First, good morning to you and everyone. I think in recent decades, what&#8217;s happened in Japanese constitutional politics is about the reinterpretation of Article 9. So what is happening today was already warned by many of my colleagues almost 10 years ago&#8212;that if the security legislation pushed by Abe was finally passed in 2015, someday a crisis like this would likely happen. So I won&#8217;t say I was surprised considering Prime Minister Takaichi&#8217;s basic position and her very hawkish style. Of course, she is a spiritual heir of Shinzo Abe. So I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s surprising, but still, it happened very, very quickly&#8212;right after she became prime minister. I think it was surprising for most Japanese intellectuals or lawyers, because this happened within just one week.</p><p>So I think that&#8217;s a big difference between her and Abe. Abe basically worked quite quickly to shift the constitutional argument on these basic policies, but even so, it still took two years after he returned to power at the end of 2012.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Yes. Just to make clear to everyone what this constitutional issue is about: after World War II, the Americans rewrote the Japanese constitution and inserted the famous Article 9, which bans Japan from using military force in its foreign policy.</p><p>Right-wingers, including Abe&#8217;s grandfather Kishi Nobusuke&#8212;who was a minister during the war&#8212;have wanted to change this ever since. It&#8217;s not a new policy. She is following, as you say, earlier efforts to change the constitution, but she has been perhaps less diplomatic in her utterances.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Before that&#8212;talking about 2013&#8212;Tokujin, you mentioned there was a shift. Can we go over what that shift was? That was the collective self-defense reinterpretation of the constitution under Abe?</p><p><strong>Tokujin: </strong><br>Yes. As you mentioned, the drafters of the postwar constitution were American lawyers and intellectuals, and most of them were New Deal&#8211;minded people. They put the pacifism into the constitution, but they also knew that there was no reason to deny Japan&#8217;s right as a nation-state to defend itself. So from the very beginning, Article 9 was never meant as a &#8220;suicide clause.&#8221;</p><p>We use the term &#8220;right to individual self-defense,&#8221; and that is still constitutional under Article 9. There is no controversy about that. But what Abe did was reinterpret the UN Charter&#8217;s notion of &#8220;collective self-defense,&#8221; and they argued&#8212;especially bureaucrats close to Abe in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs&#8212;that there is no essential difference between individual self-defense and collective self-defense.</p><p>But constitutional scholars argued 10 years ago that the idea of collective self-defense is basically a new name for a military offense-defense alliance. As you both know, before World War II, Japan had a military alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. That kind of alliance just has a different name now&#8212;&#8220;collective self-defense.&#8221; And that is not allowed under Article 9.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong><br>We should perhaps add that some Americans very quickly regretted the constitution they themselves had written. Richard Nixon, when he was vice president under Eisenhower, said it was the biggest mistake the Americans made. But by then, most Japanese were in favor of the pacifist Article 9.</p><p><strong>Tokujin: <br></strong>Yes. In fact, as early as 1948&#8212;just one year after the new constitution took effect&#8212;the American authorities approached Prime Minister Yoshida and said: the constitution is now in effect, but you will have time to reconsider whether it suits your real politics. If you wish, you can amend it. And Yoshida said no.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Let me bring listeners up to what happened. This all starts in early November, when Prime Minister Takaichi is in the Japanese parliament talking about the budget. She&#8217;s asked about what circumstances national security spending could be used for. She says that if China were to use force to bring Taiwan under its control, that could constitute a situation threatening Japan&#8217;s survival. That&#8217;s a key phrase referring to something in the constitution. We can discuss that in a moment. But that triggered a tremendous reaction from China.</p><p>The first really surprising reaction was from a Chinese diplomat in Japan&#8212;the consul general&#8212;who used language suggesting that her head should be cut off.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>He said, &#8220;If a filthy head sticks its neck out, it should be cut off.&#8221; It was vulgar and violent&#8212;part of what the Chinese call &#8220;wolf warrior diplomacy,&#8221; but still far more violent than anything Takaichi said.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Right. And there&#8217;s a standard Japanese phrase he was riffing on, which is&#8230; what was it again?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>&#8220;Kubi wo tsukkomuna&#8221; (&#39318;&#12434;&#31361;&#12387;&#36796;&#12416;&#12394;).</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>&#8220;Kubi wo tsukkomuna&#8221;&#8212;which metaphorically means &#8220;don&#8217;t stick your nose into others&#8217; affairs.&#8221; It&#8217;s common, and no one imagines literal heads being stuck anywhere. But he added, essentially, &#8220;If you do, it will get cut off.&#8221; He turned the metaphor literal&#8212;that&#8217;s why it went too far.</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>I would say it was a mistake. He is an excellent Japanese speaker&#8212;very few Chinese diplomats communicate with ordinary people on social media. He was trying to use expressions ordinary people understand. But that&#8217;s very risky for a diplomat.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong></p><p>So he used a Chinese sensibility but brought it into Japanese&#8212;and for Japanese speakers, it sounded extreme. And the English translation sounds just as crazy.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong></p><p>But did Takaichi actually mean to deny that Taiwan is part of China? Or did she mean that a military attack on Taiwan would threaten Japan&#8217;s security&#8212;for example because China would dominate the sea lanes? Isn&#8217;t that more what she meant?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>If you&#8217;re familiar with postwar diplomatic history between China and Japan on Taiwan, it&#8217;s clear she crossed a red line. There&#8217;s no doubt. In that parliamentary exchange, she referred to China as the &#8220;Beijing authorities&#8221;&#8212;a wording not used since 1972. That implies equivalence between the governments in Beijing and Taipei.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Do you think if China were to attack Taiwan, it would in fact be a serious threat to Japan?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>That&#8217;s controversial. Western intellectuals like to ask such theoretical questions, but I don&#8217;t think even Takaichi takes that claim seriously. Ten years ago, Japanese constitutional scholars already pointed out that if you say an attack on a third state constitutes a threat to Japan&#8217;s survival, you are essentially treating Taiwan as part of Japan&#8217;s security sphere. That&#8217;s a revival of a pre-war idea. In 1972 Japan agreed there would be no such security sphere.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>But after World War II, the deal was that Japan could focus on rebuilding its economy while relying on the U.S. for security. Now, with Trump, many countries aren&#8217;t sure the U.S. would defend them. If Taiwan were attacked, we don&#8217;t know whether a Trump administration would defend it. In that case, Japan becomes more perilous.</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>If the majority of Japanese people want that, they should amend the constitution. They should tell China they regret the 1972 consensus and want to renegotiate. But Takaichi&#8217;s government says they haven&#8217;t changed the 1972 interpretation.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong><br>The Yomiuri or the Asahi&#8212;I can&#8217;t remember&#8212;tried in the 80s or 90s to start a national debate on amending Article 9. It didn&#8217;t take. Would you favor such a debate?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>I think, as a constitutional scholar, there should be a debate. On this, Professor Bruce Ackerman has a very good line of argument. He always says there should be a referendum on the postwar constitution; otherwise, there will always be doubts about its legitimacy&#8212;because it was imposed by the United States, and so on.</p><p>But on the other hand, if you look at the polls, especially for Article 9, it still enjoys very, very high popularity among the Japanese people. So why not have a debate and put it to a referendum? And if a majority of voters choose to keep Article 9, then it will have stronger legitimacy.</p><p>What has happened in the political history of modern Japan, unfortunately, is that most structural changes are never put to public debate. Politicians always try to do it by reinterpretation, or by changing the wording.</p><p>I told Chang yesterday that I first noticed something bad might happen right after the APEC summit, when Prime Minister Takaichi met Xi Jinping. After that, both sides released a press statement. Normally those statements say the two leaders have confirmed the &#8220;four documents&#8221; from 1972 onward that constitute the consensus. But this time, on the Japanese side, the press release did <em>not</em> mention that both sides confirmed the four documents. As a lawyer, I found that unusual.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>This is the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, where Japan said it &#8220;fully understands and respects&#8221; the position of the People&#8217;s Republic of China.</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong><br>You grew up in Taiwan. What is your sense of Taiwanese public opinion on this? Would they support Takaichi&#8217;s statement? Would they welcome it, or does it alarm them?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>Taiwan is very politically divided now. Those who support the current government&#8212;the DPP&#8212;basically share Mr. Lai&#8217;s sense that both the United States and Japan should assist, or potentially even dispatch military forces to defend Taiwan.</p><p>Mr. Lai personally has a strong preference for Japan. After he assumed the presidency, his cabinet appointed a retired Japanese military officer as an advisor. That&#8217;s in strong tension with the 1972 consensus. But that is the DPP&#8217;s stance: they want Japan to join this kind of military alliance.</p><p>On the other hand, there is a large population strongly opposed to the DPP, who do <em>not</em> want war with China. Some of them, especially those with mainlander family backgrounds, feel very deeply hurt by the desire to have a military alliance with a former enemy state. So it&#8217;s deeply divided.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>You&#8217;re talking really about the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party, and its voters. The last time I was in Taiwan&#8212;during the 2020 election&#8212;I was told that among younger Taiwanese there&#8217;s less distinction between those whose grandparents came from the mainland and those whose roots are in Taiwan: even those with mainlander grandparents feel mainly Taiwanese now.</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>Yes, but I think there&#8217;s an important difference between Tsai Ing-wen&#8217;s approach and Mr. Lai&#8217;s. President Tsai has focused more on a Taiwanese consensus, regardless of family history. Mr. Lai is more &#8220;localist&#8221;; he has stronger personal feelings against mainlanders.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Can I come back to what I said earlier? The Trump administration has really changed perceptions. One reason the current government in Taiwan might be more pro-Japan is not only nostalgia or anti-mainland feeling, but fear that the United States would not defend them if they were attacked. So they feel they have to be closer to Japan because that would be their only defense.</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>That trend began about 30 years ago, under Lee Teng-hui. I think he was the first Taiwanese leader to try to get Japan deeply involved in Taiwan issues. In his later years, he faced a situation where President Clinton visited China and US&#8211;China relations seemed very good, so he worried that Taiwan would be abandoned by the United States.</p><p>Lee was a very good Japanese speaker. He appealed to ordinary Japanese by saying: you have lost the &#8220;Japanese spirit&#8221; after World War II. That&#8217;s why so many Japanese right-wingers were so enthusiastic about him.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>And that &#8220;Japanese spirit&#8221; is also part of Takaichi&#8217;s politics, isn&#8217;t it? Like Abe, she wants to revive the Japanese spirit, promote patriotic education, and so on. How far do you think that will go in Japan?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>I don&#8217;t think, if she pushes it as a general issue&#8212;&#8220;we should go back to prewar values&#8221;&#8212;that it will work. That&#8217;s too broad. But I think she&#8217;s &#8220;lucky&#8221; in a sense because now you have Trump. Trump appeals to a kind of xenophobic, ethnic-nationalist sentiment. If you translate that into the Japanese context, today&#8217;s Japan is very inward-looking and closed. People are not used to interacting with foreigners, even if the government tries to cope with globalization. Japanese people are still very local, very inward-looking. They&#8217;re not willing to learn about international politics in depth.</p><p>And now they see so many foreigners on the streets speaking languages they don&#8217;t understand and behaving in ways they don&#8217;t understand. So there is a concrete sense of anxiety: &#8220;These foreigners are now here, just in front of us&#8212;like aliens from Mars invading Earth.&#8221;</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>And many of those &#8220;aliens&#8221; are Chinese. Abe, as you say, encouraged tourism and foreign workers because the country needs them. Would you say Takaichi&#8212;at least rhetorically&#8212;is more xenophobic and hardline than Abe?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>At this point, I can&#8217;t say exactly where she will go. There are contradictions in her own background. She was born into a conservative middle-class family, but she went to the United States and worked as an assistant to Pat Schroeder.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Pat Schroeder, by the way, is a Democratic congresswoman from Colorado.</p><p><strong>Tokyjin:</strong><br>Yes, and a feminist. I almost laughed when Takaichi said, right after she was elected LDP president, that she would &#8220;abandon work&#8211;life balance&#8221; to do everything to save the country. The idea of work&#8211;life balance was exactly what Pat Schroeder introduced into US law.</p><p>So it&#8217;s difficult to judge whether Takaichi is really a right-wing ideologue, or whether she is playing the role of a right-wing politician. Abe endorsed globalization, but he also understood conservative anxiety. So he emphasized prewar values, spiritual mobilization, militarization, and so on.</p><p>Takaichi now faces a more difficult situation, because people are suffering from the <em>legacy</em> of Abe&#8217;s policies. Globalization cannot be reversed, and she has no real power to change that trend. But the LDP&#8217;s conservative base is weakening. It&#8217;s like what a common-law scholar at Harvard Law School&#8212;Andrew&#8212;said about Trump: critics missed the point; this is no longer a question of right vs. left but of upper vs. lower.</p><p>Japanese society is entering a dangerous phase: many former middle-class people are becoming lower class economically. They are conservative, and they don&#8217;t want to rely on social welfare. They want to say, &#8220;I have a job, I run a business, I did well, so the government must protect us from foreign pressure and competition.&#8221; Because of this, Takaichi will be pushed to rely more on spiritual mobilization and premodern slogans.</p><p>You may see a very interesting coexistence in her government: postmodern economy and premodern spiritual mobilization living side by side.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>We&#8217;ve talked a bit about this spiritual mobilization and about Takaichi&#8217;s hawkish views. I want to ask, going forward, what you anticipate.</p><p>Back to what happened after her comments: China has encouraged its citizens not to travel to Japan. For context, about half of Japan&#8217;s GDP growth last year&#8212;around 1.5%&#8212;came from tourism, and a large share of that tourism was Chinese. So there will be a significant economic impact. I asked a Chinese friend yesterday whether she thought these government warnings would work, and she said she believed a significant portion of people <em>would</em> obey them. We&#8217;ll see.</p><p>There is also the seafood ban, reimposed after the Fukushima water release. Japanese films have been canceled. I was in Beijing and planning to go to a show by a Japanese jazz musician. The band was rehearsing when the police came in and told the venue it had to be canceled&#8212;and that happened across the country.</p><p>So clearly there is a significant impact. Based on Takaichi&#8217;s views&#8212;and she has not really walked back her statements&#8212;Tokujin, what do you think is in store over the next few months? Will this pass? Will it escalate? If it escalates, where? Economic sanctions back and forth? You have a pretty pessimistic view, right? You told me you think this is the new status quo.</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>Yes. I don&#8217;t think there is room for the Chinese Communist Party to walk back. Their legitimacy now almost entirely comes from a 100-year narrative of Chinese nationalism&#8212;a sad story of unfortunate conflicts between Japan and China. Taiwan is the most symbolic issue. So I see no room for either side to walk back.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Do you think Takaichi should walk back? Should the Japanese government soften its stance on China?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>Two days ago, the Chief Cabinet Secretary held a press conference and clearly said that Takaichi&#8217;s statement went beyond the traditional government interpretation on Taiwan. And because of that, it created misunderstanding for the Chinese government. So, as a matter of logic, the Japanese government has admitted that she said something different&#8212;maybe a bit too far&#8212;from the traditional scope.</p><p>If that&#8217;s the case, I think she <em>should</em> walk back.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>There&#8217;s another potential problem. One way wars can be avoided is when governments clearly understand each other&#8217;s intentions. In this case, everything is very fuzzy. The Chinese government, as you say, is highly nationalistic and wants to expand its power&#8212;that&#8217;s fairly clear. But the US government has <em>deliberately</em> left it unclear whether they would defend Taiwan. The Chinese don&#8217;t know; probably Donald Trump himself doesn&#8217;t know.</p><p>The Japanese are constrained by their constitution. They reinterpret it, but as you pointed out, it still doesn&#8217;t allow overseas warfare. Takaichi&#8217;s government clearly <em>feels</em> Japan should be able to defend Taiwan, but nothing is certain. So these countries don&#8217;t really know one another&#8217;s intentions, and that&#8217;s risky.</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>I agree. If China were trying to impose its political or social system on Japan, I would say clearly: we don&#8217;t want that. But China is a neighbor. It&#8217;s a foreign country. Since the Bandung Conference, there have been &#8220;five principles&#8221; of peaceful coexistence, including non-interference in internal affairs. Japan made such a promise to China in 1972.</p><p>Some argue that warfare in the Taiwan Strait could threaten Japan&#8217;s economy and constitute some kind of emergency, but this is not something a <em>new</em> prime minister should announce in her first week. When you stand up in parliament and make your foreign and domestic policy preferences clear, and the first thing you mention is Taiwan, what does that mean for Japanese society&#8212;given there is no consensus on this?</p><p>And the polling questions are misleading. They&#8217;re like asking, &#8220;Would you like a new house after 80 years?&#8221; Most people will say yes. But that&#8217;s different from asking <em>which</em> part of the house they want to tear down and what to rebuild. Constitutional change is like that.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>I think that&#8217;s a very interesting way to end. Chang, do you have any more questions?</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I wanted to pause on the question of intentions with respect to Takaichi&#8217;s comment. I don&#8217;t think she expected <em>this</em> kind of reaction from China. I think she was speaking mainly to a domestic audience. She has branded herself as the first female prime minister, an assertive figure in Japanese politics. It&#8217;s part of her political DNA to say something a bit provocative.</p><p>I&#8217;m curious what you think about her as the first female prime minister&#8212;what that means for Japan. Ian, you&#8217;ve written about her and compared her to Thatcher. She has explicitly said Thatcher is a role model: a woman willing to be as assertive and confident as the men in the old boys&#8217; club of England or Japan. What do you both think about her and the meaning of having a first female prime minister?</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>I think Ian wrote a very interesting essay about her, and I mostly agree. I wouldn&#8217;t label her as a &#8220;natural&#8221; right-winger or say she&#8217;s ideologically hawkish. The deeper problem is structural. In Japan&#8217;s social structure, there is very little room for a woman like Takaichi who is not from a political dynasty, is smart, is ambitious, and wants to enter politics.</p><p>For such ambitious newcomers&#8212;men or women&#8212;there is a very strong incentive to act hawkish and right-wing. That&#8217;s how you get votes. My friend and colleague, Professor Koichi Nakano, talks about &#8220;air nationalism&#8221;: a nationalistic mood in the air. For politicians who are not as secure in their districts as someone like Ishiba, they need votes from organized conservative groups&#8212;such as religious right-wing organizations like the Unification Church&#8212;and then they add on this &#8220;air nationalism&#8221; to secure their political success.</p><p>Professor Ueno Chizuko, a famous feminist intellectual, has said she&#8217;s not happy that the first female prime minister is so conservative, like Thatcher. I understand that. But I also think this is a structural problem.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>There <em>is</em> one good thing: she has proven that a woman can become prime minister of Japan. That&#8217;s already a breakthrough. Otherwise, I agree with Ueno&#8212;she&#8217;s not going to do much for women&#8217;s rights.</p><p>On her statement, I&#8217;d add that there is a perennial problem in Japan: so few people outside Japan speak Japanese, and many Japanese don&#8217;t speak other languages. Because Japan is so inward-looking, politicians often speak as though nobody outside Japan will ever hear or read what they say. That&#8217;s happened before. Prime Minister Nakasone once said that America&#8217;s problem was that it had so many non-white citizens, which held the country back. He assumed no one abroad would understand the Japanese, but of course it was picked up immediately.</p><p>I suspect when Japanese public figures talk, they assume no one outside Japan can read or understand Japanese, so it will go unnoticed. It&#8217;s possible that Takaichi, aiming largely at a domestic audience, did not think through the consequences abroad&#8212;especially in China. I don&#8217;t think she could be <em>that</em> na&#239;ve; she probably knew the Chinese would react, just not so strongly. And some reaction may actually work to her advantage domestically, because it shows she&#8217;s standing up to &#8220;big China,&#8221; which many Japanese will applaud.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>She&#8217;s certainly made her mark internationally, too. Her audience may also include Americans, who have clearly come in to back her. So it&#8217;s not necessarily a bad thing for her.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>No, but Americans have always been ambivalent about Japan&#8217;s security role. On the one hand&#8212;like Trump&#8212;they tell the Japanese to rearm, to take more responsibility, to be more hawkish. On the other hand, they want to keep control over what happens in East Asia and don&#8217;t want the Japanese to become too independent. This puts all Japanese governments in a bind.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>That sounds like a great place to end. Thank you, Tokujin. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Thank you very, very much.</p><p><strong>Tokujin:</strong><br>Thank you very much.Less than a month into Sanae Takaichi&#8217;s tenure as Japan's prime minister, she has already sparked a diplomatic crisis with Japan's powerful neighbor. Joining us is Tokujin Matsudaira, a constitutional-law professor at Kanagawa University who grew up in Taiwan. He has written extensively on Article 9, constitutional revision, and the diplomatic challenges that shape Japan&#8211;China relations.</p><p>Related Links:&nbsp;<br>https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/takaichi-sanae-iron-lady-will-not-improve-gender-relations-japan-by-ian-buruma-2025-11</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Anti-Semitism and East Asia]]></title><description><![CDATA[In the September 29, 2025, issue of The New Yorker, the writer Ian Buruma reviews two books that trace the uses and abuses of anti-semitism from late-19th century France to present-day US campus politics.]]></description><link>https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/anti-semitism-and-east-asia-ee5</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.intoasiapodcast.com/p/anti-semitism-and-east-asia-ee5</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Chang Che]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224980753/4bcdc25c3295ec6c847459720dace668.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the<em> </em><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/09/29">September 29, 2025</a>, issue of The New Yorker, the writer Ian Buruma reviews two books that trace the uses and abuses of anti-semitism from late-19th century France to present-day US campus politics. Long before right-wing Israeli politicians to evoke the term to deflect criticism of the war in Gaza, anti-semitism reflected a persistent worldview: that a shadowy group of powerful Jews often stood behind the workings of a complicated world.&nbsp;</p><p>For over a century, that idea has found converts in East Asia. In this episode, Ian and I talk about how beliefs about Jewish power manifested in Chinese and Japanese life from the 20th century to the present.</p><p>Related Links:&nbsp;</p><p>"<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/09/29/on-antisemitism-mark-mazower-book-review-world-enemy-no-1-jochen-hellbeck">The Uses and Abuses of Anti-Semitism</a>" by Ian Buruma</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I want to start with the article you wrote for <em>The New Yorker</em> about antisemitism, which doesn&#8217;t really touch on East Asia specifically. Let&#8217;s begin with how you got into this topic. I know you have Jewish ancestry on your mother&#8217;s side and you&#8217;ve written a book about your maternal grandparents. Did you ever experience antisemitism growing up?</p><p><strong>Ian: </strong><br>No, not directly. My mother was Jewish by origin, but her family wasn&#8217;t religious at all, so we didn&#8217;t lead a Jewish life or observe traditions. I didn&#8217;t personally experience antisemitism. I might have heard the odd antisemitic remark, but I grew up in the Netherlands, which had been occupied by Nazi Germany. For a long time &#8212; certainly when I was growing up &#8212; overt antisemitism was taboo. That&#8217;s changed a bit now as memories of World War II fade; we&#8217;re already in the third generation since the war, and people don&#8217;t feel quite so constrained. But when I was young, you didn&#8217;t hear much about it.</p><p>It was really when I went to Japan, at age 23 or 24, to study, that I first encountered it in a sort of na&#239;ve way. In Europe, people didn&#8217;t talk much about Jews; the word itself would sometimes be spoken in a lowered voice, as if it were embarrassing. But in Japan, there was no such embarrassment &#8212; they had no experience of Nazi occupation or the Holocaust. Their historical problems had more to do with what Japan did in China and the rest of Asia.</p><p>If people heard that I had Jewish ancestry, they would say things like, &#8220;Oh, that&#8217;s interesting &#8212; Jews are very clever, very good at making money,&#8221; and so forth. It was all said in a completely na&#239;ve spirit, not hostile. A few years before I arrived in Japan, there had been a bestseller called <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Japanese-Jews-Isaiah-Ben-Dasan/dp/0834801582">The Japanese and the Jews</a></em>, written by a right-wing Japanese author, arguing that the Japanese and Jews were &#8220;kindred peoples,&#8221; discriminated against by others, outsiders in the world, &#8220;people of the book,&#8221; and so on. It had a somewhat sinister overtone, as he was a nativist who thought in racial terms. But again, he admired the Jews as an admirably tribal people &#8212; and saw the Japanese as similar.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>The point of that book was to elevate the Japanese &#8212; to say they were on equal footing with this kind of tribal and talented Jewish people.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Yes, very much so. And this idea &#8212; that Jews are clever, powerful, tribal people who &#8220;pull strings&#8221; behind the scenes &#8212; has a long history in Japan. The logic was: one should try to stay on their good side.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>How did reactions to your Jewish ancestry differ in other parts of Asia?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Not at all, at least not personally. But what was interesting &#8212; and disturbing to some &#8212; were the periodic scandals, usually picked up by the Western press, when na&#239;ve fascinations with Hitler or Nazi imagery were discovered. For example, there was a coffee shop in Seoul that called itself &#8220;Gestapo.&#8221; Western reporters jumped on it as proof that Koreans needed to be educated. The Israeli embassy protested, and so on. Similar things happened in Taiwan, even though the government discouraged such things.</p><p>There&#8217;s a fascination in parts of East Asia with uniforms and with Hitler as a strongman &#8212; &#8220;&#21385;&#23475;,&#8221; as the Chinese might say. And remember, the biggest source of neo-Nazi memorabilia is actually the United States, because of First Amendment protections. But in the West, Nazi symbols are never innocent &#8212; they&#8217;re used by actual neo-Nazis. In East Asia, the fascination is often na&#239;ve, because people aren&#8217;t aware of how painful the associations are, especially with the Holocaust.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>When the Japanese reacted to your Jewish ancestry positively, it came from a stereotype &#8212; one that you write about in your article, which goes back to the <em>Protocols of the Elders of Zion</em>. Can you explain how modern antisemitism emerged and why the term was coined in the late 19th century?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>It emerged really in the 19th century. Antisemitism, or forms of prejudice or hatred against Jews, are very old &#8212; and they used to be primarily religious. When there was a plague in parts of Europe, for example, it was often blamed on the Jews. But the modern form of antisemitism was really a reaction to the modern state: the rise of the rule of law, equal citizenship, large cities as centers of finance, and the emancipation of Jews from their former status as a discriminated minority without the same rights as the majority.</p><p>This caused resentment among people who felt that the nation-state, as it evolved in the 19th century, should not simply be a political entity based on law and equal rights. They believed the nation-state should be rooted in ancestry and bloodlines. And the fact that Jews were now citizens of these nation-states posed a problem for them, because Jews were not considered part of the &#8220;real people.&#8221; They were seen as infiltrators &#8212; impostors or parasites. That&#8217;s the basis of modern antisemitism in Europe and, to some extent, in the United States.</p><p>Now, this is why <em>The Protocols of the Elders of Zion</em>, a tract written by a Russian in the late 19th century, was so powerful. It was a falsification suggesting that the real power in the world was wielded by a secret cabal of Jews acting behind the scenes and pulling the strings. And this fit perfectly with the antisemitic notion that Jews were infiltrators who secretly held real power.</p><p>The connection with Japan is that Japan fought a war with Russia in 1905. During the war, Japan was running out of money and was bailed out by a Jewish banker in New York, Jacob Schiff, who floated war bonds and kept Japan financed until it defeated Russia. Later, Japanese officers encountered Russians who introduced them to the <em>Protocols</em>, and Japanese &#8220;Jewish experts&#8221; in the army put two and two together: Jacob Schiff had bailed them out &#8212; so that, to them, proved the enormous power of Jewish finance. Their conclusion, interestingly, wasn&#8217;t that the Jews should be exterminated, but that Japan should stay on their side.</p><p>This had consequences in World War II. When Jews were fleeing Europe, one of the few places they could obtain visas for was Shanghai. When the Japanese occupied Shanghai, the Germans asked them to hand over the Jews so they could be sent to death camps &#8212; and the Japanese refused. Partly they didn&#8217;t want to be ordered around by the Germans, and partly because they believed Jews were powerful and should not be made into enemies.</p><p>That didn&#8217;t mean being a Jewish refugee in Shanghai in the 1930s and &#8217;40s was a picnic. There was an area called Little Vienna with pastry shops and synagogues, but many people were poor and life was rough &#8212; though still far better than Europe.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Right. And the reason Shanghai was relatively open to Jewish refugees was that it was run by foreign concessions. China didn&#8217;t control immigration there at the time. So tens of thousands of Jewish refugees were able to go to Shanghai as a refuge. Have you heard of the Fugu Plan? It refers to a plan Japan had, I think in the 1930s, after occupying Shanghai, to resettle Jewish refugees in Manchuria. Are you familiar with that?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Yes, I&#8217;ve heard of that. There were tensions between the Jewish community in Manchuria &#8212; Manchukuo, this supposedly &#8220;independent&#8221; multiracial state that was really a Japanese colony &#8212; and the Jews in Shanghai. In Harbin, there was a large Russian Jewish community that had fled Russia. The Japanese made friends with them; there are photographs of banquets hosted by the local Japanese military governor with Jewish notables, Star of David flags crossed with the Japanese flag, and so on. The Russian Jews were keen to keep this relationship warm for their own protection.</p><p>But the Jews in Shanghai were appalled. They said: how can you collaborate with an ally of Nazi Germany? This is wrong &#8212; stop. It caused a major conflict between the two communities.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>In your article, you talk about this traditional Jewish effort to combat antisemitism that you associate with what you call the left-liberal universalist tradition. Could you explain that and connect it to what was happening in France during the Dreyfus Affair? My understanding is that this idea emerged partly in reaction to the right-wing conservative approach to antisemitism. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Yes. In the late 19th century, there was a lot of violent antisemitism in Eastern Europe and Russia, and some in Western Europe. The Dreyfus case brought everything to the surface. Captain Dreyfus, a patriotic French army officer from Alsace &#8212; sometimes part of Germany, sometimes part of France &#8212; was bilingual, from a Jewish family but not religious. First and foremost, he was a French patriot.</p><p>France had lost a humiliating war to Prussia in 1871. When someone in the army was found to have betrayed secrets to the Germans, elements in the French army immediately accused Dreyfus because he was Jewish, spoke German, and was considered untrustworthy. There was a trumped-up trial based on falsified evidence. He was convicted and sent to Devil&#8217;s Island, where he endured solitary confinement under horrific conditions.</p><p>Public opinion split. The Dreyfusards, who believed he was innocent, were generally liberal, republican, pro&#8211;rule of law. The anti-Dreyfusards tended to be conservative, authoritarian, Catholic, monarchist, anti&#8211;French Revolution. It wasn&#8217;t just about Jews &#8212; it was about two competing visions of the nation-state.</p><p>Jews themselves were shocked. Theodor Herzl, covering the trial as a reporter, concluded that the only way Jews could be safe was to have their own state &#8212; the beginning of Zionism. Others drew the opposite conclusion: that Jews should find common cause with other oppressed peoples in an internationalist movement. Many on the left embraced this universalist approach.</p><p>Those two visions remain alive today. You see them in American politics: right-wing populists who see the nation as belonging to the &#8220;real people&#8221; versus liberal and internationalist traditions. And the same dynamics appeared during the pro-Palestinian demonstrations after the recent attacks and war.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>I was interested to read that when Zionism was first proposed, many Jews were skeptical. They worried it would reinforce the idea that Jews were not loyal citizens. Can you explain those reservations?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Yes. Many established Jews &#8212; successful professionals in France, Britain, Germany &#8212; were strongly against Zionism. They feared founding a Jewish state would undermine their standing as loyal citizens, suggesting their ultimate loyalty lay elsewhere. So they opposed it. And as Israel became more right-wing over time, admiration for Israel shifted to right-wing nativists in other countries, who appreciated its &#8220;tribal&#8221; aspects. Meanwhile, many Jews today support Palestinians for internationalist reasons rooted in that older tradition.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>This universalist tradition begins to weaken around World War II as the Holocaust unfolds, and the idea of a Jewish state becomes more necessary, right?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Yes. Many Holocaust survivors had no homes to return to. Immigration was difficult. Creating a state became a tragic necessity. Another factor is that, in the eyes of German and French antisemites, America had long been associated with Jews &#8212; even before Israel. America welcomed immigrants; citizenship wasn&#8217;t based on bloodlines. So antisemites saw America as a &#8220;mongrel&#8221; nation where Jews had too much influence &#8212; in Hollywood, Wall Street, everywhere. This imagery predates the modern US&#8211;Israel relationship and shaped East Asian perceptions too.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>You write that antisemitism and Israel eventually become inseparable. When did that happen, and why?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Around the 1973 war. Jews in America and elsewhere felt Israel&#8217;s survival was existential. Before that, most Jews didn&#8217;t strongly identify with Israel unless they were Zionists. But as Jewish religious tradition weakened &#8212; more secularism, more intermarriage &#8212; identification with Israel and the Holocaust partly replaced older forms of Jewish identity.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Fast-forward to the present. You write that roles traditionally held by those resisting antisemitism and those perpetuating it have reversed in some way. What do you mean?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Israel has become more tribal. But there is also antisemitism among some pro-Palestinian demonstrators &#8212; treating Israel as uniquely evil, comparing Jews to Nazis. That connects to anti-American sentiment. But many demonstrators are motivated by genuine solidarity with persecuted people, consistent with older internationalist traditions.</p><p>On the other side, those who defend Israel &#8220;tooth and nail&#8221; are often right-wing tribal nationalists. This mirrors the split of the Dreyfus era. And similar dynamics appear in Japan, Korea, and China &#8212; between liberals who favor rule of law and those who favor blood-and-soil nationalism.</p><p>In China, ideas about &#8220;true Han identity&#8221; go back to resistance against Mongol and Manchu rule, but modern racial thinking was heavily influenced by 19th-century European racial theories, often transmitted via Japan.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>In your article, you mention campus protests. Where do you draw the line? What would you consider antisemitic?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Support for Hamas, certainly. But I think people who believe that the Jewish state does not have the right to exist can be classified as antisemites. People who feel that it does not have the right to exist solely because of the way that the Israeli jews treat the Palestinians, I think is wrong because other countries have had terrible atrocities, but nobody feels that they don&#8217;t have the right to exist.</p><p>So I think that&#8217;s a line. I don&#8217;t know how that is linked to views expressed in East Asia. I think back to the first Gulf War, which I think illustrated something that is quite common in East Asia. And this is, again, the notion that there are people, there&#8217;s a hidden hand behind the scenes that is really pulling the strings.</p><p>And during the first Gulf War, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and an international coalition led by the United States pushed Iraq out of Kuwait, I wrote an article about how people in Germany and Japan responded to the war. And I interviewed a conservative politician in the conservative Japanese ruling party, the Liberal Democrats. We talked about oil and the reasons for the war in Iraq. And then he suddenly cut me off and he said, &#8220;Look, we&#8217;re adults. We know what this is really about. I saw Henry Kissinger on television. We know what the real story here is. We just can&#8217;t really say so.&#8221; I think that says a lot about what is perceived as antisemitism in East Asia.</p><p>And that goes back to a long history of Western colonialism and Western dominance &#8212; that in confusing times, people find comfort in conspiracy theories that clarify where the real power lies. The Jewish conspiracy theory is one of these stock theories that keeps being trotted out in times of confusion in East and West. In East Asia, it&#8217;s particularly appealing because it&#8217;s so tied to the United States. And so, where people feel that they&#8217;re being dominated by American power, many people are persuaded that this American power is really Jewish power.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Yeah, so I&#8217;ll talk a little bit about the Chinese case. So in my experience, similar to you, I think when Chinese generally think about the Jewish people, ordinary Chinese think these people are really rich and they&#8217;re really good at making money.</p><p>And I think there&#8217;s a kind of fascination and admiration for them. The times when I see Chinese move closer to antisemitism tend to be among nationalists, people who generally take a worldview that is predicated on seeing American power through the lens of something more nefarious than the American view, which tends to have a much more moralizing tone.</p><p>Nationalists in China hate that. They want to change that view and they want to say, no, America is powerful because of capitalism. And that kind of view, to just sort of flatten America&#8217;s moral &#8212; the kind of moral cushion that hovers around American power &#8212; and flatten it to capitalism, that kind of instinct grafts really easily onto an antisemitic view among nationalists. So they can easily say, instead of &#8220;capitalists,&#8221; it&#8217;s the Jews who are controlling the American media and Hollywood, because that&#8217;s the instinct of the nationalists in China.</p><p>I think the first kind of really big burst, or the most recent big burst, of antisemitic content in China really started with October 7. There was a famous commentator who said Hamas was too gentle, because what Israel was doing is effectively playing the role of the Nazis today. That kind of classic association was actually quite popular in the Chinese media at the time. You certainly don&#8217;t hear that among actual political leaders. But it&#8217;s interesting to note that these accounts were not censored. Because in China they have a tremendous amount of censors; you can censor anything that they feel is a little bit too far. And recently there was a social media influencer that was censored because he said something a little bit too strong on Taiwan. He said something like, the minute China invades Taiwan, I&#8217;m going to donate X thousands of dollars to the Chinese military. And he got censored because of that.</p><p>So clearly the Chinese government has red lines &#8212; even on the nationalist side, there&#8217;s a bit of a limit to what can be said in the Chinese media space. But I haven&#8217;t seen any of the antisemitic comments being censored, which I think is quite interesting. I wonder if it&#8217;s because it might serve some kind of function. I haven&#8217;t really thought about exactly the reasons why. But one possibility that I&#8217;ve read is that over the past five, ten years, the Americans have been pushing China on its human rights abuses in Xinjiang and against Muslim minorities.</p><p>And so there&#8217;s a little bit of whataboutism going on, which is like: look at the American Jewish role in Israel and what they&#8217;re doing to the Palestinians. How can the Americans lecture us on our treatment of Muslim minorities when America is supplying bombs to Israel to bomb Palestinians? So there&#8217;s a little bit of that, I think, and allowing the Chinese nationalists to really go after America on that, I think, is helpful from a kind of moral, diplomatic perspective.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong> <br>Yeah, no, that&#8217;s very interesting. But we haven&#8217;t mentioned this, that China is the only country in East Asia that had a Jewish minority, a Chinese Jewish minority.</p><p>They&#8217;ve died out now, but since at least the Song dynasty, there&#8217;s been a community of mostly, apparently, Persian Jews who settled in Kaifeng. I think by the 19th century, they completely assimilated into the Chinese majority, but there were families, I think still, I&#8217;ve heard stories where people say, in our family, we never eat pork. There are little bits left of it, but not much.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong> <br>The last question for you, Ian, is that you live in New York. There is a mayoral race. Zohran Mamdani has said that he doesn&#8217;t support Israel as long as it&#8217;s specifically a Jewish state. And recently, there has been this massive criticism from rabbis who wrote this letter saying that Mamdani being elected is going to imperil the safety and dignity of Jews everywhere.</p><p>First, I want to get your thoughts on that. So what are your impressions of Mamdani and the debate about Mamdani threat to Jewish safety? Do you buy that?</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Mamdani, in public, has somewhat softened his stance on his views on what he called, I think, global jihad and so on.</p><p>But I think whether one agrees with Mamdani politics or not, I don&#8217;t for a moment think that he&#8217;s a danger to the safety of American Jews. I think that&#8217;s an absurd overreaction. I don&#8217;t see how, even if he&#8217;s openly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, highly critical of Israel, even if he believes that Israel should not be defined as a Jewish state, that&#8217;s his belief.</p><p>He&#8217;s not in the Israeli government. He&#8217;s never said that the Jews are not fully fledged American citizens with the same rights as other Americans. If he were to say that &#8212; if he were to say Jews, by definition, are sympathetic to Israel, and since I think Israel should not be a Jewish state, Jews should not have similar rights in New York, which he doesn&#8217;t say and would never say &#8212; then I would also feel that he&#8217;s a threat. But that&#8217;s not the case. That will never be the case; that never was the case. And so I don&#8217;t think he&#8217;s a danger to Jews in America.</p><p><strong>Chang:</strong><br>Great. Thank you, Ian. I appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Ian:</strong><br>Not at all.<br><br></p>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>