Into Asia
Into Asia
Drum Diplomacy: As Trump Sows Chaos Abroad, South Korea and Japan Edge Closer
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Drum Diplomacy: As Trump Sows Chaos Abroad, South Korea and Japan Edge Closer

We talked about:

We talked about:

  • Complex history of Korea–Japan relations and the symbolism of Lee’s recent visit

  • How Trump’s unpredictability is unsettling the East Asian security order

  • China’s role in reshaping regional alignments in East Asia

  • The limits of U.S. security guarantees in the Trump era

  • What a more self-reliant East Asian security order might look like

Transcript:

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Chang: Today we’re going to be talking about diplomatic relations between Korea, Japan, and China. East Asia is quite tumultuous right now, given the changes in the international order. Donald Trump, in early January, executed an abduction of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, and in recent weeks there has been a diplomatic row in Greenland. All of this is happening while South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung has visited Japan on his first major diplomatic trip there.

I’d like to talk to Ian about his initial thoughts on the visit last week. Ian, what were your first impressions?

Ian: Well, the visit was very unusual in several respects. For one, it’s probably the first time a South Korean president and Japanese prime minister have sat down and done K-pop renditions on the drums.

We know that Takaichi Sanae, the Japanese Prime Minister, is a great fan of heavy metal music, but it was an unusual sight. In some ways heartwarming—both were clearly trying their best to foster warm relations, which hasn’t always been the case between South Korea and Japan, and is very much welcome.

Now the question is why this should be. Why are they making such an effort? Especially since, traditionally—certainly since South Korea became a democracy—politicians on the left (in this case the president himself, from the progressive party) have been rather antagonistic toward Japan. They’ve been keen to bring up issues like the comfort women and the colonial period, etc.

It’s usually been the conservatives—including former President Yoon Suk-yeol, who’s now imprisoned for having declared martial law in a very inappropriate manner—who were more hawkish, more inclined to make common cause with Japan, and more hawkish on Taiwan as well. So here we have a progressive, left-wing South Korean leader who is clearly keen on better relations with Japan.

Chang: Before we get there, maybe we should go back a little bit and talk about Lee Jae Myung and how he became president. These are both quite new leaders in each country. Can you talk a little bit about him—just summarize what party he belongs to, the traditional political positions his party holds?

Ian: He’s the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, the progressive party. The left has usually been associated—like the left in most countries—with trade unions and that kind of thing. But one of the key distinctions between left and right is that the left has been more inclined to have diplomatic relations with North Korea, to try to find a diplomatic solution rather than immediately saber-rattling. They’re also more inclined to have better relations with China—more accommodating—whereas the right, the conservatives (who are more pro-Japanese on the whole), are much more hawkish on North Korea and China.

This makes it such an interesting development: the leader of the left is trying to dampen down the anti-Japanese tradition of left-wing Korean parties and wants warm relations with Japan as well as talking to the Chinese. President Lee visited China before he visited Japan and was not completely accommodating—a lot was left unsaid, for example on the Taiwan question. He did acknowledge there is only one China (which a conservative leader might not have done), and that “one China” of course includes Taiwan. But clearly he wanted good diplomatic relations without giving the Chinese very much, and neither side gave the other very much either. Still, Xi Jinping is clearly very keen to court South Korea, and he does it by using history—one of the ways he does it. This notion that we were all fighting the Japanese empire, that you were a colony of Japan, we must be wary of revived Japanese militarism, you have to be on the right side of history. I think Xi even used those words—he says the same thing to Americans often.

So the Chinese very much want to isolate Japan. And I think Lee Jae Myung’s visit to Japan showed that the South Koreans are not going to fall for that. The efforts to have better relations actually came from both sides—it was interesting that Takaichi personally went out to welcome the South Korean president and bowed deeply when he arrived.

So clearly the Chinese are trying to isolate Japan. The South Koreans and Japanese—so far without being completely committed—are trying to make common cause.

Chang: When President Lee Jae Myung became president last year, there’s a typical ritual where the new South Korean president visits the United States as their first diplomatic maneuver. But Lee instead visited Japan first to meet Ishiba [former PM Shigeru Ishiba], which was kind of a shift in the usual order. It shows he’s quite serious about his relationship with Japan.

With regard to Takaichi’s motives, I think it’s pretty clear that—given the diplomatic row with China (for listeners who don’t know, there’s been this freeze in China-Japan relations since last October when Takaichi made comments supporting Taiwan in the case of a security crisis in the Taiwan Strait, which was basically a red line for the Chinese government)—the Chinese have since imposed serious economic sanctions against Japan.

So I can see why Takaichi is very keen to reconnect with the South Korean president. As you say—well, actually before we go there, maybe we should talk about why liberals in South Korea tend to have a frosty relationship with Japan.

Ian: That really is a historical question. Many South Koreans—this is still a delicate topic in South Korea itself—but many members of the South Korean elites (bureaucratic, academic, business) in the days of the Japanese Empire, when Korea was part of the empire (it wasn’t strictly a colony; citizens were treated as second- or third-rate, but part of the empire), a large number of Koreans cooperated with the Japanese, collaborated—sometimes not for particularly bad reasons. Like all colonial powers, the Japanese did some good: they built infrastructure, universities; they had a big impact on the economy.

After Japan’s defeat in 1945, this caused a great rift in Korean society. First, of course, it split North from South, but inside South Korea there was a rift somewhat like the splits you still see in countries like Italy and Greece, where elites that collaborated with the Nazis often came back to power, while those who resisted were sidelined.

There was a lot of bad blood from occupation, colonialism, and war. In South Korea, many members of the old elites who collaborated with Japan—after 1945, with the connivance of the United States—came back into power. The best example is the South Korean strongman Park Chung-hee (assassinated in the 1970s), who had been an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army. Many who worked with him had roles in the Japanese Empire.

Those who resisted—dissidents under military rule and later politicians who came to power—saw themselves as on the right side of colonial history, as patriots who resisted collaboration. People who were part of the collaborationist elite—including Park, his daughter, other conservative politicians—had better relations with the Japanese than those in progressive or left-wing parties.

This is what makes the current rapprochement (if that’s what it is) between the Japanese Prime Minister and the South Korean president so remarkable.

Chang: There’s an interesting backdrop: during the Biden administration, one of the greatest legacies of his four years was brokering better relations between Korea and Japan. When President Yoon was in power, he spearheaded the decision to resolve the forced labor issue—what’s the term? The fund to compensate forced labor victims?

Ian: Yes, there are two main sticking points. One is the comfort women, and the other is the larger number of Koreans forced to work in Japanese industry, coal mines, etc., under intolerable conditions. There are continued demands that Japanese companies that employed them as slave laborers compensate them, and that the Japanese government compensate former comfort women—women forced or tricked into prostitution for the Japanese Imperial Army.

The Japanese response has always been that they paid a large sum to the South Korean government in a formal arrangement under Park Chung-hee (himself a former Imperial Japanese Army officer), so there was no need to revisit it. The fear among the Japanese is that opening that can of worms means endless demands for compensation. “It’s been done; we’ve paid the money; let’s move on.” That’s the Japanese attitude on slave laborers.

The companies don’t want responsibility for similar reasons—no endless lawsuits—and they say responsibility lay with the government, not company policy. On comfort women, the Japanese government says the opposite: this was not government policy; private entrepreneurs and businessmen were responsible for recruiting the women.

A famous Japanese historian, Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki, dug into archives and found documents showing it was Japanese government policy—especially during the occupation of China, where soldiers’ rapes were stirring up resistance. To curb mass rape, they organized prostitution and brothels, recruiting from Koreans, Taiwanese, Southeast Asians, etc. Some women were tricked with job promises, others went willingly for money, others were forced.

It’s a murky, fraught issue, easily used for political ends—and often is.

Chang: The brokering of the alliance between US, Korea, and Japan during the Biden administration was predicated on a breakthrough. Yoon made it so South Korean companies would pay to compensate forced labor victims, and that was the beginning of the reconnection. Then we had that photo of Yoon, Kishida, and Biden at Camp David. How big was that in the scheme of Japan-Korea relations, you think?

Ian: Yoon himself, regardless of forced labor, was a foreign policy hawk on China, Taiwan, North Korea, and wanted better relations with Japan. He found a way to appease South Korean opinion while pursuing what he wanted.

Traditionally, the American attitude has been that there should be a strong security relationship in East Asia, guaranteed by the U.S.—security treaties with Japan (if attacked, U.S. defends) and South Korea (lots of U.S. bases, tripwire against North Korea). Taiwan has no formal treaty, but ambiguity about U.S. response. All three relied on U.S. guarantees.

That’s now changing under Donald Trump, who seems to believe the world should be run by superpowers in their spheres: U.S. in the Americas, Russia in its sphere (including Ukraine?), China in its. That leaves Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan out in the cold if he’s serious. They can’t rely on the U.S. the way they could under Biden.

That’s probably the main reason both Japanese and South Koreans—whatever their political backgrounds—are keen to cement closer relations. Only serious cooperation—including military—between Japan and South Korea (and by extension Taiwan, Southeast Asia, possibly India) can balance China without active U.S. participation.

Chang: What do you think about Lee Jae Myung visiting China before Japan? Is it just keeping enemies close?

Ian: It’s a very traditional Korean balancing act—one power against another. He wants to be friends with China to keep them from getting aggressive, while needing friends with Japan. Korea has always been a bit like Poland—stuck between larger powers (Russia, China, Japan, the Japanese Empire). One way Koreans dealt with dominant powers (especially China historically) was paying tribute.

I think he’s serious about closer ties with Japan, but he has to pay tribute to the emperor in Beijing to keep them off his back. Anyone leading North or South Korea has to play this balancing game. The Chinese use it by saying, “You’re better off with us—look what the Japanese did to you; stick with us and you’re on the right side of history.” But I don’t think they’re buying it, which is why he went straight to Japan after China.

Chang: Another contemporary reason Lee might want to say hi to Xi on his way to Japan: China can weaponize supply chains, as we’ve seen. One key trump card is rare earths, used in electronics. Korea is an electronics powerhouse—Samsung, Hyundai—highly reliant on Chinese rare earths. Lee doesn’t want to be on the wrong side like Takaichi accidentally put herself.

Ian: Even Takaichi’s diplomatic gaffe—and in some ways, of course, it was a gaffe—she was saying things out loud that other Japanese leaders had also believed but were always wise enough to keep to themselves and not rile up the Chinese unnecessarily.

But I don’t blame her quite as much as some critics have. To what extent it was a spontaneous response to a question in the Diet or whether it was calculated, I don’t know. But that too, I think, was partly the result of shifting power relations. Former Japanese prime ministers could afford to be more diplomatic and not say things like “the fate of Taiwan directly involves Japan’s security, and we would perhaps have to do something to protect ourselves” and so on.

Many of them believed that—and they’re quite right—but they could afford to be discreet and quiet, not upsetting China, because they knew America had their back. As long as the security treaty with the United States was entirely reliable, they could afford to be diplomatic.

And I think—this is only speculation because I don’t know what goes on in Takaichi’s head—but in the current atmosphere, the Japanese realize, just like the Europeans, that they can no longer reliably count on the United States. Under Trump, the U.S. is too erratic and whimsical, and wedded to this idea of dividing the world into power blocs. So she can’t really afford to be that diplomatic anymore. She has to spell it out to the Japanese people: “Look, we’ve got to get serious here.”

In that sense, she’s no different from Mark Carney in Canada and other Europeans who are beginning to say the same sort of thing.

Chang: Do you think there’s been a fundamental break in East Asia’s security architecture thinking? Where would you date it?

Ian: I don’t think it’s fundamental yet. The U.S. bases are still there; the security arrangements are still intact. So I don’t think it’s a fundamental break. But again, because of Donald Trump’s rhetoric and his behavior and what he thinks of as his long-term goals, it means that sooner rather than later, the East Asians and the Europeans have to start thinking about a post-American era. They can’t afford to be taken by surprise. Ever since 1945, in the American-controlled world order that we lived in, West Europeans and East Asians could afford not to be blunt or frank about things like military defense and security because the Americans took care of it. The Pax Americana allowed the Europeans and the Japanese to fall asleep in some ways and bask in their prosperity. Nobody wants to pay more tax toward building more tanks and fighter planes and so on.

All that is changing, and it needs leaders to tell people that the world has changed—that it’s no longer as comfortable as it was. The Europeans and the Japanese and the South Koreans have to do more to take care of themselves. In Japan, that means having a serious discussion about the constitution—changing Article 9 perhaps, which would mean Japan could take part in combat abroad. It has all these consequences. But none of this had to be faced as long as the United States could be depended on, as long as Pax Americana was alive.

So there is a fundamental shift in thinking—not yet a fundamental break. But the thinking has to start before that break could come at a very inopportune moment.

Chang: There’s a similarity in the way that the United States—not just under Trump, but previous administrations—has treated the security bargain between Europe and East Asia, and especially Japan: they need to pull their own weight. That has always been the kind of theme, and Donald Trump has made that the case in Europe. Ian, could you talk a little bit about what you think is different in the East Asian case compared to the European case? One thing I remember you mentioning to me before is that in East Asia, unlike Europe, the one country that can really take a leading role in the security architecture is Japan—and Japan is constitutionally constrained from doing so.

Ian: Yes, and not only constitutionally—it’s also a question of public opinion. One of the foundation stones of the post-war Pax Americana, both in NATO and in East Asian security arrangements, was that Japan and Germany should never become aggressive, belligerent powers again.

I can’t remember who said it—I think it was George Kennan about NATO—but the idea was to keep the Americans in and the Germans out. Most Japanese and Germans were perfectly happy to go along with that. Their memories of World War II were pretty awful. They did not really want this to happen again, either.

They were quite happy to let America take care of security so they could concentrate on their economies. They had no desire to be a military power again or to play a big military role. And to this day, I think that is probably the opinion of more than 50% of the people in both Japan and Germany.

Now, as you said, if Europeans are going to stand on their own feet—and if East Asian countries are to balance the great power of China without the guarantee of American intervention—then Germany, as the biggest economic power in Europe, and Japan, as the biggest power in East Asia, will have to take leadership roles in whatever security architecture emerges.

The problem is that neither the Japanese nor the Germans are comfortable with doing so yet. Even though I think there’s a generational issue here. It’s interesting that Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan—which so upset the Chinese—were relatively popular in Japan, especially among young people.

So I think the younger generation in Japan would be much more open to a discussion about revising Article 9 of the Constitution and changing the pacifist constitution than people over 50, who either still have memories of the war (or fewer and fewer do) or grew up with parents who had those memories.

Something like that may also be true in Europe: Germans are gradually waking up to the fact that they can’t just bask in American protection and not think about these things. It’s interesting that in Germany, the most fervent supporters of real support for Ukraine came from the Greens—the progressive party—not from the Christian Democrats. So things are changing.

Until not so very long ago, most Europeans—again, this is generational—would have been deeply uncomfortable with the idea that Germany could play a major military role again. That, too, is changing.

Just as most Europeans don’t mind so much when Germany wins a soccer championship, they don’t really mind the idea that Germany might take a leading role again. But in East Asia and Southeast Asia, I think that’s a more open question.

Despite President Lee’s visit to Japan and their relatively warm relations, many Koreans would not at all be comfortable with Japan taking a leading role. The Taiwanese would be perfectly comfortable, as far as I can see. In Southeast Asia, it’s harder to tell. I think the Singaporeans and the Filipinos probably could go along with Japan taking a more active role in military affairs. Indonesians—maybe, it’s harder to know.

But if East and Southeast Asia were to build a new kind of security arrangement to balance China, it would have to mean that Japan takes an active role. And so all these things are going to come into play: public opinion in Japan and public opinion in other countries.

Chang: We should maybe bring up this term that we’ve sort of been toying with—the idea of an East Asian NATO. Do you think it’s harder to imagine an East Asian NATO, as you say, because of that historical baggage people have with Japan—compared to a self-sufficient European security architecture?

Ian: Yes, I think it is more difficult—because essentially what it would mean is reviving echoes of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was the Japanese imperial venture during the 1940s. At the time, of course, many Southeast Asians went along with it because they saw it as a way to use the Japanese to liberate them from European or American colonialism.

But yes, I think it would be more difficult in the Asian context than in Europe—though not impossible. Minds are being concentrated, I think, by the fact that America is so erratic and by the fact that China is increasingly aggressive.

In the end, those kinds of fears and prejudices might diminish as people see the necessity for some kind of security cooperation—which might include India. And yes, I also think this kind of architecture would require generational change within Japan and Korea and the major powers.

But I think that’s already happening. Like everywhere else in the world, active memories of the past fade. What’s left are movies, comic books, school textbooks, and so on—but the memories themselves do fade. So yes, it means generational change, but I think that’s gradual and already visible.

The generation that experienced the war in Japan was very much in favor of Article 9—overwhelmingly. There was a nationalist minority that wanted to change it, but they were never in the majority. I think people under 30 or under 40 in Japan now—more than 50%—would be open to changing it.

Chang: Just to add an economic dimensions to the post-American order. I was reporting for The New York Times in Seoul in 2022, and my experience at the time was that—this was during the period when the Biden administration was pushing South Koreans to join sanctions against China on semiconductors. One of the big questions was whether Samsung was willing to stop—Samsung has a few semiconductor plants in China, and the U.S. was basically trying to prevent Samsung from continuing to work with the Chinese.

Throughout that period, the general sentiment—especially from Samsung businessmen—was “Absolutely not, we’re not doing that.” But the South Korean government ultimately stepped in and stopped Samsung from doing so because they felt the pressure from the American side.

So generally, when it comes to these kinds of economic relationships, it’s usually the Americans who are the most gung-ho about imposing economic sanctions, severing ties, and pulling back from China. Meanwhile, these middle powers—or smaller powers—tend to be a lot more pragmatic and willing to work with whoever is there. China is nearby; it’s right next door.

I think we’re going to see a lot more willingness to participate sector by sector with China. And that’s a great outcome for the Chinese, because they’ve always despised this kind of light-versus-dark, democracies-versus-authoritarians framework. They hated that binary, and they’ve been constantly trying to push the world to see it as much more multifaceted and multicolored—where the Americans are actually the ones who are the hegemon and the bully in the world.

And it’s starting to look more and more like that.

Ian: Well, and there’s another difference with Europe: China is a serious economic power. The Japanese, the Koreans, and the Southeast Asians all have a stake in the Chinese economy—and to some extent depend on it. This is not true in Europe vis-à-vis Russia.

Russia is not a serious economic power. They have a lot of oil and resources, sure, but it’s not an economy that other European countries can’t do without. And so that does make the situation in East Asia more difficult in some ways than in Europe.

Chang: Great. Thank you Ian. I think that’s a good place to end.As Trump threatens the sovereignty of NATO allies, the leaders of South Korea and Japan appeared together in Nara, playing drums in a highly choreographed display of diplomatic comity. Ian and Chang talk about the historic significance of this unlikely rapprochement, why it is happening now, and the prospect of an East Asian security architecture without the help of the United States.

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