Japan’s New Leader Meets China’s Red Line
Transcript:
Transcript:
Ian:
Hello, I’m Ian Buruma. Today we’re discussing the first female Japanese prime minister, Takaichi Sanae. She’s a hardliner on foreign policy and a social conservative. Her hawkish views on China have unsettled Chinese leaders enough to cause a serious rift between the two countries less than a month after she was elected to lead the governing Liberal Democratic Party.
We’re delighted to discuss the new prime minister and her policies with Matsuda Tokujin, professor of law at Kanagawa University. He has written articles for many publications, including the Los Angeles Times. Professor Matsuda, there are great tensions today between China and Japan. This is nothing new—there is a long history of these tensions—and we’ll get into the details in a minute. But what were your first reactions when you heard about the Chinese response to Takaichi rather hardline views?
Tokujin:
First, good morning to you and everyone. I think in recent decades, what’s happened in Japanese constitutional politics is about the reinterpretation of Article 9. So what is happening today was already warned by many of my colleagues almost 10 years ago—that if the security legislation pushed by Abe was finally passed in 2015, someday a crisis like this would likely happen. So I won’t say I was surprised considering Prime Minister Takaichi’s basic position and her very hawkish style. Of course, she is a spiritual heir of Shinzo Abe. So I don’t think it’s surprising, but still, it happened very, very quickly—right after she became prime minister. I think it was surprising for most Japanese intellectuals or lawyers, because this happened within just one week.
So I think that’s a big difference between her and Abe. Abe basically worked quite quickly to shift the constitutional argument on these basic policies, but even so, it still took two years after he returned to power at the end of 2012.
Ian:
Yes. Just to make clear to everyone what this constitutional issue is about: after World War II, the Americans rewrote the Japanese constitution and inserted the famous Article 9, which bans Japan from using military force in its foreign policy.
Right-wingers, including Abe’s grandfather Kishi Nobusuke—who was a minister during the war—have wanted to change this ever since. It’s not a new policy. She is following, as you say, earlier efforts to change the constitution, but she has been perhaps less diplomatic in her utterances.
Chang:
Before that—talking about 2013—Tokujin, you mentioned there was a shift. Can we go over what that shift was? That was the collective self-defense reinterpretation of the constitution under Abe?
Tokujin:
Yes. As you mentioned, the drafters of the postwar constitution were American lawyers and intellectuals, and most of them were New Deal–minded people. They put the pacifism into the constitution, but they also knew that there was no reason to deny Japan’s right as a nation-state to defend itself. So from the very beginning, Article 9 was never meant as a “suicide clause.”
We use the term “right to individual self-defense,” and that is still constitutional under Article 9. There is no controversy about that. But what Abe did was reinterpret the UN Charter’s notion of “collective self-defense,” and they argued—especially bureaucrats close to Abe in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—that there is no essential difference between individual self-defense and collective self-defense.
But constitutional scholars argued 10 years ago that the idea of collective self-defense is basically a new name for a military offense-defense alliance. As you both know, before World War II, Japan had a military alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. That kind of alliance just has a different name now—“collective self-defense.” And that is not allowed under Article 9.
Ian:
We should perhaps add that some Americans very quickly regretted the constitution they themselves had written. Richard Nixon, when he was vice president under Eisenhower, said it was the biggest mistake the Americans made. But by then, most Japanese were in favor of the pacifist Article 9.
Tokujin:
Yes. In fact, as early as 1948—just one year after the new constitution took effect—the American authorities approached Prime Minister Yoshida and said: the constitution is now in effect, but you will have time to reconsider whether it suits your real politics. If you wish, you can amend it. And Yoshida said no.
Chang:
Let me bring listeners up to what happened. This all starts in early November, when Prime Minister Takaichi is in the Japanese parliament talking about the budget. She’s asked about what circumstances national security spending could be used for. She says that if China were to use force to bring Taiwan under its control, that could constitute a situation threatening Japan’s survival. That’s a key phrase referring to something in the constitution. We can discuss that in a moment. But that triggered a tremendous reaction from China.
The first really surprising reaction was from a Chinese diplomat in Japan—the consul general—who used language suggesting that her head should be cut off.
Ian:
He said, “If a filthy head sticks its neck out, it should be cut off.” It was vulgar and violent—part of what the Chinese call “wolf warrior diplomacy,” but still far more violent than anything Takaichi said.
Chang:
Right. And there’s a standard Japanese phrase he was riffing on, which is… what was it again?
Tokujin:
“Kubi wo tsukkomuna” (首を突っ込むな).
Chang:
“Kubi wo tsukkomuna”—which metaphorically means “don’t stick your nose into others’ affairs.” It’s common, and no one imagines literal heads being stuck anywhere. But he added, essentially, “If you do, it will get cut off.” He turned the metaphor literal—that’s why it went too far.
Tokujin:
I would say it was a mistake. He is an excellent Japanese speaker—very few Chinese diplomats communicate with ordinary people on social media. He was trying to use expressions ordinary people understand. But that’s very risky for a diplomat.
Chang:
So he used a Chinese sensibility but brought it into Japanese—and for Japanese speakers, it sounded extreme. And the English translation sounds just as crazy.
Ian:
But did Takaichi actually mean to deny that Taiwan is part of China? Or did she mean that a military attack on Taiwan would threaten Japan’s security—for example because China would dominate the sea lanes? Isn’t that more what she meant?
Tokujin:
If you’re familiar with postwar diplomatic history between China and Japan on Taiwan, it’s clear she crossed a red line. There’s no doubt. In that parliamentary exchange, she referred to China as the “Beijing authorities”—a wording not used since 1972. That implies equivalence between the governments in Beijing and Taipei.
Ian:
Do you think if China were to attack Taiwan, it would in fact be a serious threat to Japan?
Tokujin:
That’s controversial. Western intellectuals like to ask such theoretical questions, but I don’t think even Takaichi takes that claim seriously. Ten years ago, Japanese constitutional scholars already pointed out that if you say an attack on a third state constitutes a threat to Japan’s survival, you are essentially treating Taiwan as part of Japan’s security sphere. That’s a revival of a pre-war idea. In 1972 Japan agreed there would be no such security sphere.
Ian:
But after World War II, the deal was that Japan could focus on rebuilding its economy while relying on the U.S. for security. Now, with Trump, many countries aren’t sure the U.S. would defend them. If Taiwan were attacked, we don’t know whether a Trump administration would defend it. In that case, Japan becomes more perilous.
Tokujin:
If the majority of Japanese people want that, they should amend the constitution. They should tell China they regret the 1972 consensus and want to renegotiate. But Takaichi’s government says they haven’t changed the 1972 interpretation.
Ian:
The Yomiuri or the Asahi—I can’t remember—tried in the 80s or 90s to start a national debate on amending Article 9. It didn’t take. Would you favor such a debate?
Tokujin:
I think, as a constitutional scholar, there should be a debate. On this, Professor Bruce Ackerman has a very good line of argument. He always says there should be a referendum on the postwar constitution; otherwise, there will always be doubts about its legitimacy—because it was imposed by the United States, and so on.
But on the other hand, if you look at the polls, especially for Article 9, it still enjoys very, very high popularity among the Japanese people. So why not have a debate and put it to a referendum? And if a majority of voters choose to keep Article 9, then it will have stronger legitimacy.
What has happened in the political history of modern Japan, unfortunately, is that most structural changes are never put to public debate. Politicians always try to do it by reinterpretation, or by changing the wording.
I told Chang yesterday that I first noticed something bad might happen right after the APEC summit, when Prime Minister Takaichi met Xi Jinping. After that, both sides released a press statement. Normally those statements say the two leaders have confirmed the “four documents” from 1972 onward that constitute the consensus. But this time, on the Japanese side, the press release did not mention that both sides confirmed the four documents. As a lawyer, I found that unusual.
Chang:
This is the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, where Japan said it “fully understands and respects” the position of the People’s Republic of China.
Ian:
You grew up in Taiwan. What is your sense of Taiwanese public opinion on this? Would they support Takaichi’s statement? Would they welcome it, or does it alarm them?
Tokujin:
Taiwan is very politically divided now. Those who support the current government—the DPP—basically share Mr. Lai’s sense that both the United States and Japan should assist, or potentially even dispatch military forces to defend Taiwan.
Mr. Lai personally has a strong preference for Japan. After he assumed the presidency, his cabinet appointed a retired Japanese military officer as an advisor. That’s in strong tension with the 1972 consensus. But that is the DPP’s stance: they want Japan to join this kind of military alliance.
On the other hand, there is a large population strongly opposed to the DPP, who do not want war with China. Some of them, especially those with mainlander family backgrounds, feel very deeply hurt by the desire to have a military alliance with a former enemy state. So it’s deeply divided.
Ian:
You’re talking really about the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party, and its voters. The last time I was in Taiwan—during the 2020 election—I was told that among younger Taiwanese there’s less distinction between those whose grandparents came from the mainland and those whose roots are in Taiwan: even those with mainlander grandparents feel mainly Taiwanese now.
Tokujin:
Yes, but I think there’s an important difference between Tsai Ing-wen’s approach and Mr. Lai’s. President Tsai has focused more on a Taiwanese consensus, regardless of family history. Mr. Lai is more “localist”; he has stronger personal feelings against mainlanders.
Ian:
Can I come back to what I said earlier? The Trump administration has really changed perceptions. One reason the current government in Taiwan might be more pro-Japan is not only nostalgia or anti-mainland feeling, but fear that the United States would not defend them if they were attacked. So they feel they have to be closer to Japan because that would be their only defense.
Tokujin:
That trend began about 30 years ago, under Lee Teng-hui. I think he was the first Taiwanese leader to try to get Japan deeply involved in Taiwan issues. In his later years, he faced a situation where President Clinton visited China and US–China relations seemed very good, so he worried that Taiwan would be abandoned by the United States.
Lee was a very good Japanese speaker. He appealed to ordinary Japanese by saying: you have lost the “Japanese spirit” after World War II. That’s why so many Japanese right-wingers were so enthusiastic about him.
Ian:
And that “Japanese spirit” is also part of Takaichi’s politics, isn’t it? Like Abe, she wants to revive the Japanese spirit, promote patriotic education, and so on. How far do you think that will go in Japan?
Tokujin:
I don’t think, if she pushes it as a general issue—“we should go back to prewar values”—that it will work. That’s too broad. But I think she’s “lucky” in a sense because now you have Trump. Trump appeals to a kind of xenophobic, ethnic-nationalist sentiment. If you translate that into the Japanese context, today’s Japan is very inward-looking and closed. People are not used to interacting with foreigners, even if the government tries to cope with globalization. Japanese people are still very local, very inward-looking. They’re not willing to learn about international politics in depth.
And now they see so many foreigners on the streets speaking languages they don’t understand and behaving in ways they don’t understand. So there is a concrete sense of anxiety: “These foreigners are now here, just in front of us—like aliens from Mars invading Earth.”
Ian:
And many of those “aliens” are Chinese. Abe, as you say, encouraged tourism and foreign workers because the country needs them. Would you say Takaichi—at least rhetorically—is more xenophobic and hardline than Abe?
Tokujin:
At this point, I can’t say exactly where she will go. There are contradictions in her own background. She was born into a conservative middle-class family, but she went to the United States and worked as an assistant to Pat Schroeder.
Chang:
Pat Schroeder, by the way, is a Democratic congresswoman from Colorado.
Tokyjin:
Yes, and a feminist. I almost laughed when Takaichi said, right after she was elected LDP president, that she would “abandon work–life balance” to do everything to save the country. The idea of work–life balance was exactly what Pat Schroeder introduced into US law.
So it’s difficult to judge whether Takaichi is really a right-wing ideologue, or whether she is playing the role of a right-wing politician. Abe endorsed globalization, but he also understood conservative anxiety. So he emphasized prewar values, spiritual mobilization, militarization, and so on.
Takaichi now faces a more difficult situation, because people are suffering from the legacy of Abe’s policies. Globalization cannot be reversed, and she has no real power to change that trend. But the LDP’s conservative base is weakening. It’s like what a common-law scholar at Harvard Law School—Andrew—said about Trump: critics missed the point; this is no longer a question of right vs. left but of upper vs. lower.
Japanese society is entering a dangerous phase: many former middle-class people are becoming lower class economically. They are conservative, and they don’t want to rely on social welfare. They want to say, “I have a job, I run a business, I did well, so the government must protect us from foreign pressure and competition.” Because of this, Takaichi will be pushed to rely more on spiritual mobilization and premodern slogans.
You may see a very interesting coexistence in her government: postmodern economy and premodern spiritual mobilization living side by side.
Chang:
We’ve talked a bit about this spiritual mobilization and about Takaichi’s hawkish views. I want to ask, going forward, what you anticipate.
Back to what happened after her comments: China has encouraged its citizens not to travel to Japan. For context, about half of Japan’s GDP growth last year—around 1.5%—came from tourism, and a large share of that tourism was Chinese. So there will be a significant economic impact. I asked a Chinese friend yesterday whether she thought these government warnings would work, and she said she believed a significant portion of people would obey them. We’ll see.
There is also the seafood ban, reimposed after the Fukushima water release. Japanese films have been canceled. I was in Beijing and planning to go to a show by a Japanese jazz musician. The band was rehearsing when the police came in and told the venue it had to be canceled—and that happened across the country.
So clearly there is a significant impact. Based on Takaichi’s views—and she has not really walked back her statements—Tokujin, what do you think is in store over the next few months? Will this pass? Will it escalate? If it escalates, where? Economic sanctions back and forth? You have a pretty pessimistic view, right? You told me you think this is the new status quo.
Tokujin:
Yes. I don’t think there is room for the Chinese Communist Party to walk back. Their legitimacy now almost entirely comes from a 100-year narrative of Chinese nationalism—a sad story of unfortunate conflicts between Japan and China. Taiwan is the most symbolic issue. So I see no room for either side to walk back.
Ian:
Do you think Takaichi should walk back? Should the Japanese government soften its stance on China?
Tokujin:
Two days ago, the Chief Cabinet Secretary held a press conference and clearly said that Takaichi’s statement went beyond the traditional government interpretation on Taiwan. And because of that, it created misunderstanding for the Chinese government. So, as a matter of logic, the Japanese government has admitted that she said something different—maybe a bit too far—from the traditional scope.
If that’s the case, I think she should walk back.
Ian:
There’s another potential problem. One way wars can be avoided is when governments clearly understand each other’s intentions. In this case, everything is very fuzzy. The Chinese government, as you say, is highly nationalistic and wants to expand its power—that’s fairly clear. But the US government has deliberately left it unclear whether they would defend Taiwan. The Chinese don’t know; probably Donald Trump himself doesn’t know.
The Japanese are constrained by their constitution. They reinterpret it, but as you pointed out, it still doesn’t allow overseas warfare. Takaichi’s government clearly feels Japan should be able to defend Taiwan, but nothing is certain. So these countries don’t really know one another’s intentions, and that’s risky.
Tokujin:
I agree. If China were trying to impose its political or social system on Japan, I would say clearly: we don’t want that. But China is a neighbor. It’s a foreign country. Since the Bandung Conference, there have been “five principles” of peaceful coexistence, including non-interference in internal affairs. Japan made such a promise to China in 1972.
Some argue that warfare in the Taiwan Strait could threaten Japan’s economy and constitute some kind of emergency, but this is not something a new prime minister should announce in her first week. When you stand up in parliament and make your foreign and domestic policy preferences clear, and the first thing you mention is Taiwan, what does that mean for Japanese society—given there is no consensus on this?
And the polling questions are misleading. They’re like asking, “Would you like a new house after 80 years?” Most people will say yes. But that’s different from asking which part of the house they want to tear down and what to rebuild. Constitutional change is like that.
Ian:
I think that’s a very interesting way to end. Chang, do you have any more questions?
Chang:
I wanted to pause on the question of intentions with respect to Takaichi’s comment. I don’t think she expected this kind of reaction from China. I think she was speaking mainly to a domestic audience. She has branded herself as the first female prime minister, an assertive figure in Japanese politics. It’s part of her political DNA to say something a bit provocative.
I’m curious what you think about her as the first female prime minister—what that means for Japan. Ian, you’ve written about her and compared her to Thatcher. She has explicitly said Thatcher is a role model: a woman willing to be as assertive and confident as the men in the old boys’ club of England or Japan. What do you both think about her and the meaning of having a first female prime minister?
Tokujin:
I think Ian wrote a very interesting essay about her, and I mostly agree. I wouldn’t label her as a “natural” right-winger or say she’s ideologically hawkish. The deeper problem is structural. In Japan’s social structure, there is very little room for a woman like Takaichi who is not from a political dynasty, is smart, is ambitious, and wants to enter politics.
For such ambitious newcomers—men or women—there is a very strong incentive to act hawkish and right-wing. That’s how you get votes. My friend and colleague, Professor Koichi Nakano, talks about “air nationalism”: a nationalistic mood in the air. For politicians who are not as secure in their districts as someone like Ishiba, they need votes from organized conservative groups—such as religious right-wing organizations like the Unification Church—and then they add on this “air nationalism” to secure their political success.
Professor Ueno Chizuko, a famous feminist intellectual, has said she’s not happy that the first female prime minister is so conservative, like Thatcher. I understand that. But I also think this is a structural problem.
Ian:
There is one good thing: she has proven that a woman can become prime minister of Japan. That’s already a breakthrough. Otherwise, I agree with Ueno—she’s not going to do much for women’s rights.
On her statement, I’d add that there is a perennial problem in Japan: so few people outside Japan speak Japanese, and many Japanese don’t speak other languages. Because Japan is so inward-looking, politicians often speak as though nobody outside Japan will ever hear or read what they say. That’s happened before. Prime Minister Nakasone once said that America’s problem was that it had so many non-white citizens, which held the country back. He assumed no one abroad would understand the Japanese, but of course it was picked up immediately.
I suspect when Japanese public figures talk, they assume no one outside Japan can read or understand Japanese, so it will go unnoticed. It’s possible that Takaichi, aiming largely at a domestic audience, did not think through the consequences abroad—especially in China. I don’t think she could be that naïve; she probably knew the Chinese would react, just not so strongly. And some reaction may actually work to her advantage domestically, because it shows she’s standing up to “big China,” which many Japanese will applaud.
Chang:
She’s certainly made her mark internationally, too. Her audience may also include Americans, who have clearly come in to back her. So it’s not necessarily a bad thing for her.
Ian:
No, but Americans have always been ambivalent about Japan’s security role. On the one hand—like Trump—they tell the Japanese to rearm, to take more responsibility, to be more hawkish. On the other hand, they want to keep control over what happens in East Asia and don’t want the Japanese to become too independent. This puts all Japanese governments in a bind.
Chang:
That sounds like a great place to end. Thank you, Tokujin. I really appreciate it.
Ian:
Thank you very, very much.
Tokujin:
Thank you very much.Less than a month into Sanae Takaichi’s tenure as Japan's prime minister, she has already sparked a diplomatic crisis with Japan's powerful neighbor. Joining us is Tokujin Matsudaira, a constitutional-law professor at Kanagawa University who grew up in Taiwan. He has written extensively on Article 9, constitutional revision, and the diplomatic challenges that shape Japan–China relations.
Related Links:
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/takaichi-sanae-iron-lady-will-not-improve-gender-relations-japan-by-ian-buruma-2025-11


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