What Trump’s Military Pullback Means for East Asia
Trump has scaled back military exercises with South Korea and is courting North Korea’s president Kim Jung Un.
Trump has scaled back military exercises with South Korea and is courting North Korea's president Kim Jung Un. Chang and Ian discuss what this means for Japan and South Korea from discussions of nuclear re
We discuss:
1:42 — What’s different about Trump’s pullback from South Korea now compared with 2018?
8:16 — If the U.S. security guarantee weakens, what would Japan and South Korea actually have to do to defend themselves?
12:24 — The historical obstacles to closer military coordination between Japan and South Korea
17:28 — Will a weaker American nuclear umbrella push Japan and South Korea toward nuclear weapons?
22:23 — Has the Iran war made East Asia more vulnerable to China and North Korea?
24:18 — How an American pullback could reshape Japan’s domestic politics
27:23 — Is Japan ready to revise its pacifist constitution?
31:06 — Why the history of Japanese imperialism still complicates rearmament
Transcript:
Chang Che [00:00]
One of the topics Ian and I have discussed over the past few months is what East Asia is going to look like now that Trump has made it very clear that he is treating military alliances like transactions, destabilizing what used to be the American security umbrella in East Asia.
We got a really good look at this last week, when a joint military exercise between the U.S. and South Korea, called Ulchi Freedom Shield, was pared down by Trump with an announcement on Truth Social—which is apparently the main place to announce these kinds of major military decisions.
He said that, because of his good relationship with Kim Jong Un, he did not want to antagonize North Korea. That was one reason he cited. The other was that he had asked South Korea for help in opening the Strait of Hormuz—again, Iran comes into this—and South Korea said, “No, thanks.”
So Ian, I guess one way to ask you this question is to play devil’s advocate and say: What’s new here? Trump also did this in 2018. If we remember, in 2018 Trump and Kim Jong Un began a series of meetings, and that year he also canceled military exercises with South Korea so as not to antagonize Kim Jong Un.
It seems Trump wants to meet Kim again later this year. U.S. officials have apparently already said as much to the media. So is this just a repeat of 2018? And shouldn’t we also be happy that Trump is meeting leaders of nuclear-armed countries to presumably try to stabilize those relationships?
Ian Buruma [01:42]
In a way, it is a repeat. But certain things have happened since he canceled the exercises the last time. Furthermore, the cancellation—or scaling back—of the so-called Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises was followed even more recently by the cancellation of joint exercises between U.S. and South Korean Marines. All of that is important.
Now, the difference from 2018 is not Trump’s psychology. Trump has this illusion that, if only he can get together with other strongmen—he likes talking to dictators; he much prefers it to talking to prime ministers or presidents of democracies—and if they like him, then he can somehow sort things out with them.
He tried that in 2018. He had a meeting with Kim Jong Un, and it didn’t go anywhere. Since then, the North Koreans have simply carried on and built up even more formidable nuclear capabilities. They have been lobbing missiles in the direction of South Korea and Japan and have become, if anything, more threatening.
And nonetheless, Trump is still basically repeating North Korean propaganda points by saying that South Korean and American military exercises are a provocation, and so on; that if only he and Kim Jong Un could get together, they could sort things out.
The South Koreans become a sort of hindrance, in the same way that he thinks Ukraine is hindering his ability to sort things out with Putin. He thinks that if only he and Putin could organize the world according to their interests, smaller countries shouldn’t stand in their way.
I think he sees South Korea very much in that light.
Now, this is terrifying to allies such as South Korea and Japan—and, in Europe, to the Europeans and Ukrainians—because what it suggests is that Trump wants to divide the world among three or four strongmen, and anybody who objects should be given short shrift.
In East Asia, this is upsetting the whole postwar order. The deal after 1945, after the end of World War II, was that the United States would guarantee the security of its allies, South Korea and Japan, by offering a nuclear umbrella, conducting military exercises, and stationing troops in those countries as so-called “tripwires.” Meaning that, if there were an attack on American troops, the United States would automatically defend its allies.
That deal is now unraveling.
That is causing huge problems for the South Koreans and the Japanese, just as it is causing problems for NATO members in Europe. But in my view, the problems in East Asia are even more serious.
Chang [04:39]
Yeah. I was thinking maybe we should consider why this is happening.
Obviously, there’s the Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz. Trump has been asking a lot of allies for help with that, and he’s been unhappy with many countries for their lack of help. So that’s not new.
But why do you think Trump wants to repair relations with North Korea now? Is he just trying to find some kind of foreign-policy win that he can sell back to his base before the elections?
Ian [05:09]
I think he has this fantasy. Don’t forget, he’s an amateur. He knows nothing about foreign policy, balances of power, relations with allies, and so on. He’s a fantasist.
His fantasy is of his own omnipotence.
He has promised his voters that America would no longer get entangled in foreign wars. He thinks the way to achieve this is for him to get together with other strongmen, such as Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, or Kim Jong Un, and basically come to agreements that suit the strongmen but might create great dangers for American allies.
He thinks that doesn’t matter. Those allies should just shut up and get out of the way, and he and these strongmen will decide how the world is to be ordered.
He thinks that he will then go down in history as the great peacemaker who ended wars by coming to agreements with formerly belligerent and hostile powers—that through sheer personal magnetism and personal rapport with these various figures, he will create world peace.
I think that’s his fantasy.
More sophisticated operators, like Putin and Xi Jinping, are perfectly happy and able to play up to those fantasies by flattering him and so on. But so far it hasn’t gone anywhere.
He still thinks of himself in those grandiose terms. And he still thinks allies should essentially shut up and get out of the way of his grand global vision.
So when you ask, “Has anything changed?”—no, that hasn’t changed.
But the situation is becoming more and more dangerous, because without American protection, or the guarantee of American protection, the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the Europeans will have to go it alone.
The next question, then, is: Is it time for that? How are they going to go about it? And what are the problems?
Chang [07:24]
We should also point out that Trump has recently made clear that, on the basis of what he considers good relations with an autocrat, he’s willing to compromise on regional security.
The biggest example was during the summit with Xi Jinping. The United States was about to sell a major arms package to Taiwan, and Trump paused it partly to ingratiate himself with Xi Jinping.
That’s another example of this worry: if push comes to shove, and there’s a moment when China can entice Trump with a good deal, will Trump be willing to compromise on the security of Taiwan? Japan?
Is he going to do something similar with joint military exercises with Japan? I’m pretty sure there’s one coming up at some point this year.
What are your thoughts on how Japan is reacting to all of this?
Ian [08:16]
He’s capable of doing anything. So this is very disconcerting for U.S. allies.
In Europe, at least, there is NATO. There is the EU. There are efforts to build up the arms industry in Germany. They are beginning to wake up.
Whether they have enough time to build up enough independence from the security guaranteed by the United States is a big question.
In East Asia, it’s a harder question, because there is no NATO in East Asia. There is no military alliance in East Asia apart from American security guarantees.
The Japanese security treaty with the United States is the main thing that protects them. The alliance with South Korea works in much the same way. It depends entirely on the willingness of the United States to defend them.
Taiwan is a slightly more difficult issue because there is no explicit guarantee to defend Taiwan in the case of an invasion. It’s left deliberately vague. But in the cases of South Korea and Japan, the deal was clear.
Now that deal is unraveling.
So what are the Japanese going to do?
The Japanese have a constitution that makes it unconstitutional for Japan to take part in combat outside its own borders. There have also historically been restrictions involving nuclear weapons and the export of lethal weapons.
All this has already been nibbled at for some time by conservative Japanese prime ministers like Abe, who tried to finesse the constitution so that Japan could begin exporting arms and building up its arms industry.
Japan has fairly formidable armed forces, but it still depends heavily on the United States. And it cannot become independent from American military protection without changing the constitution—without changing the famous Article 9.
The Koreans don’t have that constitutional barrier, but it’s a small country. They can’t go it alone.
So if the United States were to disappear as the guarantor of its allies’ security in East Asia, those East Asian allies would have to start fending for themselves.
In Japan’s case, that means changing the constitution. It also means greater cooperation among the Japanese, the Koreans, the Southeast Asians, the Indians, and Australia.
Some new kind of East Asian NATO would have to emerge.
And one of the first steps is closer cooperation between Japan and South Korea. There are all kinds of problems there—historical problems. South Koreans are very sensitive about Japan, especially when it comes to Japanese military affairs.
They know they have to cooperate. There are already various military cooperation agreements, and conservative presidents in South Korea have been quite willing to cooperate with Japan on these issues. But left-wing politicians and South Korean leaders have historically been much less willing.
So it’s interesting that Lee Jae-myung, who comes from the left, is now drawing much closer to the Japanese prime minister, Takaichi, despite the fact that he represents a party that has traditionally been very skeptical of Japan.
On both sides, I think they realize the importance of this.
But there are still a lot of things standing in their way.
Chang [11:53]
Yeah. I was looking into whether Japan and South Korea conduct joint military exercises. It looks like they’ve resumed some cooperation.
Right now there’s a trilateral exercise, launched in 2024, involving air, naval, and cyber units from Japan, South Korea, and the United States.
Basically, the United States is the hub and all of the East Asian countries are spokes. They need to start building relationships outside of that—they need to break out of the hub-and-spokes model.
Do you feel like that’s different from NATO in Europe? Is that less the case there?
Ian [12:24]
No, it is the case, but the Europeans have enough problems cooperating with one another. The French are always suspicious of the Germans, and so on.
But there is a very high level of cooperation, also because of the EU.
I think the relationship between Japan and South Korea—the nature of those relations, the historical hurts, the constant demands that Japan should apologize more for its past—is more difficult. Those issues have largely been resolved in Europe.
Now, if a far-right party were to come to power in Germany, and possibly in France, that would create all kinds of problems as well. But so far, I think relations in East Asia are more fraught and more difficult than anything in Europe.
One thing I find very interesting is that Lee Jae-myung said at a recent press conference, talking about cooperation between Japan and South Korea and specifically about greater military cooperation: “In my view, there is a practical need for it, but if I say something like that, I’ll get scolded”—meaning domestically.
And this has long been a problem in Korea.
The attitude toward Japan, the history of colonialism and Japanese brutality in the first half of the 20th century, is very much a domestic political issue in South Korea.
The conservatives and the conservative party—even though politicians today were all born after the Japanese colonial empire came to an end—carry a legacy in which South Korean conservatives were associated, for fairly good reasons, with collaboration with the Japanese during the imperial period.
The conservative elite in South Korea, in many ways, benefited from colonial rule. They were bureaucrats. They were people who ran universities. They were officers in the Japanese Imperial Army, and so on.
And that continued after the war. Those same people, and their children, continued to be important in conservative politics in South Korea.
The left has always opposed them. And one of the ways they’ve opposed them is by saying: You were collaborators with Japan. You’re pandering to Japan. All these deals you want to make with Japan, all this military cooperation—it shows that you’re still part of that collaborationist tradition.
Whereas we, the left, believe in Korean nationalism, and we believe that Japan should be forced to pay more money in reparations and should apologize more, and so on.
That’s the politics Lee Jae-myung comes from.
But partly because of Trump, because the role of the United States has changed, things are shifting.
For a long time, the United States was like a schoolteacher in a playground trying to bring unruly kids who were fighting each other together. It was always the United States pushing the South Koreans and the Japanese to cooperate more and more amicably.
If the United States starts moving away—if it becomes erratic and is no longer dependable—the Koreans and Japanese have to start getting along not because the schoolteacher tells them to, but because they themselves see it as being in their interest.
I think Lee Jae-myung understands that very well.
Hence the fact that he has close relations with the conservative Japanese prime minister, and hence the fact that he says, essentially, “I’m in favor of more cooperation, but I’ll get hit if I say that too openly back home.”
Because his voters, of course, haven’t quite gotten there yet.
Chang [16:10]
The way you put it reminds me of something Trump supporters would say: this idea that East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea, as well as Europe, should do more for their own security is not a Trump phenomenon.
Successive presidents have always wanted these countries to contribute more to their own security. But Trump has, in a way, accelerated that process in record time.
And it might not necessarily be a bad thing for Korea and Japan to break out of what you described as this kind of domestic political deadlock.
I’m wondering what some of the consequences or dangers are of the United States pulling back and pushing East Asian countries to contribute more.
One unintended byproduct might be that we’re once again having debates about both countries going nuclear.
Last December, in 2025, somebody in the Japanese administration raised the possibility that this was under discussion. More recently, in July, the defense minister said in a television interview that discussion of nuclear weapons was “unavoidable.”
We’re potentially entering a world where we have multiple additional nuclear-armed states. I don’t think the Trump administration is really thinking about that right now, and they’re basically accelerating that discussion.
Ian [17:28]
Yes, I think that’s absolutely right.
Again, the idea of nuclear nonproliferation was predicated on a world order in which, in the past, the Soviet Union, the United States, and a few other countries monopolized these weapons.
Other countries didn’t need them because they were under an umbrella.
Once they feel that umbrella isn’t going to save them, they’re going to want their own bombs. I think that is going to be a big issue—not only in East Asia. The Poles want a nuclear bomb as well. I think this is going to become an issue.
And I agree with you: it’s not necessarily wrong that U.S. allies should begin standing up for themselves.
After World War II, these countries were impoverished and incapable of doing so. They needed the United States to create what became known as Pax Americana—the world order based on the United States acting as a kind of policeman for much of the world.
That dependency was necessary for a while.
But after a while, dependence becomes a problem.
You could compare it a little bit to the end of the European empires after World War II. The end of imperialism was greeted by most people as something necessary and desirable. Colonies wanted to be independent. It was humiliating to be colonized by faraway powers, et cetera.
The question then is: How is independence to be achieved? Can independence be achieved without a great deal of pain? Is there a right time for a country to become independent?
One of the arguments of colonial empires was always, “We’ll give our colonies independence at some point, but they’re not really ready for it.”
Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister in the early 1960s, under whose premiership many colonies in Africa became independent, was once asked by the right-wing American journalist William Buckley whether these countries were ready for it.
His answer was essentially: Well, no. But if we don’t give them independence now, they’ll never be ready for it. The longer we postpone it, the longer it will take them to learn how to be independent nations.
In some cases, independence perhaps came too soon. In India, for example, the British left rather quickly. Pakistan and India became two states, and independence came at the price of enormous massacres and murders. Hundreds of thousands of people died as a consequence.
Britain was later accused of leaving too soon—that it should have stayed longer and made sure this wouldn’t happen.
But if they’d stayed longer, until when?
Is there an ideal point?
The way the United States moved out of Afghanistan more recently is a similar story. Joe Biden was accused of leaving too quickly. But the longer you stay, the more difficult it becomes for these dependencies to gain independence.
You build up a class of people who are dependent on the colonial, imperial, or dominant power, and who make money out of it. It creates a new elite—exactly the kind of elite in South Korea that, to this day, is accused of having been collaborationist.
So these dependencies have to end at some point.
The question is: How do you do it without creating mayhem?
More independence from the United States is desirable, both in East Asia and Europe. But the way Donald Trump is shaking up the world creates enormous dangers.
One of them is very practical and concrete.
Having started a very foolish and reckless war in Iran, thinking that he could simply do this in five minutes, he has depleted American arms. The aircraft-carrier presence the United States had in the Pacific has been affected by deployments to the Middle East.
The United States is looking increasingly weak.
This could become an incentive for China or North Korea to try something reckless. It could make the Chinese bolder about taking over Taiwan in one way or another. They might feel that this is their opportunity: America is weak; Trump is not interested in defending his allies.
It could have all kinds of consequences like that.
So yes, it is desirable for allies that are now rich enough to start standing on their own feet without the United States.
But everything depends on how it’s done.
Chang [22:23]
We should definitely emphasize that.
Right now, because of the war in Iran, there has been a significant depletion of U.S. military stockpiles, especially long-range missiles. I think there’s been something like a 50 percent depletion in some categories of long-range missiles, which is quite significant.
It’s going to take years for the United States to build that back up.
There’s an argument in the security world that, if China has been deterred from invading Taiwan primarily because of American military might, then over the next year, two years, or three years, we may find out whether that really was the determining factor.
There are, of course, domestic considerations in China. Xi Jinping has been purging the military and its leadership quite significantly.
But there is a theory of the case in which China’s prudence about invading Taiwan has been based mainly on the American military presence.
As you said, a U.S. carrier had to be shifted because of the war in Iran. That effectively means a carrier is missing from East Asia.
That should make East Asians very nervous about what happens going forward.
One thing I wanted to ask you about, Ian, regarding your analogy to the colonial era: my understanding was that you were also talking about the possibility that the process of becoming independent can produce a lot of domestic disarray, and about whether nations are ready for that process.
That got me thinking about whether a withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from East Asia would change the domestic politics of Japan—whether it would empower the right, and maybe radicalize the left.
Japan has a history of political violence and assassinations.
Could this kind of dynamic have an effect on domestic politics? How do you imagine that might happen?
Ian [24:18]
I think that’s a very good question. This is speculation, of course.
First of all, there is a great temptation—even though the Japanese, Koreans, Europeans, and so on realize perfectly well that, in the long run, they have to become more independent from the United States—to kick the can down the road, as they say.
Right now, probably many people in Tokyo, and possibly Seoul, are thinking the same thing as many Europeans and Ukrainians: Well, Trump is going to be in power for another two years. Let’s try to wait this out and hope for a more moderate U.S. president in two years’ time, so that somehow the status quo ante can be restored.
I think that’s a fatal temptation.
As you pointed out, it is desirable for these countries to start thinking about standing on their own feet more independently of the United States.
But I think what they’re hoping is that things will stabilize again and they won’t have to worry about this so much, because it is a worry.
And one of the worries is exactly what you’re talking about.
If the Japanese start to panic and think this is becoming an existential issue, and that China is a huge danger to the nation—possibly exaggerated, but such panics do occur—that could lead to more right-wing, more authoritarian politics.
There are voices on the right in Japan that hint at what might happen: much stricter laws, perhaps restrictions on free speech, tougher sanctions on dissidents, and that kind of thing.
And that could lead, in turn, to a backlash from the left and potentially to violence.
This is very possible.
A nuclear arms race in East Asia and elsewhere that runs out of control is obviously very undesirable, too.
It will have an impact on domestic politics.
In some ways, the relative stability and calm—perhaps too much calm—of Japanese politics since World War II has rested on this arrangement. Japan has basically had one conservative party in power most of the time, with very little political turbulence.
Again, perhaps too little. Politics should have been livelier. There should have been changes of government and different parties that were equally viable as governing parties.
But that stability was largely possible because of Pax Americana. Because the United States was there to take care of Japanese security, the Japanese could concentrate on building up their industries, their economic wealth, and so on.
That stability would be in great danger, I think, once Pax Americana crumbles.
In South Korea this is perhaps less dangerous, because since the disappearance—or toppling—of the military regime in the 1980s, in some ways South Korea has had a better-functioning and livelier democracy than Japan.
Chang [27:23]
So, to catch people up on the current state of Japan’s military readiness: we did an episode last year about the relationship between Japan and China becoming strained after Takaichi said, during what was essentially a budget hearing, that an attack on Taiwan could constitute an “existential threat” to Japan.
She used a specific legal term that could potentially trigger Japan’s ability to come to Taiwan’s defense militarily.
That tension has not subsided. This kind of winter chill between Japan and China is continuing.
And what she was saying in that hearing fed directly into the increase in the Japanese military budget.
Japan’s defense budget was effectively stuck around 1 percent of GDP until 2022. Since then, it has been moving toward 2 percent.
And the biggest shift potentially coming up is in the spring of next year, when Takaichi has said she would like to have the prospect of formally initiating a constitutional amendment in sight by the spring.
She still has to convince roughly ten more people in the upper house. She has a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house, but she does not have a supermajority in the upper house, which is required to pass a constitutional revision before it can then go to the public in a referendum.
There have already been protests this year. There was a major protest over the summer. Tens of thousands of people across multiple cities in Japan came out around Constitution Memorial Day to support maintaining Article 9.
From your experience in Japan, where do you think the public is on this?
Do you think there’s a chance the public is ready to revise Article 9? And is that going to radicalize half of the public?
Ian [29:28]
I don’t know about half the public.
From the polls I’ve been reading, the people who have the biggest problem with revising it tend to be older people who grew up in the pacifist postwar world.
They were comfortable with it because they had had more than enough of war, being bullied by the military, Japanese military adventures, and so on.
So they were perfectly happy with it, and even felt slightly morally superior to other countries.
You still see that tone a little bit in the Asahi Shimbun, the liberal Asahi Shimbun, where editorials are constantly saying: We are the only country that has been atom-bombed, so it is our duty to show the world the way to peace, and so on and so forth.
Many people in the older generation feel that way, for very understandable reasons.
The last thing they want is for Japan to become involved in another war. They feel that the constitution, and Article 9, protects them against that.
But again, that’s predicated on the United States defending them in the event of war.
The people who are beginning to realize that this is not a lasting solution—that simply calling for peace and saying Japan has a moral role to be the great peacemaker is not sufficient—tend to be younger.
So I think eventually the constitution will be revised, probably with the support of a majority in Japan.
Chang [30:58]
Right. And by the way, I can also confirm from the photos of the protests that the average age was definitely on the higher side.
Ian [31:06]
Again, history still haunts all of this.
Just as it haunts the South Koreans—the history of collaboration, the history of Japanese brutality, and so on—which still stands in the way of healthy relations with their neighbor, history also haunts Japanese politics.
Because it’s one thing for the Liberal Democrats, the conservatives, to say: We need to change the constitution because it’s no longer viable. We need to be able to defend ourselves better.
It’s another thing to say: This is necessary because we’ve been beating ourselves up far too much about what we did in the past. By the way, it wasn’t all that bad. We just behaved like any other great power. There’s nothing the Japanese did during the colonial period or World War II that was any different from what anybody else did. It’s just leftists making us feel ashamed of being Japanese.
As long as conservative politicians use that argument to revise the constitution, there will be opposition—not only from the Japanese left, but from countries like South Korea, too.
So when South Koreans say, “We understand that it is necessary to cooperate more closely with Japan, but we also want Japan to apologize,” that history is part of the equation.
Now, in my view, Japan has actually apologized quite a bit under various Japanese governments. The demand for constant apology is perhaps overdone, and in some ways it is weaponized.
But that won’t go away as long as conservative politicians in Japan use history as part of the argument for revising the constitution, and say that Japan really has nothing to be ashamed of and no reason to apologize—and therefore Article 9 is obsolete.
That should not be the argument.
What should happen is that you have a responsible Japanese government that argues for a revision of the constitution while also being prepared to acknowledge what went seriously wrong in the past.
Chang [33:16]
We’re having a collision of realpolitik and history, and we’ll have to see which one wins out.
Ian [33:21]
That’s right.
Chang [33:23]
Great. Thank you again.
Ian [33:25]
Thank you.
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