Takaichi's New Japan
Japan expert Tobias Harris on Sanae Takaichi, one of the most powerful Japanese leaders in a generation
In February, Sanae Takaichi won the biggest electoral victory in the Liberal Democratic Party’s 70-year history. With a constitutional supermajority, an ambitious industrial policy, and a willingness to speak bluntly about Taiwan, Takaichi is remaking Japan’s domestic and foreign policy at a moment when the country’s alliance with the United States has never felt more uncertain. Tobias Harris is the author of The Iconoclast, a political biography of Shinzo Abe, and the founder of the consultancy Japan Foresight. He joined us to discuss what Takaichi’s rise means for Japan and the region.
Follow Tobias Harris at his Substack: https://observingjapan.substack.com/
In this episode:
Why Takaichi is so popular among young voters and women
Did Takaichi bring in new voters or flip existing ones?
Will Takaichi overshoot her mandate?
Japan’s nuclear future and the U.S. alliance under Trump
Is Takaichi’s industrial policy just Abenomics 2.0?
Takaichi’s policy on immigration
Japan-South Korea relations and Takaichi’s possible visit to Yasukuni Shrine
Takaichi’s Taiwan statement and the future of China’s economic coercion
Transcript
Ian: Perhaps we can start with this: Why do you think Takaichi is so enormously popular personally in Japan, and it seems especially with the younger generations, which is counterintuitive for a politician of the right — although perhaps less and less so in many different countries. But what is your explanation? How has she managed to turn around a party in such trouble through what seems to be personal charisma?
Tobias: I think there are a few explanations. Part of it is the fact that she is getting a dividend for being Japan’s first female prime minister. For many people — and just anecdotally, from many conversations — Women of all generations look at her and they either see, in the case of younger women, a role model, or older women, closer to her age, see someone who had to overcome many of the same obstacles that they overcame in their own professional lives. There’s something inspiring about her reaching the premiership. People don’t want her to fail. There are a lot of people rooting for her.
Some of it is just that there are a lot of right-wing voters and those voters were unhappy with leadership of the LDP before her. They were unhappy with former Prime Minister Ishiba, who they saw as too moderate. Prime Minister Kishida, who they saw as too moderate too. And they see her as one of theirs. So of course they are very excited. When I’ve written about her in the past, I’ve described her essentially as a zealous follower of the new conservative view. So you have a lot of that.
And then for younger people, they see a leader who looks very different than her predecessors. She has a frank way of speaking. She’s very blunt. She’s very sincere. She’s very diligent, and they see a different kind of leader. They see a leader who’s maybe saying the right things about some of the issues they care about, particularly inflation. So there’s maybe — Call it a rational exuberance. There’s this excitement about her and a willingness to believe that she’s going to be different, that she’s going to make headway on some of these problems. All of that , I think, has resulted in her having these extraordinarily high approval ratings, now almost six months into her government.
Ian: It’s interesting you say it’s partly because she’s a woman, because she’s not a feminist. She hasn’t really done — There’s no sign that she’s going to be great for women in Japan. The other question I was thinking about is that it seems that being tough on China and even talking about Article 9 of the Constitution and so on is more popular with the younger generation than with the older ones. Do you think it has to do with the fading of World War II memories? And could that have something to do with the popularity of, it’s a while ago now, manga like Kobayashi Yoshinori? Do you think that it shows that young people, at a greater distance from the past, are beginning to have different views on Japan and Japanese power and the use of Japanese power?
Tobias: I think there’s absolutely something to that. It was very striking during the general election campaign. You had the opposition — not just the left-wing Japanese Communist Party opposition, but even the mainstream, this centrist reform alliance that emerged right on the eve of the election — talking about these old left-versus-right categories and positioning themselves as neither left nor right, saying “we’re centrist,” but still thinking in terms of these old categories really stretching back to the beginning of the post-war period. I thought it was very striking how This was a party that had no support among young people at all. If you look at the exit polling, this was a party that offered nothing to the young, almost conceded that it wasn’t going to appeal to the young — essentially hoping that they could appeal to more older voters to make up for the deficits they had with the young.
What you saw with Takaichi’s appeals was very much not talking left or right, just moving beyond that and saying, “I’m looking at the future. I’m looking at The issues that Japan faces to have the kind of future that we want.” I think that is in some ways a response to the fact that certainly for younger voters, these ideological categories don’t have the same heft to them. They don’t carry the same meaning. They don’t think about them as much. And some of that reflects that certainly on national security — which was the left-right issue for all those decades — especially post-2022, this has been a long-term erosion, so it’s not just post-2022, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had a seismic impact on Japan. It was a huge wake-up call to the realities of what war could look like. “We could be the ones hiding in our subways from missiles overhead. Russia is next door. China is growing. North Korea and these countries are aligning.”
There’s a sense that the issue has essentially been settled. The right wing won that debate. Japan needs to be stronger, needs to spend more on its own defense. As an advisor to the prime minister said in December, “there’s no one to help us but ourselves, ultimately.” That thinking is widespread. I don’t think you’re going to find a lot of opposition to that among the young. And she has definitely profited from that in terms of her popularity.
Chang: Did she bring in younger voters who were otherwise non-political and weren’t voting in elections, or were there voters who had voted for a different party and she flipped them?
Tobias: I think it’s both. There’s been this assumption for a long time that turnout among young voters is low , and so elections are going to be decided by older voters. In absolute terms, of course, younger people don’t vote nearly as much as older people do. But as a result, if you can get a marginal increase in younger voters, it makes big differences. Last year, if you looked at turnout in the upper house elections, you got something like a five percentage point increase in younger voters. And it basically made the difference between the LDP controlling the upper house and not.
You had a bunch of young voters who came out and voted for a couple of anti-establishment parties of the right to various degrees. Sanseito, the anti-globalist party, got a lot of attention, but also the Democratic Party for the People, which is more center-right than far right. You have to be careful not to clump these two together. But both of these parties have had very strong support among the young and brought them out last summer.
What happened this time is that Takaichi got new young people out to vote, and then she also flipped a lot of the young voters who did come out last time and voted for these other parties and brought them over to the LDP. One of the questions before the campaign was: will these young voters be willing to vote for the LDP, which they see as stodgy and out of touch? Will the Takaichi factor matter more than the LDP factor? And as it turned out, it did quite a lot.
Chang: So you’re saying that there’s more hope for the American Democratic Party.
Tobias: Yeah, perhaps so, with the right messenger, I guess.
Ian: Except the Democratic Party is also seen as pretty stodgy. It’s interesting to compare Japan to Germany in this respect, because it seems that pacifism is now more and more associated with old farts. And it’s the young who are beginning to say, “Look, that’s out of date and we have to adapt in a changing world.” In Germany, for example, it was the Greens that were most supportive of helping Ukraine and not the old Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. Do you think that there is a clear parallel there?
Tobias: I think You see it just in the opinion polling. The polling after this episode with Takaichi and the Diet, talking about a Taiwan crisis and that Japan would probably end up being involved — the age group that was most skeptical of that and most divided on the value of that was, of course, older people. And you realize too, Older people have memories of a different China. Younger people only really know China as this overbearing power, economic power, growing military power. Older people will remember Japan helping China and years where they’re cooperating economically and getting along. They’re just very different views of these things.
But young people are much more inclined to be China hawks. They’re much more open to the idea of constitutional revision. They’re much more open to the idea of spending more on defense. All of these things that have been controversial — they just don’t have the baggage. It’s not part of their worldviews. And so it’s very hard for parties of the left that are still very opposed to these developments to make inroads among young voters, because it just seems out of touch. This is not the world we’re facing. We have to be adaptive. We have to respond to the conditions that we face now.
Ian: How conscious do you think she was when she made her statement on Taiwan — which was controversial and people think was undiplomatic — how conscious was she of the United States and Donald Trump when she made that statement? In other words, You’ve made the case that more and more Japanese feel that they have to look after themselves, and obviously Trump under the United States is less and less dependable. Was that one reason, do you think, that she felt she had to tell the Japanese that things are serious and they have to shape up?
Tobias: I think It’s hard to read exactly. There have been different explanations given for how premeditated that was — versus was it because of questioning and she, in the moment, basically fell back on a position that she has said before, There’s an argument that she really thought this was assumed and everyone just understood this, and that she wasn’t making some grand statement that things are different and we have to change. The evidence is there on both sides of the argument.
But the fact remains that there’s an appreciation certainly among national security elites in Tokyo that there does need to be more work by leaders to get the Japanese people to understand that if something were to happen with Taiwan, the likelihood that we’re going to be involved somehow is very high. You’ve had these articles in newspapers about war games showing the likely casualties — Japanese civilian casualties and things like that — trying to focus minds about the reality. What does it mean when we say “Ukraine today could be Taiwan tomorrow”? Really getting people to appreciate that and be aware of the reality of that. There’s still probably more work to do, but her saying that has certainly put it more front of mind than really at any point in time where people are really thinking about what this could actually mean if something were to happen.
Chang: I had a question about the distance between how a leader reads their mandate versus what actually happened in an election for them to win. I’m thinking about the US case, and there were voters last year who voted for Trump who may just have had issues with their grocery prices. They were not expecting the massive immigration raids and the assault on Venezuela and Greenland. There’s generally a difference between how political leaders think — because of the vantage point that they have, they’re thinking a lot more about national security — whereas voters tend to be maybe thinking more about economic issues. Do you feel like there’s a risk that Takaichi might overshoot, misinterpret her mandate?
Tobias: When you win to the extent that she did — and it’s really worth stressing, the LDP is 70 years old, and she won the biggest victory the party has ever won. That’s a big deal. No LDP leader in history has done as well in an election as she did. So naturally I think the temptation is going to be: “I’m vindicated.” And also because of the circumstances in which the election came about — she didn’t have to do it. There was a lot of pushback in the LDP, people saying maybe this isn’t the right time, maybe you need to accomplish a little more in office, maybe this is too risky. So the fact that she did it anyway and it pays off in ways that I think even the LDP was surprised by — there’s an argument in her mind, I’m sure, that the voters chose her, the voters decided to give her this majority, and the expectation is that she’s going to use it and run with it and act on it.
But there’s always the risk that she oversteps, There are some real hard constraints out there in the world. Even if she’s overcome domestic political constraints for the moment, Trump still has to be managed. That is a difficult thing for whoever the Japanese prime minister is. The bond market is waiting and watching to see what she does. That is something that is going to have to be managed. So there are real constraints out there.
But in terms of the things that she can control, the risk that she decides “I’m vindicated, I’m going to run with it” — I think absolutely. It’s also worth noting the victory is not entirely because of her popularity , and that’s the cautionary note for her. The size of the victory — I think It was clear that her popularity was going to get that majority in some form. The degree to which they won, though, depended a lot on the fact that the opposition’s voters rejected this alliance that was made between the Constitutional Democrats and Komeito before the election. Something like 30 to 40 percent of people who voted for the Constitutional Democrats in 2024 did not vote for the candidates they were offered this time around. That’s not because they were all switching over to the LDP — They just rejected these strategic decisions, and that cleared the way for LDP candidates to win in places that I don’t think the LDP expected didn’t expect to win.
The LDP, for all of its success, still only got 49 percent of the vote in single-member constituencies. So there are wrinkles in this victory, even if the absolute seat total is dramatic.
Ian: On handling Trump, it seems to me that Japan is in a real bind, and so is South Korea. If we’re thinking of this in the longer term and not just in the next year or so, the Europeans, following Mark Carney’s speech, are beginning to realize that in the longer term they really do have to start thinking of a different world in which they’re no longer dependent on American security guarantees. But the Europeans have the EU, they have NATO, they have nuclear arms in France and Britain. The Japanese and the South Koreans only have their security treaty with the United States. How are they going to deal with this? If I were to lay a bet, I would say within the next 10 years, Japan is going to be nuclear-armed.
Tobias: Ten years — the longer the time horizon, the likelihood is going to rise because these discussions are already happening. They’re happening quietly and maybe less quietly. You had this episode in December where an advisor to the prime minister, unnamed, told the press that yes, we have to have a discussion about having nuclear weapons. So it’s happening. The thinking is there.
In Japanese elite discourse, they talk about “Plan Bs” and “A-pluses,” trying to think about alternatives. Certainly In the near term, they don’t have any illusions about alternatives. They recognize that in the near term, there is not really an alternative when it comes to deterring China in particular , but just in general, keeping a strategic balance. They know there’s not an alternative to the United States.
What you’re seeing — and in some ways Takaichi’s domestic strength could be a liability — is that in the past, you’ve had Japanese governments that could say, “Well, we’d love to help you out, but we don’t have a big majority or the public’s not behind us. And after all, we have this pesky coalition partner, Komeito, that’s going to raise a stink if we push too hard on this stuff.” She doesn’t have any excuses anymore.
She’s going to meet with Trump next month and Trump is going to have a lot of demands. She’s not going to have the option of saying, “Well, the public’s not really behind me.” It’s like, “You won this fantastic victory. It’s time to act.” And there’s going to be a lot of demands. Every US ally in some ways faces the same calculus, but I think it’s very acute for Japan, precisely because they are essentially on their own in a lot of ways.
There is this fundamental asymmetry where Japan needs the United States. It knows that Its entire strategic worldview is centered around the idea that the United States is going to be there to help keep Japan secure, and that US markets are going to be open to Japan. This has been the bargain going back to the early 1950s. This was the very foundation of this relationship.
What they’re realizing is that with Trump, the United States has made clear that “we don’t need you, we don’t need anyone. We don’t need institutions, we don’t need norms — all of this is up for negotiation.” It’s even a big change — You could say, “Well, has any US government really needed Japan?” And actually, certainly in recent years, the Obama administration really appreciated having Japan as a partner in the region, enhancing US relations with countries in Southeast Asia, doing things that the United States couldn’t do. Japan was respected, was listened to, it had a lot of economic power . It did have and increasing military power. All of these things have made Japan quite a valuable partner.
And now you have a United States that’s saying, “Yeah, all of those things are great, but we need more. You want us to stay involved? The price is getting higher. Nothing is sacrosanct anymore.” That makes life very uncomfortable for a Japanese government. It’s going to be very uncomfortable for Takaichi when she finds that there are going to be a lot of demands coming her way. And frankly, there’s an undercurrent — the Japanese people aren’t blind to this. You’ve had people calling the trade agreement from last year an unequal treaty. They see the kind of things that Japan is being expected to do by this administration just to keep the United States doing the things that it’s always done.
It’s an uncomfortable situation, and she’s going to really — if the United States pushes too hard, she could find herself squeezed between public opinion that is uncomfortable with some of this and the reality that there’s not really an alternative in the near term to keeping the US onside.
Chang: So what do you think about the recent tariffs now that the Supreme Court has invalidated some of the tariff numbers? Do you think that has an impact on the way that Takaichi is going to discuss the investment that she’s pledged to Trump.
Tobias: Well, also because you realize that The negotiation was about the Liberation Day tariffs, but it was also about the automobile tariffs, which are not affected by the Supreme Court decision at all.
They’ve already pretty much said that the Supreme Court did its thing, but there’s not anything they can do about that. They’re going to keep the deal. They have enough on their plate just figuring out how this investment framework is going to work They’re not going to mess with it by suggesting that the deal should be altered because of the Supreme Court.
Chang: You mentioned that Takaichi doesn’t really have any excuses because she’s got such a supermajority in the lower house. How likely do you think it is that Article 9 — the effort to revise the constitution, the post-war rule that restricts Japan from having a military — how early do you think we could see an effort to try and be revised? Tobias: On the one hand, I think the barriers to revision are probably lower than they’ve ever been. Back in 2016, Abe had two-thirds majorities in both houses, which is the threshold you need to revise. Everyone got very excited that maybe now this time it’s going to happen. And even though Abe wanted to get it done and he believed in it and actually put forward some proposals for amendments, it didn’t happen.
Chang: Why didn’t that happen?
Tobias: It’s just a heavy lift. When it comes to what you want to spend political capital on, he just ultimately wasn’t going to. And I think there was a real fear that if you attempt to do it and it fails — particularly the amendment he proposed was revising Article 9 so that you make the status of the Self-Defense Forces clear, you write “the Self-Defense Forces shall exist” into the Constitution — there was a fear that if they do this and it either doesn’t pass the Diet or it doesn’t pass a referendum with the public, which needs a simple majority to pass, then isn’t the obvious implication going to be that the Self-Defense Forces are not legitimate , because the amendment failed?
One of my favorite little bits of trivia from those days: there was a delegation that met with David Cameron — I think they went to the UK and met with David Cameron in the wake of the Brexit referendum. And they said, “Talk to us about this process of having a national referendum.” And he told them, “Don’t do it unless you’re absolutely sure you’re going to get at least 60 percent. Anything less than that is too risky. Don’t do it.”
So there’s a real concern that unless they’re very confident they’re going to get it done, the risks of trying and failing are high. It’s not going to happen this year. She’s got other things to do.
Ian: But public opinion has probably changed since Abe had those ideas, right? It would be more sympathetic now to a change than even then, wouldn’t you say?
Tobias: It would, yeah. It’s just — what does the public want the government spending its time on? I think It’s as much about priorities as anything else, because ultimately, constitutional revision is not really going to change Japan’s defense capabilities all that much. They’ve already found ways of doing just about whatever they want under the scope of the Constitution as it’s written. The Constitution as it’s written, according to an interpretation that is now nearly 70 years old, allows them to have nuclear weapons. They do not need to revise the Constitution to have a nuclear arsenal.
So at this point, it really is as much about a cultural victory — showing that after all these years, part of the Constitution has been written by Japanese hands. It is more of their document. It’s really a question of how much she wants to do this.
My guess would be that, assuming Takaichi’s numbers don’t plummet, in a year or two’s time, does she start starts thinking about this as a real legacy issue ?. I still think we’re looking at a few years before it’s really possible for her to push this.
Chang: Could you walk through Takaichi’s domestic agenda in terms of what she’s hoping to do with industrial policy? I wonder whether there’s a framework for how we should understand that approach. I’ve been thinking about it in terms of something similar to the US’s CHIPS and Science Act and IRA. I’m curious how you approach it.
Tobias: It’s a great question. I have been trying to bang the drum since she took power against this idea — there’s this assumption that what she wants to do is just Abenomics 2.0: reflate the economy, spend a lot of money, loose fiscal policy, loose monetary policy, and just get the economy growing at a really fast clip.
Really, I think it’s actually a fundamental misunderstanding, because for Abe, it was, “Yes, we’ve got to overcome deflation. We’ve got to get wages up. We’ve got to get spending up. We’ve got to get all the arrows pointing in the right direction.” For her , actually — and she’s been very clear about this — she has said that Abenomics failed on its most important task of getting businesses investing, getting Japan’s industrial capacity and the advanced sectors of the future to a higher level. That is what she cares about.
She’s been pretty consistent about this for a really long time. In some ways You get a feeling that she sees this as Japan’s last chance — that if Japan is not able to compete in chips and AI and robotics , these advanced sectors, if Japan is not able to compete with China, with Europe, with Korea, with the United States in these sectors, then essentially Japan will fall behind and actually end up dependent on other countries. She’s very fearful of Japan’s dependence on others.
She talks about wanting 100 percent self-reliance on energy, which has been the Holy Grail for Japanese leaders going back for decades — Japan is resource-poor , they’ve got to find a way out of this. She wants Japan to be 100 percent self-sufficient in food. Again, this has been a long-term dream. But it’s also: Japan can’t be dependent on others for chips. It can’t be dependent on others for digital services. She wants Japan to compete in all of these areas.
What she recognizes in a way that Abe actually did not is that if Japan wants to be competitive in these sectors, it needs national champions. It needs to be willing to spend money to build industrial capacity. They have this project in Hokkaido — Rapidus — they’re building this chip maker with public money, and they’re trying to crowd in private investment. They put forward a lot of public money, and then they try to get private companies to sign on as clients, to invest, to basically support the project too. The idea is they’re going to do that in a bunch of different sectors: put a bunch of public money in and try to get private companies to then sign on and invest and help build out capacity.
The risk, of course — well, one, building national champions is hard. Rapidus at this point still hasn’t actually built anything or really sold anything yet. But also Japan’s fiscal capacity is not unlimited. There are real limitations and real risks if it has to issue more debt to do this. There’s a real danger that even if this is the right idea, executing it will already have been may be too late because interest rates are not zero or negative anymore. Borrowing costs are only going up. And if this doesn’t work, the cost for Japan could be very dear.
Ian: How is that industrial policy different from what MITI [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry] used to do — picking winners and having the state heavily involved in building up Japan’s industrial strength?
Tobias: In a lot of ways it is a throwback. MITI used to allocate capital and allocate investment credits and help with licenses. The tools are a little different, but it’s definitely a throwback. People at the successor ministry, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, feel that life is good. There are high METI officials in Tokyo who are in her circle. This is very much a government that is driven by those priorities , those old industrial policy priorities.
To some extent, the building-national-champions approach is maybe a little different. Where MITI was managing competitiveness and figuring out how many companies were in a sector and trying to organize the shape of competition — because they’re really thinking about these new sectors where it’s not like you have a bunch of Japanese companies competing for market share in automobiles or steel. These are frontier industries. And I think that makes what they’re trying to do a little different in some ways.
Ian: One thing that Abe did recognize, though, is that for Japan to remain competitive, they need foreigners — they need immigration, they need tourism, and so on. She has projected herself in many ways as Abe’s disciple, but her policies on immigration and tourism and foreigners in Japan in general seem to be rather the opposite.
Tobias: Certainly She has pivoted to a harder line towards policing Japan’s growing resident foreign population, possibly slowing the numbers of arrivals. I don’t think she wants to turn tourists away.
The question is how much is her conviction versus this is the political moment, that she was facing threats from parties to her right that were making a big issue out of this and reaping a lot of political advantage from calling attention to the problems with the foreign population in Japan and lawbreaking. There’s a lot of misinformation and maybe actual disinformation about Japan’s foreign population.But she’s responded to that. She really has responded to the fact that the public is concerned about this. Young voters especially seem concerned about this. She certainly wants to make a show of cracking down.
The question is: who is she going to listen to ultimately when it comes to making policy? Big business really wants access to foreign workers. They need them. Employers are having trouble getting enough workers. They have supported the effort to open Japan, if not to migration, then at least to guest workers. If she were to really move to limit their ability to have foreign workers, she would hear about it. Big business would make a lot of noise about that. So there is a question of how much in substance she can actually do to reverse the increase in Japan’s foreign population, versus making a show — “we’ve found all these visa overstayers and we’re going to kick them out and we’re going to have these controls at the border” — things that will maybe convincing voters that they’re taking it seriously but not actually changing the reality that there is a need for foreign workers in a lot of sectors.
Ian: Has she successfully undercut the Sanseito by taking that — at least rhetorical — position?
Tobias: Certainly. In the election she did. That was one of the questions: is Sanseito able to compete even when you have a more conservative LDP leader? As it turned out, Sanseito did not do well. They still increased their presence in the Diet, but nothing like what they were aiming for. They were aiming for something like 30 seats and they won half of that. Clearly she took some of the wind out of their sails.
Chang: Can I go back to clarify a question about her industrial policy? It seems to me that there’s this effort to basically do what China does — pick out national champions and key technology sectors. There’s also a strong investment angle to that. And then there’s also what Takaichi ran on, which was to improve cost of living for ordinary voters. Do you feel like one of the risks is that this comes into tension? I’m thinking back to what Trump ran on — cost of living — and then he went on to do Liberation Day. Do you feel like that might happen here as well?
Tobias: There’s absolutely a risk in that. A portion of her support , going back to the beginning of our conversation, is young people in particular expecting that she’s going to actually do something about inflation, about the cost of living crisis. And if people don’t feel that they have more money in their pockets, if they don’t feel that their circumstances are improving, some of that popularity is going to erode. To the extent that If her industrial policies end up increasing the size of the deficit, if they do end up having to depend on bond issuance to do that, you’re running the risk that the reaction from bond markets is going to be that interest rates should rise. What we’ve been seeing is that when interest rates have risen, the yen weakens. And a weaker yen means higher inflation. So you could end up with a situation where on the one hand, she does some policies to help people with the cost of living — there’s this talk about cutting the consumption tax on food and new handouts and new distributions — so she does things that puts more money in people’s pockets through tax policy, but on the other hand ends up running larger deficits, higher interest rates, weaker yen. You end up basically giving with one hand and the inflation tax takes it away with the other. There’s a real risk where you’re running to stand still and no one ends up better off at the end of the day.
Ian: On foreign policy, the LDP, when it was especially under really conservative prime ministers — and she’s of course one of them — their relations with South Korea were pretty good when South Korea had conservative governments. How do you think she’s going to cope with that? Because it’s interesting — and in a previous podcast we talked about that — it’s interesting that She, as a conservative Japanese prime minister, seems to have done everything to get on well with a liberal president in South Korea, and vice versa. How do you see this developing?
Tobias: It’s been one of the more remarkable developments of her tenure. Who would have thought — Progressive Korean president and conservative Japanese prime minister has generally not been a good combination. That was what we saw when Prime Minister Abe had this downward spiral of relations with President Moon of South Korea. What you’re seeing now is the dividends from when the Biden administration was helping bring Japan and Korea together — a shared appreciation that you have shared interests, you face similar threats, and you have to find a way to work through this.
The fears of abandonment by Trump, the fears that this really is a different strategic environment and we really have to find a way to get together and work together because otherwise we’re really on our own — in both countries, both governments, that feeling is acute. It helps that President Yoon has been very pragmatic and very flexible and very eager to find a way to get along with Takaichi. In some ways It’s almost a game-theoretical setup: if Korea cooperates, Japan will cooperate. And as long as they continue to do that, they see that they have enough interests at stake that there’s a lot to lose if they can’t figure it out.
The question is what happens if it gets tested. If some politician in one country or the other does something about Takeshima/Dokdo, or you have some lawsuit in Korea about a history issue, or Prime Minister Takaichi decides to go to Yasukuni Shrine — and she very noticeably alluded to that on election night as she was basking in the glow of her victory. What happens when you get one of these stressors that we’ve seen in the past? Is the recognition of shared interests strong enough to overcome that? Is it strong enough to induce some restraint? That’ll be the real question. And Yasukuni is going to be a pretty good test for it.
Ian: What is your judgment as far as South Korea is concerned? If it’s true that the memories of World War II in Japan are beginning to fade and people are much less sensitive about it — which means that pacifism is also retreating — do you think that the sensitivity in South Korea to something like the Japanese prime minister going to the Yasukuni Shrine would be less now than it would have been some decades ago?
Tobias: I don’t know South Korean public opinion well enough to make a really deep judgment on that. And clearly, I do know enough about South Korean public opinion to know that You have major polarization just among young voters. So It’s hard to even generalize about young voters, where you have a real left-right split and a gender split as well.
It’s hard to say specifically. I think We have seen that the hold of the memories from the period of colonization by Japan have not relaxed. We really saw this during the standoff over compensation for forced laborers. There’s still real feeling about that. Certainly on the left, the feelings are still very strong that you can’t trust Japan. We saw this when Takaichi was taking power — the Korean press was very concerned about what she would be like. I’m guessing you still have some doubts there, that people are not quite entirely convinced that Korea can really trust her.
I think If she went, you’d still see some pretty vociferous reactions from the public, even if the public is maybe not 100 percent united on the issue.
Ian: I was thinking of the Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorski. I can’t remember the date, but some decades ago In a speech he said, “It’s no longer the case that we are afraid of German militarism. On the contrary, we’re afraid that Germany won’t do enough to defend Europe.” You can’t see a South Korean foreign minister saying something like that in the near future.
Tobias: I don’t think we’re quite there yet. But you do have healthy communication between the two militaries and the two defense ministries. They have really resumed regular communication after some low points in recent years. South Korea maybe isn’t cheering on Japan’s rearmament process, but I think you’re also maybe less inclined to see South Koreans say that Japan is the greatest military threat that South Korea faces. I don’t think you’re going to see that kind of thinking anymore either.
Chang: Let’s just bring China into this. Just to refresh people’s memory, This comment that Takaichi made last year about how Japan’s security is tied to Taiwan triggered a really big backlash from China. China has restricted tourism. They’ve restricted some Japanese firms. They’ve also restricted rare earth access for Japanese companies. These are really big economic sanctions. There’s a little bit of performative outrage that the Chinese system often performs when these issues come up, but there’s also an effort to try to change people’s behavior — this is meant to change Takaichi’s calculation. Would you say that the election is basically a resounding referendum , that that’s not the case at all? And in fact, iIt may have made Takaichi more popular that China was reacting this way?
Tobias: I think China has these tools and does use them to try to change political behavior. They have built out this economic coercion toolbox precisely so that they can try to do that.
Chang: And it works sometimes — look at what happened with Trump.
Tobias: Right. What’s actually kind of amazing is how they’ve been relatively restrained. It’s been very much one thing at a time. It’s not like they’re going guns blazing at Japan. The tourism — okay, that’s a message first. It’s clearly graduated escalation, gradually trying to impose costs on Japan. But I think there’s also a real appreciation that they don’t want to harm China’s economy either. They can’t just do whatever they want. There are things that Chinese companies depend on importing from Japan. There’s a lot of different factors at play.
Just in terms of the structure of the conflict, though, This has the makings of something that is not going to end anytime soon, because ultimately neither side is in a position to concede here. China can’t concede the point. You have a Japanese prime minister say openly that if China uses force, we have to get involved because our security is at stake. It was bad enough for China when a former prime minister said that — when Abe, after he left office, talked about a Taiwan crisis being a Japan crisis. But for a sitting prime minister to say that, and to say that in the first days really of her premiership, clearly that’s not something China can easily swallow, given their position on Taiwan and that this is an internal matter. Conceding that a Japanese prime minister can say that — they can’t allow that.
In some ways, Takaichi painted herself into a corner, too. By saying “this has been our policy all along, so I wasn’t announcing a new policy,” that puts her in a situation where if she concedes, she can’t, because then she’s conceded that she’s allowed China to change Japan’s policy through economic coercion. She’s basically stuck now: “I didn’t say anything different. This was prevailing policy. Therefore, I don’t have to do anything. I don’t have to apologize. I don’t have to say anything different.” And China is not going to concede the point. They are going to be stuck in this cycle , it seems like, for a while — until some external factor changes that leads them to find some way of compromising that makes everyone feel that they didn’t actually give anything up.
For Takaichi, the real question is what happens between Trump and Xi Jinping. Do you end up with a situation where, If the US and China are drawing nearer each other, Japan feels like it’s being could be left out and isolated by the US and China making some by a deal that disadvantages Japan ?. That is a risk that a lot of people in Tokyo are concerned about. But in the meantime, they’re locked into this struggle because neither can concede easily.
Ian: No, Thank you very much. That was very interesting.
Tobias: Thank you. Thanks for reaching out. Obviously there’s a lot going on, so happy to talk about all this.


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