Into Asia
Into Asia
“I Helped Build China’s Brave New World”
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“I Helped Build China’s Brave New World”

The rise of China debunked a myth in the West that freedom of speech was critical to innovation.

The rise of China debunked a myth in the West that freedom of speech was critical to innovation. In the latest episode of Into Asia, the music composer turned YouTuber Yinfi (real name: Yin Lu) challenges this view. What if China’s tech rise resulted not in spite of freedom of speech, but from its selective accommodation? An example is the coding repository Github, which remans open in China despite the pervasive Great Firewall. Another is the relative freedom Elon Musk enjoys in China compared to other prominent figures like the comedian Uncle Roger.

A more unsettling factor that emerges in Yinfi’s video essays, which are part-memoir, part-analysis, part-reportage, is that his colleagues in the Chinese tech industry are complicit in this deception. They avoid political issues—the Covid-19 lockdowns, the Russia-Ukraine war, Uyghur repression—but the products they build are cross-pollinated by the technologies of free societies. This includes AI “distillation” and the use of pirated software, but it goes beyond property theft, encompassing the West’s universities as well as simply borrowing innovative paradigms like the scaling law that drives much of AI development today.

Gaming, the industry where Yinfi worked, serves another political purpose in China, he says: it floods the void left by political censorship with pleasure and entertainment. China has one of the largest gaming sectors in the world, replete with tech talents who keep themselves, their colleagues, and their countrymen “amused.” Yinfi tells us the story of how the tech juggernaut he worked for, miHoYo, abandoned his projects as soon as he began raising uncomfortable questions about the political system they were all living under. Below is our interview:

In this episode:

  • 01:20 Yinfi’s experience in the Chinese gaming industry

  • 05:57 Why Yinfi emigrated from China; the forms of censorship Yinfi faced during the Covid-19 pandemic, and censorship from miHoYo

  • 12:56 Transnational repression and the pressure on family back home

  • 15:21 How Beijing restricts games for children but promotes them abroad as “soft power”

  • 17:18 Thinking in a foreign language, and how Party-speak has corrupted Chinese

  • 25:19 The “hidden liberties” behind China’s tech rise

  • 26:57 “Hyper-hedonism”: how censorship emptied public life and left games and fantasy worlds to fill the gap

  • 32:05 What the West gets wrong about Chinese censorship: speech versus the impact of that speech

Full Transcript:

Chang Che
[00:00] Hello, everyone, and welcome to Into Asia. Over the past few years, a new wave of Chinese immigrants has settled in cities like Tokyo and London. Some of them resettled for reasons related to political repression. Others were fleeing the COVID lockdowns of 2022. There were also people who were tired of the competition in the economy back home and wanted to start over somewhere else. Some of these new immigrants have found a new voice abroad as YouTubers and podcasters with big audiences.

Our guest today is one of them. Yin Lu, who goes by Yinfi, was a music composer in Shanghai who arranged songs for some of China’s biggest video games and pop stars. He is now a content creator on YouTube. You may have seen his channel, Yinfi, where he publishes really insightful video essays analyzing the origins of China’s tech innovation and the inner workings of Chinese censorship and surveillance.

One of the things I really like about his work is that he blends his own personal experiences with deep analysis that you really can’t get anywhere in the Western media. I think that’s what I aspire to as a journalist. So, Yinfi, welcome to the show.

Yin Lu [01:10] Thank you very much for the introduction. I’m flattered.

Chang Che [01:13] I wanted to ask you to introduce yourself and maybe say a little bit about how you ended up on the career path of a music composer.

Yin Lu [01:20] Sure. I’m Yin Lu, also known by my stage name, Yinfi. I’m originally from China and now living in the UK. I’m a screen composer for games and films, a performer, and now a YouTuber. Earlier this year, I started making YouTube videos about the mindsets that shape modern China, based on my three decades of living inside the country.

First of all, I want to be clear that I wasn’t strictly in the tech industry. My job title was screen composer, but I was sort of half attached to the tech sector in China, especially gaming. Since the early 2010s, China’s ACG culture has exploded. ACG stands for animation, comics, and games; it’s very similar to Japan’s anime culture. That was when the big-name studios started up as separate divisions within the big tech companies, like Tencent, NetEase, miHoYo, ByteDance. Most of the games they make are live-service games, which need constant updates with new characters and new dungeons. So they need a huge amount of music.

Since 2014, I was an outsourced music provider for them. Across the global industry, the vast majority of game music is outsourced to independent music studios. But because live-service games in China are on such a huge scale, many Chinese studios hire dozens of full-time composers to keep up with the constant demand, which is very rare in the West.

Chang Che [03:02] The music industry you’re referring to is basically music for video games—the really, really big video games coming out of China in this period. One of them is a massive gaming company that became really famous for a game called Genshin Impact. People make fun of it for being kind of similar to Zelda, but it was super popular in the West as well. Those games require music and scoring, and that’s sort of where your career took off. I was wondering whether you could speak a little bit about what it was like day to day. What does it look like to be a music composer for a big company?

Yin Lu [03:39] It was very competitive, but I enjoyed it. I worked at Yu-Peng Chen’s studio in Shanghai. It was a very luxurious villa in central Shanghai, and there were three of us, three composers. I was very lucky, because in 2015 I composed for a Tencent game called Moonlight Blade. At that time, Yu-Peng Chen happened to be working on that game, and my score caught his attention. So he invited me to join his team. I quickly became a core member of his team and his close assistant, because he liked my style, my production quality, and my passion.

I was also a pretty good demo singer. Game directors always want to know what a song could sound like in its final version, so they can find the right singer for the marketing. A demo singer is very important, but in a production team a good singer is really rare. So I was lucky to fill that gap. I became the most trusted member of his team and worked on his scores. Normally he wrote the themes, and I did the rest—the orchestration, the scoring, and the production—and I sang the demos for him. I worked on a lot of the most difficult scores for him, because some of the boss-battle music was really hard to do, and sometimes he refused to do it because it was so time-consuming. So I did a lot of that.

Ian Buruma [05:33] Can I ask you something? There’s a lot of talk, when it comes to Chinese arts, cinema, writing, and so on—and you’ve spoken about this yourself—about problems of censorship, including in the music business, and especially the music business to do with games. Are you completely free of that kind of thing? Is there no interference at all?

Yin Lu [05:57] It’s a long story for me. A lot happened in my career, in Shanghai and in the UK. There was a major incident in 2022. When the pandemic came, all the work stopped. I was stuck in my room, binge-watching news about the Chinese government’s cover-up in the early stages of the pandemic. I had read some of the tragic stories, and I knew about some of the dark history of the Chinese system, but it wasn’t until the pandemic that I realized how an opaque system that actively suppresses speech can enable disasters that affect everyone in the world.

At that time I was just worried about the situation, so I posted on Facebook and Instagram to speak up for the Chinese whistleblowers who had been punished for reporting on the pandemic. Then, in 2021, I learned that a Uyghur friend of mine had been arbitrarily detained during the mass detentions, and I posted about that too. A few of my Chinese collaborators saw the posts and blacklisted me. Obviously I lost several collaboration opportunities back in China. But a lot of other friends still thought I had done the right thing, so they were still happy to work with me—including Yu-Peng Chen. In 2021, he spent two hours on the phone with me. He told me Genshin Impact had obviously gone viral worldwide, and he still wanted me to join his team, because in 2019 I had helped him organize a large recording session in London with the London Philharmonic Orchestra for his Genshin Impact score.

Even then, he wanted me to join his team after my graduation from the Royal College of Music. I didn’t mention that I first came to the UK in 2018 to study at the Royal College of Music. That was why I came to the UK, but I still worked remotely with artists in China, and I still flew back and forth between London, Shanghai, and Beijing. At the end of 2019, I worked on this major UK project for Genshin Impact; I assisted with the recording session. I was really impressed by how much miHoYo invested in music. I believe it was £90,000 for a three-day session. That was crazy. At that time, I promised Yu-Peng that after my graduation in 2020, I would go back to Shanghai to join his team. But then, in 2021, there were lockdowns everywhere.

Then, in 2022, there was a big update to Genshin Impact, and they needed another major recording session in the UK. Yu-Peng asked me again to take charge of the whole thing, because he couldn’t come to the UK himself—in 2022 there were draconian lockdowns in China. So I was asked to arrange the recording sessions with the London Symphony Orchestra at Abbey Road Studios, along with lots of other brilliant British soloists. I said yes. I received all the files and paperwork and started preparing for the very complicated sessions.

Then, out of nowhere, I got an email from a manager at miHoYo. The manager said this was a major project and they would be filming the whole recording session, which meant everyone appearing on camera needed to have a, quote unquote, “clean background.” They had done some background checks and found my sensitive posts online. And she said that, after all, they were a Chinese company, so unfortunately they couldn’t work with me.

To be honest, I expected something like that could happen with a company that is close to the Chinese state. I expected it, but I was still shocked that it could happen that way, here in the UK. I was literally kicked out of a team made up of British musicians.

Chang Che [10:57] I wanted to ask you a little more specifically about the kind of comments you were making on behalf of your Uyghur friend, and what you were saying about the lockdown.

Yin Lu [11:08] I posted on Facebook and Instagram about the detention of dissidents like Chen Qiushi. He was the first and only citizen journalist who broadcast the early stages of the pandemic in Wuhan. He did livestreams on YouTube at the time, and he said something like, “I don’t fear death. How could I fear the Communist Party?” I watched that on YouTube, and a few days later he disappeared. So I posted about Chen Qiushi. I also reposted something about skepticism over the origin of the virus.

And I posted about my Uyghur friend. That was another story, because I only learned about his detention in 2021, through a friend of his in Xinjiang. That friend told me the news, and I was quite shocked. I didn’t realize that situation could affect a friend of mine. He was my classmate and roommate during my undergraduate years at Nanjing University, from 2009 to 2013. He was a really smart guy; he got a master’s degree at Nanjing University. He’s not someone you could imagine being associated with anything to do with terrorism. But at that time, the official line was that everything was about cracking down on terrorism.

Chang Che [12:45] What happened after that? I think what you’re saying is that it wasn’t actually state repression—it was a kind of social ostracization that you experienced. Is that right?

Yin Lu [12:56] There were two incidents that could count as transnational repression. In 2023, I posted a Mandarin song on YouTube on the eve of the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. The song is called “It’s My Duty,” with lyrics about all the memories censored in China.

The next day, my dad sent me a message saying that the local police had called him and several other family members to ask for my personal information in the UK, in order to update my hukou, the household registration. They didn’t mention anything political, but they were definitely sending me a message.

Ian Buruma [13:44] When you posted these messages, were you in the UK or in Shanghai?

Yin Lu [13:49] I was in the UK. I haven’t been back to China since the end of 2019. In 2023, that was the first incident that made me realize I was probably on the list of the national security department. Then, later that year, in November, there was another incident. The head of the hospital where my mom worked called her in for a meeting to talk about me.

The hospital head told my mom that a national security officer from Beijing had instructed him to ask her to stop my activities in the UK; otherwise my family’s jobs, or even my interests in the UK, could be damaged. So those were the major incidents, both in 2023.

Chang Che [14:49] So it seems like there are actually two things going on. One is that the state is watching your posts and harassing your family. That’s definitely state repression. But then there’s what you mentioned earlier: some of your friends blacklisted or blocked you, and later, when you were going to work on this big project for miHoYo, one of the project managers said, “We can’t have you in the video, because you have to be clean, and you’re not politically clean.” What do you think is going on there?

Yin Lu [15:21] That’s very complicated. That second kind of censorship was largely from the company. But it’s different, because giant game studios like miHoYo receive a lot of state support, including financial support, especially from the Central Propaganda Department, because they’re treated as a sort of soft-power export pioneer. They are literally listed on the propaganda department’s website as soft-power export pioneers—

Chang Che [15:58] Which is really funny, because—just to pause on that—the Chinese government does not like games. They think games are addictive for children, they’ve cracked down on that, and they’ve put very strict restrictions on minors playing games. But on the other hand, games can be a very good soft-power tool, right? So they’re also very supportive of games. It’s kind of paradoxical.

Ian Buruma [16:25] But they’re supportive of games for foreign consumption. So presumably they don’t particularly care if foreigners get addicted.

Yin Lu [16:32] Yeah, that’s true. They don’t care.

Chang Che [16:34] Sorry—you were saying something about the psychology of the company and that kind of censorship.

Yin Lu [16:39] Yeah. I think the music industry is quite apolitical, and most of my colleagues are actively against any discussion related to politics. That’s just the norm in the Chinese entertainment industry, because if you stay silent, you get the privilege of enjoying all the benefits of the Chinese market.

Chang Che [17:06] Interesting. All these experiences you’ve had with repression—transnational repression, and also this kind of company-based repression—how have they fed into your work now on YouTube?

Yin Lu [17:18] To be honest, when I started doing these monologues on YouTube, I genuinely wanted to organize my thoughts by talking through my problems, because I’ve always wanted to think about all this systematically. I struggled to make sense of the situation I was experiencing. I wanted to be articulate; I wanted to think clearly. That was my first motivation for doing these videos.

Also, Chinese society really discourages critical thinking and reasoned debate, and I was always struggling to be articulate in that environment. Later I realized it wasn’t because I struggled to express myself. It was just that I had never had the opportunity to equip my mind with enough critical thinking, or enough vocabulary, to put my thoughts into words. Then, when AI took off in 2025, I found I could improve my language skills with it. So I thought, why not make some content online to improve my English?

Ian Buruma [18:26] What did you use? Duolingo, or—

Yin Lu [18:30] I used a plugin called Trancy. It’s a subtitle plugin that can translate YouTube videos, so I’ve been watching YouTube with that plugin. It’s really helpful. I can hide the translation, and it’s based on AI models, so the translation is very accurate, word by word and sentence by sentence. It’s called Trancy.

Ian Buruma [18:55] And now you’re very articulate in English. When you do your YouTube work now, is your main audience English speakers, overseas Chinese, and so on, or would you also like to reach people in China?

Yin Lu [19:10] I think English helped me a lot in terms of critical thinking and vocabulary, because I watched a lot of debates in English. It really helped me think clearly.

I also think it works as a kind of shield when I’m trying to express myself. I remember Haruki Murakami once said something like: he felt more comfortable speaking English than Japanese in public, because it gave him an excuse to make mistakes, and he didn’t always have to sound poetic and erudite. That really resonates with me. I constantly feel pressure when I speak Mandarin in front of people, because we are always expected to use lots of Chinese idioms and to appear erudite rather than just sound reasonable.

Ian Buruma [20:06] I’m very interested in this, because I studied Chinese in the ’70s, and we had to read things like Hongqi [Red Flag] and Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily]. All that language was very strictly controlled communist, Marxist language. One of the reasons they did that is that by forcing people to speak in a certain idiom, they were forcing them to think in a certain way, one that was loyal to the Party line. That affected the Chinese language very much. But I don’t think that’s true anymore. So is there anything in the way people speak Chinese today that is still somehow controlled by the Party or the state? I’m talking purely about idioms and the language itself, not about the security apparatus.

Yin Lu [20:54] I think some words have become associated with negative meanings to a great degree—like human rights, like democracy, or something like critical thinking. I don’t think there’s an accurate translation of “critical thinking” in Chinese. We just didn’t talk about it.

Chang Che [21:20] There are also words—in Chinese, we’ll sometimes just use Party-speak to explain things. I use the word zheng nengliang (正能量), “positive energy,” all the time when I talk to people. Sometimes you just borrow the language of the Party. So I can totally understand why you’d want to get away from that sometimes, but—

Ian Buruma [21:42] You can get away from it. You don’t have to write that way in China anymore. Forty years ago you had to write in that language, otherwise you wouldn’t get published.

Chang Che [21:52] Yeah, but I think a lot of what you see online comes from state-sponsored media. That’s where the new vogue words come from. But what Yinfi is saying about a foreign language helping you think in a different way—that’s the story of a lot of writers who write in foreign languages, like Ha Jin.

Ian Buruma [22:16] But Yinfi, can I ask you: the cost is that you might lose touch with your own language and your own culture. Does that bother you, or is that not something you’re particularly worried about?

Yin Lu [22:28] Sometimes I definitely feel that I’ve been detached from my culture and language for a long time, and I feel a little bit lost. Sometimes I feel a sort of identity crisis. But I still watch a lot of videos from the Chinese diaspora community. More and more very famous intellectuals from China have started YouTube channels. They were forced into exile. Many of them are household names in China, like Chai Jing. She used to be a household name, a journalist and CCTV host in China.

I told her story to my mom, because my mom knows her very well. My mom was very upset about my situation overseas. She didn’t even know what YouTube was. So I helped her install a VPN, and then she could get access to YouTube. She saw my YouTube channel, and I told her that some very famous intellectuals, like Chai Jing and Yan Geling, or [unclear], were all forced into exile because of what they said.

Obviously it was a very ridiculous situation, and I told my mom that their situation is sort of similar to mine.

Ian Buruma [23:55] How long do they remain household names in China after they leave? Do people in China forget about them after a while, or do they still have a lot of influence?

Yin Lu [24:05] Obviously they can’t have any influence on Chinese social media or on TV, but some of them still have some presence. Someone like Chai Jing—her documentaries and books are absolutely banned in China, but people can still use a VPN to watch her videos on YouTube. Actually, I believe the majority of the views on her YouTube channel are from mainland China. So I think they still have enormous impact in mainland China, but—

Ian Buruma [24:46] That’s a real change, isn’t it? In the past, people who went into exile were very quickly forgotten. Now, because of social media and so on, it’s much easier to keep some kind of connection.

Yin Lu [24:59] Yeah, that’s true. It also has to do with the widespread use of VPNs in China. I think after the White Paper movement—after 2022—VPN usage in China just exploded.

Chang Che [25:19] That’s really interesting. I would love to talk with you a bit about the work you’re doing now on YouTube. One theme that comes through in your videos is the hidden role of free expression, and of access to the West, in underwriting a lot of Chinese innovation.

So the question I want to ask you is: why do you think China is so successful in technology, and what do you think we’re not seeing?

Yin Lu [25:49] That’s a great question. I like the idea of hidden liberties; it’s an interesting way of putting it. I think the gray zone exists because sometimes the censorship institutions just aren’t competent enough to keep up with how fast technology is evolving. The censors can’t really reach GitHub, because they don’t understand it. And they also need GitHub to stay accessible to tech talent, so that they can build software that’s critical to the national strategy.

With AI, we all know there is all sorts of censorship of political words in all the AI models. But if you download a Chinese AI model and run it entirely on your local hardware, most of the censorship rules no longer apply. So that’s probably a good way to use Chinese models more freely.

Ian Buruma [26:49] What are those hidden liberties you mentioned? I find that very interesting. What hidden liberties are there that create such success?

Yin Lu [26:57] I think it’s if you just stay within the boundaries. There is a very strong incentive within the tech industry to stay silent publicly about all the human rights violations and misconduct by the state. If you stay silent on all of this, you can take advantage of the gigantic market.

And there’s also a trend of hyper-hedonism. This trend is partly driven by the crackdown on serious discourse and open debate. To some extent, the lack of free speech desensitized people to serious discussion and created a kind of hyper-hedonism. It left a huge content vacuum. Social media platforms like TikTok, or games, or ACG culture happened to fill that gap among young people. They basically created a brave new world.

Ian Buruma [28:06] That’s fascinating.

Yin Lu [28:07] So I watched people immerse themselves in all sorts of fantasy worlds in China. On Bilibili [a Chinese video platform], there are all sorts of subcategories and subcultures I didn’t really understand, and fantasy worlds—which I also helped build. I helped build this brave new world in China for five years. I worked on some of the hit songs on Bilibili; some of the songs I worked on ranked at the top on Bilibili several times. It all comes down to the attention economy. If there’s lots of political discussion, like in the West, attention gets pulled away from those fantasy worlds.

Ian Buruma [28:56] That’s very interesting. There’s a clear parallel in history: what happened in Japan between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, when there was complete political repression. That’s what created the whole culture of prostitution and kabuki and teahouses—the hedonism of the merchant class. It’s exactly what you’re describing: people who are intelligent putting all their attention into pleasure-seeking rather than any kind of political discussion.

Yin Lu [29:29] That’s true. So I think, ironically, political control sometimes works as a kind of favorable incentive structure for fantasy-world builders, including me. I’ve often thought that if I hadn’t happened to be abroad and experienced that sudden shock during the pandemic, during that period of absurdity, I would probably be sitting in miHoYo’s office right now, running projects in the entertainment industry across the world. I could have lived in a parallel world. Without some initial trigger, the industry’s incentives are just too strong to resist.

I think that’s the mechanism behind China’s entertainment industry, and it’s also something that triggers downstream innovation, like in the gaming industry. In terms of broader tech innovation, I’m not an expert, but I can say something that is also very significant in China’s tech innovation, which is intellectual-property theft. I worked in screen composition, and I saw all sorts of pirated software for composers in China. All of our tools—samples, sample libraries, digital synthesizers—were pirated versions downloaded from a gigantic Chinese website. It hosts all of this software, and much of it is cracked by Russian hackers. It’s not a secret. It’s been going on for decades, and the government has never bothered shutting it down, because it serves the Party’s interests.

Whenever there was a major update to one of those sample libraries, the next week you could download it for free. So when I came to the UK, I was shocked that most of my colleagues were using really outdated sample libraries, because they couldn’t afford the latest versions. These libraries are very expensive. That’s just one tiny example of how China’s industries can build some of their innovation on IP theft.

Chang Che [32:05] It’s interesting, because I think your work is trying to show an outside audience some of the hidden costs of this. And I’m wondering: what do you think the West doesn’t quite understand about China? Is there something you feel the average Western listener is missing when they’re very awed by Chinese technology?

Yin Lu [32:27] I think what I’ve just said actually summarizes how I see China developing its model. As for Westerners, I think there’s a kind of illusion, a problem of optics. I imagine that Westerners don’t have a sense of what it means to lose freedoms and constitutional rights. They don’t know what it’s really like to have your basic rights taken away, which is something I experienced personally.

Also, when they go to China, they don’t necessarily experience the same fear of punishment from the authorities, because there are multiple tiers of punishment. It’s really utilitarian: if you can bring positive economic outcomes to China, then you are tolerated, whatever you say.

One of the first videos I made on my channel was about this kind of double standard—how some rich people, like Elon Musk, can be welcomed despite criticizing the Chinese government on X, but someone like Uncle Roger, who just made some trivial jokes about Huawei and Xi Jinping, got immediately banned in China.

Ian Buruma [34:00] Who’s Uncle Roger?

Chang Che [34:02] Uncle Roger is a stand-up comedian in the US. He’s a pretty popular social media influencer.

Yin Lu [34:09] Yeah. He asked one of the audience members, who was using a Huawei phone—and then he said, “Long live President Xi. All Huawei phones are listening.” That was the joke.

Chang Che [34:25] That’s an interesting example, because I think the censorship in that case is a nationalistic kind of censorship—it “hurt the feelings of the Chinese nation.” But what you’re saying is really interesting, because one important distinction in China’s many-layered censorship is between foreign and domestic. If I’m American and I’m writing for foreign media, that’s a lot less dangerous than if I’m writing in Chinese.

If I write the exact same thing in Chinese and publish it on Weibo, that’s more dangerous, because the Chinese government obviously cares more about what its own people think than about what foreigners think.

So when you’re a foreigner and you base your sense of censorship in China on your own experience—you’re just visiting as a vacationer and you think, “I can say whatever I want”—that’s a very misleading barometer of how censorious China is. China’s censorship system is not based on what you say. As you rightly showed in your video, it’s based on the outcome of that speech. So depending on what kind of person you are, what language you’re speaking, whether you’re a tech entrepreneur like Elon Musk or a humanities person, the repression is very, very different. To get a real sense of the Chinese censorship system, you need to look at people other than yourself to gauge how repressive the society is.

Yin Lu [35:59] That’s a good way to put it.

Chang Che [36:01] What’s your situation now that you’ve started your YouTube channel? Are you scared of what might happen to your family, or about whether you might be able to go back to China?

Yin Lu [36:11] Since 2023, I haven’t really received any harassment from the government. Even after my YouTube videos, the monologues, I haven’t received any transnational repression from the Chinese authorities. But again, I think it has to do with the nature of these videos: they’re in English. They’re not generating impact among Chinese citizens, which is what the authorities are largely concerned about. If I made Mandarin versions of those videos, I would probably be targeted more harshly. So I don’t think I can go back to China. But I don’t know—it really depends. Someone like Ai Weiwei could go back to China to visit his family. So it’s a really unpredictable situation. Maybe sometime in the future I can go back, I think.

Chang Che [37:23] That’s a good place to end it. Thank you so much, Yinfi.

Ian Buruma [37:25] Thank you very much. That was very interesting.

Yin Lu [37:28] Thank you so much.China’s tech rise seemed to debunk an old Western belief that free speech drives innovation. Yinfi (Yin Lu), a music composer turned YouTuber, thinks the old Western view should be revisited. For five years he wrote music for China’s biggest video games. Now, from Britain, he makes video essays reflecting on his time there, among which is the observation that China innovates not despite its censorship but because it tolerates freedoms selectively. He now believes that censorship is driving Chinese into the fantasy worlds of games and anime, an industry Yinfi helped build.

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