Into Asia
Into Asia
The Untold Story of Jimmy Lai
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The Untold Story of Jimmy Lai

Before Jimmy Lai was branded the biggest “black hand” behind Hong Kong’s 2019 protests, he was a child laborer in a glove and textile factory.

Before Jimmy Lai was branded the biggest “black hand” behind Hong Kong’s 2019 protests, he was a child laborer in a glove and textile factory. His unlikely story is chronicled in The Troublemaker: How Jimmy Lai Became a Billionaire, Hong Kong’s Greatest Dissident, and China’s Most Feare

In this episode:

  • 00:00 Intro; Jimmy Lai in prison

  • 04:07 Why Beijing fears Lai

  • 05:41 Apple Daily and the 2003 march

  • 09:37 Lai’s fortune: sweaters, Giordano, Li Peng

  • 13:05 Faith: Lai’s conversion to Catholicism

  • 16:48 Lai, the American right, and the Democrats

  • 19:43 Hong Kong vs. mainland civil society

  • 23:13 Why Lai wasn’t jailed sooner

  • 26:03 Hong Kong today: “soft resistance”

  • 29:52 Universities and daily life

  • 31:55 The diaspora and transnational repression

  • 34:32 Coalitions: Hong Kong, the mainland, and the lockdowns

  • 40:51 Hongkongers in Taiwan

1. Intro; Jimmy Lai in prison (00:00)

Ian Buruma 00:00 Hello. Welcome to Into Asia. I’m your host, Ian Buruma, and my co-host in Tokyo is Chang Che. We’re very pleased to talk today to Mark Clifford, a distinguished journalist and the author of The Troublemaker, a biography of Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong newspaper mogul and businessman who is in prison for at least 20 years for many alleged crimes, one of them conspiracy to collude with foreign forces. Mark is also president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, and he used to be the editor of the South China Morning Post. Welcome, Mark.

Mark Clifford 00:39 Thanks very much. Great to be here.

Ian Buruma 00:40 Mark, I was last in Hong Kong in January 2020, about a month before Covid really became a big issue. Hong Kong then was still jumping. There were demonstrations every day. I interviewed all the famous dissidents, including Jimmy Lai; we had lunch. It seemed more exciting and lively than I’d ever experienced it. I lived in Hong Kong in the 1980s, which is when we first met, when it was still a British crown colony. There wasn’t much politics going on then. You had headlines in the paper you later edited saying things like “British colonial secretary decrees.” In early 2020 it felt exciting because the young generation had been born and raised there. They were no longer immigrants. It was their city, and they felt they had a real say. And as we know, it all ended badly. Three-quarters of the people I interviewed ended up in prison, and some of them are still there. Perhaps you could first give us an update on Jimmy Lai himself. What’s happening with him, or not happening?

Mark Clifford 01:51 First of all, thanks very much. It’s great to have this opportunity to talk to you, and it’s always a pleasure. Jimmy is, as you mentioned, serving a 20-year sentence. He’s 78, so it’s effectively a life sentence. Unless there’s some sort of release on medical or humanitarian grounds, he will die in prison. He’s in solitary confinement in the oldest prison in Hong Kong, the 1937 maximum-security Stanley Prison, where prisoners on death row were held before they were executed. He has a floor to himself. He’s a real VIP. I don’t think there’s ever been a political prisoner like him in Hong Kong. They completely isolate him from the rest of the prison population. That floor isn’t there to give him privacy. It’s to make sure he doesn’t communicate with anyone and that no one sees him. I’m told that even some of the adjacent floors are at least partially empty, and this is in a facility that’s overcrowded, over its maximum. He gets out of his windowless cell for about 50 minutes a day for exercise. What’s really extraordinary is that whenever he’s moved, everyone is cleared out, and he’s escorted by a phalanx of guards holding tarps around him so no one can possibly take a picture. That’s because back in 2023, a freelance French journalist had the temerity to wait on the hill overlooking Stanley Prison, above the ocean, and got a long-lens shot of Jimmy going out to exercise.

The authorities seem so worried about just the image of Jimmy. We see the same kind of obsession with the Dalai Lama. When his wife, Teresa, has her weekly 30-minute visit with him behind Plexiglas, closely monitored, they clear the entire waiting room. Nobody else can visit their loved ones in prison while she’s there. So he’s being held in these extraordinary circumstances. He’s been in for more than 2,000 days, mostly in solitary confinement. He was imprisoned later that year, in December, after you met him. These are really difficult conditions even for someone young and in the best of health, and he’s not in the best of health. He has long suffered from diabetes, and he’s 78, so it’s not looking good.

2. Why Beijing fears Lai (04:07)

Ian Buruma 04:07 Why do you think they’re more afraid of him than of any of the other dissidents? That kind of security seems extraordinary, and I haven’t heard of anything like it for any of the other prisoners.

Mark Clifford 04:19 Actually, there are many of them. This is an interesting story. There are a few dozen prisoners in isolation, and supposedly all of them, including Jimmy, have signed documents saying they wish to be in isolation. The United Nations says solitary should only be used as a last resort, never for more than 15 days, or it constitutes torture. So it beggars belief that dozens of people have asked to be in solitary for more than a month at a time.

Be that as it may, the Chinese Communist Party, in its infinite wisdom and historical understanding, seems to have decided that Jimmy Lai is a uniquely bad person, and that through his wealth, and above all his media platform, he was responsible for millions of Hong Kong people coming out into the streets in 2014.

And then most dramatically, as you mentioned in your introduction, in 2019 we had single demonstrations approaching 2 million people in a city of 7.5 million, and obviously not drawing people from over the border. They think Jimmy is the black hand, the puppeteer behind all these demonstrations. I think that’s a gross misreading of Hong Kong people and of Hong Kong history. But that’s how it is. They think he is singularly important and singularly responsible.

3. Apple Daily and the 2003 march (05:41)

Ian Buruma 05:41 You mentioned he was a media mogul. How important was Apple Daily, his newspaper, part scandal sheet, part something a bit better than that, in the development of Hong Kong politics? Perhaps you could explain its role a little, I suppose starting from Tiananmen in 1989.

Mark Clifford 06:01 I think you’re right to go back to Tiananmen. But let me go back a little earlier. Jimmy was born on the mainland just before the Communists took power. He left at the age of 12, in 1961, in the midst of a famine that killed something like 45 million people. His mother and, I think, his twin sister left a couple of years later. I think his mother faced the choice of watching her kids waste away and die, or getting them to Hong Kong. So he came to Hong Kong and went from sleeping on a factory floor to owning a factory in 15 years. He built up first a sweater manufacturing business and then a retail operation. He wasn’t political. He supported Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the ‘80s. But he was sickened by the killings of June 3rd and 4th, 1989, when hundreds, maybe thousands, of people were killed across China.

That’s when he decided to go into media. He had a visceral hatred of the Chinese Communist Party. He’s a primary school dropout, no PhD or egghead. He had an instinctive aversion to the Party’s control over people and over the economy, as a successful businessman in freewheeling Hong Kong. When he decided to go into media, his friends said, “What do you know about media? You’re a garment guy, you’re from the rag trade.” And he said, “I read Fortune, I read The Economist, I read Time. I can do this.” Real entrepreneurial verve. He first started Next Magazine, which did heavy investigative work but also had lots of paparazzi, starlet movie gossip, and scandal. Five years later he doubled down and started a newspaper, Apple Daily, which, as you said, was all over the place. It had everything from really sleazy sex scandals, and worse, to really good political coverage. It had Nobel Prize–winning economists. It had a horse racing section. It was a real smorgasbord of a paper, and it quickly became wildly popular and made him a lot of money.

But on the point of how important they were: in late 2002, the government started talking about introducing a national security law, which it was obligated to do under the Basic Law, the mini-constitution that governed Hong Kong after China took over. I was at BusinessWeek then, and one of my colleagues went to the first demonstration against it. I think he told me there were 15 or 20 people. Being nice Hong Kong people, they politely burned a copy of the draft bill and put it in the trash can. That was October 2002, I think. The following July 1st, 500,000 people came out into the streets, and I’d say Jimmy, Apple Daily, and Next Digital were more responsible than anyone for getting those crowds out. There were opposition parties, there was civil society, there was a lot going on. But Jimmy really led the charge. The magazine had fold-out posters attacking the city’s leader, Tung Chee-hwa, including one with a custard pie being thrown in his face. They were probably the closest thing to an opposition political party. Fast-forward a decade or so to the 2014 Umbrella Movement. By then they were a little behind; it was a younger generation of students. But Apple and its journalists were really there, even if Jimmy was perhaps a little more conservative.

And then in 2019, full-throated support for the movement.

4. Lai’s fortune: sweaters, Giordano, Li Peng (09:37)

Chang Che 09:37 How did Jimmy Lai make his wealth? Was he already wealthy before he moved into the newspaper business?

Mark Clifford 09:45 Interesting question. He made his first fortune making sweaters, and he became the biggest sweater manufacturer in Hong Kong, maybe in Asia.

Ian Buruma 09:52 Jeans, too, right? Giordano.

Mark Clifford 09:54 He’s a serial entrepreneur. He got bored with just making sweaters, and he got mad that the retailers seemed to be taking most of the profit. So he said, “I can do this,” and set up Giordano, which was really the first of the fast-fashion chains. Tadashi Yanai, who was starting a little clothing company at the time, came down to learn from him, and really learned a lot from Jimmy and Giordano when he was setting up what became Uniqlo. Yanai offered to make Jimmy a 25 percent partner. Jimmy said he wasn’t interested. Yanai said, “How about 30 percent?” Jimmy passed on that too. Obviously, Yanai went on to extraordinary success. He had something Jimmy didn’t: more follow-through. He’s a much more systematic person. Jimmy is a classic entrepreneur, a classic Hong Kong entrepreneur. He’d start things and get them going, they’d be successful, and just as they started paying off, he’d move on to the next thing. So he did sweaters, then Giordano.

Giordano is interesting because it went public shortly after 1989. All of a sudden Jimmy’s stake was worth a couple hundred million dollars, and the Chinese saw that he was expanding into China. He’d opened a store in Beijing by 1994, certainly. Then he wrote a column trashing Li Peng, the premier, who was making his first trip to the West after Tiananmen. Jimmy was livid about this and famously called him “son of a turtle egg,” which basically means bastard. So the Chinese authorities responded as they so often do: they found a number of safety violations at the Giordano store in Beijing and forced it to close. Jimmy then doubled down. He wrote something like, “I’m really sorry about the bad words I used. I was a little intemperate in my language in that last column. Li Peng is a bad dude. The Chinese Communist Party is going to be consigned to the dustbin of history, and the sooner it gets there, the better.”

So the Chinese authorities kept increasing the pressure, figuring that, like most business people, he’d crumble. He would choose the profits of this company that was doing really well in China and dial back his criticism. Jimmy said, “Forget it.” He sold his Giordano stake, pocketed a couple hundred million dollars, and used it to finance the launch of Apple Daily the next year.

So he is singular, I think, certainly in modern Chinese dissident history, in having not just principles but also the cash to act on them: to start a media business and to withstand the pressure and attacks on him.

He was in Hong Kong, which was free then. But it was that kind of boldness in standing up to the Chinese that, I don’t know if it unnerved them or angered them or both, but I think there’s a long-standing desire to get Jimmy Lai, going back to 1994, even 1989.

5. Faith: Lai’s conversion to Catholicism (13:05)

Ian Buruma 13:05 There’s another side to him, which is also true of some other Chinese dissidents in recent history: he’s a devout Christian, a devout Catholic. He’s convinced, and I’ve heard the same thing from other Christian dissidents in China, that Christianity is somehow the key to Western democracy and liberalism, and that as long as the Chinese don’t find the true faith, it will always be difficult to get rid of the authoritarian heritage. His religion may help him in prison. But to what extent do you think it contributed to his political evolution? And when did he embrace the faith?

Mark Clifford 13:48 That’s a really interesting question. He was not religious. When I first met him in 1993, I didn’t see any signs of it. But writing the biography, I learned a lot more. In 1989 he met two people who really changed his life. One was Martin Lee, the so-called father of democracy in Hong Kong, who is a devout Catholic. The other was a young woman named Teresa Li, who interviewed him when she was a summer cadet at the South China Morning Post. He fell in love with her. His first wife had walked out a couple of years earlier. A little later, Teresa’s sister married another prominent pro-democracy figure, Yeung Sum, who later headed the Democratic Party. So he moved into this Catholic milieu. After 1989 he was still reluctant to convert. Teresa’s a Francophile, and he spent a lot of time in Paris, where he had long discussions with a Chinese priest living there, whom I was unable to track down.

And funnily enough, the week before the handover, in late June 1997, a friend asked him to convert, at Teresa’s behest. Jimmy said no. The day after the handover, he changed his mind and asked Bill McGurn, who’s at The Wall Street Journal, to be his godfather. I understand it usually takes about a year of preparation to convert to Catholicism. Jimmy did it in a week or so. He had the help of Joseph Zen, who I don’t think was a cardinal yet, but whom Jimmy was close to, another very prominent pro-democracy figure and one of Asia’s most prominent pro-democracy theologians. Cardinal Zen helped him prepare. Jimmy’s a very intense guy. He read assiduously. From what I’ve heard, he barely slept for a week or ten days until the conversion.

So he converted in 1997. But it’s interesting what you say, because when I hear Jimmy talk, he’s not like any other human rights person I’ve heard. He doesn’t talk in terms of universal human rights. He always talks in terms of Western values, sometimes British values. Rule of law is what I’ve always heard him say is the key. He has become increasingly religious. Even after his conversion, Apple Daily kept running reviews of brothels, and worse. I know Bill McGurn and others thought, “It’s great that Jimmy’s converting, another convert for the fold.”

But how much of it was social and political, and how much did he really believe? I think we can say without a doubt that after six years in prison, he’s a very, very devout Catholic. He reads intensely. I think he’s only allowed six books a month, but they’re all Roman Catholic, and they’re all pretty hard-core theology.

6. Lai, the American right, and the Democrats (16:48)

Ian Buruma 16:48 What he told me, and I’ve heard it from others, has to do with the notion of truth. His argument is that in China, truth is always imposed from above, by the state, by the government, and in modern times by the Communist Party. Whereas for Christians, it’s God’s truth. And that has led him to the views he holds.

There’s another element, which is perhaps more disturbing to some human rights activists. The people who support him most, in the United States in particular, are fellow devout Christians, and they’re often on the right.

I don’t think Donald Trump is a devout Christian. He pretends to be sometimes. But nonetheless, Jimmy Lai was rather supportive of Trump, because he thought Trump and his supporters were more supportive of freedom in Hong Kong, and by extension China. People on the left, where are they? Would you say it’s true that the right in the United States has been more active in supporting democracy activists in Hong Kong and China than the left?

Mark Clifford 17:55 It’s a great question. I think the left, and maybe the Democratic Party as a whole, lost their focus on China and Hong Kong human rights sometime in the last couple of decades. In the 1990s you had a Nancy Pelosi way of thinking and a Bill Clinton way of thinking, and Clinton famously linked human rights and trade, I believe in 1994, in the debate over giving China most-favored-nation trading status.

Then after China got into the WTO, that debate was settled, unfortunately to the detriment of human rights. Pelosi just met with Jimmy’s son in mid-September, I think, so Pelosi and some other Democrats are still very supportive. But what’s true is that Jimmy is a businessman. He was friends with Milton Friedman. He considers himself a Hayekian; it was reading Hayek that really turned him on to this broader truth about economics and liberty. And as a Catholic, Jimmy has personally identified with, and has more contacts among, the religious and pro-market right than the Democratic Party. Still, I’d say Jimmy personally, and Hong Kong more generally, has a lot of support among Democrats, though not as much as I’d like to see. And I do think progressives in particular, in the States and beyond, tend to check their brains at the door when it comes to China and human rights. There isn’t the concern there should be. I think we’re starting to see the Democrats get their mojo back on the issue. I’m not really sure why it disappeared.

7. Hong Kong vs. mainland civil society (19:43)

Chang Che 19:43 Mark, I wanted to ask you about the erosion of civil society in Hong Kong compared to the mainland, because you mentioned 2003. That was also a big inflection point for civil society on the mainland. It was the year of the Sun Zhigang incident, which kicked off what became known as the rights defense movement.

There were also similar publications on the mainland, like Southern Weekend, Nanfang Zhoumo. I’m curious how you’d compare Southern Weekend to Apple Daily. My sense is that after ‘89, not many mainland activists went directly after the regime. Most civil society activists tried to invoke China’s own constitution to protect civil liberties, whereas Jimmy Lai wasn’t afraid to go after the regime itself. Is that just a result of the civil society protections the government had committed to in Hong Kong? How do you explain the difference?

Mark Clifford 20:37 I think Hong Kong was never democratic, but it was quite free. And as Ian said earlier, Hong Kong in the 1980s, when we first met, wasn’t political on the surface, but underneath there was a huge amount bubbling. Parenthetically, I got a PhD a few years ago in postwar Hong Kong history, and it’s really interesting how much politics was going on beneath the surface.

So civil society in Hong Kong had been developing pretty powerfully since 1945. The shoots were small, but there were decades of slow growth: people like Christine Loh and others in groups like Hong Kong Observers or Meeting Point, which British intelligence was all over, going back to the 1970s. Then Chris Patten came along and really turbocharged the whole environment. In 1989, people in Hong Kong said, “China today is Hong Kong tomorrow.” And the lesson they took was not “Let’s hide under a rock,” but “Let’s fight and extend the civil liberties and freedoms we have.” Then Patten brought in more electoral reforms, and we got much more political engagement. Patten encouraged all this, and he encouraged Hongkongers to really believe in themselves and in Hong Kong. Jimmy came into this environment. So things were fairly well rooted by 1997. You could say they’ve spent the last three decades trying to uproot those freedoms. The elite hated Jimmy, and many of them still do. They’d be delighted if he died in jail. But Hong Kong people were ready, because, as Ian said, you had a whole generation who had grown up in Hong Kong and didn’t see it as a way station to somewhere else. The expansion of the universities, environmental groups, civil society, arts groups, the sense of Cantonese as a language and a culture: it had all been developing, and it really blossomed after ‘89, when Patten came in ‘92, in that run-up to ‘97.

As for Nanfang Zhoumo, and Caixin and Caijing, they were always more cautious. In my reading, they were much more focused on economic and business issues, although they clearly did get into some rights and labor issues, and the incident you mentioned was obviously very important. I just think things were more rooted in Hong Kong.

8. Why Lai wasn’t jailed sooner (23:13)

Chang Che 23:13 Just to follow up: something I struggle with, looking back at the erosion of civil society on the mainland, is the reverse question. Why didn’t it erode earlier? What was holding it up in the 2000s? There are a bunch of explanations on the mainland. One is that there was a collective leadership system then. It wasn’t just one guy, and there were turf disputes among elites, so it wasn’t easy to crack down on civil society. How would you explain why Jimmy Lai didn’t go to jail earlier?

Mark Clifford 23:48 That’s a great question. In June 1997, a couple of weeks before the handover, I was at an event in the grand ballroom of the Grand Hyatt. There were probably 500 people jammed in there. Jimmy Lai was on stage in conversation with Al Neuharth, the founder of USA Today, who really put the Gannett newspaper chain together. The question came up: “What’s going to happen?” And Jimmy started crying. He broke down on stage and said he expected to go to jail. I was more optimistic, or more naive. I thought, really? I knew Jimmy, and here was a guy who had just started this newspaper. So maybe we should just be surprised it took three decades instead of five years.

I should mention that I was on the board of directors of Next when it collapsed, so I got a pretty close-up view of this. I should also say that Jimmy was a very hands-off proprietor, by everyone’s account. If you wrote anything that smacked of socialism, you were gone. But other than that, he even had a columnist, Lee Yee, who was very close to the Beijing leadership. There was a real multiplicity of views. I think Apple and Next were instrumental in pushing forward the notion of freedom and of a Hong Kong identity, or a modern Chinese identity, whether in Taiwan or in Hong Kong. They weren’t the only factor. We also had a somewhat more open election system, and other media were emboldened by the example of Apple and Next. And again, I think Patten was key in raising the bar and opening things up. You had a generation, or a couple of generations, who had been held back, and they said, “This is our moment. We’re going to take it and push forward.”

But it is a good question why it didn’t happen earlier. They were trying. Think back to 2003: Tung Chee-hwa, who by the way has just died, was trying to push through the national security bill. If it had gone through in 2003, if those 20 people hadn’t somehow turned into 500,000 people on the streets and forced Tung’s resignation, maybe all this would have happened two decades earlier. We can’t really do counterfactual history, but it’s a really interesting question.

9. Hong Kong today: “soft resistance” (26:03)

Ian Buruma 26:03 Those numbers are huge. And as you say, political ferment had been bubbling under the surface for a long time. They can’t put everybody in prison. So what’s happening in Hong Kong today? Have people simply gone home and called it quits? Or is something still bubbling under the surface?

Mark Clifford 26:22 I very much believe something is bubbling beneath the surface, but it’s quite far beneath. Consider the elections. The first real territory-wide election for the Legislative Council was in 1991. The pro-democracy camp shocked everyone, including, I think, themselves, with a landslide: about six out of ten votes. The same held in every free election all the way through November 2019, right before you were last there, when the pro-democracy camp won a landslide in the district council elections. Again, about six out of ten people voted for pro-democracy candidates, even after the tumult, chaos, and violence of the summer of 2019.

Beijing and the pro-government camp thought there would be a real flip to a more conservative vote. Instead, the pro-democracy candidates stomped home, because most Hong Kong people want some form of democracy. They can debate what it should look like, but they want to live in a free, open society. Sure, a couple hundred thousand people have left, but most of the 7.5 million people who were there in 2019 are still there. And in their hearts, if they had the choice, probably six out of ten Hongkongers would again choose the pro-democracy candidates.

What we’re seeing now is what the government, being a totalitarian regime, calls “soft resistance.” Soft resistance is anything they don’t like. It’s people lining up for days before a court hearing for Chow Hang-tung, the Hong Kong Alliance member who, with her colleagues, organized the June 4th commemorations in Victoria Park every year. She was just sentenced, in early September, to, I think, over seven years and three months. People lined up for days. Somebody was actually arrested in the line. Supporters are showing up where they can, at court hearings. So I think we are seeing support, but you can’t ask people to commit suicide. People are trying to figure out where the lines are.

We’ve seen a number of booksellers arrested, including for selling my biography of Jimmy Lai. I was amazed to learn that as of earlier this year, there were 70 independent bookstores in Hong Kong. I thought there were a handful, maybe half a dozen. Most of them are the size of a closet, or a little bigger, but the point is, people are out there. The first person arrested, apparently for selling a copy of the Jimmy Lai biography, runs a bookstore whose name is usually translated in English as Mighty Punch. This guy is incredible. He’s been arrested for so many things. He was convicted for giving unauthorized Spanish lessons. Think about it: you get people together to study a foreign language, something a little more international, and that’s seen as a threat to the regime. He had a Japanese author come down, served people little cups of sake, and was arrested for serving alcohol without a license. So there are all these small things happening. I don’t want to say the authorities are powerless to stop it. They aren’t powerless; they’re arresting people. But they can’t arrest the entire city. As best we can figure, close to 2,000 people have been jailed on political charges since the 2019 protests, and 200 to 300 are behind bars right now. That’s not a huge number, but it’s pretty big for a single city of 7.5 million people.

10. Universities and daily life (29:52)

Ian Buruma 29:52 How is it affecting the universities, and education in general?

Mark Clifford 29:56 I can only give you an anecdotal answer. I went to the University of Hong Kong’s history department, and much of that department has left. Some people go back and forth, but there’s a huge squeeze. The student unions have all been disbanded, or have “voluntarily” disbanded. Many student leaders have served time in prison, and some are still there. So there’s a real crimp on intellectual freedom. You’re free if you want to study the sciences. You’re not free if you want to study history, sociology, law, the liberal arts.

Chang Che 30:33 What about daily life? Since the pandemic, or basically since 2020, have you noticed something similar to the mainland, where you’re not really at liberty to talk about politics in public? On the mainland, people are pretty honest in private. But talking about politics in any public setting is a really big taboo.

Mark Clifford 30:53 I haven’t been there since October 2020. I was planning to go back, but then Jimmy was thrown in prison. I’ve been doing quite a lot with him. I was on the board, as I said, and we’ve been doing regular weekly livestreams. My name was mentioned by the prosecutor and has continually been mentioned by Hong Kong authorities since then. I was also threatened under the national security law by a leading Hong Kong businessman. So I haven’t been back, and I don’t think the Hong Kong authorities would welcome me in. And if they did, I’m not sure they’d let me leave. So I can’t give you a great answer. But I think if you’re a foreigner working for a big bank, you’re probably enjoying the same nice expatriate lifestyle you always did, and you know not to talk about certain things. So yes, people don’t talk about politics anymore. But on the surface, as in Berlin in the mid-1930s probably, life goes on.

11. The diaspora and transnational repression (31:55)

Ian Buruma 31:55 And what about life outside Hong Kong? There’s quite a diaspora, and some of its members were prominent figures in the democracy movement. Are they heard in Hong Kong? Are they effective in any way? Or are they just voices crying in the wilderness?

Mark Clifford 32:14 Ian, I think that’s a great question, and I’ve been thinking about it. Whether you go back to 1848, or the Bolshevik Revolution, or the Hungarian Revolution, you can look at how diaspora groups try to maintain some force and relevance. There are several hundred thousand Hongkongers outside Hong Kong, concentrated in the United Kingdom, where it’s fairly easy for them to go, work, and eventually get citizenship. There are also a lot in Canada and Australia, and a lot in Taiwan as well. It’s a robust, active community. Because of technology, I think their voices have much more resonance in Hong Kong now than they might have had in, say, Hungary after 1956. Our website at the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation was recently blocked by the Chinese authorities, and they attack us. My Hong Kong Chinese colleagues have bounties on their heads: a $130,000 reward for bringing them back to Hong Kong to be prosecuted. The transnational repression is quite serious, and it’s a new and worrying trend. But I feel there’s a huge amount of interest in Hong Kong in the support they’re getting from abroad.

Take Chow Hang-tung. She and Jimmy Lai are probably the two best-known political prisoners. She and her supporters know what’s going on. Her prison statements and her statements in open court are sometimes posted on social media by her supporters almost before she’s read them out.

So there’s a surprising degree of porosity, a flow of ideas in both directions. Hongkongers in Hong Kong know the world hasn’t forgotten them. And that support continues. At the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, we’re extremely active in Washington, DC, and in London, for obvious reasons: it’s a former British crown colony, and the US is still quite engaged with China and Hong Kong.

12. Coalitions: Hong Kong, the mainland, and the lockdowns (34:32)

Chang Che 34:32 Mark, to what extent is the Hong Kong diaspora in coalition with the mainland diaspora? After Covid, a huge mainland contingent went overseas. I haven’t spent much time in these communities, but in Tokyo, which I guess counts, you sometimes see some mixing. At some of the bookstores, a lot of the events bring together Taiwanese, the Hong Kong diaspora, and the mainland diaspora. The reason I ask is that I wonder whether the Hong Kong diaspora is focused on the future of Hong Kong and not necessarily thinking about reform on the mainland. Is that what you see?

Mark Clifford 35:14 That’s a really interesting question. I just came back from Washington earlier this week. In the five-plus years I’ve been doing this work, I’ve been really encouraged to see Hong Kong become part of a coalition. You can’t really call it a united front, but it’s brought Hongkongers together with Tibetans, Uyghurs, Han Chinese, and, not surprisingly, a lot of Falun Gong and human rights defenders from the mainland. I’m sure Ian would appreciate this: Hong Kong can be a very parochial place.

One criticism I’d make of some of the younger activists is that they didn’t even want to go to the June 4th commemorations. Their attitude was, “We’re Hongkongers. That’s the mainland. It has nothing to do with us.” Really? Hong Kong isn’t going to change until China changes. So unwittingly, and I’m sure to its dismay, the Chinese Communist Party has done a lot to forge a coalition between Hong Kong and others. On September 24th, the day Xi Jinping comes to DC, there will be a number of demonstrations around the city, and they’re all coalition efforts. One might be led more by the Tibetans, another by somebody else, but all the groups are involved in all of them. From my perspective, that’s incredibly encouraging and a really interesting development. I also want to underscore the importance of technology, which gives both sides new capabilities and new opportunities. Although our website is blocked, it’s pretty easy for us to get our newsletter and statements into Hong Kong.

So we’ll see how it plays out, but I think it’s a fascinating question.

Ian Buruma 37:01 That also perhaps explains why Jimmy Lai is such a target. When I think of the famous Hong Kong activists and politicians, Martin Lee, Emily Lau, and, from the youngest generation, Joshua Wong, they were all focused on Hong Kong, and deliberately so. I knew Emily very well, as you did, and she always said she wasn’t interested in China. She was interested in Hong Kong. Whereas Jimmy Lai went straight after the central government in China. That’s a big difference, I think.

Mark Clifford 37:35 You bring up an interesting point. Jimmy is of a generation born in China. He had tried to leave China behind and just focus on his business, but when he saw the Tiananmen protesters, he said, “I felt like my mother was calling.” My young colleagues were born 20 or 25 years ago. They don’t remember the handover. They don’t have a Chinese identity. We’ve seen this in all sorts of polls: Hongkongers’ sense of being Chinese peaked, coincidentally or not, in 2008, around the Olympics. And I think it was in 2007 or 2008 that Xi Jinping, then vice premier, took over as head of the leading group on Hong Kong and Macau. That’s when a much harder-line policy started.

Chang Che 38:21 I have an interesting anecdote for you, Mark. I noticed a similar kind of political attachment from mainlanders to Hongkongers during the pandemic. I was in Shanghai during the Covid years, and during the lockdowns a lot of the Shanghai residents I spoke to related their experience to Hong Kong’s. They’d say, “It’s so interesting. When Hong Kong was protesting the national security law in 2019, [NB: 2019 was the extradition bill, 2020 was the national security law] I was always thinking, what are they so mad about? Come on.” And then, locked in their homes by the Party, they’d say, “I finally understand what Hongkongers were feeling.” That was a very powerful sentiment during the lockdown. So in a way, Xi Jinping has helped reunify a generation that, as the polls you mentioned suggest, was splintering apart, and pushed them into a kind of coalition, an anti–united front.

Mark Clifford 39:23 That’s very interesting, because one of my teachers, a young local guy who has since emigrated to Tokyo and speaks excellent Japanese, Thai, Burmese, and everything else, an amazing guy, experienced exactly the opposite. His view was, “Where were the mainlanders? We needed them in 2019.” And then something happened. It was pandemic-related, though not directly; it might have been around the White Paper movement as well. There was some new platform where, for a week or so, mainlanders and Hongkongers were suddenly mingling and talking. And he came away saying, “These mainlanders are people too.”

Chang Che 40:01 That was Clubhouse.

Mark Clifford 40:03 Clubhouse, exactly. Because there were real divisions, real racism. And by the way, Apple and Jimmy sometimes played into this. They ran a headline that called mainlanders locusts. And then Hongkongers get upset when they’re called cockroaches. The demonization on both sides is really incredible. We can all understand it, though I think the average American isn’t going to see the differences between the Cantonese, the northerners, and other mainlanders. But I think you’re right. I don’t know how durable it will be, but at least we have a foundation for real knowledge, personal relationships, and integration. I was amazed to see some of this earlier this week between the Han and the Uyghurs, and even the Falun Gong.

So it’ll be interesting to see.

13. Hongkongers in Taiwan (40:51)

Ian Buruma 40:51 I think those attitudes on the mainland long predated Covid. When Hong Kong people were complaining, many mainlanders said, “Who are these pampered Cantonese? We should have their lives, and they’re making a fuss,” and so on.

But what about the Hongkongers now in Taiwan? That same year I was in Hong Kong, 2020, was also election year in Taiwan, and quite a lot was made of Hong Kong exiles and their politics. The Taiwanese are very interested in these people.

Mark Clifford 41:25 It’s fascinating, because Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement fed into the uprising in Hong Kong, and people like Emily Lau would go to Taiwan, which drove the mainland nuts.

But I can’t give you a really good sense right now. I’ll be in Tokyo and Taipei next month, and I want to meet a lot of the Hongkongers there. What I always hear is that the Taiwanese government makes things very difficult. It’s very suspicious of Hongkongers and makes it hard for them to come. Quite a few people have told me that, for one reason or another, things didn’t work out in Taiwan. The economy isn’t great, and jobs are pretty low-paid. So I hear a lot of complaints. But I don’t know, because when I go there, the communities seem very vibrant.

14. Beijing’s misreading of Hong Kong (42:08)

Chang Che 42:08 Let’s go back to Jimmy Lai. Earlier, when we were talking about the government’s narrative about him, you wanted to say something about why it isn’t true. I wanted to give you the chance to finish that.

Mark Clifford 42:23 Thanks. The irony is that Jimmy has no political ambitions at all. He’s a private person, actually quite shy. I’m sure Ian would attest to this. He’s very happy one-on-one. He loves playing host. He has invited hundreds of foreign journalists, economists, religious figures, and politicians to his house and out on his boat. Then, usually around nine at night, it’s, “I’m going to bed. Good night, goodbye.” He’s not a man who’s generally out on the front stage, and he wouldn’t be even if he were half his age. He never had any ambition to be a Nelson Mandela or an Alexei Navalny. It’s just not who he is. So it’s ironic that the government has turned him into public enemy number one.

I think it shows, first, his entrepreneurial success. But above all, it shows how much his willingness to stand up, to not be afraid, to have principles and speak truth to power, resonated with the people of Hong Kong, because their leaders weren’t doing that, Patten being the one exception. Nobody else would stand up and call the Chinese Communist Party out for what it was: a corrupt, power-seeking cabal. Jimmy was willing to, often very crudely and rudely. He’s a primary school dropout. The fact that a primary school dropout, a Cantonese merchant, a garment guy, could rally millions of people in Hong Kong behind him is really a testament to truth. It’s not about Jimmy. It’s about his ideas.

So I think the Chinese government has consistently misread Hong Kong. I’ve looked at a lot of the material from the ‘80s, around Thatcher’s visit. I obviously don’t have access to all the internal documents, but British colonial civil servants, British businessmen, and Hong Kong Chinese businessmen trooped off to Beijing and told the Chinese leaders, and told each other, and believed, that Hong Kong people didn’t care about politics. That’s just total rubbish.

That misreading, I would say, is at the heart of the failure to understand Hong Kong, and of the failure to preserve it as the free, open, prosperous city it once was. It could have stayed that way under Chinese rule. It didn’t have to be like this, and it could change again. The DNA, the bones, are still there for Hong Kong to flourish as one of the most open cities in the world.

Ian Buruma 45:11 That’s a great place to end. Thank you very much, Mark.

Mark Clifford 45:15 Thanks a lot. It’s been fun.d Critic (2024) by veteran journalist Mark Clifford. Clifford, now the president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, sits down with Ian and Chang to discuss Lai’s path from garment factories to founding Apple Daily, Hong Kong’s loud, gossipy, fiercely pro-democracy tabloid, and his effective life sentence, meted out in February. 

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