How China Remembers World War II
In September, China staged a boisterous military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of World War II.
In September, China staged a boisterous military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of World War II. The spectacle is part of a broader campaign in recent years, from museums openings, movies, and memorials, to elevate its role in what it calls the “victory over fascism.”
How accurate is China’s official narrative of WWII — and what political purpose does it serve? How does it differ from the way Japan, the aggressor nation, or Europe and the U.S., the allies, remember the war?
Rana Mitter, historian and S.T. Lee Chair in U.S.–Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School, joins us.
See also Face-Off with Jane Perlez and Rana Mitter: https://open.spotify.com/show/1XnPbxcS20PCgamDoEmEba
Transcript:
Chang: Hi, I’m Chang Che and I’m an American journalist. My co-host, Ian Buruma is a Dutch writer and specialist on the politics and culture of East Asia.
Ian and I have spent much of our lives living and writing about the region. We both spent many years in Japan and write regularly about China, Japan, and the Koreas for publications like The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books. Into Asia is a podcast where Ian and I will be discussing what we think are some of the most pressing issues in the region—from demographic decline to the impact of AI to the unresolved legacies of World War II.
We’re living through a time when old political assumptions are in flux, and we believe Asia will shape the 21st century, much like the West shaped the 20th. Welcome to Into Asia.
Chang: So, September 2 marked the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II. It’s a moment that remains central to both China and Japan’s understanding of themselves, their identities, their politics, and their relationship with each other. In China, during the 1990s, wartime memory was a tool for bolstering nationalism. In Japan, it continues to divide opinion along the left and right. To help us unpack how this history still shapes East Asia, today we’re joined by the inimitable Rana Mitter, one of the world’s leading historians of modern China and the author of several books on the memory of World War II in Asia. Rana, welcome to the show.
Rana: It’s great to be on the show with you, Chang. Great to be on the show with you, Ian.
Chang: Ian, you want to share an anecdote about your experience at the Nanjing Massacre Museum in the ‘90s?
Ian: Yes, I visited the memorial—I think the exact title is the Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre or something of that sort—which was built in 1982, at a time when the Nanjing Massacre was really discussed for the first time, seriously in China, because before that, it was a Nationalist thing; it had nothing to do with Communist heroism and so on. It didn’t really have a place in the Communist narrative. But in the ‘80s, when Deng Xiaoping was in power and opening China to business with the United States and Japan, it became important for the Chinese—and Deng Xiaoping himself—to present himself as a nationalist, and the Nanjing Massacre fitted into that narrative of China as the victim, and that only the Communist Party could make China great again, so that nothing like that could ever happen again.
Now, I visited in the mid-’90s with an old group of Chinese Americans, for whom the Nanjing Massacre was a kind of cornerstone of Chinese American identity, as it were. Iris Chang wrote in her book about how the Chinese Americans—or the Chinese, as she put it—needed their Holocaust to be paid attention to. So there were these activists. There were also some well-meaning Japanese activists who felt that their country should do more to acknowledge what it had done in the past and were perhaps slightly tediously contrite themselves, even though they had no role in it.
There I was, suddenly seeing in China this monument to victimhood, which is really what it was—stressing the new nationalism, which was very much based on the idea that China had been the victim of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, specifically the Japanese. And this would never happen again if the Communist Party would be supported and made China great again. That was what I saw at the time.
Chang: You’ve spent a lot of time thinking about war memory in Japan. Can you say something a little bit about how the Japanese understand the Nanjing Massacre? And did they have a reaction to that kind of shift in narrative in China in the 1990s?
Ian: What sparked the new nationalism was the so-called textbook issue. What happens is that the government in Japan does not publish textbooks. Various publishers publish history textbooks, among others, and they have to be submitted to the Ministry of Education.
Now, Asahi Shimbun, I think it was—the sort of left-leaning Japanese national newspaper—reported that new textbooks had changed phrases like “invasion of China” to something sort of like “entering China.”
Rana: “Advancing into China” rather than “invading China.” So not shinryaku [invasion], but shinshutsu [advance].
Ian: That sparked a reaction in China. In fact, it was untrue—the change had never been made in Japanese textbooks—but there was a Nanjing Massacre debate. And rarely ever since the end of World War II, even the Japanese nationalists who saw the Pacific War as a just war against colonial powers in Asia, were always a little embarrassed about the Chinese angle, because China was not a colonial power, and much of the horror inflicted by the Japanese in the war was against Chinese—not only in China itself, but also in Southeast Asia.
The Nanjing Massacre was always brought up by the Japanese left as a symbol of Japanese militarism, how badly things could go. And this was used as an argument by the left to preserve the so-called pacifist constitution, which outlaws combat as a method of foreign policy in Japan.
Now, as long as the left did that, the right tried to counter that argument by saying, no, there’s nothing particularly wrong about what the Japanese did in World War II—it’s really all propaganda of Japanese leftists and Chinese. The Nanjing Massacre—well, a few people, I’m sure, were killed, but war is war and so on. And this was a battle over textbooks and history and so on. But it was rarely also a battle over the nature of the Japanese constitution. Those who want to change the constitution and strike out the pacifist aspect of it, on the whole, tended to favor a narrative that downplayed Japanese atrocities very much, including Nanjing. Whereas the other side tended to make a big thing of it.
Chang: Rana, you mentioned that you were in Beijing a couple weeks ago, and you had also spent some time at one of these museums that China is particularly interested in politically. So, can you tell us a little bit about your experience there?
Rana: I was actually fascinated to hear about your experience more than 30 years ago in Nanjing, because actually, just three or four weeks ago, I was in Beijing at what you might call one of the sister museums of that particular institution. The full name is the Memorial Museum for the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression—in other words, the museum of World War II as a whole from the Chinese perspective. And it is a museum that’s existed for quite some decades now; it was founded in the 1990s. Each time I’ve been back—maybe about every 10 years or so—it has changed significantly. And when I went this year, it was clear that, in commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the ending of the war, they put a lot of money and a lot of effort into changing many of the displays and also physically expanding the museum in a big way.
But what I found fascinating is that there was a combination of both stories that had existed before and new aspects. So, in terms of things that existed before, Ian was talking about the Nanjing Massacre, and that very much has its own place in the museum—that’s certainly there. I would say that the areas where there was a very innovative, as it were, political use of history struck me in two particular areas.
The first one was an expansion of an idea which has been seen for a few years now around World War II in China, which I think has now become very mainstream in China, which is the idea that China’s blood and treasure and sacrifice—millions of deaths and horrific experience in the war after the Japanese invasion—has earned China the right to a shaping of the global order from 1945, at the end of World War II, up to the present day.
In other words, just as—in the, I think, quite famous words of the former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson—the U.S. is associated with creating that order. And China wants to make it very clear that it too was a victorious Allied power that made sacrifices in World War II, just like the Americans. And it too should have the right to a deciding role in what happens to that order, just as it was present—for instance—at the signing of the UN Charter in 1945 in San Francisco.
Now, for a historian, there are all sorts of interesting anomalies in this narrative, because of course it was not the Chinese Communist Party of today that was principally involved in signing that charter in San Francisco in 1945. It was the Nationalist government, the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek. They sent then-quite-famous diplomats—Wellington Koo and others—to sign it. There was one Communist delegate, Dong Biwu, but his role is now given much more prominence on the grounds that they can then make a link to the CCP in 1945 and today’s global order. But the Kuomintang element is removed from that explanation.
The other element, briefly, historically, that appears in the museum now is the new prominence of Russia. The Soviet Union was important in supporting China in two specific areas during World War II. Right at the beginning, when Stalin sent Soviet fighter pilots to defend the skies over Shanghai for a year or so at the beginning of the war—unofficially, because the Soviet Union was not officially involved in the war at that stage—but it was a significant piece of air support for the Nationalists on the ground. That ended in about 1939.
And then, in 1945, the Red Army famously comes into Manchuria and was one of the factors—along with the atomic bombings—that ends World War II in Asia.
But again, not mentioned in this version of history is the fact that the Soviet Union was neutral against Japan for most of the intervening period, 1939 up to 1945. And that version of the story doesn’t fit today’s geopolitics, where Vladimir Putin stood in Tiananmen Square next to Xi Jinping as a very clear indication that today’s Russian-Chinese partnership is strong and will continue. So there again, World War II—and the museum and TV shows and other aspects of public education and propaganda around World War II in China—are being used to boost a very present-day story about geopolitics.
Ian: What about in the museum the role of the United States during the China war? Because one of the things in the film about the Nanjing Massacre—what’s the English title?
Rana: It’s called Dead to Rights in English, and the Chinese title literally translates as The Nanjing Photo Studio.
Chang: And just to give listeners some context, this is a movie that the Chinese put out this month as a way to kind of basically set up this military parade and to bolster this idea of its history.
And so there were actually two movies that came out. One is this movie about the Nanjing Massacre, and the other is another sort of famous incident. And that’s... Unit 731?
Rana: Unit 731, about biological warfare. [This is referring to Japan’s wartime biological weapons program in Manchuria]
Chang: Right. So that movie is apparently still in the works—it’s gonna be coming out soon—but there’s already been a lot of media reports about Chinese crying at the movie theater, standing up and applauding and singing the national anthem, and it’s become a really big deal in China.
Ian: What is interesting about The Nanjing Photo Studio is that it’s a propaganda film in Communist China in which no Communist really has any role at all, because the only people in Nanjing were the Nationalists. It’s not as crude as many propaganda films have been in the past, but it does one thing. The story of the camera store is of a brave Chinese hero who manages to smuggle out photographs taken of the atrocities taking place in Nanjing, smuggling them to the International Safety Zone. And that is what ended up in the world press, and it’s why we know what people at the time knew something about what’s going on. Now, that is a distortion, because it was an American missionary who did all that, not a Chinese. And so foreigners are shown and are not shown in a bad light. They’re shown as people who rescue refugees and so on. But their role is absolutely washed out of this whole story.
So I’m wondering, in the museum in Beijing, to what extent the American role in the war in supporting the Chinese against Japan is shown.
Rana: It’s a fascinating question, and the short answer to your question there, Ian, is that the American role is significantly downplayed. It’s not absent by any means. And I think you’ll see shots of Franklin D. Roosevelt and mention of the one body that is still, I think, very highly regarded in China in terms of this narrative from the American side.
And that is the Flying Tigers, the AVG—American Volunteer Group—under General Claire Lee Chennault, who were the American volunteers who came in and basically defended the skies over Chongqing, the temporary wartime Nationalist capital, for several years at a time when China’s own air force capacity was just simply not up to the job. China was then—and remains now, actually—appreciative and grateful. So the museum itself, I think, from what I can see, doesn’t say anything very much that is inaccurate in terms of the specifics of what happened.
But there’s definitely a change of emphasis: more on the Russians, who were, in reality, relatively marginal to most of the middle of the war; very little about the huge amount of financial commitment that was made by the United States—and the British Empire, to be fair—to the defense of China. At the same time as really stressing the element of Soviet presence, which was not really very active in the war. I want to make a distinction here, but you mentioned that essentially something that was done by an American missionary is sort of repurposed in the film as being a Chinese doing that. In a film, which is fiction—it’s not meant to be documentary—things are substituted, even in the West, in terms of narrative to make it smoother or to make a point.
I’d say there’s another film that’s just come out, actually, which is directed and produced by the huge producer Guan Hu, which is on the subject of the sinking of a ship, the Lisbon Maru, which had a lot of British prisoners of war on it. And they are rescued by Chinese fishermen. And this is based on a true story. Obviously, it’s made more heroic and fictionalized. But again, part of the phenomenon you’re talking about, I think, is encompassed in the way the plot is put forward. These are British sailors who are about to drown—become victims, essentially, of being prisoners of the Japanese—but they are rescued by Chinese sailors. And the wider message is that China is the active player. It is active in saving its allies. It’s not simply a victim waiting to be saved by the Americans or by the British.
I think that film again provides some of the leeway into that.
Ian: To what extent are the anti-Japanese and anti-American aspects still played up, because they were very much there at the end of the last century?
Rana: I think that’s right—exactly the 1990s into the early 2000s. I would say—and I’m not claiming this in any kind of scientific sense, but just from observation of the very recent last few months—the anti-Japanese part, at least the highly critical part on Japan, is quite strong. I again, with something like the Nanjing Massacre. You can’t really blame China for being highly critical of at least Japan in that era, which is very different from Japan for the Japan of today, which is a democratic and peaceful society.
But in terms of pointing up Japanese war atrocities, I’ll also actually mention the Tokyo War Crimes Trials—the IMTFE, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East—and a shout-out here actually to a wonderful book by Gary Bass published last year, Judgment at Tokyo, which is just brilliant and comprehensive on that trial. Those are very much brought up in Beijing and elsewhere in the museums, but I wouldn’t describe them really—I suppose it might sound counterintuitive—as anti-Japanese in the sense of simply being kind of random accusations. Both the war crimes trial and the Nanjing Massacre are presented with a certain amount of obviously emotional overlay, but on the basis of history. What I think is much more notable is that the Americans really have disappeared from the narratives as we were saying before. I wouldn’t say that it necessarily displays large amounts of explicit anti-Americanism, but the disappearance of much of the American contribution is a sort of negative criticism or criticism by kind of omission, rather than commission, you might say.
To give an idea of what I’m contrasting this with: if you go back to the 70th anniversary just 10 years ago, I think the explicit attacks on Japan as being supposedly a kind of eternally imperialist state that can never be allowed to have a role in postwar society was stronger then, because we were just one or two years out from that potentially very dangerous moment over the disputed islands—Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—where literally warships from both sides were getting far too close to each other in 2011, 2012, 2013 even.
And in that period, I think the 2015 70th war anniversary became much more of an occasion to really kind of push on Japan. One of the other reasons was that the Japanese prime minister at the time, Abe Shinzo, took a much more strongly nationalist line in terms of Japan needing to deal with constitutional change and get on with it. I think it’s fair to say this time round, poor Mr. Ishiba—who, as we speak, is the outgoing Japanese prime minister, dealing with a loss of his majority both in the lower house and the upper house—he’s not such a good target in terms of being a kind of avatar of Japanese nationalism in that sense.
So I think the Chinese found that Abe, in a sense, was a worthy target from their point of view, and perhaps Ishiba-led LDP doesn’t really sit in that category.
Ian: What is the influence of this in academic life? Are people able to write academic books in which the role of the Kuomintang is perhaps slightly more honestly portrayed than would have been possible before?
Rana: Yes is the short answer. I would say that you might regard the portrayal of this World War II experience in the Chinese public sphere at the moment as a spectrum—or perhaps almost like a kind of cone or funnel-shaped thing—in the sense that for the kind of messages which are intended for a very wide and general audience—in movies, television, and so forth—the realm of discussion of difficult topics is quite narrow. It was probably wider about 10 or 15 years ago.
For instance, you got more dramas on TV in those days that had KMT heroes, or at least KMT characters who were not villains. And there are fewer of those now. There is much more emphasis on the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP, and its wartime experience. And then as you sort of begin to go towards the narrower part of the cone, you find—actually, because the audiences are smaller—there’s space for a bit more nuance and expression of broader worldviews. And then if you go to what is really obviously for a specialist audience—scholarly academic journals—there is even now an awful lot of the debates and discussions that do involve questions about what was the KMT’s role? And where’s the evidence for these things? Also, volumes of documents, which often are a way of making a point without being too explicit. That’s something that’s still very visible. But I would note that some of the things that people discuss around these subjects actually are academic topics that even in the West are not necessarily at the sort of forefront of what people are most concerned.
Let me just give one example of what I mean by that. One subject that is still actually given a certain amount of leeway in Chinese academic discussion is the periodization of World War II. In other words, when does it start? When does it end? But there’s a big debate—the 15-year war debate—about whether it’s actually the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, or the Marco Polo Bridge incident [1937] when Sino-Japanese fighting breaks out on a national scale for the first time the beginning of the war.
I should say, just out of interest, that we are recording this literally on the 18th of September 2025, which is the exact anniversary to the day of 九一八, the September 18 Incident, the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria back in 1931. In Japan, that’s largely a debate among the left amongst historians about Japanese war responsibility, the 戦争責任 debate. In China, I think there’s a lot of controversy around it in many ways. The state has made it very clear that they regard 1931 as the beginning of World War II. That’s the rule—that’s the law, you might actually say.
But in scholarly debates, there is some discussion about, in that case, how do you differentiate what happens in 1937?
Chang: You mentioned the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. That is one of the debated potential beginnings of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Importantly, before that, the Nationalists and Communists had already gone to war—they had already started fighting. In 1927. There was the Shanghai Massacre, is that right? And then that pushes the Communists out.
Rana: Basically, the Nationalist-Communist United Front breaks up with the killings in Shanghai and then Canton, Guangzhou, in 1927. That’s right. So Nationalist-Communist cooperation the first time ends abruptly at that point.
Chang: And then this expels the Communists out of the cities. And then when the war against—this is why their role is minimal when they’re fighting the Japanese in the 1930s.
Rana: What I’d say is that it’s secondary in the sense that there is—I think—guerrilla warfare is very significant, and a lot of that is led by the CCP. What it isn’t is decisive. And I think what the Party would like to say is that the Chinese Communist Party takes the leading role in terms of the war as a whole. I think actually what most historians, including, I think, most military historians in China, would actually say is that on the one hand, you have what are called the key battlefields—正面战场—which are KMT-dominated. If you think about the big names of battles in China during World War II—and these are often not well known outside China: Shanghai, Changsha, Hengyang, Tai’erzhuang—they are KMT battles. The only major set-piece battle the CCP do is the Hundred Regiments Campaign, 1940 under Peng Dehuai. But it is the case also that from base areas after 1937—and just to be clear to listeners, in 1937, hastily, a united front is set up again between the Communists and Nationalists who agreed to fight Japan rather than each other for the duration of the war—the agreement is more solid in the first years of the war against Japan than in the last years.
But in those first years, Chinese Communists do a great deal in terms of preparation in the rural areas, mobilizing a kind of guerrilla warfare. These are important in harassing the Japanese. During that period, what they can’t do is win the war. And this is actually expressed by Mao himself in his famous essay of 1938 “On protracted warfare,” where in some senses he endorses that kind of tactic. So what I’m trying to do is get out of the politically often sort of very polarized way in China of talking about either: “the Nationalists did all the fighting and the Communists did nothing,” or it was “all the Communists and the Nationalists basically sat around.”
And as you can imagine, most historians would say that life is a bit more complex.
Ian: Can I ask you a historical question? What you say is absolutely true, but the Communists, I think, were the main victims of some of the campaigns nearer the end of the war, when there were huge massacres—sort of anti-Communist massacres to wipe out the guerrillas. Why has there been relatively little attention paid to that compared to the Nanjing Massacre?
Rana: Do you mean the sankou三光 campaigns?
Ian: Yes.
Rana: This is sankou三光—essentially means “Three Alls,” which, if I remember correctly, was “kill all, burn all, destroy all.” And it is huge, as you say, a campaign by the Japan’s China Expeditionary Army—in other words, the Japanese troops—to try and launch a kind of slash-and-burn-type campaign, essentially to destroy the ability of guerrilla warriors to support themselves in the countryside.
So I think the answer to the question as to why we don’t stress it as much: first of all, it depends who the “we” is. I would say that reading Chinese historiography—which I do a lot—it is actually, I think, produced quite a lot. It’s probably true that Western accounts of the war perhaps have less about it, but perhaps it’s less stressed because there isn’t one single iconic event, you might say. The Nanjing Massacre—you can define it; there’s photographs, and you can say this is what happened at this point. Or even a big battle, something like Changsha or Tai’erzhuang. The Three Alls campaign: first of all, it was a sort of anti-partisan campaign that went on and on and on, but it probably doesn’t have one or two specific really kind of keynote events that can be drawn out on that front.
Second thing is, one of the things that is still not clear—because of the difficulties getting statistics—is how much of the massive drop in population in central China that’s attributed to the campaign is deaths, and how much is what happened a huge amount in wartime China, which is large numbers of people fleeing as refugees to other areas of the country. And that isn’t entirely clear either. But I would say that certainly that is another element: the idea that the Communists didn’t suffer during the war is also not at all the case.
And the guerrilla warfare element, I think, is important, it’s just important to differentiate that from the idea that this could be the decisive factor. In the end, amongst other things, the decisive factor was the entry of the United States and the British Empire as allies of China to bring the war to a conclusion against the Japanese.
Ian: The only thing is, in a way, the Communists are missing a trick in terms of propaganda, because not only were the Communists the victims of those “burn all, kill all” campaigns, but the general who was responsible for that very murderous campaign very soon after the war became the main military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek.
Rana: That’s Okamura Yasuji. Yes, that’s a fascinating story of what might have been. And again, it’s not often remembered that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, with its last few years in power—1945 to ‘49—actually very quickly takes, in some ways, a remarkable worldview, which is that it’s time almost to forgive the Japanese for war crimes in China and instead bring them on board, essentially as Cold War allies.
But in that pro-American Nationalist China that might have existed in that alternative world, Japan and China actually would have been pretty close to each other in certain ways.
And then we get into the areas that again you’ve written brilliantly about, Ian, which is sort of war memory and why Germany and France managed to reconcile, and China and Japan didn’t. I think the lack of capacity during the early Cold War in the ‘40s and ‘50s for China and Japan to talk to each other—because of the Cold War split—is one of the major reasons why even today that historical gap is huge and hasn’t really been reconciled.
Ian: If the Japanese really were to have a real debate on Article 9, which is the pacifist article of the Japanese constitution—which doesn’t allow Japan constitutionally to use armed force abroad—if they were to debate it and were to at least adjust it or reform it or change it, do you think that the war memory in China is still so present and so important in the political debate that the Chinese government would not be able to accept it, or would at least make a tremendous fuss?
Rana: I think there’s no doubt it would make a tremendous fuss about it. It would be an opportunity for China to claim that there was this military spirit emerging in Japan again and probably make a big meal of that. I don’t know that it necessarily—put this way: I think it would be in the gift of the Chinese government, which is able to control a lot of public opinion. You can decide what goes on social media and what doesn’t—not 100% by any means, but significantly influence that online world, which is really where a lot of this discussion happens in China, as in the rest of the world.
What we see at the moment, I think, is less directed anger against, state-directed anger against Japan—and more sort of populist, frankly, often very horrifying incidents of violence in China against Japanese, like the stabbing of a child, I think, just last year in Shenzhen. These are not common incidents—let’s not get it out of proportion—but whenever they happen, they are horrific, and they do suggest that there is a sort of—at least in some circles—a willingness to let that propaganda be out there and shape views about the Japanese.
I think it will be within the gift of the Beijing government if the constitutional position on Article 9 changed—either to downplay it and let it go, or to really ramp it up—but I don’t think it would be a purely sort of grassroots thing. I think that the state definitely would have a role in how it received particular news.
Chang: Can we talk also a little bit about Taiwan? We’ve mentioned it a little bit, but just to sort of follow this history all the way to 1945. So, in 1945, Japan surrenders, and Taiwan and Manchuria are given back to the Republic of China, the Nationalists. There’s the four-year civil war where the Communists become victorious in 1949; the Nationalists move to Taiwan.
And this is kind of where the tension lies, right? Where the current Communist Party of China is trying to say, no, Taiwan belongs to us, China—that the Allies gave the territories back to China. And there the Taiwanese are saying, no, they gave it back to the Republic of China. Is that where the fault line is?
Rana: It’s a large part of it. You can find an awful lot of people—and believe there are many volunteers out there—who will give you a very, very long chapter and verse on the legality of the Cairo Communiqués of 1943, and what various kind of postwar—in the 1950, ‘51, ‘52—Treaty of Taipei, and all sorts of other things that can be used in terms of this interpretation.
Essentially, one of the things that has become clear is that there is no accepted narrative that everyone will get behind. Beijing obviously has a very strong interest in playing a sort of— you might kind of say—a kind of Schrödinger’s international law: At some points, its predecessor state, in the shape of the Republic of China on the mainland—the Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek—is regarded as being, by implication, a legitimate predecessor, even though it wasn’t acknowledged as such by the CCP, because it undertook various international discussions and agreements which today’s Beijing wants to take care of—or take advantage of. In other cases, most notably, obviously, the legitimacy of the PRC itself as being founded on October 1, 1949, as a successor regime that supplants an illegitimate regime. In other words, it defeats the KMT in the civil war. It doesn’t lose or win a general election, after all—that previous regime is regarded as being illegitimate.
So you have to maintain both these positions at the same time, depending on which part of the political story you need to tell. The problem is that since the rest of the world A) doesn’t have huge amounts of time to sort of spend dancing on the head of a pin as to the intricacies of Chinese historiography of the recent past, it creates an extremely confusing situation, since obviously Beijing needs to maintain that both of these historical interpretations are true at the same time, even though they point in different directions.
Chang: Rana, I was wondering whether you could just talk a little bit about the military parades and how—what you’ve observed is—their role in the Chinese context. And has it changed over time? Has anything stuck out to you about this year’s military parade compared to other years?
Rana: Military parades have now become part of the mainstream of the way in which the PRC and the CCP commemorate and celebrate themselves. Military parades as such are not particularly unusual.
Now, what is unusual about this one that just happened on September 3, 2025, and the one that happened exactly 10 years earlier in 2015, is that even now, I think they remain to date the only two occasions when there was a national-level parade held right at the heart of Chinese politics in Tiananmen Square that does not commemorate an event that’s either directly to do with an anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party or the People’s Republic of China. V-J Day—Victory over Japan—obviously is important for China as it is for the Russians and the Americans and British, but it’s not as such a Communist-specific event.
So that makes those two parades—and this most recent one among them—distinctive in and of itself. Beyond that, what I saw this time, say compared with the previous war parade 10 years ago, was, I think, quite notable. The first one is that I think there was less mention of history as a whole, actually—partly because 10 years ago, there were still more veterans and survivors, not very many, but even so, than there are today when there are very, very few people left who remember the war directly. While there were mentions of historical events, I think, more marginal this time than they were 10 years ago. That said, there were certain indications of things that I think did send signals, going back to things in the parade that seemed to chime with that wider set of messages we talked about earlier in the conversation.
The blue berets—in other words, the Chinese UN peacekeeping forces in the parade — obviously are a tip of the hat to that wider sense that China wants to project of itself as an originator of the United Nations at the end of World War II, and a maintainer of that global structure today—by implication, suggesting the United States is no longer interested in maintaining that structure and that China becomes the sort of owner, as it were, of that structure.
So the blue berets in the parade, I think, were nodding in that direction. And also the presence of none other than Vladimir Putin standing right next to Xi Jinping—alongside Kim Jong Un, the center. As I said, in historical terms, there is a Soviet role in World War II when it comes to China, but it’s not a singularly central one, as opposed to the Soviet role in World War II as a whole, which was massive. But nonetheless, the choice that was made at this point to have the Russian leader standing directly next to Xi Jinping was as much a statement about the meaning of that war in the present day as it was really about any historical accuracy about representation of allies in the parade itself.
So those were two things that sort of stood out to me. And maybe also wonder whether, in fact, they would go for a 90th anniversary. And if so, who would be involved and what symbolism would be put forward then.
Ian: Prime Minister Modi was there, too wasn’t he?
Rana: He wasn’t at the parade. He was there a week before, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which again was an extraordinary moment as well. You’re right Ian in that, having been snubbed, at least in his own estimation—probably correctly—by the United States over trade agreements and other things, Modi decided unusually that he would go to China, to Tianjin, to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting and be seen very publicly putting his hand out and shaking hands with Xi Jinping, with Putin also there.
And that photograph has gone viral. But Modi, I think, not accidentally, declined to stay for the war parade. He was there for the SCO and then flew home before the parade actually started.
Chang: Can I ask both of you guys a question? So, I am American. So I know what it’s like to have a pretty simplistic view of World War II. I think in America, we have this kind of—Normandy is like the one story that we always talk about when we talk about—I know we saved the Europeans in World War II. These are—I wouldn’t say that they’re propagandistic, but when we talk about the Nanjing Massacre, that might be their Normandy.
And when we look at movies like Saving Private Ryan, there’s a lot of—there’s something self-serving and mythologizing in the American tale of World War II. We also have this kind of hero-villain: we have Russians and the Germans tend to be villains. We don’t really have them as heroes in our movies. I’m curious how war memory is similar between the way that Americans understand it and the way that China and Japan do it. And what do you think are really the differences in the way that the war memory plays out in the Chinese and Japanese systems?
Rana: First of all, I think there are many Americans who have noticed the disparity you’re talking about.
I think back in the mid-1980s, the great popular historian—oral historian—Studs Terkel published a book called The Good War. And it was about the U.S. experience in World War II, but it was an ironic title because it covered the way in which a war which was fought ultimately for the right cause—but in which, for instance, discrimination against African American GIs and so forth—was very much part of the experience—had been sort of homogenized into a story that this was a war purely about Western virtue versus Axis evil.
And I adopted that irony myself for a book I wrote a few years ago called China’s Good War, which is not about a war that China has carried out being a good thing. And it’s meant to be about the same phenomenon of making a very complex World War II experience in China and turning it into a narrative about how this is a virtuous, patriotic resistance and no other version of that story is really worth talking or knowing about.
And the ambivalence that comes from the fact that in China you have to deal with the fact that you have these Nationalist fighters who are not actually on the same side as the Communists after the war. And so historical reality and complexity versus a kind of propaganda story. In terms of—I think it is absolutely true that every country uses aspects of its World War II history to tell a heroic story about itself, or even perhaps as a consolation for decline. In some ways, the loss of the British Empire is, in some ways, explained by a narrative that says that the empire was sacrificed by the need to engage in a virtuous cause that ultimately kind of destroyed this structure.
In the case of China and Japan, I just go back briefly to what I was saying a little earlier, which is that because of the not entirely expected circumstances of the early Cold War, there was never really any opportunity for a shared dialogue—a meaningful one—while the war memories were still fresh, in a way that France and Germany essentially... So France and Germany came under American occupation/influence after World War II as part of what became then the EU, NATO, and all that.
So the ability of French and Germans to get together and essentially agree on what World War II had been about—which was Nazi aggression in Europe and its ultimate defeat and removal from European political ecology—that might or might not have happened after 1945 in Asia, in a world in which China and Japan were in direct contact, essentially both under American sponsorship, which could have been the case when FDR expected China to become a sort of leading policeman, as he put it, in the postwar world.
Because, in fact, the unexpected but ultimately transformative event was a revolution which basically put the Communists in power in China, and therefore put them on the other side—not only of the United States, but also of Japan. The ability for decades to have that shared dialogue was entirely lost, really, in a meaningful way. And by the time you get to some sort of ongoing engagement in the 1970s and afterwards, it’s a generation or two later; many of the key players are dead or much older, and the kind of fresh ground of the war being relatively recent current affairs was no longer really true in the ‘70s in a way that it would have been in the 1950s.
Ian: No, oddly enough, Taiwan is probably the one place where there has been a certain amount of dialogue and quite a lot of reason.
But I would say the following: I think the United States and Britain are the outliers here, in that they have a largely heroic view of World War II as the victors. Every other country in Europe—including Germany and China—I’ll get to Russia in a minute—has a tragic memory of World War II because of horrendous losses. And that tends to be the central narrative. It would be absurd—there is a certain amount of heroic stories of the French Resistance and so on. But basically, the emphasis is on collective suffering, which to you, Chang, as an all-American boy, *laugh* it may sound difficult to grasp. The Americans don’t have that experience—not except for the Civil War. This is what makes America and Britain different from the rest of the world.
Now, the Soviet Union is also a curious case, because there the anti-Fascist war is played up very much as a heroic story of the Soviets—the Red Army—having done the bulk of the fighting and so on, which is not untrue.
But they also had a huge amount of suffering, but much of the suffering took place outside the borders of what is now Russia—that the bloodlands in what is now Ukraine and Belarus and Lithuania and Poland and so on—which may be one reason why it’s slightly easier for Russians to emphasize the heroism over the tragedy, which is not to say that Russians also lost huge numbers of people in the fighting.
So I think the difference is that there are two countries in the world—and if you include Russia, three—that can confidently stress the heroic aspects of being victors. No other country that was involved in the war can rarely do that with good conscience.
Chang: But China is trying, right? China is trying to say that there is some kind of agency or heroism in their own...
Ian: They are trying. But I think again, if you’re honest about it, the memory of what happened to the Chinese—and I say that quite deliberately—is a tragic one, perhaps more than a heroic one. But you might differ, Rana.
Rana: No, I think both these things are compatible with each other, I think.
Yeah, I think I would say that actually I’m not against one aspect of what’s happened in recent years, which is the recovery of some element of Chinese agency. I do think that, for instance, in 1938—without going into sort of hugely complex details—1938 is a sort of turning point for Chiang Kai-shek and his government, in that it’s a year into the war after the kind of full-scale war begins in 1937. Finances are terrible; they’re running out of weaponry; it’s all looking very bad. Lots of diplomats look at China and say they’re gonna have to do a deal with the Japanese, because it’s just no way. If you see echoes of kind of Russia-Ukraine today and want to draw analogies, that might be interesting to think of that.
But sticking to the historical case example, Chiang Kai-shek essentially says no—he doesn’t quite use Churchill’s words, “never surrender,” but it’s pretty close to that—even though there’s a logical argument actually followed by his great rival Wang Jingwei, who sets up a collaborationist government with the Japanese because he believes exactly that: China is suffering, and that suffering will end if he does a deal with the Japanese. And Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists basically say, no, we’re gonna keep fighting. If it had not been for that continued Chinese resistance in 1938 and afterwards—and this is Nationalists and Communists essentially—I think you get into a very different version of war in Asia, where there’s a sort of compromise deal; there’s a sort of Japanese puppet state of one sort or another, perhaps run by Chinese technically, and actually it’s really under Japanese control. Then it’s very hard to get to Pearl Harbor, because American efforts to try and pressure the Japanese are less important if you’ve got a sort of semi-peace that’s in operation, which then means that the European war against Hitler—which of course is also ramping up separately across the Eurasian continent—is much harder to combine with the Asian war to create the global war that we now think of as World War II.
Chinese resistance isn’t the only reason that happens, but actually it’s a pretty central one, and one that tends to be underestimated because the standard historiography of World War II starts even now in 1939, and not ‘37 or indeed ‘31.
So I don’t—again, being historically accurate—I don’t want to exaggerate the Chinese role in China today; at least in its official version, it starts talking about China the key battlefield and several things. That’s difficult to just say simplistically without having quite a lot of qualifications. But talking about China having a significant role that actually gives agency, I think that is more meaningful. That said, the tragedy that you talk about, Ian, is absolutely, I think, evident looking at the numbers on the scale of devastation, which is the most besetting element of World War II in China. It was a horrific, destructive war to live through, that I think during the time that it’s being fought probably appeared to have very few heroic qualities. Though I think the reality of war is that people don’t necessarily feel very heroic at the time; they feel frightened, and they feel—in most cases—very inclined to bring it to an end by whatever means.
Chang: One last question: I would be remiss not to ask you both—what you see now in the U.S. with the Trump administration, there has been a lot of efforts to control history, especially with the Smithsonian Museum. I’d be curious if you guys have sort of any parallels that strike you about what Trump is doing, what the MAGA movement is trying to do to history in the given Chinese context.
And maybe Ian, you might be able to speak to the Japan context about just this sense that we need to sort of eradicate any sort of negativity or anti-American narratives, and we need to sort of bolster a kind of narrative of strength historically.
Rana: I think it is important to differentiate between what has been happening in China, which is a very, very top-down control of history for a very long time, and what we see at the moment, I think most historians will be concerned to make sure that when it comes to the free flow and debate of history, that it is as wide as possible. If you think about the war, one thing that’s worth remembering is that 30 years ago, in 1995, there was a massive row around the Smithsonian Museum because of—I think it was the Enola Gay, actually—the plane, the bomber that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima.
There was such an argument then—a really very ill-tempered one—about precisely how this was going to be described, that in the end, I believe, the display ended up being extremely technical and quite a lot removed from there as well. I think the encouragement of debate in the historical sphere—through museums, through popular culture, and in universities and schools as well—really does need to be heavily encouraged.
And I think we have to see where we are at the moment in terms of that. I don’t want to be like Zhou Enlai and say it’s still too soon to say. But what I’d say is that you can see an awful lot of polities—India will be a good example—where there’d be more restrictions recently in terms of how history is understood. In China, history essentially is a state enterprise as a whole in terms of the boundaries that can be imposed on it, and that’s clearly a direction that we do not want to travel, I think, in the wider world.
Ian: I think that the impulses of Trump may indeed not be so different from authoritarians in countries where the state is able to impose that kind of uniformity.
But it is indeed true: things are not quite the same here [in the US], or indeed in Japan, because a lot of people rather loosely like to say the Germans face their history so honestly and so on, and in Japan it’s all swept under the rug, and you can’t talk about what the Japanese did and so on—which is entirely untrue.
For in the first place, in Japan in the ‘50s, people spoke more openly about Japanese atrocities than the Germans did about what they’ve done. And any Japanese bookstore will show rows and rows of books: some of them overtly nationalistic and denying that the Nanjing Massacre ever took place, or the books that take the opposite view. And as long as that’s the case, a country is in relatively good shape. That’s not true of China today and probably not of Russia either. India is probably in between.
Chang: Great, thank you so much, Rana. I really appreciate it.
Rana: Thank you both. It’s a great privilege to be on with you two distinguished gentlemen, and I hope that all continues to thrive with the podcast.
Chang: If you want to hear more on some of the turbulent issues involving the U.S.-China relationship, Rana also hosts his own podcast called Face Off with The New York Times journalist Jane Perlez. We’ll leave the link in the show notes. Thanks so much for listening.


Discussion about this episode