China-maxxing: Why Young Americans are Rethinking China
In November, the left-wing political commentator Hasan Piker took his first trip to China, live-streaming the trip to hundreds of thousands of viewers on the streaming platform Twitch.
In November, the left-wing political commentator Hasan Piker took his first trip to China, live-streaming the trip to hundreds of thousands of viewers on the streaming platform Twitch. Hasan is a self-described socialist and a staunch critic of American capitalism, and he told me he had long wanted to see for himself how a Communist government ran a country. He wasn’t disappointed.
In this episode:
Why Hasan sees China differently than liberals; growing up in Turkey
First impressions of China, Tiananmen flag-raising ceremony
The incident where Hasan got stopped by security at Tiananmen
Hasan’s thoughts on Chinese (and American) censorship
Surprising similarities between America and China
Hasan’s Chinese fan base and how the red pill pipeline is going global
What Hasan would advise a future Democratic president on China policy
Chang: I wanted to ask you about your trip to China and your general thoughts and impressions.
Hasan: You said there’s been a change of attitude about a lot of people with regard to China. I have not had a change of attitude about China. So for me, it was more so just seeing what I was already talking about in action and seeing it in real time, whether it be the development or whether it be what I suspected were rumors about everyday Chinese existence — either great exaggerations in western press or outright fabrications.
One of the examples I always use is I went with a bunch of people who had these kinds of negative opinions about China, these fears. Given its presentation, I think, in the western world, for the uninitiated it’s kind of like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — a hermit kingdom. If you recall, JD Vance said, even as recently as a couple months ago, that it’s a nation of peasants. I think that’s still by and large the average American’s attitude towards China. And instantly, as soon as we landed in Beijing airport, the people that I was with who had previously thought that it’s illegal to even show Winnie the Pooh were shocked to find out that the first vending machine that we saw was a Disney vending machine, and there were Winnie the Pooh figurines.
It’s little things like that. I already knew they were greatly exaggerated — the social media ban over referring to Xi Jinping as Winnie the Pooh being turned into this major story in the western news. That’s why a lot of people will still do that thing when they’re talking about China, even well-intentioned liberals.
Chang: This was your first time in China. Tell me about how you were able to overcome that narrative. I’m curious where your views of China formed.
Hasan: I grew up in Turkey. I’ve had a very different approach to western narratives. I grew up not being too trustful of the western State Department narratives about enemies of America. And that skepticism, I guess, leaked into my analysis of China as well, where I was like, is this actually real? So I sought out further information.
I think one of my first interactions with this kind of anti-China coverage was around ghost cities. That transformation also happened at the same time when I was learning more about socialism as well, developing my own personal worldview. So that was what caused me to be doubly skeptical, I guess, of the official narratives. But I remember reading into ghost cities and what the actual intentions behind building these robust infrastructure and development projects were. And the approach from the Chinese government was obviously they wanted to increase the amount of development around housing. There was a specific purpose for it from what I understood. And that made a lot more sense to me — it wasn’t just to create economic activity necessarily, although that certainly helped give people jobs, and have investments for people to put their savings into.
But it was also for people to live in, right? It was housing, which is a major issue in the western world. It was a radically new approach from my perspective. I don’t know if these ghost cities are necessarily being built out in the way that we think they are in the western world. I think they’re just building housing, especially as there were developments happening on the edge of cities that were expanding rapidly as well. As far as I can remember, that was one of the first instances where I was like, is this as bad as the way people are presenting it? Or is there an alternative reason for why they’re doing it? And then it just expanded from that point on.
Chang: One thing that I’ve been interested in thinking about with you is just how younger Americans think about China and how different their views are, because it strikes me that for younger Americans, a lot of them — especially the ones who I think are engaging with China — are less political or at least less ideological.
They don’t have these kinds of ideological blinders. There’s a certain kind of cultural vibes, aesthetic that comes out of China that you can see on Little Red Book and these kinds of social media apps that I think older politicians in America don’t have any sense of, but I think younger Americans are tuned into. I wanted to get your thoughts on it.
Hasan: Yeah, I think IShowSpeed is a great example of this. His audience is primarily kids and teenagers. And he probably went through a transformational experience personally going to China. I talked to him about it. He’s like, it’s one of his favorite places that he’s ever visited. He thought the experience was unbelievable — going in thinking that it’s gonna be this scary place, because that’s what a lot of Americans think. They think it’s somehow unique, that the people are gonna be different, that the culture is gonna be totally different, that it’s not going to be as welcoming, that there is this constant fear of mass surveillance.
People talking about social credit, right? It’s understandable that the average American would be like, what the hell is going on over here? They’re communists. I’ve been taught to fear communism my whole life. And then you go there and you’re like, wait a minute, they just chill.
Another one that I thought was really interesting was the Nelk Boys. They’re a Canadian podcast group that is deeply in the manosphere. Donald Trump, I believe, credited his victory to a group of broadcasters. One of them was the Nelk Boys. That’s how right wing these guys are, right? And they went to China. And I think it was Kyle who was telling the other Nelk that the experience was eye-opening, because they thought it’s gonna be so scary. And then it was like, we partied freaking hard. And we learned that as long as you don’t say anything about the leadership or the party, you could do whatever you want. It’s just like us. That was their takeaway.
Obviously, it’s not exactly like America, but I would say that my experience was also somewhat similar in that regard. I do think there are a lot of similarities between China and America in ways that I think most people would not ever think would be so similar. Car-reliant infrastructure, even though they have public transit obviously. And also treats — they love their treats, just like we do.
Chang: What do you mean?
Hasan: Commodity consumption, more so than other OECD nations that I’ve been to, in Europe and all these other places. Culturally speaking, there’s more of an emphasis on purchasing goods. There is a focus on almost the veneration of commodities and consumption in the way that you see in America, which is really interesting because it is—
Chang: Not a very Marxist thing.
Hasan: It’s not, but I like that personally. I do think it’s one of the things that the western capitalist world has actually nailed fairly well. Treats are an important part of making sure that you have a happy base of support.
China has nailed that.
Chang: I wanna talk a little bit more about your trip, but before we get there — what was the kind of trigger, when you decided to go?
And was it a kind of formal thing related to Speed’s visit?
Hasan: Ha. According to the Chinese netizens, that’s why they call me Lemon Bro, because they say I’m sour about all the love that IShowSpeed got in China. Because I was always one of the few big content creators that is not super anti-China, especially in my realm.
Many of the political commentators are like, China is our enemy, they’re the worst country on the planet, all this stuff. I spend a good deal of time cutting through that. But I’ve always wanted to go. I’m fascinated by countries that are outside of the American sphere of influence and considered foreign adversaries. IShowSpeed’s trip made it a lot easier for me to sell it to my friends, because they were like, he did this, he had a great time, I think we can do it as well.
Chang: He kind of opened the door.
Hasan: They were still resistant. Even after all of that, they were still like, I don’t know.
Chang: Were they afraid that something might happen to you?
Hasan: Not to me, just in general, because they didn’t know anything. I kind of understand it — if you’re an American and you’ve learned so much about how scary and dangerous China is, you’re gonna get in there and you’re gonna be like, am I allowed to say whatever I wanna say? What could happen to me? It’s a very real fear in the back of your mind when you’re visiting for the first time, I think.
Chang: I’ve lived in China for the past five years since 2020. I think technologically, it’s just a nightmare getting all the new apps.
Hasan: We did all that ahead of time.
Chang: So you guys just had people help you out?
Hasan: We had friends who had lived in China. And on top of that, we hired help. We literally paid for a group to show us around. An MCN or something, there was someone from the tourism bureau walking us around in the cities. We had time to ourselves as well because we wanted to explore. But basically it would have been impossible for us to do a comprehensive multi-city trip without getting a tremendous amount of logistical help from a Chinese company.
Chang: You mentioned that you had interacted with the cultural bureau. Did they give you any sort of hints about things not to say, or were you guys aware of things to keep in mind of what not to do?
Hasan: No, not really, but also, it wasn’t the cultural bureau. It was an MCN, a private company. They had a local tour guide wherever we went, for each individual city.
There wasn’t any warnings about what you can and can’t say. I was also live-streaming on Bilibili as well while I was there.
I learned through the process of going through that experience that there are certain things that people look at you weird about when you say something about it — mentioning Xi Jinping, mentioning Mao Zedong in any way. And I wasn’t even making fun of them or anything. I would talk about Xi Jinping or Mao Zedong in a historical context, as a matter of history, right? And even then, there was definitely a little bit of tension. But I did find in my experience that there was an environment of self-censorship for sure, both amongst the people who are not tourists but are living there as foreigners, and certainly even amongst the local population as well. That environment of self-censorship changed dramatically once we left Beijing.
We went to Shanghai. It was much more loose. And then from Shanghai onward to Chengdu and Chongqing, it was nonexistent almost. It was really interesting to see — the more inland the cities were, the less tense it was. Beijing, I will admit, as much as I love the history of Chinese development, as much as I’m fascinated by it — I will say, Beijing, you feel like you’re being surveilled.
Chang: Hahaha
Hasan: But Chengdu and Chongqing was awesome. Definitely the two dopest out of all the cities that we went to. I think it was Chengdu where they said that there was a big Taoist culture and temples and whatnot. The vibes were dramatically different city to city. And I would say that Chengdu was the most chill.
Chang: What do you think about the self-censorship? You’ve expressed admiration for the political economy of China and bringing so many millions of people up through poverty. But I think that there’s a view among liberals that this kind of socialist system also comes hand in hand with this kind of self-repression.
How are you thinking about that now that you came back?
Hasan: It’s interesting. I don’t know how much of it is cultural differences. I don’t know how much of it is more so just a byproduct of existing in a system such as this one versus — I feel like western liberalism has a social libertarian streak in it where people want to be offensive. People want to constantly prod people on issues. This is foundational, I feel, to western society. I don’t necessarily believe that any sort of social repression has to exist in a socialist or communist structure of governance.
Overall, though, I think it’s not something that I personally like. I grew up in Turkey, and then I now live in America. So very clearly, free speech is something that I value. Turkey didn’t have it. America is supposed to have it. But in general, I do think it’s heavy-handed. I don’t think it needs to exist in a different economic organization of society.
Chang: The other thing about China, in addition to the repression, is that there’s just a lot of history that a lot of Chinese don’t know. For example, I bet that the fans of Speed who were interacting with Speed, most of them probably wouldn’t know about Tiananmen, 1989. There’s a lot of things like that in China.
So I guess to summarize your view — would it be safe to say if you were to think about some kind of future governmental system in America, it would look closer to China but without the repression? And you think that’s possible?
Hasan: No, I’m more so focused on controlling the flows of capital, right? I think that’s one aspect of Chinese development that has been profoundly successful. It’s actually a reality that even western countries are now having to reckon with, right? The alleviation of poverty, a focus on education — even if sometimes it has downsides as well, this hyper focus on education.
But those are the things that I am not only familiar with, but those are things I think are valuable lessons we can learn to integrate into our system. But no, not the social repression or restriction of speech in any way, shape or form.
Chang: I’d love to get some more memorable moments from your trip. And I think that a lot of Americans maybe don’t realize how different Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Chengdu are, even though they’re all kind of first-tier cities. But they have clearly very different vibes, and there’s even kind of like beef.
So tell me a little bit about what you noticed.
Hasan: I noticed that there’s a little bit of a rivalry as well, for sure. It was fascinating to see the diversity of it all, because I think it’s beyond the differences between Texas and New York City. Because at the end of the day, there isn’t an almost totally different dialect in Texas as opposed to New York City, right? Whereas because China is so vast and these cities have been around for a very long time — much longer than America has been around — it’s almost like a collection of different countries inside of one country.
Chang: Any memorable moments from your trip that stuck out to you?
Hasan: They let us work in a wonton shop in Chongqing — straight up work the lunch rush. I was the busker, bringing people in. My friend Will was literally whipping up wontons in the back, and we were serving the people of Chongqing wonton soup, wonton dumplings.
Chang: And they knew that you were influencers?
Hasan: Yeah, there were cameras. I was literally pulling random people off the street to come into the shop. That was a really cool experience. Seeing the tunnels was a crazy experience as well, the bomb shelters—
Chang: For listeners, during the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese used to bomb Chongqing. And so Chongqing has these bomb shelters that have been repurposed into bars and turned into restaurants.
Hasan: But for me, the most fascinating thing was just seeing a country run by a communist party have Gucci stores, basically. Because it’s something that people yell at me about all the time, where they’re like, you’re a Gucci Marxist, you’re a Gucci communist, or champagne socialism. Seeing both of those worlds exist at the same time where there is obviously still income inequality, but ultimately, the productive forces are almost entirely centrally controlled in this totally unique mode of development — that was the ultimate fascination for me.
Chang: I wouldn’t say that productive forces are totally centrally controlled, but I would say that there’s a complex mix and interaction between the state and the private sector that produces the overall productive forces.
Hasan: But what I mean is, they ultimately control the flows of capital, and they move it in a certain direction. It’s not as hands-on, I would say, in comparison to some of these other communist projects.
Chang: You had mentioned at some point you kind of see China as where Japan was in the 1980s or ‘90s when Japan was also this kind of East Asian technological powerhouse. Did you see that when you were in China? I know you’re excited about high-speed rail and I want to get your thoughts on high-speed rail, but anything else that you felt was particularly like, damn, we don’t have this in America — that China is like the future?
Hasan: Absolutely. Pretty much everything. All the cities that we went to were so modern. Very clean, very modern. Seeing all of that from an American perspective, looking at the trajectory of a country that is very clearly still developing but has areas that have already developed.
Because I think ten, twenty years ago the argument was, this is all — what do they say — tofu dreg buildings, they’re all fake. They’re building all these things just to flex on us or to make it seem like they have these constructions taking place in China. And then you go and you’re like, this is a real metropolitan city.
It’s one that I would say is even more modern than American major cities.
It feels like there is a promise of more growth. You can feel that the Chinese trajectory is on an upward trajectory. Whereas when you go to any city in America — I live in Los Angeles. It was raining earlier today, my internet was going in and out. There’s this feeling of living in a big city in the United States where there’s a downward trajectory.
Chang: I wanted to ask about the incident where you were stopped at Tiananmen.
Tell me a little bit about that — what actually happened?
Hasan: That was the only time, and it was really funny because it happened the first day we were in Beijing. So we land in Beijing, we get into our hotel — very nice hotel, one of these famous international hotel chains, right?
And the next morning we have to wake up at 4:00 AM. It’s like minus 30 degrees.
Chang: Is that for the flag-raising ceremony?
Hasan: Yep.
Chang: I think that China and the US are similar in this way, because there’s this kind of patriotism that’s kind of unique to the two countries. We love to sing the Star-Spangled Banner at every sports event, and Chinese too — they do this thing every single day. People come from all over just to see the flag-raising ceremony.
Hasan: It blew my mind. That level of patriotism is higher than American patriotism. American patriotism is like bubblegum — you experience it while you’re watching a football game and an F-35 flies over or something.
So what I thought was really interesting about it is that I asked people my age, Chinese people that are somewhat more liberal that live in big cities, how they felt about it. And they’re like, why would I go to the flag-raising ceremony? But when we went there, it was people who were either 7 or 70 and nothing in between, and they were coming from all different parts of China. I asked the auntie next to me, where are you coming from? And they were like, I traveled for 24 hours to get here to watch this flag get raised in the morning. Basically a five-minute experience sitting in the cold.
We start off our trip in Beijing, which is, I wouldn’t say, as welcoming as the other cities are — even though it was very welcoming, the people are very welcoming — but there’s an environment of tension.
We’re going to Tiananmen Square, which is a very important place. As our guide told us, the most important place — the beating heart of 1.4 billion Chinese who wish to come to Tiananmen Square to see the flag-raising ceremony. She was really patriotic.
Chang: She was very strict.
Hasan: Much more so, for sure, than the other cities and the other guides that we had. So, yeah, she gave us this big spiel. And that spiel actually came after one of my friends made the mistake of being like, isn’t Tiananmen Square where the thing happened?
And she got tense: “Tiananmen Square is really important for the People’s Revolution. Historically, this place that was for the super wealthy changed ownership over warlords and emperors and it was given to the people. So it’s a very important place for all Chinese people, 1.4 billion Chinese people.”
So we’re just kind of sitting there, and I was like dude, you shouldn’t have said that. Anyway, it was 4:00 AM. We are shocked, to say the least, because there are tens of thousands of people walking in these massive lines that have come from all around China to get to Tiananmen Square.
And obviously, that’s the most security theater we’ve ever encountered, because there are checkpoints upon checkpoints and constant face scanning, to even get to Tiananmen Square for this flag raising.
Chang: For people who don’t realize, going to Tiananmen Square today is like three times harder than going through airport security.
Hasan: They do not mess around at Tiananmen Square with their security. So we get in, and I’m really excited. I’m like a six-foot-four white guy. I think the only white guy at Tiananmen Square on this random Monday morning. I’m jumping up and down, I’m super stoked. The rest of the group is not as excited as I am. My producer — because we’re livestreaming — in the chat shows a meme of me, my face as Mao Zedong. And I’m not even thinking that’s going to be seen as anything — it’s not going to be seen as a slight, because it’s not even offensive. My intention is not to offend.
So, all of a sudden, boom. We have a young police officer walk up to us. And he was a little bit stern with us. He’s trying to talk to us in Chinese and we’re like, we don’t know what you’re saying. And he’s like, show me your phone. So we show him the phone and we’re filming from the phone too, we’re livestreaming from the phone. And we’re trying to explain to him, there’s nothing on the phone, because we didn’t even understand what was going on at the time. And it was like a one-minute conversation. And then he just let us go. And then we kept livestreaming and it wasn’t that big of a deal. It was a very funny first interaction with Beijing and China as well. Because we did happen to go to the one location where there are no jokes allowed.
But outside of that, there was no other instance where there was any sort of stress or pressure whatsoever.
Chang: I’m curious about your audience in China. Were you able to interact with people who were big fans of you?
Hasan: Yeah, definitely. It was really interesting. There was one experience where someone came up to me and was like, I’m a huge fan of you, I’ve been watching for years.
Chang: Which, first of all, is remarkable that they have to go through the firewall to see you.
Hasan: From what I gathered, VPN usage is very liberal out there. Maybe there are times when the government stresses it more. But the only time when someone stressed that VPNs are not allowed was the border patrol in China when we were first walking in. They were like, what do you do? And I was like, I’m a Twitch streamer, all this stuff, right? And they’re like, what is Twitch? And I was like, don’t you have a VPN? And they were like, no, VPNs are not allowed. But it was the police, the border police saying that. But I very quickly found out everybody uses it.
Chang: VPN use is pretty widespread in first-tier cities among a certain young population. It gets a little bit diffuse — the kinds of people that would go to the flag-raising ceremony, I think they’re probably pretty underrepresented in VPN use.
Hasan: If you have any sort of appetite for western content, I hear it’s fairly easily accessible. But as I was saying — There was a guy in Chengdu who said, I’m a huge fan of you. And I immediately assumed that this person was either American-born Chinese or was a Chinese guy that went to school in America at some point. And no, he was like, no, I’m born and raised, I never left China. I was like, okay, that’s crazy cool. He was like, you got me out of the red pill pipeline.
Chang: Hasan, I think that you’re aware that this kind of debate around feminism and red pill men in China is as intense as it is in the US, which is a fascinating phenomenon.
We also see this in South Korea. But there isn’t a Hasan Piker in China. There isn’t somebody like you who can pull people away from the red pill, which is oftentimes connected with nationalists and this concept of the “Little Pinks” — these ultra-nationalist Chinese youth. And so it makes sense to me that you are playing that role for some people in China, which is really remarkable.
Hasan: It was definitely a shock to me. I can understand why someone who is Chinese, born and raised in China, is fascinated with American culture and they see my commentary and they’re like, this guy isn’t so anti-Chinese. And then they start listening to other stuff. But the fact that they were getting content from people who are expressly and outwardly anti-China in ways that are fairly hateful — that was so shocking to me.
The gender wars are very much alive and well everywhere around the world. I don’t know if it’s as bad as it is in South Korea. I feel like, because everything is so heavily controlled by the government — the flows of information are very restricted by the government if they have ambitions that people need to repopulate, for example, they’ll be like, we need to focus more on traditional lifestyle. The American version of that is pretty crazy. I don’t know how anyone who is Chinese could find that appealing. Because it’s very nationalistic, very pro-America. The red pill content creators here in America — they’re very pro-America, they’re very pro-West. They feel a sense of western superiority. They make racist memes about Chinese people and stuff like that.
So that’s why I’m like, how does that not get you out of it?
Chang: Oftentimes these kinds of masculine red pill figures in China — the equivalent would be some kind of ultra-nationalist, anti-feminist, misogynist person.
They tend to have a kind of affinity towards each other, even though they’re both kind of racist and anti…each other. This is the same reason why nationalists kind of prefer to deal with Trump sometimes over somebody like Biden.
Hasan: Are they nationalists, like pro-China nationalism?
Chang: Yeah, pro-China.
Hasan: That’s why I’m so shocked by it, right? Because if you’re a pro-China, ultra-nationalist, guy, and you get your notes and your content from a guy who is very clearly anti-China — that’s shocking to me. Ideologically, I’m so far removed from that. I’m so totally on the opposite end of that spectrum that if I saw someone who was super nationalist in China, as opposed to communist or whatever, I would be like, this is a little strange for me.
Chang: They disagree with that, and I’ve talked to nationalists who find that off-putting. But these red pill influencers are magnets for lost men who can’t really find a place in their society, who feel like culture has shifted significantly to the left, especially around women’s rights.
And so what happens is they see this kind of affinity with the way that they are attacking the enemies domestically. And they find that to be more resonant with them. And they kind of airbrush — they sort of move that anti-China stuff to the side. That’s my general impression of it.
I’m sure that you have been criticized going and coming back. What have you been hearing?
Hasan: Some people say I’m paid by the Chinese government, and I always laugh and say I wish. But that’s usually the number one thing — you hate America, you love China, you went to China to do propaganda for China. Things of that nature.
That’s pretty much it. Normal people that aren’t political operatives — they just think it’s fascinating. They’re like, how was it? That’s usually the conversation I have with normal people. But political operatives will be like, you are an enemy of the state, and you are a propagandist for China. Even though I’ve been very critical of numerous aspects of Chinese governance, and am more so fascinated by the difference in their governance when it comes to the economy — how they manage the economy.
Chang: So let’s talk about some of the criticisms. What are you critical of when it comes to the government? We’ve already talked about repression. Is there anything else?
Hasan: Obviously, Xinjiang — dragnets, mass surveillance initiatives, things of that nature. I think it’s super heavy-handed. I understand the argument from the Chinese government, but I just think it’s a human rights violation.
I also understand why people in Hong Kong are resistant to the One Country, Two Systems approach, because once again, it comes back to social repression. People don’t see Chinese control in a positive way, especially if they’ve been living under a western system, because the western system gives you more freedoms in terms of what you can say. It makes you feel like you have a say in the process.
And that’s important for a lot of people, understandably. A big part of my argument in the West is that the two options are oftentimes not reflective of the real material needs that we have — Democrat versus Republican. But that’s besides the point.
The very fact that you have this pressure valve of the democratic process, and the very fact that you have at least this established, almost social libertarian culture — that’s very alluring for people. And they don’t want that to go away. It’s understandable that you don’t want it to go away. So it’s things like that I am critical of.
Chang: You don’t want that to go away either, right?
Hasan: Yeah, no, I don’t want that to go away. And I’m pretty critical of the American government currently moving in that direction. It would be very hypocritical of me to say, no, that’s fine. Although sometimes I do go back and forth, because the brain rot here is pretty severe. So sometimes I’m like, maybe we should be a little bit more restrictive. But then I know that restriction is going to inevitably go in the direction of what the American government wants.
And we’ve clearly seen what that looks like with Israel and commentary surrounding Israel. Both under the Biden administration, 3,500 student protesters being arrested. And then now with the Trump administration accelerating pretty severely with surveillance lists that the Department of Homeland Security now has for anti-ICE protesters, anti-Israel protesters as well. So it’s pretty terrifying. I fundamentally am at odds with any sort of social repression of that sort.
Chang: I wanted to share a little bit about my thought process. For reporting on China, it’s become harder over the years as a reporter to cover China. We oftentimes will write critically about certain things that China does, right?
And so we’ll write about trade protectionism or the security state. And then when the West starts to do that and more, it becomes harder to write about China from that perspective. That being said, I think that there are still significant differences, right? China — if you look at the ranking of free speech, there’s a list of countries.
And I think America is somewhere in the 50s, which is already pretty low. But China is at 178 of 180. That’s still a categorical difference, right? And the thing about Don Lemon — he got arrested, and that’s still playing out, but that is a national story. Whereas in China, there’s so many Don Lemons. It happens all the time.
Hasan: The same with Turkey. There is no free speech in the Turkish constitution at all.
And I can’t go back to Turkey because I’ve written extensively about the Turkish coup that happened. I wasn’t even all that critical of the Turkish government, but it’s not great. I know that if I go back, I will have issues. I might go to jail. And because I’m a Turkish citizen as well, I know the American government is not trying to get me out. They’d be like, you can keep him, right?
That’s why I said Ai Weiwei’s approach to it has been fascinating, because he’s experienced Chinese state repression. And he is a dissident — a person who was incredibly critical.
And then for him to also experience it in the West, especially after October 7 — it’s been really fascinating to see that unfold, where he’s like, these guys are hypocrites too. At least China is also offering something to the citizens. Because from my Chinese relatives and my friends that now live here, when I talk to them, it was always like, there are certain things you can’t say that you all know. As long as you don’t do that, you’re fine. You have this knowledge that the government will take care of you. There is a social cohesion around that.
But if you obviously want to become a dissident, or if you see something that is truly an issue — in the case of Ai Weiwei, it was the earthquake, right? There was this massive earthquake and all these students had died and he wanted to criticize the government over it.
And the government was like, you can’t do that, we’re going to put you in prison and we’re going to beat you up. And then he wanted to criticize the fact that he got beaten up. And he wanted to make a performance art piece out of it. I feel like the American government hasn’t gotten to that level yet. But I think the reason why is because America has been the hegemonic superpower. And I have this belief that the First Amendment, as a foundation or principle, is almost afforded to a country like that. Because we are not considered disruptive enough. I, as a person, can be a socialist, a communist, whatever I want to be in America, because I can’t cause any instability in the eyes of the state, right? Because the state is so powerful. Whereas I feel like it stems from a place of insecurity, basically a place of vulnerability.
When you think speech and being a dissident is a problem that exposes a weakness in your own mechanism of governance. Maybe I’m wrong about this, but I do think that there will be a loosening of restriction if China becomes more of a power player around the world, in terms of speech.
Chang: The reason why it’s hard for me to think that is the case is because I feel like the repression now has been worsening over my five years that I’ve been here. It’s gotten worse in China.
Since the pandemic, when China was locked down, there’s a whole host of things that you just could not say about the government. And the government became a lot more censorious during that period and it never really relaxed after that. So a lot of people in Shanghai — I don’t know if you knew — but Shanghai was under lockdown. There was a period where for two months we didn’t have enough food. We couldn’t even get basic medicine. And people were trying to basically express their issues online, which is the only way that they could possibly do it. And the government censored that. And so a lot of people died during that period, and it’s still not a topic that can be discussed in China.
And so there’s examples of this where the government has gotten worse over time. But the irony for me is that China has gotten richer and more successful in that same period. It’s been a curious thing. I also share your intuition, which is that surely when you become more powerful and more successful, you should open up the space for free expression.
But what I’ve noticed in the past few years in China has been this kind of strange paradox where the government has become more successful but they’ve started to tighten up more and become more oppressive.
And I think that it has to do with the way that they relate to the world, especially the United States. In times when they felt that the United States was in a more collaborative posture, they were more willing to open up society, let people talk. But then now they feel like when the US is more anti-China, when the government voices are more anti-China, there’s more repression domestically. I’ve talked to a lot of dissidents who say that they feel their experience with the security state always gets worse whenever Nancy Pelosi visits Taiwan, or when someone says that we’re gonna have to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack, or when politicians say these things that create tension within the relationship diplomatically — that creates more repression domestically.
Hasan: No, it totally makes sense. I’m going to Cuba with a humanitarian aid flotilla. And much has been said about Cuban governance and the repressive nature of the Cuban government, right? And I think it’s a lot more understandable, especially when I judge it by the American standards of moments of repression of political speech in American history, in times of war, right? Whether it be the Cold War, World War I, World War II. There have been a lot of instances where the American government has considered speech to be disruptive and has punished people criminally, right? Draft dodgers, conscientious objectors, things of that nature. People were branded as communists. Or even civil rights leaders, right? Sometimes they were directly assassinated.
So the way I see it — it’s almost seen as a necessity by some of these countries that exist in the periphery or outside of the scope of America, that have been branded as foreign adversaries. Because there’s so much outside interference from America that’s super direct too. It’s not like they hide it, especially with Cuba. The government, as a mechanism of sovereignty, tries to do its very best to just clamp down on dissent. Maybe in some instances, they also like that, where it’s like, we can use outside intervention as a reason to say you can’t say certain things. So that’s the way I interpret it. Because at the end of the day, all manner of leadership still want to at least manage their nation-state. It’s not like people are doing it specifically so they can eat lobster rolls or whatever as the people suffer. They want to thrive, they want to have sovereignty.
This is one of the lines of self-defense that these countries engage in, which is why I think China is in a unique situation, because it is becoming this incredibly powerful force around the planet.
Therefore, I almost see it as a burden to have any sort of limitations on speech, or at least have such strict controls over the speech of its own citizens. Because especially given the surveillance mechanisms that exist, figuring out what’s valid criticism or valid dissent coming from within versus hatred being fomented by outside influences like the CIA is probably fairly easy to distinguish.
The more powerful you become, the more ridiculous it almost becomes that you would have such a strong censorious approach.
Chang: I was reading some of your commentary about China, and you do mention there’s a history in China of foreign intervention, right? It’s been invaded many times by the British and by the Americans. And Shanghai is still — you can see the remnants of the concessions in Shanghai. So China has always felt like their regime is kind of vulnerable to foreign adversaries. And so what you see in China and in a lot of authoritarian countries is that they see this through that lens in any kind of situation where the regime is in trouble. So when there’s a protest among the citizenry, they assume that there is some kind of black hand, American forces that are sowing discord.
And I think that kind of paranoid thinking — I don’t know if it’s maybe it’s just propaganda — but I think that there’s a kind of confident, patriotic Chinese person who thinks, we did so much for you guys. If you guys are actually pissed off at us, it must be because the CIA has helped. I’ve seen this before. And I don’t think that kind of thinking is amenable to what you’re saying about this kind of gradual enriching process that softens the public sphere.
Hasan: No, I get it. There’s also validity for that fear due to the historical reasons. But also on top of that, here, it’s valid to say, hey, the uncertainty surrounding the lockdowns is terrifying for the average person, right? Then on the other hand, you’ve got the New York Times writing about it. So then when the New York Times is writing about it, they’re like, see, they’re trying to foment instability in the country. So we gotta be extra hard in cracking down on this sort of speech. This is not even a justification for the actions of the government. I’m just saying that I can see why, if I were to put myself in the shoes of someone leading a country branded as a foreign adversary, that kind of stuff plays a role in the heavy-handed approach the government takes.
And then, they probably don’t mind that this is a repressive force that makes it easier to control the public.
Chang: So I wanted to get your thoughts on — do you think that China is socialist, in your definition and value system?
Hasan: I’m much more pragmatic than someone who is an orthodox Marxist, and that’s why I stress the controlling-the-flows-of-capital thing in terms of the way that the Chinese economy has developed. Do I believe that China is a transitional socialist state? I think it’s an attempt in that direction. It’s not a communist state.
Obviously, there’s no such thing — it’s never really existed. But I think the state has found this very unique structure where they still take some of the valuable lessons of decentralization in terms of developing stuff, right? Manufacturing goods, especially light goods. It feels like it’s much less restrictive in terms of what you can produce. I explain it as the Chinese government wears capitalism like a sleeve almost, where there’s still control over the productive forces — a lot more control over the productive forces than what you get in comparison to the American system, where we have subsidies.
But if a company wants to use subsidies to engage in stock buybacks, they can do so, right? Whereas in terms of the five-year plans that they set in motion, they’re like, we’re gonna move on from real estate, right? That’s what happened in the last decade. They were like, all right, we built a lot of housing, we’re moving on from real estate. We’re gonna move into what direction? Renewable energy and also electric vehicles. So then boom, all of a sudden, flows of capital move in that direction. And then everyone’s like, it’s time to build, it’s time to make EVs. I feel like that’s a unique system that doesn’t exist in the western world at all, which is why they constantly complain about it and say China is actually cheating in international trade. And it’s a major point of contention with the European markets, because they’re impossible to compete with.
Chang: One thing that I feel is really different about China from what you would expect in a kind of Anglo-American socialist perspective is that all of this government intervention and interaction with the productive forces — so to speak — they don’t tend to end up in just ordinary people’s hands. What you mentioned about high-speed rail — high-speed rail is public. So there is an argument to be made that there’s a lot of investment in public infrastructure, and that is a kind of common good. But EVs, right? This intense focus on EVs and climate change — these are long-term things that drive China’s technological edge. It probably looks cool, right? When China’s government supports robots — if you saw the Spring Festival two days ago, there’s this enormous push about robots.
Hasan: I don’t much care for robots and stuff, but everybody here thinks it’s super cool.
Chang: So one thing that I think is almost contradictory to the view that China is a socialist country is that Xi Jinping has said himself that he does not like welfarism and he wants Chinese citizens to “eat bitterness,” and he doesn’t like this kind of direct cash transfer.
So a lot of this is abundance. It’s China focusing on the supply side and not on the demand side. I was wondering whether you were aware of that.
Hasan: No, I fully agree. I don’t think welfare is necessarily a socialist concept anyway. I think it might have been Lenin who said — no, it was definitely Lenin who said, you’re gonna still work, right? At the end of the day, it’s a totally different approach. Welfare is a social democratic approach that in many instances offers a lifeline. My focus is more so about having some kind of control over capital. We have these mechanisms in America as well. We just never apply them — the Defense Production Act and things like that will only be seen as a last resort. And in most circumstances, they’re never deployed. We have eminent domain. We rarely ever use it unless it’s super necessary, I guess. And I feel like the Chinese system is more efficient for that reason, because the state is more powerful than capital. Whereas in America and in the western world, capital dominates the state.
So the state will dish out funds at the behest of capital, rather than at the behest of a vision that they might have. That’s what I mean as far as dominating the forces of capital. However, I’m sure there’s a distribution process that still rewards people who are within the party structure. But at the end of the day, it’s still done for a different purpose. The industrial focus is done with a higher purpose in mind. And the surplus value is then still allocated back to development projects — building out the tier-one cities, and then also building out the tier-four cities and modernizing the countryside, for example.
Chang: Right. My view of China is that there’s this constant focus on development and making things look nice and things that the public can share, like roads and bridges.
And there’s a lot less — there’s almost no appetite for a kind of redistributive policy that provides spending cash for ordinary citizens. That has been a really big pain point for a lot of leftists in China — people who have similar views to you.
Hasan: I’ve heard that there is a Maoist resurgence almost, where there are more people saying, the class struggle continues in China.
Chang: Absolutely.
Hasan: That’s fascinating, because the established cultural attitude is not capitalist inherently, whereas in America, the solution when there’s a problem is more capitalism. Whereas in China, the solution when there’s a problem is, let’s do socialism, let’s do more socialism. And that is fascinating to me — someone who grew up in both Turkey and then the United States of America, a person who has only known one way of doing business is severely limited in their political approach to fixing problems — it’s always like, we gotta bring in private enterprise, private enterprise is the solution to this.
Chang: I want to get your view about what kind of a message you might have to an establishment Democratic figure, somebody — I think that you had talked to Lina Khan [former FTC chair] about their attitudes towards China. Now that you have come back from China, what would you say to her?
Hasan: I don’t really talk to American politicians about China at all, because no one knows anything about China. And they not only don’t know anything about China — if they are curious about what’s going on in China, they have a very different approach than I do that I think is not as open-minded, or even—
Chang: A security mindset, right?
Hasan: National security concerns trump all. And this is analysts that I talk to who are not even analysts in America — analysts around the globe all share the same concerns. When it comes down to talking about China, they can be the most woke person. They immediately shut it out where there is a sense of Orientalism in their approach, 100 percent, where they think, no, they’re just different. Their attitude is different, their worldview is different. You can’t trust them. That’s oftentimes the sense I get. Which is great for me because it has helped me make better predictions — even with the tariff war that was taking place with China.
The Chinese government is pretty open about what they’re going to do, especially when it comes to matters of international affairs, where they’re just like, this is unacceptable, this is our red line, don’t cross it, right? And I’m also more aware of what kind of manufacturing behemoth they are than the average American analyst is, who is constantly talking about how China is in a state of collapse any moment.
That’s given me an upper hand, I guess, in terms of my analysis. But usually I don’t talk to American politicians about China as much. But I think I’ll probably be talking to them a lot more in the next five years, because the New York Times article was like, I just came back from China and they’re dominating us. I never thought I would read that in the Times.
So I think that is going to open up more opportunities for people to look at what they’re doing differently and what kind of lessons we can learn from their development.
Chang: That’s my last question. There’s a kind of trend, as you’ve noticed, of people — including you — going to China and coming out and being like, I saw the future. Tom Friedman has done it. Several people in the New York Times have done it. This has intensified since last year.
I wanted to get your thoughts on the timing of that. Why do you think it’s happening this year? Is it reflective of something about America that you’re noticing?
Hasan: It’s American material conditions deteriorating. It’s an inevitability. It feels like you’re a party apparatchik visiting an American grocery store for the first time after leaving the USSR and going, wait, this is available for everyone? What the fuck. That’s what it feels like if you go to China. You’re like, what do you mean, you’ve got an abundance of different options of travel? People aren’t even using the airlines that much, because even though China is so vast, high-speed rail is so accessible. When you go there, you’re like, it doesn’t make sense.
We thought that this was a country that was extremely poor not that long ago. How did this development take place in such a short period of time? They must be utilizing their resources a lot better than we are here in America. And I think it’s impossible not to have that be your main takeaway. You would have to have been propagandized so exceptionally to go to China and say that what they’ve done in the last four decades is anything short of a miracle. If you were to look at that and be like, no, this still sucks, and I think the American way is actually the right approach — you would have to be deluding yourself. Five years ago, even six years ago or ten years ago, when I used to talk about China, they would say all the tier-one cities are fake, right? It’s just bells and whistles.
Now, when I came back from China, I thought it was fascinating that they were like, the tier-one cities are actually much nicer than ours, but you didn’t go to the rural countryside. You didn’t see how underdeveloped the rural countryside is. And it’s true — the countryside, obviously, there are certain parts of the Chinese countryside that aren’t as developed as the tier-one cities, certainly.
But in comparison to the trajectory of development in areas that are still being built out, they clearly have a positive trajectory. As opposed to going to Buffalo, New York, going to all of these forgotten towns in the heartland of America, where you realize that there was industry here in the past.
And it’s gone now. They’re ghost cities. That’s how I felt traveling around the country, there used to be people here, there used to be commerce here, there used to be economic activity here.
Now it’s all gone.
Chang: So here’s a hypothetical for you. Let’s say that there’s a Democratic president in the next few years, 2028. And they are thinking about China and they call you up and they say, Hasan, what can you tell me about what we can do concretely in terms of policy, either domestically or foreign policy-wise, with regards to China? What would you recommend them?
Hasan: I would immediately reverse the decades of anti-China hawkery and move to a cooperative agreement with China.
Chang: What do you mean by that? Economically?
Hasan: Economic cooperation, which already exists, obviously. But I would take a much less hawkish approach.
Chang: You’d take the tariffs down?
Hasan: All of that stuff, I think, is so frivolous. And in any case, it’s almost helped Chinese development in that area as well, because then they just find a way around it. And then the indigenous production is an inevitability. I find it ridiculous to try to approach foreign nations as adversaries. I believe in internationalism. So I would tell them, no more. We’re only focusing on international cooperation from this day on — if I had the magic wand to somehow overcome decades, if not centuries, of hatred that the average American has, and oftentimes the economic interest that they have in complete domination of all of these other countries.
Within the confines of permissibility, I would say that I probably would move the IMF-World Bank structure that has existed, that has dominated the Global South, to a more tolerant approach as well. No more focus on austerity, no more forcing developing nations to have to work with foreign capital and foreign investments, and just allow them room to develop. I would try to get America to become more Chinese, is what I’m saying. If you wanna quote-unquote beat China, you have to become more like China.
Now, do I think that we have enough time to even engage in such competition? No, I don’t. So I think international cooperation is the way. Maybe I’m wrong, maybe I’m foolhardy about this. But I do think that, as you’ve said as well, it kind of feels like China wants things to just be stable on the international front. They value stability quite a lot more than they want to engage in any sort of militant posture against the United States of America.
Chang: One context that is important is that this kind of anti-China posturing — there are many sources, but one of the genuine sources of anti-China posturing has been cybersecurity. China has been really aggressive in the past few years on spying. There have been major spying efforts in the US, and that has really alarmed a lot of policymakers.
So when you talk to people in the Trump administration, in the first term, when they were initially starting up their anti-China posture, which has kind of continued to now, they cite these genuine concerns about espionage. Have you thought about that?
Hasan: I’m very aware of it. There was a New York Times report about how the Chinese government has basically infiltrated the telecommunications grid in its entirety.
Chang: What do you think about that?
Hasan: From what I understand, even the New York Times takeaway was they were more so invested in trying to figure out which of their people were compromised — as far as the actual ambassadors or agents they have. That’s what they were more so tracking, rather than finding compromising information.
But I think all of that is a direct consequence of the militant posture that America engages in, where I don’t think that there’s any reason for countries to truly engage one another in this militant fashion, even countries that have been historically considered foreign adversaries.
Maybe I have a naive approach to it, but I always think about the European continent, which was at war with one another for centuries until not that long ago, including World War II.
And now there is a mutual understanding, a security cooperation there, and a much more tolerant approach to these nation-states. And I feel like we can expand on that mentality across the board — not just through different continents, not just through the European Union, but I have a more global approach to that kind of security arrangement that revolves around mutual respect and understanding of both differences, and isn’t so heavily focused on trying to go to war with one another all the time.
Chang: Thanks, Hasan.
Hasan: No problem.


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