The China Model, ten years on
Things we discussed:
Things we discussed:
00:00 — Introduction
00:53 — How Bell’s training in Western communitarianism led to Confucianism
10:42 — Does Xi’s fixation on loyalty and the cult of personality undermine Bell’s political meritocracy?
19:28 — Inside the Chinese bureaucracy: five years as the first foreign dean of a political science faculty in mainland China
24:00 — What Party Secretaries actually do all day
26:12 — The return of Communist education and the increase in censorship on academics
38:25 — Why the Legalists, not Marx, helps you understand Xi’s reform of the bureaucracy
47:49 — The Legalist roots of Xi’s obsession with “eating bitterness”
Full Transcript:
Chang Che (00:00): Hello everyone, and welcome to Into Asia. My name is Chang Che, and with me today is Daniel Bell. Daniel Bell is a professor of political theory at the University of Hong Kong, and he is the recent author of Why Ancient Chinese Political Thought Matters: Four Dialogues on China’s Past, Present, and Future. Daniel, welcome to Into Asia.
Daniel Bell (00:24): Thanks. I very much look forward to our conversation.
Chang Che (00:27): So you are very well known in the political theory world, which is where I came from. For listeners who don’t know, I graduated from a master’s at Oxford University, where Daniel was also a student. He completed his DPhil, I believe, under David Miller.
Daniel Bell (00:43): Yes, under David Miller — in 1991 I completed it.
Chang Che (00:46): I completed it a little bit after Daniel.
Daniel Bell (00:49): Were you born? I’m not sure if you were born then. But anyway.
Chang Che (00:53): But the reason why I mention this is because at the time, you were well known as an author, writer, and thinker of communitarianism, which is a sort of rejection of the current at the time, which was predominantly Rawlsian — the liberalism under John Rawls. There were many criticisms, but one of them was a kind of universalist assumption that liberal principles should or could apply to other societies. And I’m wondering whether your communitarianism ultimately informed some of the work that you would later go on to produce, such as the book on the China model.
Daniel Bell (01:31): Yeah — at the time I didn’t know, but if I want to do some sort of rational reconstruction of the past, I would say something like this. As you say, communitarianism has different strands, and one strand is that it’s a critique of the liberal view of the self, arguing that liberals tend to have an overly individualistic view of the self. And allegedly, they neglect the fact that we are communal creatures — a bit like lions, who live in packs, rather than tigers, who live individually — and also that the good life lies in nurturing the communities that give meaning to our lives. And we thought that by developing that view, we could literally overthrow the whole liberal theory that underpins much of the Western way of life. That’s part of it. The other part, as you say, is that we also argued that this liberal view, to the extent that it’s predominant, is only there in Western cultures, and not so important outside of that context.
So the first part — basically, as you suggest, I was a defender of this communitarian view at the time. But I guess I realized I was an unsuccessful revolutionary, because the liberals, I think, responded to the communitarian criticisms quite well. So basically the communitarian debate died out. But then my first job was in Singapore, from 1991 to 1994. And at the time there was this debate about Asian values — and the term “Asian values” is so broad. What do Asian countries really have so much in common that differentiates them from the West? But when the debate became more focused on Confucianism, I thought, this is really fascinating, because we have some of the same themes that we have in the communitarian debate — the idea, for example, that the good life lies in nurturing our social relations. But it actually has a much deeper and richer tradition. It’s not just an offshoot of liberalism, so to speak — it’s very much its own tradition, with diverse views and perspectives. And there are some issues that Confucians argue about that are really not prioritized in debates in Western political theory: like the importance of ritual for securing a sense of community, or the importance of harmony in social and political life, or this idea of political meritocracy — that the most important task of politics is to select and train public officials with above-average ability and virtue.
So basically, I was pushed in that direction as a result of discovering this rich and diverse Confucian tradition that has so much to offer, both for political theory in general, but also for understanding this part of the world in particular — like China, where Confucianism is a dominant political tradition, or at least has been until recently.
Chang Che (04:19): This is something that I want to tease out with you in this interview. On the one hand, there’s a kind of language that the Confucians discuss, as you say — like ritual, and the role of ritual in maintaining harmony. I could see how that is a really refreshing thing to look at coming out of the Western tradition, having battled liberals for so long. But then I also feel that it’s a different thing, right, to talk about what Confucianism implies for contemporary governance and modern states. And I think the Asian values debate was certainly about the latter, whereas what you were trying to refer to was more of the former — it was sort of opening a door to a new intellectual inquiry.
Daniel Bell (04:58): Yeah, exactly. When I studied Confucianism at first, it was a purely intellectual exercise. I didn’t relate it to the political realities of East Asian countries, even though I knew it was part of the intellectual heritage. But it’s only when I moved to China, and especially to Beijing, that I began to realize these ideas are very much live and part of the political discourse. Because I was a professor at Tsinghua University, which trains many of China’s political elites. My colleagues were all arguing about what is the best way of selecting public officials with superior ability and virtue — in Chinese it’s xianneng zhengzhi [贤能政治], which is very much this mainstream Confucian ideal. And then: which virtues matter for rulers, which abilities matter, what’s the relation between virtues and abilities, how do you assess virtue, how do you assess ability? All these issues — as someone brought up in Canada, this was just not something that we talked about, either in everyday life or in political theory.
Then I realized: where does this come from? It doesn’t come from the Marxist tradition. It doesn’t come, at least much, from the liberal tradition either. If you want to look into Western political theory, the closest would be Plato’s Republic, which is a long work that also lays out a long educational process for how to select public officials — or, as he called them, guardians — with superior ability and virtue. But when I was in Beijing, these Confucian texts were used both to understand the political system and to think about how to improve it. And I became quite fascinated. And that’s why eventually I wrote this book, The China Model, which was an effort to make sense of these ideas and put them in a relatively systematic way. What exactly is political meritocracy? What are its advantages, what are its disadvantages, and how to combine it with democracy? That came straight from my experience living and working in Beijing. I would never have written it had I stayed in Canada, or even Singapore — even Hong Kong, frankly. In Hong Kong at the time, the debates were all about how we could move towards one person, one vote, which they call democracy.
Chang Che (07:13): So you mentioned The China Model. This is your most famous book. I’m wondering whether you could talk to us about the debates with your Western interlocutors that animated it. Because it’s coming at a time of deep anxiety in the West, right? This idea of the rise of China, and this feeling that this system — a little bit opaque and difficult to understand — was now potentially going to catch up to the West. It was a really important chapter for understanding where we are today. So can you give us a little bit more background?
Daniel Bell (07:42): Thanks. I’m critical of the view that there are two kinds of political systems. One is a kind of democracy, where leaders are selected by means of one person, one vote — competitive elections, free and fair elections. And the others are all labeled authoritarian, and they’re all put in the same camp. So you have family-run dictatorships in North Korea, you have military dictatorships in Myanmar, you have hereditary monarchies like in Saudi Arabia — and you have China. And they’re all lumped into the same category. And it’s both a descriptive category, but it’s also a normative one: they’re fundamentally illegitimate, because we — meaning we brought up in the West — tend to think there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders, and that’s by means of one person, one vote.
Now, I thought: hold on a second here. That doesn’t quite fit the reality in China — what we can call the China model — where there’s a very complex bureaucracy which aims to select and promote leaders over decades of training. Those leaders are supposed to have above-average ability and virtue, and there’s this huge Department of Organization — the Zuzhibu [组织部] in Chinese — which is like the largest human resources department, at least in the political world, which really aims to select and promote those leaders. So then I decided: let’s just try to make sense of this ideal and what it would mean, and then use that as a critical perspective for evaluating the reality in China, and to think about how the Chinese political system can be improved on the basis of its own guiding political ideals — namely, this ideal of political meritocracy.
But the book itself argues for a kind of differentiated form of politics. And again, I got this from China — because when I asked questions, including, frankly, to leaders — and at that time, I was lucky enough to meet the head of the Department of Organization. And I said, what’s the right way of choosing leaders? And immediately the response: it depends what level you’re talking about, right? The right way of selecting leaders in villages is not the right way of selecting leaders at the higher levels of government. At lower levels, you can have more democratic practices, because the farmers especially know who’s a good person, who’s corrupt, who’s not corrupt, and the issues are not so complex. And then at higher levels, we want leaders who can take a more long-term perspective, who have a lot of education and training and political experience. Whereas in the middle, we don’t quite know what’s the right way, so we allow for lots of experimentation. And that really — maybe I shouldn’t admit this, but it’s rare, as a theorist, as an academic, that you get great ideas from politicians. But really, I thought this put things in perspective. That’s why I decided to develop that. And as you say, I think it hit maybe at the right time, because in 2016 Donald Trump was elected — and he’s been reelected recently. And that cast a lot of doubt on this idea that in the West there’s only one legitimate form of government, and that’s electoral democracy.
Chang Che (10:42): One thing that I think has really aged well from 2014 to now is that China has its own ideal. I don’t think anybody would contest the idea that China is not just an authoritarian dictatorship, but also one that is functioning quite well in certain respects — primarily, I think, the recognition that the Chinese are doing something right that the Americans aren’t in certain technological sectors. Why China has the ability to dominate in electric vehicles and solar panels — all these technologies of the future. And this sense that the American system is somehow losing out. That, I think, very much speaks to what you’re saying about this bureaucracy that is incentivized to experiment and innovate. So your book has really aged well in that respect.
I think what hasn’t aged well — if I were to offer my critique of the book — is that it doesn’t seem like, in the past ten years, the government is actually moving towards the kind of political meritocracy that you have set out as their ideal. In fact, if I were to put it strongly, I’d argue that Xi Jinping is actually the greatest repudiation of the Daniel Bell China model. Because rather than meritocracy, he has emphasized personal loyalty. There is a kind of reintroduction of the personality cult in Chinese life — you see this man everywhere. I’m not sure whether we could say that there’s any sort of meritocratic reason for this. And one thing that struck me about your book is that the Communist Party plays a kind of background role in it. It’s not clear to me that it even needs to exist in the Daniel Bell version of the China model. Whereas what’s been clear in the past ten years is that the party is like the most important thing about the Chinese system for Xi Jinping — the survival of the Communist Party, the role that party secretaries play; the power of party secretaries has increased across the government. And just the focus on ideology. Whereas in your book, it felt as though the Communist Party was almost superfluous to some kind of core meritocratic ideal — it’s actually the meritocracy that is superfluous to Xi Jinping, and the real core is the Communist Party.
Daniel Bell (13:11): I think there’s a lot of truth to what you’re saying, but I do need to push back a little bit. So, the Communist Party — in the book The China Model, the word “party” is kind of misleading in English, because we tend to think of one party among others. But if you think of it as a giant, bureaucratic, and quite diverse organization which aims to select and promote public officials with above-average ability and virtue, then it’s a necessary part of what I called this China model. And what has changed over the past ten years, as you suggest — it’s always been the core of the political system, but it has infiltrated more, perhaps, into everyday life. It’s become more centralized than it used to be, and there’s less experimentation at mid-levels of government than there used to be. Because remember, part of this China model, or what makes it desirable, is that at mid-levels of government, you had bureaucrats who were rewarded partly according to their ability, in uncertain situations, to take risks and to do something new. But what has really changed is the intensity of the anti-corruption campaign, which makes public officials so risk-averse and so conservative and so reluctant to experiment. I think that really poses a huge danger to the success of the Chinese political system and its meritocratic aspects.
At the very top — I’m not so inclined to say it’s like one person who’s changed everything. I think when Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, there were some issues that would have had to be prioritized regardless of who was in power. Corruption was completely out of hand. In a meritocracy, the leaders are selected partly according to virtue, and virtue means you’re committed, at least partly, to serving the public. If you’re misusing public funds for yourself or your family interests — that is, if you’re corrupt — then it fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of the whole system. That’s one reason why corruption had to be attacked so ferociously. But arguably it’s gone on too far. Another is environmental disasters — at the time, you remember, in cities like Beijing, the pollution was so horrible. Something had to be done to promote more environmental sustainability. Another thing is reducing the gap between rich and poor. So all those things would have had to be done regardless of who was in power.
The aspect of what you call the personality cult — again, that’s not really, as you suggest, a necessary part of a political meritocracy. In fact, if you look at Chinese history, most of the Chinese emperors have been quite — staying in the background. It’s more in ancient Rome, for example, that you had those sorts of personality cults. So that’s a little bit of a, let’s just say, odd kind of addition to Chinese history — or you can argue maybe that’s more Maoist in inspiration than meritocratic.
In other words, I wouldn’t agree with what you said earlier — that political meritocracy as an ideal could operate without any sort of communist-style political organization. I do think there’s a need for a very complex and huge bureaucratic organization, whatever we’re going to call it, for political meritocracy to be operationalized.
Chang Che (16:24): I think the difference between the way that you see China today and maybe the way that I see China has to do with what will be defined by meritocracy. Because when I think about this idea of meritocracy, I think of objective, impersonal standards or metrics, right? Testing, KPIs, how much business you bring into your particular locality — things that you can actually measure. Whereas I feel like when Xi Jinping talks about corrupt officials, maybe there’s a little bit of that, but I think what he’s trying to say is: you’re not red enough. You don’t believe in the redness of the Communist Party. You don’t believe in the Communist Party being the one who stood up China against the Western powers, and that the only way for China to survive into the 21st century is for the Communist Party to be reaffirmed by the whole of society — that society should support communism, rather than a Confucian, meritocratic standard. It’s the redness that I feel has been brought back to Chinese society over the past ten years. Whereas I think earlier leaders, like Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, were trying to pursue what you suggested — this idea of meritocracy in the more impersonal metric. An example of this is separating the party system from the government, right? Separating civil servants from the party.
Daniel Bell (18:02): In The China Model, I have a chapter where I describe the key qualities of public officials in a meritocratic system. One is you have high IQ, because at higher levels of government, the issues are so complex — you have to have high-level analytical ability. Two, you have emotional intelligence, which is much harder to measure, because most of your time as a public figure, you don’t spend in your office reading books — you engage with other people, you have to persuade people with different perspectives and different views, and you have to have very good social skills. And three is virtue: at some level, you have to be committed to serving the public. And four — I think this is something that I learned more working within the system myself — is hard work. None of it works without hard work.
So, what you said about the redness — it depends what we mean by that, right? If redness means that what matters more is to have a strong political party, that’s not the Confucian view. The Confucian view is that the ultimate point of politics is to benefit the people, to serve the people. It’s more of a legalist idea — fajia [法家] in Chinese, which I explore in my new book as well: this idea that the main point of politics is to have a strong state that could be victorious in war and withstand attacks from outsiders. I think you may be referring more to this legalist strain rather than this Confucian strain.
Chang Che (19:28): That’s the question that I hope we can get into more, which is to what extent legalism and Confucianism can explain contemporary China, as opposed to, say, a kind of return to Maoism. But before we get there: you left Tsinghua at some point to take up a deanship at Shandong University, and this made you the first foreign dean of a political science department in China. Is that correct?
Daniel Bell (19:55): Yeah — maybe I overstated that. There may have been some ethnic Chinese with foreign passports who served as deans. I’m not sure.
Chang Che (20:03): Right. So the first foreign dean with a white face. That must have been an experience. So what was that like?
Daniel Bell (20:12): There’s a bit of background to that. I had written this theoretical work on political meritocracy. I knew some public officials, but I hadn’t really understood the system from the inside, and then I thought: what a great opportunity this would be. It was a new campus in Qingdao, which is a beautiful city in Shandong province. And the party secretary who invited me to serve as dean was a descendant of Confucius — of Kongzi in Chinese — and his surname was Kong. Even though he’s a party secretary, he never once mentioned “you have to promote Marxism.” He said: there are two things I hope you can do. One is to promote more of these Confucian values, and two is to help us internationalize. That’s one reason why I accepted this job — also, to learn more about the political system from the inside. And so I served as dean for five years and left in 2022.
Chang Che (21:03): One thing that you had mentioned about your experience that I’m really curious about is whether it confirmed what you had already been arguing in your career — that there’s a difference between China and North Korea. One thing that the Chinese have really spent a lot of time thinking about, in contemporary times and in ancient times, is how you pick and select good bureaucrats. Did your experience confirm that or not?
Daniel Bell (21:28): At the mid-levels of government, almost everybody I meet is super talented and super hardworking. It’s the hardworking part that I discovered and that I didn’t address in The China Model. It’s only when I went back and read some historical accounts of public officials throughout imperial Chinese history that I realized what really makes them successful, among these other traits I mentioned, is this capacity to work hard. As dean, I was on call all the time, for five years — literally, if I didn’t respond to a work-related WeChat message, seven days a week, 365 days a year, within like half an hour, people would start panicking. And it’s not just me. These public officials work incredibly hard. We can ask whether they’re doing the right kind of work, but just in terms of this ability to work hard, to be successful — I think that’s so important. After a few years, I realized I didn’t have the level of energy that it takes to be a really successful public official in China. And I think that probably differentiates the Chinese political system from other political systems. You can’t slack off. You have to be always committed to work, and ultimately to serving the public. And at least at the mid-level of the bureaucracy, most of the public officials that I encountered — I have great respect for them, including during COVID times, when they were even more hardworking than usual. Again — certainly towards the end, I don’t think it was for a good cause, because in the last year, the zero-COVID policy made no sense, and people were working so hard to implement a policy that made no sense. So I’m not saying that hard work itself is sufficient.
I also learned about the importance of collective leadership, which we read about. That’s why I’m a bit resistant to this idea that it’s Xi Jinping decides this and decides that — as though he decides everything on his own. Theoretically, I was dean, but all the decisions had to be made by means of this collective leadership, where we had meetings with four vice deans and three party secretaries. And we had to argue from different perspectives. And in these closed meetings, we really did argue in a very open way. But once we made a decision, there was a consensus, and we implemented it throughout the university. And I strongly suspect that happens at different levels of government, including, to a certain extent, at higher levels of government. Just try to think: how many things has President Xi said that are really odd or strange, or where a different leader would have said something different? I’m not sure about that. There’s a very strong machine in place, a very powerful bureaucracy, and whoever occupies different posts, at the end of the day, it doesn’t really make that much difference. That’s what’s really key to the Chinese political system, I think.
Another aspect is, again, the party secretary — it sounds almost sinister in English, where their main task is to enforce political indoctrination. It’s part of what they do, but at the mid-levels of the bureaucracy, it’s literally a tiny part of what they do. Most of what they do — like in the case of this party secretary who hired me: he built the whole campus from scratch, and he spent most of his time persuading people, including members of the Qingdao government, for funds to build this beautiful new campus — and how to build it, which buildings, who should be the architects, what kind of university campus we’re going to have. And those who work at the lower levels, including, for example, in the faculty — they would spend most of their time dealing with social issues: teachers who are complaining about their housing, or students who do bad things, like smoking drugs or whatever. That’s the sort of thing they would deal with most of the time. That’s why, in the book that I wrote about my experience as Dean of Shandong, I have a chapter called “The Harmony Secretary,” which is only a little bit tongue-in-cheek. I think if you want a term that accounts for most of what these mid-level party secretaries do, that makes much more sense: they spend most of their time trying to secure harmony in whatever organization they’re part of, and only a little bit of their time on political indoctrination.
Another part of the experience that you asked about — one of the not-so-positive parts of my experience — and this goes back to, if I were to be quite critical of the developments over the past ten years: it hasn’t been good for intellectuals, or we can call them the creative class, whether it’s academics or artists or journalists, or even entrepreneurs. We have faced greater and greater constraints. And that part hasn’t been a positive part of my experience.
Chang Che (26:12): Can you give an example?
Daniel Bell (26:14): I was dean of this faculty of political science. Before I assumed my post, you had many academics working on issues like social protests at local levels. You could do great work on that — you could do hands-on interviews and write about it in publications, both in English and Chinese. Now, forget about it. You can’t do that anymore. There are some areas where you can do good work, like on environmental issues or international organizations, but people have had to change their research interests, because the space that allowed for independent scholarship — not to mention social criticism — has really narrowed of late. And I think it does come from different factors. One is the very top, where current leaders in power have gone through the Cultural Revolution, which made them so paranoid and looking out for enemies. And that empowers a kind of security apparatus, rather than the more reform-minded parts of the Chinese political system.
Chang Che (27:14): That seems to be the role of the party secretary, right? He’s supposed to impart those kinds of changes.
Daniel Bell (27:21): It doesn’t mean that they like doing it. And it’s something that almost everybody under, like, 60 — whether they’re party secretaries, or whether they’re liberals or socialists or Confucians — we want to have freedom to express our views. And we are committed to serving the public, but we also want to criticize things that go wrong. And the space for that has been drastically narrowed, which is really, I think, a huge problem.
Chang Che (27:46): So one difference that I observed throughout my time in Shanghai — and this became extremely apparent during the Shanghai lockdowns in 2022 — is that public officials are always more accountable to their superiors than they are to those who they are managing. So when there is an order that is sent from, say, the Shanghai government, or the center, the whole system falls in line, regardless of any kind of reaction or uproar from the citizenry — the party has to follow the orders from the top. The difference in the United States is that it’s actually kind of the opposite. The question is: are you accountable to the people that you rule, who are below you, or accountable to the superiors above you?
Daniel Bell (28:29): No, I agree. In terms of national emergency, or social chaos, or warfare — that’s when we would expect the top level of the political system to make a decision, and others are supposed to almost blindly enforce it, without too many questions. And that’s what happened in the days of COVID. It worked more or less the first two years, because the policies were more or less correct — and also because, in some indirect way, they were accountable to the people. But when it made no sense in 2022 — these harsh and very cruel policies, and you faced even worse in Shanghai than other parts of China — the people were totally against it, and then things changed almost overnight. So in some indirect sense, I think there’s some form of accountability. I wish it had come much sooner. And I wish especially that scientists in China had had more possibility to express their views. Because in the very early days of COVID, things went wrong because some of the scientists were shut down. And also in 2022 — I knew some scientists, as did you, and they were totally against the policies, but they couldn’t express it publicly. What a disaster that was. So there’s definitely a need for more freedom of speech to correct mistaken policies in the political system.
Chang Che (29:47): So you have this kind of self-deprecating joke that you were almost like a symbolic leader. This is a quote: “Deep in my heart, however, I knew that a more accurate description of my role would be not responsible for any administration of the faculty, only responsible for symbolic leadership.” What are you saying here? Are you saying that, in fact, your role was more ceremonial, and that the real power lay in the party secretary?
Daniel Bell (30:11): So the real power lay in whatever decision emanated from the collective leadership. And I had a say, but not much say. But then I realized — symbolic leadership — let’s not cast that in such a negative light. It’s still very meaningful, because you need people to generate a sense of community. For example, at Shandong University, you have these graduation rituals. As a symbolic leader, I had to give speeches and give certificates to students. So then I realized: maybe an even more ideal political system would be one that more clearly separates between a symbolic leader, who has the task of providing a sense of community and maybe intergenerational solidarity, and one where you have real meritocratic leaders who do the hard work.
Chang Che (30:59): Can you just elaborate on what you mean by the collective leadership? Who is the one holding the administrative power, then, at Shandong University?
Daniel Bell (31:05): So there’s no one person. When it comes to deciding how much money you get from the city government to fund a new building on campus, then this top-level party secretary for the whole campus would have the most power. But when it comes to faculty decision-making, there we had myself, four vice deans, and three party secretaries, arguing about who gets a scholarship, how should we change our curriculum — and these sorts of issues were decided in these collective leadership meetings.
Chang Che (31:41): You do have a chapter in your Dean of Shandong book called “The Communist Comeback” — the emphasis on Marxist studies and a sort of cultural shift in prioritizing Marxism. Would you maybe summarize a little bit of what you were saying there?
Daniel Bell (31:56): So in the 1980s and 90s, until, let’s say, ten or twenty years ago, Marxism didn’t have much of a hold on people’s value system. People paid lip service. But the idea that Marxism should inspire the way that we think about China’s political future — even high-level officials in the Chinese political system would say, off the record: we know we say that, but that’s not really what we’re — you know. But what happened in 2008 was a huge financial crisis, generated by the excesses of capitalism. So many independent intellectuals began to think about the Marxist tradition as a resource for thinking about the excesses of capitalism, and how we could critique capitalism. That’s one issue. And also this ideal of higher communism, where advanced machinery does the socially necessary work, and then people are free to realize their creative talents — that seemed crazy until recently. Many intellectuals are becoming excited about that in China, including reformist members of the government. So that’s what I meant by this communist comeback: it’s being taken as a serious value system in a way that hadn’t been true prior to, like, twenty years ago.
Chang Che (33:09): The thing that I was reminded of is just the sheer number of new Marxist institutes that have arisen in universities. That was something that I was quite surprised by.
Daniel Bell (33:24): That’s a concrete manifestation of this communist comeback. But it’s not always a very good thing, frankly, because it does mean that those who are in those Marxist organizations have to spend a lot more time teaching a very boring political ideology, which the teachers don’t like and the students don’t like. That said, I know some people who are officially supposed to be doing Marxism, but then they also teach feminism and Confucianism and other things. But still, they have to spend a lot of time on this really mind-dulling stuff, which is really not what academics are supposed to do, frankly.
Chang Che (34:01): It seems to me like, in the past few years, this kind of emphasis on Marxism is going against your theory of the ideal in The China Model — that in each aspect of society — you can see it at the university level, at the corporate level — there’s been a growth of these party divisions within companies, right? You can see the party inserting itself into all aspects of society, in a way that the West, obviously, will cast as extremely nefarious. The way that I think about it is that it’s kind of like a rudder that helps steer society. And the party is interested in inserting rudders into different aspects of society, so that they can steer — within what the leader at the time, in this case Xi Jinping, decides should be the direction of society. If we feel like there’s an aspect of society that’s going awry, or moving away from our priorities, we can nudge it in the right direction.
Daniel Bell (34:51): I think that’s a good metaphor, and I’m more inclined to your view. But again, I wouldn’t say that it’s the leader who decides everything and then people blindly follow. I think it’s much more than that — there’s much more bottom-up: views that inform the political system before decisions are made, and then decisions are made in a more collective way.
Chang Che (35:09): Okay, so let’s talk about ancient political thought, because this is your new book. For listeners who haven’t picked it up, it’s a really fascinating look at the way that ancient Chinese philosophers thought, through this modern dialogue format. There are four chapters, and there are debates about contemporary issues. So one has to do with the family, one has to do with corruption, one has to do with invading Taiwan, and another has to do with funding a musical arts house in a village. And what Daniel has done is he’s pit modern, contemporary channelers of these ancient political theories against each other, to create these really humorous and fascinating debates. So Daniel, my first question is: to a skeptic — I can imagine a China analyst reading this book and saying, I’d much rather spend my time reading Mao, Stalin, or Lenin, or Marx, as a way of understanding China — why should we read the ancients to understand contemporary China?
Daniel Bell (36:09): So the book has two main points. First, for those who are not familiar with these ancient Chinese debates, I want to use the original words of the authors to show that these are fascinating and diverse — as fascinating and diverse as ancient Greek debates on politics. There are these huge, diverse traditions — Confucianism, legalism, Mohism, and Taoism — that were hugely influential, and that continue to be influential throughout history. And, here’s the part that finally addresses your question: they continue to be influential today. But I’m not saying that they explain everything in contemporary China. The Marxist idea of historical progress — that’s not in any of those traditions, and that’s important, too, to understand some of the guiding political ideals in China. But on some issues, what they argued about, for example, in the Warring States period — those issues are timeless, and they set the terms in which those debates are still argued about today.
As you mentioned: one is about family law. If you want to understand family law in China, and the debates, for example, about filial piety — whether it should be legally enforced, or whether we should use more indirect means — Marxism has nothing to say about that. You have to look to Confucianism. Or debates about how to reduce corruption in government — there are huge resources in this tradition: the legalists saying we need to use, first and foremost, laws and fear to reduce corruption; the Confucians saying no, we have to transform people’s hearts. That debate is still very much live today, and set in very similar terms as it was argued about 2,000 years ago. Again, you can’t go to Marxism or liberalism to make sense of those debates. And finally, the debates about just war, between the legalists and the Confucians — these debates are so important, so rich. Again, as rich as anything you had in ancient Greece.
Chang Che (38:00): Just to add on to that — I think also, quite simply, Xi Jinping and political leaders just reference these thinkers.
Daniel Bell (38:07): Exactly. Even if you want to understand Marxism, the official view now is liangge jiehe [两个结合], which is sometimes translated as “the two combines” or “the two integrations” — which means, and it’s official, right: we need to combine the Marxist tradition with the best of Chinese culture, with Confucianism at its core.
Chang Che (38:25): The other thing that really struck me about reading your book is that if you think of Xi as a kind of reversion to Marx, or if you think of him as moving away from the Deng Xiaoping reform years, there’s an element of this where I think you’re actually still missing a lot. One aspect that you’re missing is the sheer amount of ingenuity, but also ruthlessness, that Xi has brought towards the Chinese bureaucracy — which is so hard to understand if you don’t read the legalists. The legalists are the answer to understanding how Xi Jinping — maybe you will contest me saying the word Xi Jinping — the current regime, and the approach that they have brought to the bureaucracy. It’s something that I don’t really see in Western discourse. Though I think in recent times there’s been a kind of interesting convergence with intellectuals on the American right — there are discussions about a managerial elite, or what they call a deep state. Have you ever thought of a more Chinese concept than the deep state?
Daniel Bell (39:22): The legalist idea, as you say, is to have a strong state. And how do you do that? It’s by having a bureaucratic system that covers most of everyday life, where the bureaucrats are there to implement the decisions of the top. And they’re not supposed to have any discretion — they’re supposed to do exactly what they’re supposed to do, not more, not less. And if they do more or less, they’re ruthlessly punished. And to a certain extent, I agree with you — that’s coming back in China, which is really not a good sign for China’s future. There’s a need for more — let’s call them Confucian-oriented — public officials, who have more discretion to rely on their experience and judgment and wisdom, and even virtue, to make public-spirited decisions, as well as to address new challenges in new and innovative ways. So that’s a big problem in China — this reversion towards a more legalist-style bureaucracy.
Chang Che (40:20): So to dive a little bit more deeply into the book: the second chapter is a debate between a descendant of the legalist tradition — Han Feizi, he’s a kind of representative of the legalist tradition — versus Xunzi, a Confucian in his morals. And one of the patterns that comes out in this debate, which is really fascinating, is the moral goody-two-shoes, right? The Confucian, who is trying to be a good person, versus the cold, hard, pragmatic realist. That kind of tension plays out throughout all of your debates. What’s most resonant for journalists like me, who write about contemporary China, is the legalist side. So the person channeling Han Feizi in this debate about corruption is arguing for, effectively, a ruthless approach to anti-corruption — to punish harshly, to have a set of rules, and, as you say, bureaucrats who slightly stray away from the mandate should be punished harshly. The other thing that’s really resonant is just the general disdain toward intellectuals. He says something like: intellectuals instill doubt in the law. All of this is justified in the legalist tradition through a kind of cold calculus of maintaining a stable state. And it’s not a personalistic approach — which is very Trumpian. There’s an aspect, from the Western perspective, that these kinds of maneuvers, at least in the past few years, have been mostly because of egotism. But in the Chinese system, there’s something cold about it that I’ve always wondered about, and it seems to really jive with the legalist perspective.
Daniel Bell (41:58): Yeah, I think that’s right. So the dialogue is with Xunzi, who’s actually less goody-two-shoes than Mencius — Mengzi, right? He was actually Han Fei’s teacher, and he was writing in the most violent part of the Warring States period. It was hard for him to be very optimistic about human nature. He thought we have this tendency to badness, but that we can improve through education, through great teachers, and through participating in rituals that generate a sense of harmony. He thought, if you want to reduce corruption — he’s not against laws — but ultimately, to have long-term success, you have to make sure that you transform people’s hearts and make public officials more public-spirited.
But even Han Feizi would argue that, at the end of the day, you need to have punishments that work to eliminate punishment. He would have found it strange that we have this anti-corruption drive that is still there ten years later, and seems to be with no end in sight — and also that it relies on sometimes obscure means, right? Sometimes the public officials just fall into a dark hole — you never know what happened, or why it happened to them. That doesn’t sound very legalist either, because they also argued for clear and transparent laws that are easy to understand. So whether it’s the legalists or the Confucians, I think they would argue that at some point, probably earlier than later, there’s a need for a transition from these legalist measures to more Confucian-style soft power.
And one of Xunzi’s great insights is that, at the time, he predicted that the state of Qin, which went on to unify China — he said, look, they’re very militarily powerful; their meritocracy is objective — you get promoted according to the number of heads of decapitated soldiers, if you’re a soldier — and that’s going to work, but it won’t work in the long term, because eventually people rebel against cruelty. The dynasty collapsed after 15 years. So that debate — I tried to show that some aspects of it are still relevant today.
Chang Che (43:54): Maybe we should then go a little bit into the push and pull of legalism and Confucianism. So, as you say, Qin Shi Huang was the emperor to unify China under legalist principles; it collapses. And then, when would you say is the high point of Confucianism?
Daniel Bell (44:10): So it was made into an official value system in the Han dynasty, which succeeded the Qin and lasted for about 400 years, more or less. But it was always combined with some legalist means. So the idea is that the ends should be more Confucian — meaning that the point of government is to benefit the people — but that we can use some legalist means to help bring about that end. So, the Confucian-legalist state — to borrow the title of a very good book by Dingxin Zhao, who shows that this was influential throughout Chinese history. More or less, the pattern was set in the Han dynasty. So some of us were hoping that we’d move more towards this Han dynasty model, as opposed to this seemingly permanent Qin dynasty model. I’m not sure whether it’s happening or will happen.
But I do want to make one point, which is important, because both the legalists and the Confucians agree on the need to limit arbitrary rule by the top ruler. For the legalists, one very important point of having this legal system in place, and a bureaucracy that’s objective, is that even if you have a mediocre ruler, the system would still work, more or less. And they explicitly argue that the ruler shouldn’t interfere too much once the machine is in place, so to speak. In imperial China, you had court historians who had to monitor the words and deeds of rulers for posterity. That also served as a check on rulers, because they knew that if they did something really bad, future generations would know about it. And there’s another institution, called the censorate, where meritocratically selected Confucians had the task of criticizing mistaken policies. They didn’t usually address the very top, because they knew that was very dangerous, but it did have an important function in limiting abuses of power. So my point here is that if we are to move towards a more Confucian period in Chinese history, there are resources also to think about how to limit abuses by the very top, and personalistic rule.
Chang Che (46:02): But Mao Zedong famously was inspired by the legalist philosophers — notably, he wrote a high school essay about Shang Yang, one of the intellectuals who emerges in the fourth chapter of your book. And I guess he certainly didn’t see it the way that you described it, right? He basically saw legalism as a way of maximizing state authority.
Daniel Bell (46:29): So it goes back further than Mao, right? You can say the May Fourth student movement was meant to promote science and democracy, and they viewed Confucianism as a kind of feudal ideology that promotes patriarchy and aristocracy. And then the communists, including Mao, latched onto that. And that helps explain this anti-Confucian tradition throughout much of the 20th century, which culminated in the Cultural Revolution, led by Mao, which was an explicit attack on Confucianism. But as you say, he was also inspired by legalism explicitly in his early days — his first essay, as you say, was dedicated to Shang Yang. And in times of social chaos, that’s where legalism matters more, right? When do you need a strong state? When you’re being attacked by foreign states, and when there’s social chaos at home — that’s when you need to focus first and foremost on strengthening the state. It wasn’t a crazy idea that legalism made more sense in that context. But when it comes to peaceful times, or times of economic development, then legalism doesn’t have that much to offer. And Mao and others explicitly invoked legalism to justify their anti-Confucian movement, which really made no sense, and led to a tremendous amount of destruction and anti-intellectualism.
Chang Che (47:49): The last chapter that I wanted to mention is the invading-Taiwan one. This dialogue reminds me of something that could easily happen in the US context, with a president and a really hawkish foreign policy advocate, like John Bolton. And so the hawkish guy is represented by Shang Yang, the person that we’ve already mentioned — Mao favored him, and he was a legalist. He’s just very much gung-ho about invading Taiwan when the enemy is weak: we have to do this to maintain our superiority and our control over the rest of China. And then we have, again, the moralist — is this Xunzi?
Daniel Bell (48:29): Mencius — Mengzi, the descendant.
Chang Che (48:32): Mencius comes back, right? Mencius is arguing the other side: why we should exercise restraint. What’s really interesting about this dialogue is the legalist rationale for trying to create a war-ready population. And you use the term that Xi Jinping has often used, which is “eat bitterness.” In other words, the public should not be too engaged in the pleasantries of life, like music and all this, because what it ultimately comes down to is whether or not the society is ready for some kind of battle or collision — in this case, Taiwan. I was wondering whether you could speak a little bit about this, because it’s very much something that I’ve felt is in the zeitgeist in China — this idea right now that the young are being too lazy, they’re being too indulgent with their lives, and they need to get a dose of the bitter pill.
Daniel Bell (49:23): I think that’s right, and I’d agree with what you say. Just one point about legalism: it is the political tradition that most strongly endorses war, as you suggest, and it also worries about war readiness — worries about a military that grows rusty over time. China hasn’t gone to war since 1979, and that would be a huge concern for legalists, because you need to practice to get better at war. That said, they recognize that war is hell. The only way to motivate people is by making them realize that if they don’t go to war, things would be even worse. So Shang Yang says you have to force soldiers to go to war. And the way to do that is: if you don’t go to war, we’ll torture you and we’ll kill your whole family — the alternatives would be even worse. I’m still more or less convinced that there’s not a desire to go to war now, and that people, including the leaders, recognize that the best way for China to develop is to do it in a peaceful way. And it’s only if Taiwan would formally declare independence, or the US would pressure them to do so, that there’s a really serious risk of war. In this dialogue, I begin with that assumption — which hopefully won’t come true.
Chang Che (50:43): Okay, so the last question I wanted to get your thoughts on is about this idea of harmony. Because when I read this in the Confucians in your book, it’s oftentimes discussed in this really soft, or almost ritualistic, way — to try and guide people with the power of the example. This idea of soft power, right — which you’ve suggested is something that the Confucians came up with, not Joseph Nye. And what immediately comes to mind for me is that it’s actually a joke — there’s a running joke in China that you get “harmonized” when you get censored, or when you get invited to tea. There’s a cynicism in the population in China about harmony as it’s used. And what it suggests to me is that oftentimes this kind of Confucianism, or this kind of goody-two-shoes moralism that comes out in your debates, is kind of like window dressing for the state. And the Chinese are actually aware of the fact that it is something like window dressing. What would you say to that? Do you feel like there’s a truth to that?
Daniel Bell (51:41): There is a truth to it, but it’s not the whole truth. The Confucian idea of harmony — one of the most famous sayings that all intellectuals know in Chinese is he er bu tong [和而不同]: that if you’re an exemplary person, you should pursue this ideal of he [和], which we can translate as diversity in harmony, rather than tong [同], which is sameness, or uniformity, or conformity. The Confucian idea of harmony celebrates diversity and pluralism. The question is: how can we deal with it in a peaceful way, in a way that the outcome is even more beautiful and better than the parts, so to speak? That’s the idea. And I think most intellectuals understand it that way. But sometimes it’s misused by the government to justify tong — conformity, or sameness. And that’s a misuse of the idea.
So what should we do? I think that’s one reason why we need more freedom of speech: to criticize misuses. And this is a Confucian view, too — they also make harmony a political idea. It’s very clear in the ancient texts, which I quote as well, that if you have different ministers, they need to express different views, so that they can criticize mistaken policies. That’s what they mean by harmony in a political sense. And if you only have one perspective — a perspective that agrees with the ruler — you will never expose and criticize and improve mistaken policies, and the state will be doomed. The Confucians are very explicit about that. Yes, you have misuses, but it’s also very important — I think most intellectuals know that’s not what harmony is supposed to be. We need freedom of speech to criticize those misuses. That would be my somewhat pompous conclusion.
Chang Che (53:21): So I guess the last question that I have: I’m wondering whether, when you were writing ten or twelve years ago, when you wrote The China Model, you were trying to push back against a certain worldview among liberals that suggests that one person, one vote may be the only legitimate form of selecting leadership — and you were trying to present the Chinese answer, or the way that the Chinese were really thinking at the time. I’m wondering whether, over time, the target of your criticism has changed, or whether you feel like that problem still persists today — and that in your books, you’re still trying to push back against this, maybe, hubris: the belief that China is still just authoritarian.
Daniel Bell (54:00): The target is still there. I do think it’s this idea that we in the West tend to divide the world between the good democracies and the bad authoritarian regimes. It’s still there in everyday speech, it’s still there in journalism, it’s still there in academia. Try to get a book published, or an article published in a political science journal, that doesn’t use that language — it’s very hard; you’ll get knocked down by referees. And it’s still used by political leaders. So there’s a need to have a different language to try to understand China’s guiding political ideals. That’s so important. So I still think that the critique is directed against that way of understanding — or misunderstanding — China.
And to the extent that some of it is directed within China — I try to be fair to the legalists. In fact, in this book, I try to be fair to all four major schools that I discuss, and I don’t want to take sides too explicitly. But some people who have read it, including my students, say: come on, your Confucianism — it’s hidden, but it’s still there. So if I do want to persuade readers of that book within China, it would be to have less legalism and more Confucianism, if I can crudely summarize.
That said — this is a little point about academic freedom in Hong Kong. You can write a lot about mainland Chinese politics in Hong Kong in a balanced and academic and independent way — but not about Hong Kong politics; that’s highly sensitive. But if you work on mainland Chinese politics, you can still be balanced, independent, and academic, including in Chinese. So this book will be translated by a Hong Kong publisher, but no mainland Chinese publisher will touch it, because it addresses so many politically sensitive topics — including the last chapter, on what would be a justified invasion of Taiwan. That said, it will be published in Hong Kong, the PDF will be available, and it’ll be widely distributed in mainland China, in Chinese. So if I had a moral, proselytizing kind of view — which really goes against my character — then I would hope that some of the Confucian aspects affect the reality.
Chang Che (56:00): With that — Daniel, thank you so much for coming on the show.
Daniel Bell (56:04): Thank you for the great comments and questions and conversation.In 2015, Daniel Bell, then a political theorist at Tsinghua University published “The China Model.” China should be evaluated not by its failure to live up to a Western liberal democracy, Bell argued, but by its own ideals, what he called a "political meritocracy." More than a decade into the Xi Jinping era, Chang asks Daniel whether his views had changed. They also discuss Bell's new book Why Ancient Chinese Political Thought Matters, and whether ancient Chinese wisdom does inform policies like Xi's anti-corruption campaign and his criticism of "lying flat" youths.
See Bell's book: https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691279800/why-ancient-chinese-political-thought-matters


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