How Christianity Shaped North Korea’s Personality Cult
Before Pyongyang became the capital of the Kim dynasty, it was known as the “Jerusalem of the East,” a city so devoutly Christian that one American missionary in 1925 declared it “the most Protestant city” they had ever seen.
Before Pyongyang became the capital of the Kim dynasty, it was known as the "Jerusalem of the East," a city so devoutly Christian that one American missionary in 1925 declared it "the most Protestant city" they had ever seen. Its most consequential resident was a Sunday school teacher named Kim Il Sung.
Ian and Chang are joined by Jonathan Cheng, the Wall Street Journal's China bureau chief, to break down how a child of the church turned a nation into a nuclear-armed religious society. He is the author of Korean
In this episode:
0:43 — How a tourist trip to Pyongyang in 2013 turned into a book
4:14 — Kim Il-Sung vs. Mao Zedong: differences in personality cults
9:58 — Was Kim Il Sung a Christian?
12:30 — What are the Christian elements of the Kim personality cult?
19:52 — Why East Asia, and Korea in particular, seems to produce so many messianic figures
34:50 — Why did a child of the church become Christianity’s greatest persecutor?
37:40 — How Japanese imperialism fueled Korean Christianity
41:17 — The moment(s) when Kim’s personality cult took a dark turn
47:26 — The other Korean messiah: Sun Myung Moon and his endurance of religiosity in East Asia today
Below is a transcript:
Chang: Hello everyone, and welcome to Into Asia. I’m your co-host, Chang Che.
Ian: And I’m Ian Buruma.
Chang: Today we are here with the Beijing bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal, Jonathan Cheng, but we’re moving a bit east of China to talk about Jonathan’s recent book, Korean Messiah, a biography of Kim Il Sung and the Christian roots of his personality cult. Jonathan, welcome to Into Asia.
Jonathan: Hey, it’s a real pleasure to be here.
Chang: So Jon, you were previously the Korea bureau chief for the Journal. You had visited North Korea while you were bureau chief. I’m wondering whether you could talk a little bit about the inception of the book. Was it partly driven by your fascination with North Korea as you visited, or did you already have an interest in North Korea before you were the bureau chief?
Jonathan: Well, I’d been learning Korean for a few years before being sent to Seoul. My family is not Korean. My parents are from Hong Kong, so I’m Southern Chinese, but born in Canada. So I did already have a little bit of an interest in North Korea, but I can’t say I had much more knowledge of the country than the average avid newsreader, of which I would count myself as one.
When I was sent to South Korea in 2013, one of the first things I did was to go to North Korea. I spent about 10 days there as a tourist. Back then it was a bit more of a normal thing that people could go to North Korea. These days, of course, it’s near impossible, certainly if you’re an American citizen. That is really where that fascination kicked into overdrive. I was able to make another trip in 2017 when they invited the Wall Street Journal to visit. But really, it was 2013 that this book began to take shape in my mind.
It didn’t actually start as a book at all. It was something I was thinking I might want to write as a long, perhaps essayistic weekend piece for the Wall Street Journal, because I studied history in school. I’m a big history buff, and one of the first things I did when I knew I was being sent to Korea was to read what I could about North Korea. And you find that when you pick up any book about North Korea, you’ll learn the basics of Kim Il Sung’s life, because he was the founder of the state. You’ll learn that he was born on the outskirts of Pyongyang in 1912 — born, in fact, on the same day that the Titanic sank. You’ll learn that he was raised in a devout Christian family. Perhaps you’ll learn that Pyongyang was a center of Christendom at the time. All these things were quite fascinating to me, but they’re all mentioned for about a sentence or two, or at most a paragraph, in any of these books, before the book moves on and talks about Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla fighter career, and then how he ends up in Pyongyang in 1945, and then it just keeps barreling on in that way until you get to the North Korea that we know today.
And yet for me, the really big question was: hold on, what is this bit here about his upbringing in the Christian church, about his family being quite a devout family, about Pyongyang being the city that was so Christianized it was called the Jerusalem of the East? I wanted to resolve this mystery. Here I am in Pyongyang, 2013. I’m a tourist, I’m looking around at everything I see around me — the statues of Kim Il Sung everywhere, his portrait on the walls of every room you walk into, his portrait pinned over everyone’s heart, the praise songs that have been written for him, the quotations that everyone has to memorize. It just felt to me like there must have been some sort of a connection here. It couldn’t have been coincidence: the man who created the world’s greatest and most over-the-top personality cult was raised in a Christian home in a very devoutly Christian city. Could there possibly have been any connection?
And so that was where it all started. I wanted to do a little bit of research and perhaps put together a piece of maybe 1,500 or 2,000 words, and maybe I could introduce to the average newsreader: hey, did you know that Pyongyang, before it became known as the capital of the Kim dynasty, was known as this Christian city? So that’s how it began.
Ian: I think the thesis is fascinating, but while you were talking, I kept thinking: a lot of what you’re saying about the religious fervor behind the Kim dynasty was true of Mao Zedong during the Maoist years in China, and I don’t think there was a Christian background there. How would you compare the Chinese case to the Korean case in this respect?
Jonathan: Sure. It’s something I think about a lot, obviously, because the last seven years of my life have been in China. The first point I would make is that one needn’t have a Christian upbringing to build a cult of personality. Certainly there have been many cults of personality built outside of the Christian context. That said, missionaries were very active in China. We all recall the example of Hong Xiuquan, the leader of perhaps the greatest religious movement, if you want to call it that, in Chinese history — the Taiping Rebellion. He was inspired by Christian tracts that missionaries had brought to China. So you do have some of that.
Ian: He claimed to be the brother of Christ.
Jonathan: Precisely, yes. Now, obviously, that’s not the same as Mao Zedong and the cult around Mao, but I’m saying there are antecedents in Chinese history for a quasi-Christian following to gather quite a bit of steam.
So I think what you have in Mao is a cult of personality that certainly burned very bright for a relatively brief amount of time. But you didn’t have the same systematic approach that you saw with Kim Il Sung. For those who do read my book, you’ll find that there are many socialist allied countries whose diplomats in Pyongyang are, very early on, writing diplomatic cables back to their respective capitals and remarking on just how advanced and how far removed from orthodox Marxism-Leninism this cult of personality around Kim Il Sung is. Very quickly, it adopts these religious overtones, and it was very striking to these Eastern European diplomats, who of course would have been familiar with the traditional tropes and imagery and iconography of Christianity.
So I would say that Kim Il Sung begins almost right away, in his 30s. He’s only 33 years old when he takes power. And I think the real difference is that the runway Kim Il Sung had was so much longer, because he had from 1945, when he arrived back in Pyongyang, until his death in 1994. That’s 49 years — half a century. It’s a smaller population than China, certainly, but it burned bright and it stayed bright for decades and decades. And of course, unlike Mao, his cult was not repudiated after his death.
While it isn’t a prerequisite to have a Christian upbringing to have a cult of personality, I think Kim Il Sung is unique in that he really understood quite well how religion works, how faith works, how belief works — and how it can be harnessed, how it can be instrumentalized, how it can be weaponized, if you want to use that word. I quote in here a speech that Kim Il Sung gives quite early on — we know about the speech because the North Koreans have published it — where he tells his cadres to take cues from evangelical Christian pastors who have done a very good job of bringing young Koreans into the church. We should emulate them, we should learn from them. So you get these glimpses where it becomes very clear that he did model it on Christianity in some way.
Ian: I think one main difference with China is that Kim Il Sung has been followed by his son, and his son was followed by his son, and might be followed by his daughter — so it’s a dynastic succession. Now, that seems to me to point to something that is not so much Christian as possibly Confucian, modeled after the old Chinese imperial system, or indeed Japanese.
Jonathan: Yes, you can certainly point to Confucianism, but you could also turn to medieval Europe, or to any sort of feudal system where hereditary rule was the default, was the expected norm.
Chang: China has that as well. We have revolutionary princelings, right? There’s definitely hereditary stuff in there as well.
Jonathan: Right. And this points to one trap that I was trying to avoid while I was trying to conceive and write and research this book. Something like bowing before a statue of Kim Il Sung, which everyone’s expected to do when they arrive in Pyongyang, or handing off power to your son — I don’t want to say that it’s exclusively from one tradition or another. I mean, who can say? Even if you had Kim Il Sung in front of you and you asked him, he may not be able to give you an honest answer, because he may not be able to articulate it himself. So I don’t want to say that what we see in North Korea today is 28 percent Confucian, 14.5 percent Christian, and so on. That would be a fool’s errand — and of course, I throw out these numbers to show how absurd such an idea would be.
But what we can certainly say is that Kim Il Sung was, like everyone, a product of all of the various influences in his life. And I think the one unmistakable influence in his life and in his family’s life that no one had seriously looked at — and this is really why I wrote this book. The reason the book is so long is because I was just astounded by how much I was able to find, and how explicit Kim Il Sung’s debt to Christianity was in terms of his upbringing and how he became the man that he did.
Chang: Jon, do you think that Kim Il Sung was Christian at some point? Or was he just a nationalist who conveniently used Christianity for his nationalism?
Jonathan: I don’t know whether he was Christian or not, and it depends on how you define a Christian. Some people would say, well, he was born and raised in a Christian family, therefore he’s Christian. I wouldn’t agree with that statement myself. Whether or not anyone is a Christian — if you want to talk about Donald Trump, is Donald Trump a Christian? Is George W. Bush a Christian? — I would say the answer is really whether or not that person has made a decision that they want to identify that way, and that they really believe the doctrine to some degree. It’s hard to quantify. But in the case of Kim Il Sung — who am I to say? is really the answer, because I don’t know. He certainly never self-identified as a Christian. He self-identified as somebody who grew up going to church, who was very familiar with the church and very familiar with the Bible. And to some people, that would mean that he was a Christian — open and shut case.
Chang: But that wasn’t the case at some point in his life, right? Later in his life, about when he was about to die, he starts to re-embrace his Christianity. Is that right?
Jonathan: Yeah, that’s right. Though “re-embrace” is an interesting word. I don’t know that he re-embraces it per se. The word I might choose instead is that he re-engages with his faith — that’s for sure. Whether the prefix “re” suggests that he had embraced the faith earlier, I’m not entirely certain about either. But I think that he was a product of a church upbringing. He definitely understood how Christianity works at a sociological level. I think he understood how it worked at a theological level as well. That’s not the same as saying that he necessarily embraced it or believed it, which in my books would make him a Christian.
Ian: Can you perhaps become a bit more specific on that point and tell us what the Christian influence really consisted of? We know he grew up as a Christian, surrounded by Christians. We know that there were a lot of missionaries in Pyongyang. What would you identify as Christian in his cult?
Jonathan: Sure. I’ll start by picking up a little bit on what you’ve just laid out there, Ian. It is true that he was born and raised in this city that, by the time he was born in 1912, was already known as the Jerusalem of the East. His grandparents were converts to Christianity and quite devout. His parents were effectively raised in the church — certainly his mother was raised in the church. And this is a religion that had just arrived. By this religion, I refer specifically to Protestant Christianity, and more specifically to Presbyterianism. Catholicism is a separate thread — it actually enters Korea a little bit earlier — but we’ll set that aside.
This was a faith that was very vibrant, because it was the fervor of the newly converted. This was not something that those who had converted went through the motions on. If you go to a church in the West now, you may have families that have been Christian for many generations but may not take it very seriously. That was not the case here in Pyongyang. And when Kim Il Sung was growing up, he was not just somebody who showed up for church on Sundays because his parents dragged him out. He was intimately familiar with the church, and he was very active as well. He was teaching Sunday school, he was learning to play the organ, he was performing in church plays, he was doing all sorts of things in the church, and he was very familiar with the Bible. We know this because even towards the end of his life — and in his 30s, and all throughout his life — you see him quoting from the Bible in North Korean sources. North Korean sources will show us Kim Il Sung displaying his knowledge of the Bible.
How does that translate into the cult of personality that he built? This is where, again, it gets a little bit tricky, and I want to take a page from what I said in response to the previous question. I don’t want to say: you point to this thing in Christianity and it tracks neatly onto Kimilsungism, onto his cult of personality. You’ll see some people say Christianity has the Holy Trinity — the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit — and then say, well, North Korea also has its holy trinity, and its holy trinity would be Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il... and actually, this is where it breaks down a little bit. People will disagree on what the third person of the Trinity in North Korea is supposed to be. Some people will say it’s Kim Il Sung’s wife, the mother of Kim Jong Il. Some will say, no, it’s the Juche ideology of North Korea. Some will say, no, it’s the masses, the people. Or some will say, no, it’s the party — the Workers’ Party of Korea.
So I don’t know that I would say Kim Il Sung did some sort of a copy-and-paste job. The idea that one would bow before the statue of Kim Il Sung when you arrive in Pyongyang is not something that is done in a Presbyterian church. That practice, while I think very evidently religious to us — the idea of bowing before a bronze statue of another person is a religious act — I don’t know that I would call it a Christian act per se.
What I can say is that when you talk to North Korean defectors — the 30,000 or so North Koreans who have fled the country and resettled in South Korea — many of them will tell you that when they first encounter Christianity (because of course they’re not allowed to really engage with Christianity in North Korea; when they come out, they’re often introduced to it through the South Korean missionaries helping them get to South Korea), many of them will just be bowled over. They will remark on how similar it is — this Christian faith they’re being introduced to versus the Kimilsungism that they were raised in. Some of them will point to specific things like the Ten Principles in North Korea, the highest set of principles and doctrines in the land. Many of them will say it’s so clearly inspired by the Ten Commandments. And yet it’s not like you could track the first commandment over to the first principle and the second commandment to the second principle. It doesn’t work that way. So I just want to resist a little bit this notion that it was a copy-and-paste job, because I simply don’t think that’s what happened here.
Chang: It sounds to me that he transposed his learnings of Christianity from his upbringing to his own personality cult. But one possible interpretation is that he understands his audience. I wonder whether this interpretation is valid: that he may have not been a Christian, but he was so aware of the Christian faith among the people of North Korea that he knew how to place himself into the Christian-shaped hole in people’s brains. Is that a fair assessment?
Jonathan: No, I think you’ve hit the nail on the head. He tells us that people need something to believe in. And: I’m going to be that person that they’re going to believe in. I’m going to be that messiah, that messianic figure, because everyone needs that — the Korean people need that. And he is explicit about that in his own memoir. We have a couple of these incidents in his eight-volume memoir — which very few North Korea scholars, I think, have actually read. I don’t want to make a blanket statement here, but I’ve raised it in a lot of conversations, and I don’t believe there have been too many North Korea scholars who have read all eight volumes. And that’s mostly because it is filled with a lot of fiction. And yet you have these anecdotes, these moments in his adolescence, where he very self-consciously breaks the fourth wall and helps explain why it is that he adopts this persona of Kim Il Sung — that’s not his birth name. That’s why he takes on this almost Superman type of figure, where he’s able to teleport, where he’s able to turn bullets into pine cones, where he’s able, effectively, almost to walk on water. He knows he can’t do this, and he makes that very clear. And yet he knows that the Korean people, who have been colonized by Japan, their hated neighbors, for 40 years — if you include the five years of the protectorate — want someone to believe in. They want a Korean messiah. They want somebody who is going to vanquish the Japanese. And even though we know that it wasn’t because of Kim Il Sung that the Japanese surrendered, it was such a craving in the nationalist spirit that at some level they were willing to suspend disbelief and attribute the defeat of the Japanese not to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but rather to this guerrilla fighter, born to Christian parents, who called himself Kim Il Sung and claimed to have vanquished the Japanese. And so I think that’s really what he took away from Christianity.
Ian: So Jon, what you just said makes a lot of sense. You obviously can’t put percentages on influences, and there are many, in all countries. What I find extraordinary in the history of China and Korea and Japan is that you so often find these hybrids between Western — in this case Christian — influences and much older local cultures. In the cult of Kim Il Sung, they also make a lot of the sacred mountain, Paektu, which is where he was supposedly a guerrilla fighter, with Tan’gun, the founder of the Korean state, and all that. And so it’s these hybrids that are interesting, and they have one thing in common — and this is where I’d like you to elaborate a little bit more on the Taiping. Why is this phenomenon — which of course you’ll find in many different countries, not just in Asia — seemingly particularly strong in Korea and other parts of East Asia: this phenomenon of messianic figures who use Christianity as well as local shamanistic and other religions to position themselves as holy figures? This is not something you find so often in France, or even in Spain or Turkey. There is something East Asian about this. What could it be?
Jonathan: It’s a great question. Generally, it is true, of course, that syncretism — this idea that religions mix and blend and indigenize — is natural. That’s part of the reason that a foreign religion can become a domestic religion, can take root in a place: it has to almost meld with the local culture in order to succeed in any way.
But certainly, in this book I spent a lot of time thinking about Korea in particular, and I got this question a lot, including from Koreans: is there something special about the Korean case? A lot of people will point to this notion that there seem to be more cults, for want of a better word, in Korea than in many other countries. The only point I’ll make here is that some people have theorized — Koreans have theorized — that Korea has thrived, in a sense, by going to extremes: by internalizing foreign ideologies and taking them to their logical endpoint. You could point to Confucianism, because almost any scholar of Confucius would tell you that the most Confucian country in the world is probably Korea — it’s probably not the Chinese. If you want to take a foreign ideology such as socialism, or Marxism-Leninism, or Stalinism, if you want to call it that, you can look at what the North Koreans did — they took it to a degree that surprised even their socialist bloc allies. Christianity, certainly, as I describe in the book: when it first enters Korea, the converts take it to a degree that you didn’t see in Japan or in India or in China. Indeed, even the Western missionaries who brought Christianity to Korea were stunned at how quickly and how fervently the Koreans adopted it. You could say the same of capitalism in South Korea, because it’s become this hyper-capitalistic society. You could even turn to K-pop music and say that what the Koreans did with Western pop music was to take it, internalize it, and take it to its logical extreme — which is how it’s managed to stand out even in that realm as well.
So I don’t know if I’ve directly answered your question, Ian, but I feel like that’s part of explaining how this Christianity, how this cult of personality, takes root in Korea and becomes something so much more than what you see in Stalin’s USSR or in Mao’s China.
Ian: Yeah, I agree with you that it’s a mug’s game to do what many Koreans, and indeed Japanese, are prone to do — or Chinese — which is to see themselves as more unique than they really are. And I don’t think it’s uniquely Korean. But this is a speculation I’m just putting to you. It could be that all three countries have a long history of imperial rule, where the emperor was also a sacred figure. And what happens when a sacred institution collapses is that you get a lot of mini-emperors. This was often said in Japan just after the war: when the imperial system collapsed, when the emperor had to say he was not divine, you got a lot of mini-emperors who had their own little cults. And maybe in China and Korea and Japan, the collapse of sacred imperial rule paved the way for figures like Mao, and for the Kim dynasty, that in a grotesque way took the place of something that was very culturally established.
Jonathan: I think that’s a fascinating theory. What I tried to do in my research was less to give a grand theory — the best thing I could do was simply to present the facts as best as I could find them, and to unearth as much as I could about Kim Il Sung’s own Christian upbringing, but also about how he ended up constructing this cult of personality that was so striking to people who grew up in the system, as well as to the Christian leaders that Kim Il Sung, towards the end of his life, invites to come visit him in Pyongyang, who engage with his cult of personality and find it just striking in its parallels.
And of course, Kim Il Sung himself wrestles with Christianity again in the last decade or two of his life. He’s very explicit in grappling with his upbringing and in trying to make sense of it himself — because he too was mortal, and he too, I presume, was grappling with his own mortality, but also the immortality that he had created around himself. Because today, here we are in 2026, more than three decades after his death, and he is still the eternal president of North Korea. There’s a lot here that I think was deeply embedded in his own psyche, and so much of what the North Korean experience is, is an outward manifestation of the internal grappling that he had with his own upbringing in this Western faith.
And part of my purpose, if there was a purpose in writing this, other than to satiate my own curiosity, was to posit that North Korea is misunderstood when we look at it primarily as a political nation-state. It absolutely is a nation-state, but I think that fundamentally overlooks so much of what makes North Korea what it is. And my own theory about what it is, is that it’s a religious society — it’s a nuclear-armed religious society — but at core, I believe it’s a religious society that is built around the veneration of the Kim family.
Ian: No, that is clearly the case. Jon, if one looks at Christian influence in East Asian countries, it’s so interesting because it has so many different facets. On the one hand, there is what you point out — the Presbyterian influences that may have gone into the cult of Kim Il Sung. Lee Kuan Yew, the strongman of Singapore, liked to say he admired the Leninist organization of the Catholic Church, and took a lot of his own autocratic notions from that. But then there is the other side of Christianity, which fires up a lot of dissidents — a lot of Chinese dissidents against the Communist Party, very much including Jimmy Lai, the newspaper owner who’s now in prison in Hong Kong — who think that Christianity is the only way to fight against Chinese authoritarianism, because it’s an alternative dogma, and so on. Maybe there is something to be looked at here, which you’ve already hinted at in an earlier answer: one reason why East Asians take to these hybrids is indeed the tradition of syncretic religions — there is no one dogma, there isn’t a Buddhist dogma or a Shintoist dogma or anything like that. What the dictatorships have often done is to create a new dogma — Mao’s Little Red Book, Kim Il Sung’s Ten Principles, and so on. And that may be the biggest influence of a monotheistic religion, in this case Christianity, which these countries have luckily not really had before — an import from the West that has had very unfortunate consequences.
Jonathan: Yeah. One point that I like to pull out from what you just said is that perhaps in America, this notion of separation of church and state — this ideal, anyway — is more the exception than the rule. In many places, religion and politics should perhaps be seen as a continuum. Certainly the Vatican would be a wonderful illustration of how politics and religion dovetail almost entirely in a state. And I would put North Korea right up there. There is a state religion, and that state religion is Kimilsungism — he’s literally written into the constitution of the country. And yet what it represents is something that’s true in every polity, which is that there is always an element of loyalty demanded by the state. But loyalty can bleed into something larger than loyalty — into devotion, into almost a veneration and worship. It’s a continuum, in a certain way.
And Kim Il Sung was really good at it — so good at it that when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, when the USSR and the Eastern Bloc collapsed in 1991, nobody thought that the North Koreans would be able to keep it going. And yet here we are, two more generations later. It’s now 2026, and in some ways the North Korean state is looking more impregnable than it’s ever looked. It has nuclear weapons. It is not in danger, I don’t think, of going the way of a Venezuela or an Iran, as we’ve seen this year, because of its possession of a nuclear deterrent. And it has a cult of personality that — and this is another contrast with Mao — there was never any liberalization, there was never any reform and opening in North Korea, there was never any glasnost or perestroika in North Korea. North Korea has only adhered to a very extreme and highly dogmatic cult of personality since 1945, with almost no breathing room. It has sustained itself at a very, very high level now for more than eight decades.
Ian: I think one great merit of your book is that it makes mincemeat of the cliché that you often hear in East Asia: “we are not a religious people, we don’t have religion here.” People in China say it, people in Japan say it, and people in Korea. This is clearly bullshit. They’re as religious, and as prone to worship and submission and so on, as any other people. And what is interesting is the form that it takes. In North Korea, and certainly in Mao’s China, they had to actually believe dogmatically in everything that the great leader said or wrote — hence the fact that in photographs of the Kims, you see all these dignitaries behind them scribbling notes. Every word is a lesson to be taught. And this idea that you have to believe dogmatically — I think that’s the main legacy of Christianity, of a monotheistic religion, which didn’t exist before.
Jonathan: Although I am frequently asked: how much do you think the fervor on display in North Korea — when Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un walks into the room and you see everyone almost in a state of ecstasy — how much of that is real? First of all, let’s begin with the idea that there is no way to know for sure. But I think most people would accept that not all of it is real — some of it is feigned, some of it may be affected — and yet I still think that the vast majority of it is probably real. Again, I can’t prove that.
Ian: Yes, but if you put a bunch of teenagers with Taylor Swift, they’d react in a very similar way. I actually saw it, because I was in Pyongyang a few months after Kim Il Sung died. I was told to go and mingle with a crowd that bowed to the statue, and you had professional mourners in the Korean tradition, through loudspeakers, who were wailing and crying, and there were a lot of teachers with children. And many of these children probably didn’t have very strong feelings about the great leader, but as soon as they saw their teachers cry and heard it through the loudspeakers, it became a matter of crowd psychology. There’s nothing particularly Korean about it — and then they all went into hysterics.
Jonathan: Yes, that’s right. I think in many ways, the fans of a rock star or a pop star or a movie star are akin, in many ways, to a religious experience.
Ian: Yeah — which is why the founding fathers wanted to keep it separate. One almost begins to think, and I say this as somebody who has no religion whatsoever, that organized religion, just like rock concerts, is actually a good thing, because it allows people to go through all these things without it becoming political.
Chang: Jon, there’s a line in your book that says this guy who grew up Christian became the greatest persecutor of Christians. How do you explain that about him?
Jonathan: I think the answer, in my mind, is quite straightforward. He harnessed the power of Christianity because he understood it. But part of understanding the power of Christianity is then recognizing it as a potential threat. In other words, I think he recognized Christianity as both a blueprint and a potential threat to the very pseudo-Christian belief system that he himself was propagating and championing. We’ve seen how Christianity has transformed our species over the last 2,000 years, and how it’s affected the sweep of history.
Chang: Do you think that if, in an alternative historical timeline, Japan was really nice to the Koreans, Christianity would not have been so ubiquitous in North Korea, and it may not have been called the Jerusalem of the East?
Jonathan: It’s a great question, because I spend a lot of the book explaining how the flourishing of Christianity in Korea went hand in hand with the rise of Korean nationalism. I’m very careful about putting the two words “Christian” and “nationalism” next to one another, because it carries so much baggage in the context of modern-day America, for one thing. But certainly that’s what you saw happen in Korea at the dawn of the 20th century: the two really flourished as parallel, intertwined ideologies. Because Christianity did not enter Korea as a classically imperialist endeavor, the way Christianity entered the Americas — as an imperialistic handmaiden to the conquering power. In Korea, the conquering power was actually a non-Christian nation, a Shinto nation, and Christianity, rather than being associated with the ruling colonial force, was actually seen as a bulwark against the encroaching imperialist power. So yes, I do think that if Japan’s colonial rule over Korea had not been as cruel and as iron-fisted as it was, it is possible that Christianity would not have flourished to the same degree in Korea. That’s a big counterfactual, and I don’t know how far we can possibly take it. But it’s a fascinating one to consider.
Chang: There’s something I noticed in your book that made me think of this, which had to do with something I’m familiar with: the Zainichi Koreans. These are the Koreans who live in Japan. During the war efforts in World War II, Japan forced a lot of Koreans to move to Japan, and a lot of them stayed. And one thing that stuck out from your book was that during the time Kim Il Sung was cultivating his cult of personality, there seemed to be a lot of Zainichi Koreans who were not on the mainland — they were not, in fact, living anywhere near Kim Il Sung — but they somehow fell into his cult of personality. I wondered whether the reason is that they had a common enemy: the Japanese. They were extremely discriminated against — famously, the Zainichi Koreans are discriminated against in Japan — and they saw Kim Il Sung as the nationalist figure that would liberate them from the Japanese.
Jonathan: I think you’re spot on. Most of the Zainichi Koreans, as far as I understand it, are actually from what we would now call South Korea — the southern half of the peninsula; of course, they were all over there before the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel. So none of them should have necessarily had a geographic or familial tie, or reason to associate with Kim Il Sung. And yet most of these Koreans were indeed, as you say, the underclass in Osaka, in Tokyo, in these other cities — including, by the way, Kim Jong Un’s mother, who, as Anna Fifield wrote in her biography of Kim Jong Un, was singing in the choir of the Korean church in Osaka.
And many of them do end up identifying with Kim Il Sung. There’s one particular source that I cite — a memoir from a Zainichi Korean who ends up in North Korea and later escapes — who talks exactly about this. He said that Kim Il Sung was like a Robin Hood-Superman sort of messianic figure to these Zainichi Koreans: this superhero who could single-handedly vanquish the Japanese. And even if it was fanciful, bordering on utterly fictional — a comic book portrayal of Kim Il Sung — it’s what they wanted to believe. And because they wanted to believe it, and because Kim Il Sung was so willing to play the part, it had a real attraction, a real magnetism, for many of these Zainichi Koreans.
And that’s another thing I really hope I got across in the book: from the outside, it’s so easy to mock North Korea. We know that because so many people in the West get their understanding of North Korea from Team America: World Police, that movie from 2004, or from The Interview, the movie from a few years back that Sony Pictures put out — to their regret later. The Kim family is so easy to mock in a certain way, because of the way they look, because of how isolated the country is. And yet it’s not all what you might dismiss as brainwashing. I think there really is a genuine appeal to this plucky country that has been able to stand up to the great imperialist powers of the day. Here it is in 2026, with a nuclear deterrent, with a fourth generation waiting in the wings. This is a success story, when you consider what happened to all of North Korea’s ideological and socialist peers.
Chang: So I was kind of sympathetic to Kim Il Sung in the first half of the book, because he just comes across as a guy who — there’s an interesting section where you highlight the moment when he explicitly says he’s basically going to start a personality cult: people need a hero, and I’m going to be that person. But then in the second half of the book, things take a really dark turn. His personality cult becomes deranged; it becomes very aggressive. And I’m wondering whether there was a tipping point — the fall, the moment Adam ate the apple. In your research, did you find anything that explains how it became so dark in the second half of the book?
Jonathan: Well, I would point to two moments. One is when he first comes to power in 1945. You see him actually not persecuting Christians right away. He is taking power in Pyongyang, and he knows — because he’s a child of Pyongyang — that this is a conservative Christian stronghold. So he actually reaches out with an olive branch to the Christian leaders of Pyongyang. He quotes scripture, he shows off his knowledge of the Bible, he talks about his favorite hymn from when he was a child, and all the rest of it. But then you have this assassination attempt on him very early on — March the 1st, 1946 — and on his distant uncle, whom he later makes the vice president of the DPRK. I think that’s one moment where you can see the dark side come out. Certainly the Christians who were trying to kill him — one might say they weren’t practicing the highest ideals of Christian teachings — and yet one can understand how an assassination attempt or two can change your mind about working with these Christians. That’s one moment.
The other comes in 1956, when Khrushchev in Moscow calls for de-Stalinization and the scrapping of the personality cult. When Khrushchev tries to squeeze him, they even do a joint intervention: the USSR and the PRC send two of their top men to Pyongyang to try and get Kim Il Sung in line. And he also faces a coup attempt at this point — the only real coup attempt he faces is also in 1956.
I think it’s actually pretty simple. In 1946, Christians tried to kill him, and in 1956, his own more orthodox Marxist-Leninist colleagues tried to depose him. In both cases, he fends off the challenge, he gets more extreme, and he doubles down on his cult of personality. And I think that’s really what happens.
Ian: Yeah, but I’d like to challenge the idea of him as a nice fellow full of Christian virtue, who somehow psychologically tipped over into something else, in the way that power corrupts and so on. Don’t forget: he was a ruthless operator who would never have been in power had it not been for Stalin’s Soviet Union. He was their puppet. They put him in there. He knew what they were doing and used them, but they were also using him. So the thing was pretty dark from the very beginning. And you describe in your book, very well and in great detail, how there were far more decent people, many of them Christians, who could have had political power in North Korea and were ruthlessly disposed of. The same case has often been made for Ho Chi Minh — that he was really a liberal, and it was only American imperialism that turned him into a despot. And this is nonsense. He was never a Jeffersonian liberal.
Jonathan: No — and thank you for making that point, Ian. I think that’s exactly right. There’s been this portrayal of him as almost bumbling his way to the top. But this was a very high-stakes game. This was life or death. The elbows were very sharp. Kim Il Sung was a genuinely charismatic figure — I believe that, not having met him, but from the photos and everything that’s written about him, I think there was a charm to him. But that doesn’t change the fact that beneath it there was a real ruthlessness that was necessary in order for him to get to where he got. There’s no way he even gets to 1956 as the leader of North Korea — perhaps there’s not even a way he gets to March 1946, when that assassination attempt takes place — unless he is very sharp-elbowed indeed. He was incredible at playing that game, as well as the game of playing his two patrons, the USSR and the PRC, off one another, as you pointed out, Ian. And also at understanding how to instill a deep, deep sense of devotion, loyalty, and worship in his people. He didn’t finish high school; he wasn’t particularly well read and educated in that regard. And yet he was very skilled in the school of hard knocks, if you want to call it that. He knew how human nature works, and he was incredibly savvy about it.
Chang: Can we talk about the other Korean messiah, Sun Myung Moon? He is also a North Korean, and he’s potentially, in a way, more powerful than Kim Il Sung, because of the power that he projects globally with the Unification Church and its different branches — his followers are sometimes called the Moonies. The person who assassinated Shinzo Abe had a mother who was deeply tied to the Unification Church. So Jon, I just want to ask: how should we think about Sun Myung Moon in light of all this research you’ve done on Kim Il Sung? Maybe also talk about their relationship, because their relationship is also bizarre — I don’t quite understand how they came to embrace at some point. Enlighten us about Sun Myung Moon, please.
Jonathan: Sure. This is a section of the book where I talk about all three men — not just Kim Il Sung and Sun Myung Moon, but also Jim Jones. They understood this human need to have answers, to understand what happens after we die, to find meaning, to find community, to have someone to look up to and to follow, in a certain sense. And I think all three of them were masters — were genius — at turning this mere devotion into something larger.
So yes, the Reverend Moon is this fascinating figure, because he’s just eight years younger than Kim Il Sung, and also born in northwestern Korea. He too is a messianic figure — a Korean messiah, as it were. He appears in Pyongyang and begins to preach there in 1945, the same time that Kim Il Sung is coming to power in that same city. And it’s Kim Il Sung’s state that locks up the Reverend Moon, twice. When Reverend Moon makes it out of North Korea, he becomes an anti-communist crusader and a preacher who melds his version of Christianity with anti-communism. That endears him, of course, to Richard Nixon. It brings him to the U.S. He presides over his famous mass weddings. He buys up all of these assets — the Washington Times newspaper, the New Yorker Hotel just outside Madison Square Garden. He builds up this sushi empire in the U.S.
What’s interesting is that all three of these men controlled different faith communities. Jim Jones’s was very clearly this swath of the jungle in Guyana, where he was the unquestioned deity, almost. In Reverend Moon, what you have is not a geographically delimited faith community — it’s a transnational one. But I think what really makes Kim Il Sung stand out among the three is that he happened to build his following within the confines of a nation-state. And he was able to do that because he was in the right place at the right time, but also because he was very wily: he played his cards right, and he managed to maneuver himself into the favor of Stalin and position himself in Pyongyang. But all three of them, at some level, were able to blend belief, faith, and political power, and turn themselves into these messianic figures with almost total sway over their followers.
So I think that by the time the Reverend Moon comes to Pyongyang at the invitation of Kim Il Sung, the two of them are both survivors. They’ve both been doing this for decades and decades. They both have total dominion over millions of their followers. And so I think there’s a sense of mutual respect there. And so they embrace in Pyongyang, as you mentioned — I have the photo in my book. The Reverend Moon sets up the Potonggang Hotel in Pyongyang, which still stands today and still takes guests. They start an automotive joint venture together, Pyeonghwa Motors. And Kim Il Sung permits the Reverend Moon to turn his birthplace in northwestern Korea into a pilgrimage site.
Actually, Chang, I sort of have the opposite view of you: it’s not bizarre, in a certain sense. It makes perfect sense. The two of them understand each other — they’re two peas in a pod, one could almost say, in that they could look each other in the eye.
Chang: It’s kind of like Trump and Xi.
Jonathan: Yeah — they’re so different in so many ways, and they were antagonistic on the surface in so many ways, and yet there was perhaps more that bound them together than actually divided them. And I think that’s what you saw at the end of their respective lives.
Chang: Great. Okay, well, with that, thank you so much, Jonathan Cheng. I really appreciate it.
Jonathan: Thank you. It was a real pleasure being here — really, just so much fun talking about this and putting it in context. Messiah: Kim Il Sung and the Christian Roots of North Korea's Personality Cult (Knopf, April 2026)


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