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Into Asia
Takaichi Goes to Washington
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Takaichi Goes to Washington

The main item on Sanae Takaichi’s agenda during her recent visit to the White House, on March 19, was China: to shore up Japan’s relationship with the U.S.

The main item on Sanae Takaichi's agenda during her recent visit to the White House, on March 19, was China: to shore up Japan's relationship with the U.S. ahead of Trump much-anticipated summit with Xi Jinping. But the Iran war scrambled her plans. Ian and Chang talk about how Japan has now found itself caught in the middle of Trump's war in Iran, the shadow of China on the US-Japan relationship, and the unintended consequences in East Asia of Pax Americana's irreversible deterioration.

Show Notes

  • Japan’s fear of what Trump with do when he meets Xi Jinping: could Trump trade something on Taiwan for a deal with Xi?

  • Why Takaichi is constitutionally limited in sending warships to the Strait of Hormuz

  • Japan stuck between Iran and the United States

  • Why the United States and Japan are at odds over Takaichi’s November comments on Taiwan

  • Takaichi’s push to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution and prepare for a post-Pax Americana world

Chang: Today we’re going to be talking about Sanae Takaichi, the prime minister of Japan’s recent visit to the White House. From my understanding, part of the motives was that Takaichi wanted some reassurance before Donald Trump’s more high-profile scheduled meeting with Xi Jinping. I think now it’s been pushed back to May and June because of the Iran war.

Takaichi wanted to make sure she was the last person to talk to Trump just before the meeting because she’s nervous that Trump is unpredictable and he might do some crazy deal with Xi Jinping bilaterally without consulting Japan. What do you think was the motivating force behind the meeting, Ian?

Ian: Yes, I think that’s absolutely true. She also is taking a leaf out of Abe Shinzo, her predecessor, her mentor’s book. She’s very keen to get as close personally to Trump as possible. And this is partly because Japan is so completely dependent on the United States for its security, even more so than the Europeans are. So any opportunity to cement a personal relationship with this very mercurial figure, she sees as essential. Now, of course, she didn’t know that the Iran war was going to intervene, which made her visit to the White House far more perilous. First of all, Japan is very dependent on Middle Eastern oil and therefore on the flow of oil and tankers through the Straits of Hormuz. Japan has had a fairly good relation with Iran for many years. And she also knew that Trump was going to put a lot of pressure on America’s so-called allies to try and clear up the mess that he himself has made. He’s contemptuous of the Europeans for having refused to get involved in this war.

She knew before she left for Washington that he was likely to put pressure on Japan. And indeed, he had already said that Japan should take part in this and send minesweepers and that kind of thing. And this was going to put her into a very, very tight spot because she doesn’t want to alienate Trump in any way. On the other hand, she is constitutionally unable to take part, to send Japanese naval ships while combat is still going on. It’s forbidden by the constitution. So she would have to turn him down on that.

I think the Japanese were terrified that this visit, because of the Iran war, would end very badly for Japan and end up with Trump ranting and raving at her that they weren’t a dependable ally.

Chang: Yeah. There’s something so on point about 2026 and meeting with Donald Trump — your plans for your summit just completely go out the window because the United States decides to go into a war with Iran.

I think Japan probably feels like they’re on the back foot quite a bit. Before the Iran war, they were afraid that Trump might give some tacit security agreement about Taiwan that might undercut what Takaichi said in November last year. I think that is still hovering over the visit, and we can talk about that.

There’s been some really interesting drama with the Director of National Intelligence’s threat assessment. They released a threat assessment that basically said that Takaichi strayed from the political line. Did you see that? I remember we were talking about it before and you thought that she just said the quiet part out loud.

Ian: Well, we don’t know exactly why she said what she said at that time. Some people say it was an off-the-cuff remark to a comment made in the Japanese diet and that she hadn’t prepared it and was therefore perhaps incautious. I do think she said out loud what she and many other Japanese politicians think, including again her predecessor Abe Shinzo.

But I’ve always taken a slightly different view from many people on this. I think she said it partly because of Donald Trump. It wasn’t just the fear of China and China’s might and Japan’s vulnerability, in which Taiwan plays a very major role — because if Taiwan were to be seriously threatened or indeed invaded, that would be a threat to Japan.But the Trump factor, I think, plays a big part. She does want to change the Japanese pacifist constitution. She wants a stronger military profile. But up until now, the Japanese were resigned to being dependent on American protection and American nuclear protection. With Donald Trump, they can no longer be sure of that. And so I think she was sending a signal to the Japanese to shape up and say, look, we have to start preparing for a different world — in a way a little bit like the Canadian Prime Minister Carney, who said we no longer live in the post-war world. We’re now entering a completely different era in which we can no longer depend on the United States as the guarantor of the security of the so-called free world. Things have to change. And in his case, he said middle-ranking countries have to start getting together and taking care of their own security and no longer rely on the United States in the long run.

Now, I’m sure that the Japanese think that too, but with even more urgency because there is no NATO in East Asia. The Japanese and the South Koreans are entirely dependent on the United States.

Chang: I think there’s an interesting dynamic at play here where Trump’s pressure on allies to step up with their own security is having unintended consequences. Takaichi is making these claims in some ways in reaction to what Trump is doing — Trump 2.0, which is to basically say we’re America first and everyone else needs to step up with their security — that is what angered China. China called Trump immediately after Takaichi’s comments and Xi Jinping spent, I think, half an hour talking to him about how this is not okay. And Trump had to basically call Takaichi and say, you’ve got to tone it down.

So these reverberations across the global order that he doesn’t know about — the global order is fracturing, people are reacting — it’s causing these instabilities that he’s causing, but he’s also having to ameliorate somehow. He’s got to tell Takaichi to tone it down.

That backdrop is interesting because it clearly shows Trump hasn’t — in general, the US hasn’t really taken a side in the current China-Japan dispute. The US-Japan relationship always tries to present an extremely united front, but we know that there’s always a lot of distance between the two. And this was a clear distance, with China-Japan relations being so bad right now and Trump trying to maintain a trade deal with China.

One thing we were looking for in the summit is how that would play out. And I don’t know about you, Ian, but it seems to me like they kicked the can down the road. The questions and the readouts don’t seem like there was much progress on that front. It looks like Trump made a comment that the China-Japan relationship is “edgy” right now and he didn’t really say anything else. What do you think about that?

Ian: Well, it always has been slightly edgy. Think back to 2009, when almost for the first time since World War II, the Liberal Democratic Party was not in power and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan was in power. Prime Minister Hatoyama tried to reset, in a fairly cautious manner, Japan’s foreign policy goals. His idea was that Japan had to become slightly more independent, move more towards a new relationship with Asia and be an equal partner with the United States. And there was talk of moving US military bases from Okinawa and that kind of thing.

The Japanese conservative establishment, associated with the Liberal Democrats who have been in power for most of the time since World War II and still are, were very much against this. They wanted to stick to the status quo, meaning Japan would remain dependent on American support, American security. Washington took the side of the conservatives and tried to stop Japan’s new initiatives to focus more on Asia and less on the special relationship with the United States. So that really came to an end then.

Trump is very different. Trump himself is not a real proponent of Pax Americana, of the post-war order. He wants to break it. And what he seems to have in mind is to basically divide the world into spheres of three superpowers. Russia has its sphere, which might include Ukraine — probably does in Trump’s mind, which is why he takes Putin’s side usually against Zelensky. He feels that is part of Russia’s legitimate sphere. He sees a future in which China has its sphere, and that would include East Asia and its periphery. And the United States controls the Western Hemisphere. I think that’s how he sees the world — that the only powers that matter are the three superpowers, and the peripheral powers, the middle powers, in Carney’s words, should simply listen to what the big powers tell them.

Chang: Yeah.

Ian: Now, this makes the relationship with Japan and Korea edgy because they are clearly very much in China’s periphery. And yet they have this security relationship with the United States. In some ways, if this is indeed the way Trump sees the post-Pax Americana world, the Japanese and the Koreans are a nuisance. Which is why he tells everybody to take care of their own security and the American taxpayer will no longer pay for this.

Now the question is how China sees this development, how China sees the post-Pax Americana world. On the one hand, they welcome it — they want China to be the great power in East Asia. They don’t want the Americans there interfering. On the other hand, if the choice is between the United States being the policeman of East Asia and keeping its allies — Japan and Korea and Taiwan — in order, or handing over the responsibility for security to the Japanese, they might very well, or at least some Chinese might very well, prefer Pax Americana. They’re more afraid of a remilitarized Japan than they are of America continuing to play its role.

I would imagine that these are things that are debated or thought about in very small circles in Beijing. I don’t know the answer to this. But that is why Xi Jinping would call Donald Trump and say, keep Japan in order.

Chang: I agree. I do think we can separate the longer-term question of who is going to guarantee East Asian security — either the US or Japan — from just the question of Taiwan and what positioning the US should have on Taiwan at this moment.

Right now, the strategic ambiguity policy that America has towards Taiwan has been there a long time, and it’s starting to fray. Famously, Biden had made some gaffes about saying that he would defend Taiwan. From China’s perspective, it seems to be a really great opportunity while Trump is still president. As you say, he has asserted this Western Hemisphere idea — he’s already hinted at this idea that we’re going to have control over the Western Hemisphere, by which he’s also implying that China can have control over the Eastern Hemisphere.

In this case, he’s just so primed to trade some economic deal for some improvement on the Taiwan issue — some tacit shift. Trump recognizing that he opposes Taiwanese independence — even that small statement, to try and inch him towards that — I think would be a major win for the Chinese. That is hovering over the May-June meeting. And that’s a really scary thing for Japan and Korea. I think that was clearly the main goal for Takaichi: to back him off that.

Ian: Yes, it is. Well, also thinking about Taiwan — the Americans have defended Taiwan for various different reasons. For a long time, Taiwan was a military dictatorship, but the Americans stood by Taiwan because of anti-communism, because they wanted to oppose communist China. They wanted to stop communist China from becoming too powerful. Then when Taiwan became a democracy, the rhetoric changed somewhat and it was about defending a democratic government and defending democracy against a powerful dictatorship. And it was of course also about defending the security of Japan and South Korea by having open sea lanes.

But the idea that Taiwan should be defended because it’s a democracy — I don’t think that enters Donald Trump’s mind. I don’t think he cares at all about Taiwan being a democracy. He would be perfectly happy for China to take over if it weren’t for other security concerns and indeed Japan.

Now, what is Takaichi’s strategy? I think in the longer run, she is positioning or trying to position Japan for a post-Pax Americana world, which is why she wants the constitution to be changed so that Japan can actually send troops into combat if necessary. She wants to beef up the military. She wants Japan to be much more independent in that way. But she also knows that this will take a long time. So kicking the can down the road is the short-term strategy — or tactic, maybe. And that is what she was doing in Washington. It was simply playing for time.

In the same way that the Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte, whenever he sees Trump or speaks about Trump in public, covers him in oily flattery so that Trump is less likely to break up NATO. And she does exactly the same thing. When she said to Trump in the White House, or at a press conference, that Donald is the only one who can guarantee peace and prosperity of the world, and telling him how handsome he is and so on — she was obviously very carefully briefed by the Japanese foreign ministry. Pile it on. Just keep him happy. Flatter him. Tell him how good-looking and how great he is.

Everybody knows that this can work in the short term, and indeed it does seem to work. He does respond to flattery. When Rutte did this, he backed off from Greenland and NATO and so on. And in this case, even though Japan hasn’t sent any ships to the Straits of Hormuz, he came out of the meeting saying Japan was great and a great ally and was doing its bit to help America on Iran and so on. So it really does work, but it only works in the short term because he can change his mind five minutes later. And she knows that, but every five minutes is valuable.

Chang: So let’s talk about Iran. As you’ve already mentioned, Japan is extremely exposed to Middle Eastern oil through the Strait of Hormuz. They take over 90% of their crude oil through the strait. Japan has already released its emergency stockpile of oil — I think they have about 200 days of that — but it’s a delay tactic.

Japan is a prime candidate for what Trump has been on about: getting allies to contribute by bringing warships into the Strait of Hormuz. Takaichi had already been asked about this before she came to the US. She had said in the diet that she was going to tell Trump what Japan legally can and cannot do under the constitution.

I don’t know how well you know what they’re technically allowed to do. My understanding is that, ironically, when she said Taiwan could potentially be an existential threat or some survival crisis — that would be the trigger for Japan to be able to send their military. By defining the Iran war right now as something that’s a survival-threatening situation, which I don’t think can be done — do you know what is feasible under the current constitutional framework?

Ian: Well, it keeps changing. Again, Abe amended it and reinterpreted the constitution to mean that they could take part in collective defense. But basically, constitutionally, they’re only allowed to use any kind of force if Japan is under direct threat. If another power were poised to invade Japan or attack Japan directly, they could constitutionally use military force to defend themselves. What they can’t do is send any kind of military to take part in combat outside Japan.

What Abe did in his reinterpretation — I can’t remember the exact phrase — but I think he interpreted the constitution to say that Japan could take part in military operations if it was part of a collective defense. But again, Japan has never sent ships or used any kind of military in any combat abroad.

What they can do is send minesweepers and so on when a war has been concluded, to clean up. They can send medical personnel, they can help out in some ways, but never to engage in direct combat. I don’t think even if the oil supplies were directly threatened by Iran, that means they can constitutionally send troops to the Middle East to actually take part. They can’t do that.

Chang: Yeah. It doesn’t seem like she even made a commitment about minesweepers or surveillance or intelligence — those things that might be allowed under the constitution.

But what was really fascinating was that just yesterday or two days ago, the Iranian foreign minister said that they would let Japanese ships through the Strait of Hormuz. So there’s this fascinating dilemma now for Japan. As you say, they have had a diplomatic relationship with Iran. Iran has offered Japan safe passage through the strait. At the same time, Japan has to think about sucking up to Trump, because what they really care about is China.

It’s a fascinating situation because they have 90% of their crude oil through the strait. They would love to just have straight passage now, but the optics of that look awful in front of Trump, who you want to pretend you’re on his side. What do you think about that?

Ian: Yes, well, that’s exactly why I think they were terrified when Takaichi went to Washington. They were terrified it would go very badly wrong and end up with him ranting at her the way he did to Zelensky. And she solved it basically through flattery. But of course, that’s not a long-term solution. It worked this time.

But those dilemmas that you mentioned have not gone away.

Chang: I think Japan is trying to play both sides. There are diplomatic channels towards Iran asking for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for Japanese ships. At the same time, Japan signed on to a pledge with five European nations expressing their readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts on Hormuz, which is vague, but that’s in the broad theme of “we’re on the side of the allies.”

I don’t really know what Japan is doing and what it will end up doing. The main question I have is: are they going to take Iran up on their offer to have Japanese ships just go through the strait? And how would they be able to sell that to Donald Trump?

Ian: That’s indeed a huge question. I suppose one thing they could do — Trump seems now to be thinking, and of course he wants to walk away from this war as quickly as possible because it could damage him very badly in the midterm elections with gasoline prices going sky high and so on. He’d love to walk away and claim victory. Then what he would say is, the Europeans and others, you clean up the mess. You’re dependent on the oil going through the Straits of Hormuz, so it’s up to you now. I think he’d love to do that.

The Europeans, reluctant though they may be, would at least still be able to use some kind of military force to try and open the Straits of Hormuz if Iran insists on keeping it closed. The Japanese cannot do that. But what they could do is, once the conflict is over and Iran agrees that ships will be allowed to go through the strait again, there’s probably still quite a lot of work to do to clean up mines and all kinds of stuff that could still cause a great deal of damage. There they can play a role. They can send minesweepers because that would not be a question of taking part in combat.

But I agree that the dilemma — on the one hand, making sure that the Japanese can still get oil; on the other hand, looking like a loyal ally of Donald Trump’s — is going to be very, very difficult.

Chang: What did you think about the comment that Trump made when the journalist asked him, “Why didn’t you notify Japan about the Iran attack?” Trump was like, “Well, we wanted it to be a surprise. Who knows better about surprises than Japan? Pearl Harbor. Why didn’t you notify me about Pearl Harbor?”

It’s such a ridiculous comment. clearly it just popped into his head and he just said it out loud. But to be fair to him, I think he was just trying to say that he wanted this war to be a surprise. He didn’t want to notify allies because he was afraid that it might leak. What do you think?

Ian: That is what he was trying to say. From what I have read, Takaichi was angry at the Japanese journalists who asked the question. And I think that’s very unfair to the journalists because it’s a completely fair question. You cannot, as a responsible superpower, simply go to war — not only without notifying your allies, especially if you’re going to ask those allies to help you later, but also without notifying Congress.

even in the Iraq war, ill-conceived though it may have been, President Bush did try to get the allies on line. He did involve Congress. He did try to pave the way to make it look legitimate. Trump did none of that.

So it’s a completely legitimate question, and the response — “Well, it has to be done in secret and we’re not going to tell you” — this has become the stock response to any question, including from the American press, about what America’s goals are. People are not asking Trump to give away military secrets or to discuss tactics. But it’s legitimate to ask the administration what the strategy is and what they’re trying to achieve. And this is where they’re very cagey, because this changes from day to day, sometimes from hour to hour. Sometimes it’s regime change, sometimes it’s about oil, sometimes it’s about nuclear weapons.

So it’s an entirely legitimate question to ask: A, what the strategy is, and B, why the allies are not involved in this, even though the allies are asked to take part.

Now, how serious is a crack like that about Pearl Harbor? I think the Japanese take it in their stride because you expect it from Trump. If Joe Biden had said something like that, or even Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan, it would have been all over the world press and there would have been a diplomatic incident, probably. But in this case, people shrugged their shoulders. He’s said so many outrageous things and it doesn’t come as a surprise.

Chang: That’s true. The tolerance has just gotten a lot higher.

Ian: I think people think it’s entirely in character.

Chang: So to summarize: the US wanted Japan to pitch in and send warships to the strait. They did not make a decision on that. In a way, Japan came out of this relatively the winner in that they didn’t have to make any commitments on Hormuz. Although they’ve already made the deal to invest billions of dollars in the United States, and that is still on schedule. Several of the nuclear plants that they’ve agreed to have already started to break ground. Japan is trying to play up their end of the bargain — this is from the previous negotiations with tariffs, even though the Supreme Court has struck down the tariffs as unlawful, Japan is still going on with that. But the last question I have is: did Japan get the reassurances that it wanted on China with Donald Trump? The only real empirical outcome that Trump mentioned is that he off the cuff said, “I’ll speak Japan’s praises to Xi.” I don’t know what that means. But of course, the general vibe of the summit was extremely jovial and happy. They sent a picture of Takaichi almost in a dancing pose. do you think Takaichi has come back to Japan with the reassurances that she wanted?

Ian: No, because I don’t think such reassurances are possible with this president, because he changes his mind all the time. I think it’s very important that we discuss in our podcast now and in future, that we reflect on the post-Pax Americana world, because that is what we’re entering now and everybody knows it.

It probably had to happen anyway, but Trump has sped it up because he’s not committed to it. For the time being, the United States is still guaranteeing Japanese security. But we don’t know how long that’s going to last.

I think she was probably happy at the end of her visit to Washington because things didn’t go badly. But the long-term problem, and this concerns the Chinese as much as it does the Japanese, is that we’re faced with two different futures in Asia. One is that Pax Americana continues, which is highly unlikely, but it’s possible that for a while it will still continue. Or in the longer run, Japan and South Korea will become nuclear powers. And the question then is: which would China prefer? Of course they’d prefer for America to leave and Japan not to become a nuclear power. But I think that’s unlikely to happen.

Chang: Yeah. It seems to me that Trump, as you say, doesn’t believe in Pax Americana, but on the other hand just wants Asia to stay the way it is. Based on the pattern of what happened in November, Trump didn’t say, “Yeah, go Japan, you’re taking your security seriously.” He could have said, “Look, this is a good sign that Takaichi and the Japanese government are taking their security seriously. This is the world that we’re entering.” He could have had this forward-looking vision that is consistent with his post-Pax Americana theory. He could have picked up the phone with Xi and said, “I’m sorry, you’re going to have to deal with it.” He could have told Xi, “Do you want Japan or me? You can only pick one. You can’t have none.”

But instead, he immediately hung up the phone with Xi and the same day called Takaichi and said, “You’ve got to tone it down. Tone down your rhetoric.” It seems like he wants to have his cake and eat it too. Do you think I’m interpreting that right?

Ian: Yes, probably. But it’s very difficult to discern any kind of strategic logic in what Trump is thinking or doing, because I don’t think he has a strategy. It appears that he doesn’t really think very much beyond next week. The way he sees the world is how it’s going to look on TV and how he’s going to look. And that can change very, very quickly.

I don’t think he thinks strategically. Strategies can of course be wrong. But most presidents have had a strategy. I don’t think Trump really has one beyond this very vague idea of dividing the world into — basically divvying it up between three superpowers. I think that’s vaguely in his head. But apart from that, I don’t think he has a real strategy.

It’s very difficult for a country like Japan to deal with that. They’re stuck with a status quo, but they realize it’s not going to last. Again, I have very little sympathy for a lot of Takaichi’s politics, but I sympathize with her dilemma and I sympathize with her attempt to gradually move Japanese public opinion towards thinking seriously about what the post-American world will look like.

Chang: So in a way, her flattery line in the beginning of the summit where she says that Trump is the only one who can guarantee peace around the world — maybe she’s saying, look, the ball is in your court. Next time you’re with Xi Jinping, you can choose to sell us out or you can choose to stay the line. In a way, it’s up to you — which is true, right?

Ian: Yes, that is true. But I don’t think one should read too much into it. I think the first goal was to keep this great big bully happy so that he doesn’t do more damage. As a diplomatic maneuver, that worked.

The problem is — and this again is very much like Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO — he’s been criticized for flattering Trump in such a gross manner. But from his point of view, you could say, well, his job is to keep NATO together and you can only keep NATO together with American leadership. Okay, him rather than me, but somebody has to flatter this man.

On the other hand, there are those who say bullies always respond to people who stand up to them. And it’s a mistake to simply flatter him because you can play for time that way, but you don’t solve anything. And both are true. That is probably true. On the other hand, you can’t afford to alienate him unnecessarily. And I think both Rutte and Takaichi have concluded that it’s better to play for time than anything else because they have no other options.

Hang on until the midterms, hang on until the next presidential election — things might change again. I think that’s the idea.

Chang: All right, that sounds like a good place to end it.

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