Into Asia
Into Asia
Anti-Semitism and East Asia
0:00
-42:56

Anti-Semitism and East Asia

In the September 29, 2025, issue of The New Yorker, the writer Ian Buruma reviews two books that trace the uses and abuses of anti-semitism from late-19th century France to present-day US campus politics.

In the September 29, 2025, issue of The New Yorker, the writer Ian Buruma reviews two books that trace the uses and abuses of anti-semitism from late-19th century France to present-day US campus politics. Long before right-wing Israeli politicians to evoke the term to deflect criticism of the war in Gaza, anti-semitism reflected a persistent worldview: that a shadowy group of powerful Jews often stood behind the workings of a complicated world. 

For over a century, that idea has found converts in East Asia. In this episode, Ian and I talk about how beliefs about Jewish power manifested in Chinese and Japanese life from the 20th century to the present.

Related Links: 

"The Uses and Abuses of Anti-Semitism" by Ian Buruma

Chang:
I want to start with the article you wrote for The New Yorker about antisemitism, which doesn’t really touch on East Asia specifically. Let’s begin with how you got into this topic. I know you have Jewish ancestry on your mother’s side and you’ve written a book about your maternal grandparents. Did you ever experience antisemitism growing up?

Ian:
No, not directly. My mother was Jewish by origin, but her family wasn’t religious at all, so we didn’t lead a Jewish life or observe traditions. I didn’t personally experience antisemitism. I might have heard the odd antisemitic remark, but I grew up in the Netherlands, which had been occupied by Nazi Germany. For a long time — certainly when I was growing up — overt antisemitism was taboo. That’s changed a bit now as memories of World War II fade; we’re already in the third generation since the war, and people don’t feel quite so constrained. But when I was young, you didn’t hear much about it.

It was really when I went to Japan, at age 23 or 24, to study, that I first encountered it in a sort of naïve way. In Europe, people didn’t talk much about Jews; the word itself would sometimes be spoken in a lowered voice, as if it were embarrassing. But in Japan, there was no such embarrassment — they had no experience of Nazi occupation or the Holocaust. Their historical problems had more to do with what Japan did in China and the rest of Asia.

If people heard that I had Jewish ancestry, they would say things like, “Oh, that’s interesting — Jews are very clever, very good at making money,” and so forth. It was all said in a completely naïve spirit, not hostile. A few years before I arrived in Japan, there had been a bestseller called The Japanese and the Jews, written by a right-wing Japanese author, arguing that the Japanese and Jews were “kindred peoples,” discriminated against by others, outsiders in the world, “people of the book,” and so on. It had a somewhat sinister overtone, as he was a nativist who thought in racial terms. But again, he admired the Jews as an admirably tribal people — and saw the Japanese as similar.

Chang:
The point of that book was to elevate the Japanese — to say they were on equal footing with this kind of tribal and talented Jewish people.

Ian:
Yes, very much so. And this idea — that Jews are clever, powerful, tribal people who “pull strings” behind the scenes — has a long history in Japan. The logic was: one should try to stay on their good side.

Chang:
How did reactions to your Jewish ancestry differ in other parts of Asia?

Ian:
Not at all, at least not personally. But what was interesting — and disturbing to some — were the periodic scandals, usually picked up by the Western press, when naïve fascinations with Hitler or Nazi imagery were discovered. For example, there was a coffee shop in Seoul that called itself “Gestapo.” Western reporters jumped on it as proof that Koreans needed to be educated. The Israeli embassy protested, and so on. Similar things happened in Taiwan, even though the government discouraged such things.

There’s a fascination in parts of East Asia with uniforms and with Hitler as a strongman — “厉害,” as the Chinese might say. And remember, the biggest source of neo-Nazi memorabilia is actually the United States, because of First Amendment protections. But in the West, Nazi symbols are never innocent — they’re used by actual neo-Nazis. In East Asia, the fascination is often naïve, because people aren’t aware of how painful the associations are, especially with the Holocaust.

Chang:
When the Japanese reacted to your Jewish ancestry positively, it came from a stereotype — one that you write about in your article, which goes back to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Can you explain how modern antisemitism emerged and why the term was coined in the late 19th century?

Ian:
It emerged really in the 19th century. Antisemitism, or forms of prejudice or hatred against Jews, are very old — and they used to be primarily religious. When there was a plague in parts of Europe, for example, it was often blamed on the Jews. But the modern form of antisemitism was really a reaction to the modern state: the rise of the rule of law, equal citizenship, large cities as centers of finance, and the emancipation of Jews from their former status as a discriminated minority without the same rights as the majority.

This caused resentment among people who felt that the nation-state, as it evolved in the 19th century, should not simply be a political entity based on law and equal rights. They believed the nation-state should be rooted in ancestry and bloodlines. And the fact that Jews were now citizens of these nation-states posed a problem for them, because Jews were not considered part of the “real people.” They were seen as infiltrators — impostors or parasites. That’s the basis of modern antisemitism in Europe and, to some extent, in the United States.

Now, this is why The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a tract written by a Russian in the late 19th century, was so powerful. It was a falsification suggesting that the real power in the world was wielded by a secret cabal of Jews acting behind the scenes and pulling the strings. And this fit perfectly with the antisemitic notion that Jews were infiltrators who secretly held real power.

The connection with Japan is that Japan fought a war with Russia in 1905. During the war, Japan was running out of money and was bailed out by a Jewish banker in New York, Jacob Schiff, who floated war bonds and kept Japan financed until it defeated Russia. Later, Japanese officers encountered Russians who introduced them to the Protocols, and Japanese “Jewish experts” in the army put two and two together: Jacob Schiff had bailed them out — so that, to them, proved the enormous power of Jewish finance. Their conclusion, interestingly, wasn’t that the Jews should be exterminated, but that Japan should stay on their side.

This had consequences in World War II. When Jews were fleeing Europe, one of the few places they could obtain visas for was Shanghai. When the Japanese occupied Shanghai, the Germans asked them to hand over the Jews so they could be sent to death camps — and the Japanese refused. Partly they didn’t want to be ordered around by the Germans, and partly because they believed Jews were powerful and should not be made into enemies.

That didn’t mean being a Jewish refugee in Shanghai in the 1930s and ’40s was a picnic. There was an area called Little Vienna with pastry shops and synagogues, but many people were poor and life was rough — though still far better than Europe.

Chang:
Right. And the reason Shanghai was relatively open to Jewish refugees was that it was run by foreign concessions. China didn’t control immigration there at the time. So tens of thousands of Jewish refugees were able to go to Shanghai as a refuge. Have you heard of the Fugu Plan? It refers to a plan Japan had, I think in the 1930s, after occupying Shanghai, to resettle Jewish refugees in Manchuria. Are you familiar with that?

Ian:
Yes, I’ve heard of that. There were tensions between the Jewish community in Manchuria — Manchukuo, this supposedly “independent” multiracial state that was really a Japanese colony — and the Jews in Shanghai. In Harbin, there was a large Russian Jewish community that had fled Russia. The Japanese made friends with them; there are photographs of banquets hosted by the local Japanese military governor with Jewish notables, Star of David flags crossed with the Japanese flag, and so on. The Russian Jews were keen to keep this relationship warm for their own protection.

But the Jews in Shanghai were appalled. They said: how can you collaborate with an ally of Nazi Germany? This is wrong — stop. It caused a major conflict between the two communities.

Chang:
In your article, you talk about this traditional Jewish effort to combat antisemitism that you associate with what you call the left-liberal universalist tradition. Could you explain that and connect it to what was happening in France during the Dreyfus Affair? My understanding is that this idea emerged partly in reaction to the right-wing conservative approach to antisemitism. Is that right?

Ian:
Yes. In the late 19th century, there was a lot of violent antisemitism in Eastern Europe and Russia, and some in Western Europe. The Dreyfus case brought everything to the surface. Captain Dreyfus, a patriotic French army officer from Alsace — sometimes part of Germany, sometimes part of France — was bilingual, from a Jewish family but not religious. First and foremost, he was a French patriot.

France had lost a humiliating war to Prussia in 1871. When someone in the army was found to have betrayed secrets to the Germans, elements in the French army immediately accused Dreyfus because he was Jewish, spoke German, and was considered untrustworthy. There was a trumped-up trial based on falsified evidence. He was convicted and sent to Devil’s Island, where he endured solitary confinement under horrific conditions.

Public opinion split. The Dreyfusards, who believed he was innocent, were generally liberal, republican, pro–rule of law. The anti-Dreyfusards tended to be conservative, authoritarian, Catholic, monarchist, anti–French Revolution. It wasn’t just about Jews — it was about two competing visions of the nation-state.

Jews themselves were shocked. Theodor Herzl, covering the trial as a reporter, concluded that the only way Jews could be safe was to have their own state — the beginning of Zionism. Others drew the opposite conclusion: that Jews should find common cause with other oppressed peoples in an internationalist movement. Many on the left embraced this universalist approach.

Those two visions remain alive today. You see them in American politics: right-wing populists who see the nation as belonging to the “real people” versus liberal and internationalist traditions. And the same dynamics appeared during the pro-Palestinian demonstrations after the recent attacks and war.

Chang:
I was interested to read that when Zionism was first proposed, many Jews were skeptical. They worried it would reinforce the idea that Jews were not loyal citizens. Can you explain those reservations?

Ian:
Yes. Many established Jews — successful professionals in France, Britain, Germany — were strongly against Zionism. They feared founding a Jewish state would undermine their standing as loyal citizens, suggesting their ultimate loyalty lay elsewhere. So they opposed it. And as Israel became more right-wing over time, admiration for Israel shifted to right-wing nativists in other countries, who appreciated its “tribal” aspects. Meanwhile, many Jews today support Palestinians for internationalist reasons rooted in that older tradition.

Chang:
This universalist tradition begins to weaken around World War II as the Holocaust unfolds, and the idea of a Jewish state becomes more necessary, right?

Ian:
Yes. Many Holocaust survivors had no homes to return to. Immigration was difficult. Creating a state became a tragic necessity. Another factor is that, in the eyes of German and French antisemites, America had long been associated with Jews — even before Israel. America welcomed immigrants; citizenship wasn’t based on bloodlines. So antisemites saw America as a “mongrel” nation where Jews had too much influence — in Hollywood, Wall Street, everywhere. This imagery predates the modern US–Israel relationship and shaped East Asian perceptions too.

Chang:
You write that antisemitism and Israel eventually become inseparable. When did that happen, and why?

Ian:
Around the 1973 war. Jews in America and elsewhere felt Israel’s survival was existential. Before that, most Jews didn’t strongly identify with Israel unless they were Zionists. But as Jewish religious tradition weakened — more secularism, more intermarriage — identification with Israel and the Holocaust partly replaced older forms of Jewish identity.

Chang:
Fast-forward to the present. You write that roles traditionally held by those resisting antisemitism and those perpetuating it have reversed in some way. What do you mean?

Ian:
Israel has become more tribal. But there is also antisemitism among some pro-Palestinian demonstrators — treating Israel as uniquely evil, comparing Jews to Nazis. That connects to anti-American sentiment. But many demonstrators are motivated by genuine solidarity with persecuted people, consistent with older internationalist traditions.

On the other side, those who defend Israel “tooth and nail” are often right-wing tribal nationalists. This mirrors the split of the Dreyfus era. And similar dynamics appear in Japan, Korea, and China — between liberals who favor rule of law and those who favor blood-and-soil nationalism.

In China, ideas about “true Han identity” go back to resistance against Mongol and Manchu rule, but modern racial thinking was heavily influenced by 19th-century European racial theories, often transmitted via Japan.

Chang:
In your article, you mention campus protests. Where do you draw the line? What would you consider antisemitic?

Ian:
Support for Hamas, certainly. But I think people who believe that the Jewish state does not have the right to exist can be classified as antisemites. People who feel that it does not have the right to exist solely because of the way that the Israeli jews treat the Palestinians, I think is wrong because other countries have had terrible atrocities, but nobody feels that they don’t have the right to exist.

So I think that’s a line. I don’t know how that is linked to views expressed in East Asia. I think back to the first Gulf War, which I think illustrated something that is quite common in East Asia. And this is, again, the notion that there are people, there’s a hidden hand behind the scenes that is really pulling the strings.

And during the first Gulf War, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and an international coalition led by the United States pushed Iraq out of Kuwait, I wrote an article about how people in Germany and Japan responded to the war. And I interviewed a conservative politician in the conservative Japanese ruling party, the Liberal Democrats. We talked about oil and the reasons for the war in Iraq. And then he suddenly cut me off and he said, “Look, we’re adults. We know what this is really about. I saw Henry Kissinger on television. We know what the real story here is. We just can’t really say so.” I think that says a lot about what is perceived as antisemitism in East Asia.

And that goes back to a long history of Western colonialism and Western dominance — that in confusing times, people find comfort in conspiracy theories that clarify where the real power lies. The Jewish conspiracy theory is one of these stock theories that keeps being trotted out in times of confusion in East and West. In East Asia, it’s particularly appealing because it’s so tied to the United States. And so, where people feel that they’re being dominated by American power, many people are persuaded that this American power is really Jewish power.

Chang:
Yeah, so I’ll talk a little bit about the Chinese case. So in my experience, similar to you, I think when Chinese generally think about the Jewish people, ordinary Chinese think these people are really rich and they’re really good at making money.

And I think there’s a kind of fascination and admiration for them. The times when I see Chinese move closer to antisemitism tend to be among nationalists, people who generally take a worldview that is predicated on seeing American power through the lens of something more nefarious than the American view, which tends to have a much more moralizing tone.

Nationalists in China hate that. They want to change that view and they want to say, no, America is powerful because of capitalism. And that kind of view, to just sort of flatten America’s moral — the kind of moral cushion that hovers around American power — and flatten it to capitalism, that kind of instinct grafts really easily onto an antisemitic view among nationalists. So they can easily say, instead of “capitalists,” it’s the Jews who are controlling the American media and Hollywood, because that’s the instinct of the nationalists in China.

I think the first kind of really big burst, or the most recent big burst, of antisemitic content in China really started with October 7. There was a famous commentator who said Hamas was too gentle, because what Israel was doing is effectively playing the role of the Nazis today. That kind of classic association was actually quite popular in the Chinese media at the time. You certainly don’t hear that among actual political leaders. But it’s interesting to note that these accounts were not censored. Because in China they have a tremendous amount of censors; you can censor anything that they feel is a little bit too far. And recently there was a social media influencer that was censored because he said something a little bit too strong on Taiwan. He said something like, the minute China invades Taiwan, I’m going to donate X thousands of dollars to the Chinese military. And he got censored because of that.

So clearly the Chinese government has red lines — even on the nationalist side, there’s a bit of a limit to what can be said in the Chinese media space. But I haven’t seen any of the antisemitic comments being censored, which I think is quite interesting. I wonder if it’s because it might serve some kind of function. I haven’t really thought about exactly the reasons why. But one possibility that I’ve read is that over the past five, ten years, the Americans have been pushing China on its human rights abuses in Xinjiang and against Muslim minorities.

And so there’s a little bit of whataboutism going on, which is like: look at the American Jewish role in Israel and what they’re doing to the Palestinians. How can the Americans lecture us on our treatment of Muslim minorities when America is supplying bombs to Israel to bomb Palestinians? So there’s a little bit of that, I think, and allowing the Chinese nationalists to really go after America on that, I think, is helpful from a kind of moral, diplomatic perspective.

Ian:
Yeah, no, that’s very interesting. But we haven’t mentioned this, that China is the only country in East Asia that had a Jewish minority, a Chinese Jewish minority.

They’ve died out now, but since at least the Song dynasty, there’s been a community of mostly, apparently, Persian Jews who settled in Kaifeng. I think by the 19th century, they completely assimilated into the Chinese majority, but there were families, I think still, I’ve heard stories where people say, in our family, we never eat pork. There are little bits left of it, but not much.

Chang:
The last question for you, Ian, is that you live in New York. There is a mayoral race. Zohran Mamdani has said that he doesn’t support Israel as long as it’s specifically a Jewish state. And recently, there has been this massive criticism from rabbis who wrote this letter saying that Mamdani being elected is going to imperil the safety and dignity of Jews everywhere.

First, I want to get your thoughts on that. So what are your impressions of Mamdani and the debate about Mamdani threat to Jewish safety? Do you buy that?

Ian:
Mamdani, in public, has somewhat softened his stance on his views on what he called, I think, global jihad and so on.

But I think whether one agrees with Mamdani politics or not, I don’t for a moment think that he’s a danger to the safety of American Jews. I think that’s an absurd overreaction. I don’t see how, even if he’s openly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, highly critical of Israel, even if he believes that Israel should not be defined as a Jewish state, that’s his belief.

He’s not in the Israeli government. He’s never said that the Jews are not fully fledged American citizens with the same rights as other Americans. If he were to say that — if he were to say Jews, by definition, are sympathetic to Israel, and since I think Israel should not be a Jewish state, Jews should not have similar rights in New York, which he doesn’t say and would never say — then I would also feel that he’s a threat. But that’s not the case. That will never be the case; that never was the case. And so I don’t think he’s a danger to Jews in America.

Chang:
Great. Thank you, Ian. I appreciate it.

Ian:
Not at all.

Discussion about this episode

User's avatar