Into Asia
Into Asia
Taiwan’s Forgotten Role in Japan’s War
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Taiwan’s Forgotten Role in Japan’s War

Lau Kek-huat is a Malaysian-born documentary filmmaker based in Taiwan.

Lau Kek-huat is a Malaysian-born documentary filmmaker based in Taiwan. His latest film, From Island to Island, won the prestigious Golden Horse Award in 2024. The film examines the role of Taiwanese in Japan’s Pacific War and explores why memories of World War II diverge across the Chinese-speaking world. 

Lau joins us to discuss his latest film and its differing reception across Asia.

Follow his work, including his film at: https://reurl.cc/6bGRDr 

We discuss:

  • How Taiwanese conscripts in the Imperial Japanese Army were deployed across Southeast Asia as translators and intermediaries, using proximity to local dialects (Taiwanese/Hokkien).

  • How KMT rule and the White Terror shaped Taiwan’s postwar memory, leaving younger generations with an image of their grandparents as victims, while obscuring their roles in perpetuating violence.

  • The postwar fate of overseas Taiwanese: stripped of Japanese citizenship, rendered stateless, and forcibly repatriated to a homeland some had never lived in.

  • How Japanese occupation deepened ethnic tensions among Chinese, Malay, and Indian communities in Malaya, producing fractured wartime memories that persist today.

  • Interview process: What Lau learned interviewing staff at Hiroshima’s Holocaust museums, the difficulty of interviewing Japanese and Taiwanese veterans and how some recalled their time in Southeast Asia.

  • Taiwan’s pro-Japan consensus today, Southeast Asia’s lingering distrust of Japanese military power, the unresolved politics of comfort women.

Ian: So my first question to you would be: what motivated you to make this particular film?

Lau: Okay, hello to everyone. I’m so happy to be here. Regarding the question—how did I start this documentary—at the beginning I didn’t plan for the film to be so long, like five hours. And it wasn’t about the darker history of Taiwan—Taiwanese soldiers in the Japanese army—at first.

In the beginning, I read a thesis by a professor from Chengchi University. The thesis is about overseas Taiwanese who lived in Southeast Asia before World War II. They were already living in Southeast Asia before the war. But when the war broke out, they were treated as alien enemies, because they were citizens of the Japanese Empire. So they were sent to internment camps—in Japan, in Australia, and also in India.

At first, I tried to approach those people. They were still living in Taiwan—some had come back from the Australia camp, others from the India camp. At the same time, I was researching the World War II background—how Taiwan was involved in the war. As a Malaysian, growing up, we don’t read much about World War II in the history textbooks. But we do hear from the grandparents’ generation—they keep telling us how traumatic it was when Japan invaded Malaysia and Singapore. Even then, I didn’t imagine that within the Japanese army there were Taiwanese involved. We didn’t know about that.

When I was doing research, I tried to match the timeline—when Taiwanese soldiers were dispatched to Southeast Asia, and then the Malayan campaign and Singapore campaign. And then I realized they were already there from the very beginning of the war in Southeast Asia. That’s when I thought I should include all this knowledge I found, and put it into the film.

The film expanded from 90 minutes, to 2.5 hours, and then to five hours long, because there were so many things I discovered along the way.

Ian: Yes, and just for the listeners, we should point out that this is a story—rarely told—of Chinese being involved in a war against other Chinese, or at least Chinese speakers. Taiwan was part of the Japanese Empire, and as such Taiwanese were drafted into the Imperial Japanese Army. In Southeast Asia, they were involved in many things as interpreters and so on, and were often witnesses to torture sessions. And the Chinese of Southeast Asia were the targets of a lot of Japanese aggression.

So this is a Chinese-versus-Chinese story, isn’t it?

Lau: Indeed. If you look at Japanese army strategy at that time, they had to make use of a lot of Taiwanese people, because they spoke Taiwanese, which is very similar to Hokkien in Southeast Asia.

From the beginning, they knew they had to make use of this language fluency so they could manage and conquer Southeast Asia. They already tried this out when they conquered Hainan Island or some parts of China. They needed people who could understand the local language to run the government there. So from the beginning, a lot of Taiwanese soldiers were involved as interpreters—especially during massacres, and especially in interrogations, where they needed Taiwanese to do translation.

Chang: Yeah. It wasn’t just that they were useful. In the beginning of the film, you can see there’s also a kind of cultural attachment to the war in Taiwan. You can see celebrations, and people singing.

It’s really messy and complicated, the Taiwanese role in this kind of war—and you bring up so many of the complexities in the film. For listeners who haven’t watched it, I’ll just give a quick synopsis of this really long film. Basically, the film is centered on three main places: Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. The film is recreated through interviews and archival footage, and through really creative film techniques that bring letters and diaries back to life. There are also reenactments. And all of them give different perspectives on the war.

So we have Taiwanese soldiers who participated in the war. We also have Taiwanese who aided the Japanese in various ways—as translators and doctors—their memories of the war, how they understood it, and how their descendants grapple with it. And then we also have Malaysians and Singaporeans who recollect the war from their perspective, as well as their descendants.

And often there are horrific massacres that come up in the course of the film, ones that are not recorded in official ways. Lau, you said something earlier that I’m curious about: when you heard about these memories through your grandparents’ generation, I can imagine how they might feel about the Japanese—but what was their attitude toward the Taiwanese?

Lau: Because after the war, we had a Malay-majority government. The history book narrative is mainly a Malay World War II narrative. So there’s not much about the Chinese suffering during World War II. We have to rely on grandparents’ oral stories to remember it.

And after World War II, the Chinese community didn’t really have the strength or power to build out this narrative publicly—to collect testimony and make it part of official memory.

Ian: And Singapore presumably would be different, right, with the Chinese majority?

Lau: If you talk about “Chinese,” there are different groups—English-educated Chinese, and what you might call Chinese newcomers. The English-educated Chinese came to Southeast Asia earlier and were educated in English. They pledged loyalty more to the British colonial government.

The newcomers came later, and some still thought of themselves as from China and needing to return to China. When the Japanese army came, they targeted mostly the China-oriented Chinese—because those were the people who donated and supported the war against Japan in China. Before they came to Southeast Asia, they already saw this group as an enemy, because they were funding the war in China.

So before they came, they already had lists of names—Chinese they wanted to kill. And this is why the Chinese were the most suffering group during the war.

Ian: Were there any Taiwanese who actually joined the resistance—who switched sides?

Lau: There were—especially Taiwanese who had already lived in Malaysia or Singapore before the war. Some were daughters, musicians. When they lived in Southeast Asia, they didn’t really differentiate themselves as Taiwanese. Mostly they would describe themselves as Hokkien, because we all speak Hokkien—alongside other groups like Cantonese and Hakka.

So it was easy for them to blend into the Chinese community in Malaysia and Singapore. Only when the war broke out did citizenship suddenly become something very important. Then it became: if you are Taiwanese, you are Japanese; if you are Indonesian or Malayan, you are treated differently.

I did hear testimonies that some people joined anti-Japanese guerrillas—that they supported, or tried to help, the Communist Party in Malaya.

Ian: And in Taiwan—you were saying in Malaysia, people don’t really learn much about the fate of the Chinese-speaking population. What about Taiwan? I assume that when Taiwan was still ruled by the KMT, the Japanese were depicted as the enemy. Since Taiwan became a democracy, how is that history taught—the history of the Japanese empire and Taiwan’s collaboration?

Lau: Taiwan is very complicated. After the war, the KMT took over Taiwan. Under KMT rule, those who were educated in Japanese, or who wanted to join the Japanese army, tried to hide their identities, because they would be targeted by the government. They hid their identity, they hid their memories.

During the long White Terror—from the 1950s to the 1990s—people involved with the Japanese army or Japanese government tried not to tell their descendants, not to tell anyone, their real identities.

In the 1990s, we started interviewing Taiwanese veterans, but the focus was more on what they suffered during the White Terror or the 2/28 Incident in Taiwan. It was a selective memory—remembering them as victims. But we didn’t really ask what they had been involved in before they came back from Southeast Asia, or what they witnessed in Southeast Asia.

So this part of history is long forgotten, and unknown to younger Taiwanese. When my film screened in Taiwan, for the younger generation it was a shock. They remember their grandfathers as victims; they don’t remember them as collaborators of the Japanese imperial army.

Chang: Lau, could you talk a little bit about the ending—where after the war, Taiwanese basically become stateless, right? Because they’re no longer Japanese citizens, and they’re not accepted by the Chinese population because they were collaborating. That’s a really complicated and interesting part of the film.

Lau: After the war, Taiwanese lost their citizenship—they were no longer citizens of the Japanese Empire—and Taiwan was taken over by the KMT. But what we’re talking about is also a totally different official language. People who grew up in Japanese education suddenly became illiterate. They were trained to speak and write in Japanese.

Then suddenly, after KMT takeover, everything changed into Chinese, and you had to use Mandarin as the official language. For people trained professionally—doctors, and other professions—you suddenly lost the ability to use that knowledge, and you had to relearn Mandarin and Chinese.

And we have to bear in mind: during the war, they saw Chinese as an enemy language, because Japan was at war with China. So if you wanted to carry on with your profession, you had to pick up this “enemy language.” That’s psychologically complicated for Taiwanese.

As you mentioned, nowadays Taiwanese still have a kind of pro-Japan culture—Japanese pop culture, and so on. One reason is that the grandparents’ generation compares Japanese rule to KMT rule. They would say Japanese rule was much better than KMT rule, because of the White Terror and the targeting of Japan-related people. That’s why memory in Taiwan is so divided—there are competing narratives.

Chang: There’s a section in the documentary where one Malaysian interviewee says that during the occupation there was already ethnic conflict between the Chinese and the Malays, and that some Malays started to support the Japanese. Could you speak a little bit more about that? What were Malays doing in support of the Japanese?

Lau: In Malaysia, we have three main ethnic groups—Chinese, Malay, and Indian. During British colonial times, there was already a divide-and-rule system, which meant they made use of rivalry between ethnic groups, so people didn’t understand each other well.

During the Japanese occupation, Japan carried on with this strategy—and actually made it worse. They intensified rivalry between Malays and Chinese, and also Indians.

Chang: How did they make it worse? Do you know any specific examples?

Lau: They recruited Malays to join the Japanese forces. And many civil servants were Malay under British colonial rule, so they continued using Malays as policemen and government officers.

When Japan carried out massacres, you can see in war crimes court documents that many witnesses are Malay—because they were the ones who could bring soldiers to where they wanted to go. Japan made use of Malays’ local knowledge so they could access Chinese communities and carry out killings.

This made the gap between Malay and Chinese worse. After the war, there were serious killings between Chinese and Malays, because there was distrust.

Ian: And before the war, professionally—was the division that most Chinese in Southeast Asia were merchants and in business, and Malays were largely rural? Isn’t it quite like that?

Lau: For Chinese, as I said, many supported the war in China against Japan. But identity was often based on the region you came from—Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese—depending on what language you spoke.

For Malays, they were the local ruling group, and local chiefs were important. They were more united by religion—Islam. They saw themselves as Muslims.

And in my film, if you remember, there’s Japanese propaganda. They tried to connect an Islamic “holy war” with Japan’s imperial war. They claimed the emperor was connected to Muhammad, so if Malays joined the Japanese army, they were doing the same holy war. This was unknown to many Malaysians.

When we released the film in Malaysia, we worried because it’s sensitive. In Malaysia today, religion is untouchable—it’s taboo. We don’t talk about it. But luckily we got through censorship, and this part screened. It shocked Malay audiences, because they could see it as provocation from a Chinese director—relating Islam to Japanese war propaganda. But we got through.

Ian: That’s fascinating. But my question was really about professional roles. In Thailand and Indonesia, many Chinese or people with Chinese backgrounds were in business, associated with money, and that created resentment. Is that true of Malaysia as well?

Lau: Yes, it’s also true in Malaysia and in Singapore. Many Chinese were businesspeople. They were wealthy and had economic power, but they didn’t really have political power. Under British colonial rule there might be a “head of the Chinese community” appointed to govern Chinese affairs, but not much political power beyond that.

Meanwhile, Malays were more employed in government roles—as civil servants. Chinese were mostly doing business.

Chang: Sorry—I wanted to go back to the Taiwanese after the war ended. There’s a section near the end where you interview Taiwanese who had lived in Southeast Asia. After the war, most of them were resettled back to Taiwan, right? And some of them had never lived in Taiwan, so they didn’t want to go back. What is that about?

Lau: They lived in Southeast Asia before the war. When the war broke out, they were captured and sent to camps, which meant their properties in Southeast Asia were confiscated by the government. After the war, they were forced to go back to Taiwan. They had no say in whether they wanted to stay or leave—they had to leave.

All of them were sent back to Taiwan, and they became Taiwanese in the political sense when they arrived. Later, under KMT rule, some tried to go back to Southeast Asia to reclaim property, but it failed, because it had already been confiscated. So most couldn’t resettle there again, and stayed in Taiwan.

Ian: How were they treated by local, native Taiwanese? Were they treated badly?

Lau: Not really. They could still speak Taiwanese, and some still had families in Taiwan, so they relied on their relatives. There was also a lot of intermarriage within this group that came back from Southeast Asia, because they understood each other.

Chang: Can I ask a journalistic question? As a journalist, I can imagine you had to knock on a lot of doors to get this story. And the film shows you were successful in interviews—people said yes, people were willing to be filmed. I’m curious: how difficult was it to get the story? What were some of the obstacles? You’re asking people about really difficult things. How often did people say, “I don’t want to remember this period of my life”?

Lau: One of the most difficult parts was interviewing Japanese-Taiwanese soldiers. They were interviewed, but most of what they shared was about suffering during 2/28 and the White Terror.

But I guess I’m one of the first people to ask them: what did you see, or participate in, when you were in Southeast Asia? That shocked them, because no one really asked those questions.

In the beginning, a lot of them were friendly and willing to talk. But slowly, as they found out my Southeast Asia accent—or found out I came from Malaysia—they would reject the interview and refuse to see me. So I had to use strategies to approach them.

Many interviews you see in the film were not done by me. For example, there’s one soldier, Yang Fu-cheng. I found a young Japanese woman who came to Taiwan to study—she was about granddaughter age for these old soldiers. I listed three major questions I wanted to ask. The rest of the conversation was done by her. She approached the Taiwanese veteran as a grandpa, and asked, “Grandpa, what do you remember? What did you see? Please tell me.” I tried to create this intergenerational setup. I played a third-party role—observing and filming.

Ian: And she spoke Japanese to him?

Lau: Yes—she spoke Japanese. I think language is one of the most important points. If you ask the same question in Japanese, Taiwanese, or Mandarin, they will answer differently.

If you speak in Japanese, you bring out their memories of youth—when they were young, joining the army, full of hope. If you ask in Taiwanese, the memories that come back are White Terror and 2/28. If you ask in Mandarin, they might scold you, because for them it’s an enemy language.

So with different languages, it’s like they become different people. That’s why I needed someone close to them, who understands the language close to them, to ask the questions. Some soldiers were interviewed by their own daughters. When they face their families, they’re more willing to reveal memories.

Another difficulty was interviewing descendants of soldiers, or of people preparing to join the Japanese army—like Simon in Penang. He knew his grandfather was from Taiwan, and his grandfather was sentenced to death after the war. He did a lot of bad things to local people. Imagine growing up in a community where everyone remembers your grandfather as a collaborator of the Japanese empire—it’s a shameful family story.

When I approached Simon, he had unsettled feelings. Sometimes he agreed to an interview, sometimes he rejected it—quite a few times. And as you see in the film, although he had heard stories about his grandpa, he had never seen the real documents.

When I showed him the real documents, it was a shock. It made everything concrete. Ethically, if Simon had collapsed emotionally and couldn’t handle it, I wouldn’t have put it in the film. If someone breaks down, I won’t put it in. Luckily, Simon could overcome it, and he could talk.

And Simon wasn’t the only descendant. Many descendants I approached stopped me in the middle of interviews, stopped the camera, and said, “Please leave my home and don’t come again.” That was a fairly common reaction.

Chang: I wish that was in the film, because it would give a sense of how difficult these topics are for some people. But the Simon interview was really memorable.

This is actually a question for Ian. Ian, you’re familiar with the German case, and there are interesting parallels. What’s striking is Simon grappling with the legacy of his grandfather. There’s a line where he says something like, “I have no choice—he’s my grandfather—I have to respect him.” And as soon as you go into his house, you see an ancestral shrine.

I wondered if there’s a cultural reason—filial piety, and the idea that Chinese culture emphasizes respecting elders. In Germany, I know the generation after the war was often much more critical of the Nazi-era generation. Do you see a difference between how Simon behaves and how Germans behaved?

Ian: They may be more critical of German behavior under the Nazi period, but I think it’s human to have feelings about your parents or grandparents that are separate from what they may have done outside the family.

In other words, you had concentration camp commanders responsible for mass murder who were very kind fathers and took their children out for picnics on the weekend. It’s entirely natural for those children to remember these figures—who may have been hanged for war crimes—as their fathers. That’s a universal human thing, not related to one culture or another.

It’s the same in Japan. I once spoke to the daughter of somebody who was very high up in the Japanese imperial army in Manchuria, probably responsible for all kinds of crimes. And she remembered him as a doting father. Knowing what he did, she wasn’t trying to excuse him. She was just saying: the man I knew is not the man being accused of all these crimes. That’s a reality people have to accept.

Lau: I agree. It’s human nature. Someone can be a killer and also a kind father at the same time—it’s not a contradiction.

But if you compare Germany and Asia: after the war, German governments put people on trial. Even now, they still put Nazi collaborators on trial. It sends a message to society: we have to face this, we have to acknowledge it.

That doesn’t really happen in Japan, or even in Taiwan. After the Tokyo Trial, it’s like the government didn’t really acknowledge it anymore. So it didn’t create an atmosphere where Taiwanese people feel: we were involved in this, we have to face it, we have to analyze it. Instead there’s an ambiguous space where people selectively remember some things and ignore others. That’s the difference between Germany’s public atmosphere and Asia’s.

Ian: Yes, people always say that, but West Germany and East Germany were very different in how they dealt with war memory. And it took Germans at least a generation to come to grips with it, because in the 1950s they didn’t want to face it at all.

And the Japanese, in some ways, did. There were more movies and novels written in the 1950s by Japanese about their experiences during the war than was true in Germany. So a lot of this is political, more than cultural.

Lau: During my research, I read a lot of memoirs written by Japanese soldiers. Before they passed away, many wrote about what they had seen and done, and reflected deeply on humanity and democracy.

But sadly, if I read memoirs by Taiwanese soldiers, most of the time it doesn’t reach that stage. They remain focused on suffering under KMT rule—the White Terror, 2/28. They hardly mention what they witnessed in Southeast Asia. As a human being, that’s regretful. Even in old age, people kept those memories as secrets, and passed away with them—without telling their families.

I interviewed one descendant of a doctor who was involved with chemical weapons in Southeast Asia. I found the name and went—

Chang: Unit 731

Lau: Yes, in Southeast Asia. I went to the family and interviewed the descendant. He told me that after his father came back from Southeast Asia, he became very silent. He didn’t talk much to the family. But he became a very kind doctor—he went to poor regions and treated patients for free, and did many good deeds.

They didn’t really know what he experienced in Southeast Asia.

Ian: Yeah, I think there may be a difference between Taiwan and Japan, though. In Japan, even though it was an authoritarian government, it was their country that was responsible for all this. As a Japanese, you’d feel your country was responsible. Whereas Taiwanese—it was a Japanese colony. They had no political responsibility for what happened, really. And even their collaboration—they didn’t feel that same responsibility.

Lau: Indeed, that’s true. They weren’t really decision-makers. They weren’t central decision-makers. They were kind of forced to be involved. So we have to understand it. As I say, I’m not trying to point fingers—we’re trying to understand.

And I think it’s important for us to realize how we’re slowly involved in structures—how we become accomplices. When do we realize we’re slowly getting involved? That’s important to know, in human terms.

Chang: Back to the topic of Japan not confronting its atrocities in Southeast Asia—near the end of the film you go to Hiroshima, or one of your crew goes, and you interview the director of a Holocaust museum there. That was a really interesting interview. Can you talk about what you were hoping to ask him, and what he told you?

Lau: I found out about this museum along the way. It surprised me—there are actually four or six museums in Japan that commemorate the Jewish Holocaust, but there are no museums talking about the Southeast Asia massacres. And as someone from Southeast Asia, I felt angry: why aren’t you letting young people know about this?

But I didn’t ambush the director. I sent him the questions before the interview. I listed the questions I wanted to ask and gave him time to prepare how he wanted to respond.

When I went to the museum, I hired a translator—she later appears in the film. She’s from Hiroshima. People who grew up in Hiroshima are heavily educated in peace education, to remember Hiroshima as a victim of the atomic bomb. So people in Hiroshima can be reluctant to talk about Japan as an invading country—it’s too heavy for them.

Chang: Let’s slow down. Can we go through how Japanese people—especially people in Hiroshima—are educated about what happened during the war?

Ian: I think it’s complicated. Quite a few people in Japan, certainly just after the war—and even the Japanese emperor, Emperor Shōwa, who was emperor during the war—later endorsed the view that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a kind of just punishment for what the Japanese had done.

Another view is that the bombings wiped out Japanese guilt. In other words, the Japanese did terrible things during the war—in China in particular, and in Southeast Asia—but the atom bombs were so terrible that in some ways they cancelled each other out. That’s another fairly common view.

There are also Japanese who feel they suffered more than anybody else, though I’m not sure that’s the dominant view.

Chang: Lau, how was Ayano educated growing up?

Lau: For her education, she was educated mainly as Hiroshima being a victim of the bombing. She saw many pictures of victims. She remembers innocent people—women and children suffering during the atomic bomb.

They don’t really remember that Hiroshima was also an important military center.

Ian: It’s a big base.

Lau: The funny thing is: when I asked Ayano to be the translator for that interview, and I gave her the questions I wanted to ask, she refused to translate for me. For her, she said it was impolite to ask elder Japanese those questions, and she found it hard to translate into Japanese.

That’s why, as you see in the film, the interview is conducted by me in English. It wasn’t originally planned that way. Along the way, she refused to translate for me quite a few times. But even for young Japanese today, it takes time to slowly understand the situation and acknowledge it. That’s what happened for her as well during the filmmaking process. It was difficult for her in the beginning.

Ian: But I don’t think Hiroshima being a big military base was the reason for the atomic bomb. They had run out of cities to bomb—most Japanese cities had already been completely destroyed. There was a list of cities left, and Hiroshima was one of them. So it wasn’t necessarily related to the fact that it was a military center.

But I think there’s another reason Japanese memories don’t involve Southeast Asia as much: Japanese who recognize war crimes focus mostly on what happened in China, because that’s where the bulk of the crimes occurred. China was clearly invaded by Japan.

Whereas the war in Southeast Asia is often seen as a war against European empires and American empires, like in the Philippines. So it’s seen as a conflict between colonial powers, or Japan against colonial powers. That’s why, to the extent there are feelings of guilt in Japan, they may be less pronounced regarding Southeast Asia than regarding China.

Lau: There’s one more interesting thing. During interviews with veterans, there were two kinds of responses. The first kind: as I mentioned, they rejected interviews or stopped in the middle, saying they had headaches or were old, and tried to escape the scene.

The second kind: there was one veteran in Hiroshima. When I went there, he prepared Malay song lyric books, and he tried to speak Malay to me. He had been in Malaysia before, and he spoke Malay. He tried to welcome me as a friend. He said, “I know how to speak Malay, but my children don’t. I was once in Malaya, and you are the first person who came after so many years. I want to practice my Malay with you.”

He kept singing Malay songs in a really happy mode. He stood up, tried to dance, singing in Malay. The scene was chaotic for me—it was totally outside my imagination. I didn’t know what was happening. And you could feel the soldier’s nostalgia for his youth.

This happened with a lot of Taiwanese soldiers as well. They recalled Southeast Asia more like travel. They would say they drank coconut milk, met local girls, fell in love, saw nice houses and scenery—but they didn’t mention war scenes or killings. It’s strange, but it’s also a kind of soft way they tell their memories.

Ian: But it’s not so hard to imagine. Most of those people were very young. They’d never been in another country. Not all of them saw war crimes. It’s easy to imagine that these are memories of youth and adventure. They never really thought about the horrible things that happened, or that they may or may not have witnessed. And to the extent they knew about it, they preferred to forget.

Lau: A lot of that—especially when they mention Manila. Many of them went to Manila before they were sent elsewhere in Southeast Asia. They would say Manila was the most beautiful city they ever saw. Comparing Manila to Taipei at that time, Manila was a totally different cosmopolitan city.

And then imagine after the war—after the Manila massacre—the whole city was almost wiped out. But nowadays, in Taiwan, very few people know about the Manila massacre at all. Yet in these Taiwanese soldiers’ memories, Manila is a beautiful city. They keep mentioning it.

Ian: I wonder how many of those troops would have been involved in the massacre, because that came right at the end of the war. And it was the Japanese marines, I think—and it may very well be that a lot of those Taiwanese were there.

Lau: If you look at the places where Taiwanese soldiers were sent, Manila was one of the biggest hubs. A lot of Taiwanese were there—

Ian: Right, until the end.

Lau: Even former president Lee Teng-hui’s brother was in Manila as well. We know many soldiers sent to Southeast Asia didn’t come back. But we don’t know about the Manila massacre, or how terrible the war was.

Ian: Can I bring it a bit up to date? Relations between China and Japan are very tense. The Japanese prime minister has said Japan might have to use military force if Taiwan were attacked by China. If you think about this, and about attitudes in different parts of Southeast Asia—specifically Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore—how do people react? What is public sentiment toward Japan, and the idea of Japan using military force? What do Taiwanese think, and how does that compare to people in Malaysia?

Lau: If you look at Taiwan, in mainstream media you see slogans like: “If Taiwan is attacked, Japan will help.” This kind of slogan is very popular, and Taiwanese people welcome it.

I guess this is one obstacle for us to recall World War II memory and to acknowledge it. Because if we discuss Japan’s military involvement in Southeast Asia, it would hurt diplomacy between Taiwan and Japan.

That’s why people shy away from discussing these issues—comfort women, and compensation for Taiwanese soldiers. The government isn’t really in a position to discuss it.

For example, we do have comfort women in Taiwan. And as you mentioned, in my film it was treated like a business—stakeholders, businessmen involved in the comfort women system. But we don’t talk about this structure at all.

Even today, there is a comfort women museum in Taipei, but it relies on fundraising every year; it’s not funded by the government. The government doesn’t want it to be a permanent museum for people to remember. If they run out of funds, they can’t operate. That shows what kind of memory the government wants people to have.

In textbooks, comfort women might be mentioned, but only very simply. Meanwhile, a lot of archives and testimonies have been collected by the museum. Taiwan is a developed country—we are rich enough to build a permanent museum—but we don’t really do that.

Ian: And in Malaysia and Singapore, how do people there regard this?

Lau: I think it’s even worse in Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia has mainly a Malay narrative of World War II. Different ethnic groups remember in different ways—Malays keep silence.

Chinese memory is mostly within the Chinese community. Some volunteer scholars try to write about it, but there isn’t funding to set up memorials. It’s only within the community. I think it applies to the Indian community too. We have separate and divided narratives of World War II memory.

In Singapore, after the war, there was more focus on national development. Even comfort women issues were only brought up more recently. There were comfort women in Singapore, but there isn’t really organized collecting of testimony or research. And Lee Kuan Yew even said openly it wasn’t necessarily a bad thing to have comfort women in Singapore, because he said the system stopped Japanese soldiers from raping local girls.

With that kind of thinking, people are effectively told not to bring up this history too much.

Ian: Yes, but many people in Southeast Asia are worried about China. Are they so worried that they would welcome a stronger Japan, or would war memories still make it difficult for them to accept a stronger Japanese military?

Lau: It’s different from Taiwan. Taiwan is pro-Japan in a very strong way. In Malaysia and Singapore, people are more doubtful about Japan’s intentions. We have traumatic memories passed down. We don’t really trust Japan that much, overall. Taiwan is different—there’s a group of people who believe a stronger Japan will help keep peace in the region.

Chang: Lau, can I ask about how official history is remembered in Malaysia and Singapore, and what you feel hasn’t been confronted yet? In the Japan case, the contrast with Germany is a big topic in the film—the Japanese evasion of their role in Southeast Asia, as well as China. As a Malaysian, what do you think the Malaysian government hasn’t confronted yet, and what would you like them to confront?

Lau: First: how Malays were involved with the Japanese army isn’t really mentioned or discussed. And for the Indian community, how Indians joined the Indian National Army to fight for independence—joining with Japan to “free” Indians—this part of memory isn’t really discussed in Malaysia either. People think: this is just an Indian story, not something to discuss nationally.

And even for Chinese communities, some elements in my film challenge Chinese thinking as well. The mainstream Chinese narrative is that Chinese were totally innocent, and Japanese were evil—it’s a stereotype. “All Japanese are evil, all Chinese are innocent.”

But in my film, as you can see, there’s a village head who was forced to make a decision—if he handed over twelve girls, his village would not be massacred in return. People had to make hard choices. Even within the Chinese community, people faced moral dilemmas—who collaborates with Japan, who doesn’t. But we don’t really discuss that. We keep using memory for nationalist narrative, instead of focusing on individual memory and individual suffering.

That’s also what I’m trying to show with Simon’s grandfather. He was a musician before the war. He was recruited as a translator for the Japanese army, but that doesn’t mean he was born evil. During the time, normal civilians had demands and requests to the Japanese army. Simon’s grandfather was the person they approached, because he could speak Japanese. He was one of the only people who could speak Hokkien and Japanese.

People would bring gifts and ask, “Can you say some good words for us? Can you find out news about someone who was taken?” I’m trying to say: don’t think of him as born evil. He faced tests—moral dilemmas about what kind of person you want to be. He saw Japanese officers taking property from people, and he slowly got involved in the system. That’s what I’m trying to show.

Chang: I have another question, just practically, about screening the film. I’m especially curious what it’s like trying to screen this film in Japan—whether you’ve experienced resistance—and also what it’s been like in Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan.

Lau: It’s very interesting—there’s a lot I can share. There was resistance even in Taiwan. When I screened in Taiwan, some Taiwanese audience members were shocked and frustrated. Some raised their hands and asked me: “Who do you think you are, a Malaysian? Why do you come and dig out our history?” I did face that in Taiwan.

At the same time, when I screened in Malaysia and Singapore, some audience members saw me as Taiwanese. A Singapore audience member raised his hand and said—very angrily—“You Taiwanese, please tell me exactly how many Taiwanese were here during World War II.”

I’m the same person, the same director, the same film. But in Taiwan, I’m treated as Southeast Asian; and in Malaysia and Singapore, they see me as Taiwanese. That’s identity politics. They project an identity onto you.

When I travel to different countries, people see me as the opposite identity. You can see how dominant national war narratives are—how quickly people project “enemy” onto you.

In Japan, there was also resistance. People asked: “What evidence can you show? Is it really true, what you show in the film?” Some accused me of political motives—again, projecting politics onto you.

Chang: That’s a sign that you did a good job. Thank you, Lau. I really appreciate the talk.

Ian: No, it was wonderful. Thank you very, very much.

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