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The Chinese Immigrants Behind Japan’s Populist Surge
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The Chinese Immigrants Behind Japan’s Populist Surge

Japan’s first female prime minister, Takaichi Sanae, a hard-line conservative, rose to power on promises of national renewal and a “Japan First” agenda.

Japan's first female prime minister, Takaichi Sanae, a hard-line conservative, rose to power on promises of national renewal and a “Japan First” agenda. Her rise follows the stunning breakthrough of the Sanseito, a Trump-style populist party that captured 14 seats in the upper house this summer, drawing support from disaffected youth and social-media activists.

Takehiro Masutomo, author of Runri: Tracking the Mass Exodus of Wealthy Chinese to Japan, talks about the Chinese immigrants behind Japan's right-wing turn.

Maustomo's book is on Amazon (Japanese version only)

Masutomo's podcast Asia Frontline

Transcript:

Chang: When I returned to Japan recently, I was struck by how little had changed. The convenience stores still had the same boxed lunches I remembered as a kid in Tokyo in the 1990s. The train stations still played the same melodic chimes. China had completely switched to digital payments, but in Japan, cash was everywhere.

But one thing was different: the number of foreigners. I saw them everywhere—at airport customs, in restaurants, and on the streets. In places like Shinjuku, the share of foreign residents has surged from roughly one in a hundred in the 1990s to about one in ten today.

Alongside that demographic shift, a new and energetic right-wing populist movement has gained traction. Founded in 2020, the Sanseito bears striking similarities to Trumpism. It promotes a “Japan First” message, calls for stricter border controls, and rails against a political establishment it claims is compromised by global elites. The party gained momentum during the pandemic with its opposition to Japan’s vaccine mandates and made splashes in the recent upper house elections, winning broad support among a younger, male, social media–savvy urban base.

In October, Japan welcomed its first female prime minister, Takaichi Sanae, who was elected by tapping into some of the national security and anti-immigrant sentiments of the Japan First movement. This podcast was recorded before her election, but the themes of the discussion have only grown more relevant.

Ian, the Sanseito just won 15 seats in the upper house of the Japanese parliament. It’s still modest, but this is the first time a Trump-like populist party has broken into the national legislature. You just wrote about this in Project Syndicate. You want to tell us a little bit about what you wrote?

Ian: In the first place, it shows the influence of the American president, who has given license to and encouraged similar right-wing populist parties all over the world—or at least all over the democratic world.

These parties all exploit similar things: anxieties about economic inequality and the sense that the world is changing so fast people feel they no longer have a grip on it.

And the easiest explanation—the most demotic one used by all these parties—is to blame foreigners: immigrants, tourists, whoever.

What makes Japan a little different from many other countries, such as Italy, is that the numbers are still very small. The Sanseito can exploit this notion that there are suddenly lots of tourists and immigrants, particularly Chinese. We’ll talk about that later. But compared to Europe, the United States, or Australia, the numbers are still modest—just high compared to what they once were. And that’s enough for a right-wing populist party to exploit.

Chang: We’re going to talk about some of these issues with Hiro later, but first, about what you said on the right wing:

People who’ve been to Japan usually have a general impression of what the right wing is. When I lived here, I’d see those white vans blaring slogans about constitutional revision on loudspeakers. That’s the kind of association most people have with the Japanese right. How do you think this new brand of right-wing populism differs from that old-school version?

Ian: I think it’s very different. The old far right was really focused on the postwar constitutional arrangements, as you say.

During the American occupation, the U.S. had to figure out what had gone wrong in Japan. In Germany it was easy—it was the Nazis, Hitler, et cetera. In Japan it wasn’t so clear, because there was no Nazi Party, no Hitler. They decided the problem was Japanese militarism. That’s why, with the consent of most Japanese at the time, they wrote a pacifist constitution that took away Japan’s right to use military force in foreign policy.

There’s been resistance to that from the start—from the right wing of the mainstream parties and also from the far right. It became a historical issue. The left, which represented the majority of Japanese at the time, insisted Japan needed a pacifist constitution—like an alcoholic who must refrain from drinking to stay safe—because of the terrible things Japan had done during the war.

The far right responded by claiming Japan hadn’t done anything particularly wrong. It was an honorable war. War is terrible, and all countries do terrible things, but Japan was no different. That’s what the old right was about—along with the Northern Territories, the islands the Soviet Union seized after the war.

Now, the Sanseito—the modern form of right-wing populism—is very different. It’s much closer to its counterparts in Europe and America. Its focus is on immigration and the perceived unfair treatment of the local population. The rallying cry is: Let’s get our country back. Let’s get our identity back.

Chang: Do you think there’s a little bit of the bread-and-butter issues component to it? That was kind of the whole point, that one of the takeaways from the 2024 election in the US was about the price of eggs. And it’s funny because in Japan, we’re talking about the price of rice, this kind of economic corollary here in Japan as well.

Ian: Yes, absolutely. So because people feel the pinch and they feel there are all kinds of problems that they feel in the sense that they’re not on top of. It makes it all much clearer and easier if you can blame it all on foreigners, on immigrants, on people who are treating your country unfairly and so on.

So in America, you get this resentment that Trump exploits—the world is playing us as suckers and so on. And in Japan with the Sanseito you get this notion that foreigners are being coddled, that the local population is being neglected and so on.

Chang: Let’s talk to Hiro about his views on the elections. Hiro Masutomo was a former journalist at Caixin, a reputable financial news outlet based in Beijing. He has since moved back to Tokyo where he is the author of Run to Japan, a book that has been sold out in bookstores and Amazon in the first few months. It was published this year as immigration has become a hot topic in Japan. Hiro, thanks for joining us.

Hiro: Thank you for having me.

Chang: I’d love to learn a little bit about your experience living in China and how you came to write a book about Chinese immigrants.

Hiro: So as a Caixin reporter, I have been covering Japan as a whole, covering everything from politics to economy, even maybe to society.

And then the reason why I wrote this book is because I was one of the earliest to notice this emerging trend: Run to Japan. Back in 2022, some of my friends I got to know in Beijing started to move to Japan. So that’s one thing. And then also in Tokyo, I witnessed this massive gathering of Chinese protesters to echo the ongoing white paper movement, the anti-lockdown protests in China in November 2022. I used to have the impression that all Chinese immigrants here are not protesters and sometimes it’s quite pro-CCP. That was my impression, but that time I thought maybe newly arrived Chinese people are different. So that’s how I started to realize maybe some other Chinese people are now arriving in Tokyo.

Ian: Can I ask you to follow up on what you’re saying? That in your book, you describe many of the new Chinese immigrants as wanting more freedom, being very critical of the Communist Party, but there are others who tend to be quite nationalistic, and especially may living abroad, become more nationalistic, because they feel that they have to defend China and so on.

Of those two groups, who would you say is the more dominant?

Hiro: At least for those newcomers over the past few years, especially after the Shanghai lockdown in 2022, these people really “run” to Japan. So by definition, many of them are tired of or were fed up with the economic and political situation in China.

So, by definition, there’s a distance between these new immigrants and the CCP.

Ian: And why Japan? How does it compare to countries like Singapore or Australia, or maybe even Europe that such Chinese might want to go? Because after all, there’s a strong anti-Japanese mood in China, too.

Hiro: That’s right. So that’s a good question. Many of those new immigrants coming to Japan, they had been to Japan as tourists. So they don’t necessarily synchronize with this kind of anti-Japanese propaganda in China. And they have seen how Japan looks like with their own eyes. So they could imagine living in Japan.

Ian: Do you think because there are so many Chinese tourists, that even the tourists are affected in their political views by experiencing Japan?

Hiro: To some extent, and that was, part of the motivations behind Japanese government’s decision to relax tourist visas toward Chinese people.

Yeah, so it was a strategic move in a way.

Chang: Just for listeners who don’t know, “run” is actually a Chinese word. The reason why it’s used to symbolize this kind of exodus of Chinese leaving the country is because it sounds like the English term “run.” But what it’s referring to is basically Chinese thinking about ways to get out of the country. This is a term that became popular in 2022 because of the pandemic controls. And the lockdowns in China were especially harsh compared to other countries. And Chinese netizens—people online—are extremely creative.

And so they came up with this term that it became a kind of buzzword, and Hiro used that buzzword in the title of his book. And the book is currently only in Japanese. But hopefully maybe there’s an English translation in the future. But for listeners who don’t know, it says Run which just means run to Japan—the character, the second character is the same character for Japan.

Hiro, you mentioned that a lot of the people that you were interacting with were fleeing or you’re leaving China for some kind of economic situation? Is there a way that you have tried to categorize like the types of immigrants? I’ve noticed that you’ve done a little bit of that in your book. Can you tell me a little bit about how you would sort of categorize the Chinese immigrants that are coming to Japan?

Hiro: If I could divide this group by their motivations to come to Japan, there are three kinds:

One, these people want to secure their assets, especially overseas. And then, secondly, these people want to have access to better education. And thirdly, some other people want to have freedom of expression. So that’s my understanding.

Chang: And are those the same people? Or are they different?

Hiro: Sometimes these motivations overlap.

Chang: But there’s also presumably those that don’t overlap. So there are some who are mostly trying to have a better education and is not too focused on the political freedoms.

Hiro: And I could add that these new immigrants are quite different from previous generations. It’s really clear because, for example, their origins are quite different.

For example, for the older generation, many of them are from places like Fujian province. For this new wave, many are from big cities in China.

Chang: Meaning Shanghai and Beijing.

Hiro: And also by profession, they are quite different. Nowadays, those new immigrants include entrepreneurs, engineers, academics, or even cultural figures.

Ian: In your book, you draw very interesting comparisons with the Chinese that came at the end of the 19th century in the beginning of the 20th century. When many Chinese intellectuals and so on came to Japan and learned not only about Japan, but really learned a lot about the Western world through Japan, right? They came to study and so on.

The situation seems to be different now because in many ways, in terms of technology and modern science and so on, the Chinese are sort of ahead. Even coming to Japan to learn about that is probably no longer an issue. Politics maybe is. And perhaps you could say something about that, but also what effect is it having on Japan? Is there any effort on the Japanese side to learn something from these Chinese who come to Japan? So that it’s no longer Chinese learning from Japan, but then Japan can actually learn something from the Chinese.

Hiro: Yeah, you’re right. So the situation is quite different from early 20th century. And for example, in terms of learning from China, for example, I notice there is this emerging trend. The Chinese AI companies are coming to Japan. And also there’s also influx of Chinese engineers coming to Japan.

And so their presence is getting bigger and bigger in Japan’s, for example, startup industry sector.

Ian: So people are paying attention to them, because in your descriptions and the many interesting encounters that you describe in your book, that you personally have—Chinese bookshops in Tokyo and so on and so forth. You often seem to be the only Japanese.

So I’m wondering how much attention Japanese are paying to the Chinese in a serious way.

Hiro: Yeah, I would say over the past year or so many Japanese people started to realize those Chinese newcomers are really different. And compared with previous generations, they are much wealthier, for example. And if you live in Tokyo, almost everybody knows that they are buying up real estate on a big scale. So people certainly realize now this emerging trend.

Ian: But they don’t necessarily approve of it, right? Because it puts real estate prices up.

Hiro: That’s right. So when I started to write this book back in 2023, I thought this is definitely an upcoming megatrend. And this topic really deserves nationwide discussion, whether or not we should practically welcome these people. But unfortunately, I didn’t expect the debate to go like this, like it’s all negative these days.

Chang: Can you just lay out from your perspective what you think are the biggest tensions, the problems that you think have arisen? Certainly, this year, there’s been a lot on the news that I’ve read. And there’s already been policies that the government has rolled out. I heard about restricting funding for foreign PhD students. So clearly this is in the ether. Tell us a little bit about what you think are some of the tensions that you’ve noticed. You’ve covered a lot of sectors in the book. You’ve covered real estate, you’ve talked about education. So tell us a little bit about that.

Hiro: So real estate prices in Tokyo are rising quite significantly over the past few years, especially in high-rise condominiums. There are increasing number of Chinese residents these days in the city center of Tokyo.

And a lot of Japanese people here associate the rising real estate price with the influx of rich Chinese people. So yeah, that’s why this so-called foreigner issue became such a thing before the upper house election. And also speaking of education, there are many Japanese reports saying now percentage of Chinese students in top universities like Waseda or the University of Tokyo is rising maybe up to 15 percent-20 percent, so some Japanese people feel that these Chinese people are dominating top schools. So that’s also why foreigners became like a central topic in politics.

Chang: Hiro, you mentioned that your aim was to have a discussion, a sort of more healthy discussion about Chinese immigrants. Can you just explain what exactly you mean by that? I can understand what you mean by a sort of unhealthy discussion, but tell us what a healthy discussion looks like.

Hiro: For example, there are also this influx of Chinese intellectuals coming to Japan. And that’s why we see a lot of new Chinese-language bookstores these days in Tokyo, also at the same time, as I have been explaining. There are also a lot of wealthy Chinese people coming to Japan. So they are maybe contributing to Japanese economy as a whole. So you can still argue that they are playing a positive role. That’s what I mean by healthy discussion.

Ian: Can I follow up on that a little bit? If you think of the history of Tokyo, it’s always, already in the Edo period, it was a metropolitan city in that it was a very big city, very sophisticated, with a great culture and so on. But it was never a cosmopolitan city in the way that Paris or London or New York have been, where the whole world came to that center. Can you see the Chinese immigrants being kind of the vanguard of finally turning Tokyo into a cosmopolitan city?

At least in an Asian context that it will become a center for people from all over Asia to come and make it truly cosmopolitan and not just metropolitan.

Hiro: That’s a really profound question. The number of Chinese residents in Japan is going to hit 1 million soon. So that’s really significant in numbers. Not just Chinese people, but also a lot of Nepalese or Vietnamese, and more recently, Indonesians are coming to Japan. You could argue that, yeah, slowly but surely Tokyo or Japan is becoming more internationalized or at least becoming more Asian.

Chang: You mentioned in the end of your book that you kind of project a future scenario and you were just explaining this to Ian, but I wonder whether you can just tell me a little bit about this one line that you have. You say you compare the Jews fleeing Nazi Germany and arriving to New York and you say because of the Chinese immigrants now, we may have this future where there’s Chinese politicians and Chinese economic elites in Japan.

Presumably, you’re also thinking of maybe the children of some of the immigrants as they grow into Japanese society. Can you just paint that picture for me in the future and tell me if you were imagining a better future, or was this a kind of potentially a negative one. I’m curious sort of how you were thinking about it when you were writing that sentence.

Hiro: We can divide this into economic and political elites. When I talk about economic elites, what I mean are people with roots in China who are going to, for example, big Japanese corporations like Toyota, but it would take a lot of time, maybe several decades for them to reach the top.

So I don’t think it will happen so quickly, but like I explained earlier, they are slowly going into, for example, startup sectors. In the startups sector, there’s more room for them to play their roles. That is a positive future I would say. But for politics, I have mixed expectations. For example, maybe you also know that this time around some China-born people ran for office at the recently held upper house election. And I actually knew that maybe even more China-born candidates were trying to become politicians. And I have to say there are concerns, at least among intelligence people that we are not sure about their background, whether or not they are linked to the CCP. In other Western countries like Australia or Canada, there are many preceding examples where the Chinese Communist Party intervenes.

Japan has yet to learn how to deal with those aspiring Chinese politicians.

Ian Buruma: But this is going to become a much bigger problem if tensions between Japan and China were to really escalate.

If, let’s say China became really aggressive towards Taiwan, leading to all kinds of serious military tensions, you could imagine Chinese minority in Japan to come under great pressure, and the public mood could really turn against them.

So there is great risk there too isn’t there.

Hiro: Yeah that’s a real concern and I don’t really have sophisticated answer to that question. Yeah, you’re right. As the total number of Chinese people here increase—actually, meanwhile, it’s interesting that in China, the number of Japanese residents is decreasing. So there’s this asymmetric situation. So that’s also quite interesting, or maybe a bit worrisome. And then, but at the same time, I should note that there is this strategic way of thinking that we should try to cultivate so-called second Sun Yat-sens. Because those liberal-minded intellectuals are also coming to Japan these days. And if these people and wealthy Chinese people join forces, who knows, maybe in the far future, they could become like a potential alternative to the current government in China.

But at this moment, it’s still imagination, but some Japanese diplomats or scholars are seriously thinking of this possibility.

Chang: Just to clarify, Sun Yat-sen is a revolutionary from the early 20th century in China, who was the founder of the Republic of China and Hiro’s talking about how with this new wave of Chinese immigrants, there’s this discussion among Japanese elites as well as some liberal Chinese that maybe we’re kind of repeating something that’s happened in the early 20th century, whether there may be another Sun Yat-sen that can emerge and revolutionize China’s political system from Japan. This time around.

Ian: I have one final question, sort of from a historical perspective. If you think about the 1920s and 30s, many Japanese who took a serious interest in Chinese affairs tended to be people of the far right, like the Black Dragon Society and so on. Who are the Japanese now who take a serious interest in China? I there is yourself, but who would you say in Japan now are most serious about Chinese affairs?

Hiro: Actually the problem is not many people are interested in China these days.

Here it’s a global trend, especially in developed countries. There’s this apathy toward China. This is growing. To answer your question, some Japanese diplomats, for example, a good example is former Japanese ambassador to China, Hideo Tarumi. He’s kind of a mastermind behind these programs to invite a lot of Chinese intellectuals to Japan. So he’s one example. Other than him, I would say scholars like Professor Tomoko Ako of the University of Tokyo. She’s proactively welcoming these intellectuals from China.

Chang: Hiro. The last question that I have for you but before that I’m just gonna give a quick shout out to the book for people who may not be able to read Japanese, it’s got a really wide breadth.

It’s a survey of all kinds of different dimensions of Chinese immigrants in Japan over the past few years. He covers Chinese in the education system. The liberal Chinese that we just discussed, a bunch of different kinds of wealthy Chinese who are buying up tower mansions, who are buying up property in Hokkaido, those in Osaka. So it’s really trying to—correct me if I’m wrong—but you’re trying to uncover a kind of hidden world. It is a way of sort of showing that this was not as obvious to even Japanese who are living here.

My last question to you is, what has the reception been like from Japanese readers of this book. What are people saying to you? Including ordinary people, but also if there’s government officials or companies that are approaching you, I’m just curious of how the reception of your book has been over the past few months.

Hiro: So I have been receiving a lot of feedback from my readers, and mostly they are elites in Japanese society, like those in the financial sector or investors, other people in the real estate industry and so on.

I also got contacted by many government officials. Geographically speaking, I also noticed this trend that many people living in central Tokyo read my book, because they know it was happening! These people are buying tower mansions in central Tokyo, and maybe their kids are now competing with those Chinese students in schools.

So yeah, that’s the general overview, but it’s also interesting to point out that among these readers, there are some people who want to exchange ideas with me privately. Because they think this could be a new source of demand for them. Japan’s population has been shrinking, and this wealthy Chinese people could fill out this vacuum. So that’s what they are telling me.

Chang: So in other words, there are some who are asking you for some kind of consultation or discussion around business opportunities. There’s some who seem to simply resonate with your book, because they had always been experiencing this on the periphery of their life. And it has finally been revealed by you, for them.

Hiro: That’s the feeling.

Chang: You mentioned the government officials. What are they asking you about?

Hiro: They’re asking me what’s really going on on the ground, because the problem is there’s this lack of data, for example, people know Chinese people are buying real estate here, but there’s no official numbers, statistics. So they want me to tell them what’s really going on.

Chang: Hiro Masutomo. Thank you very much.

Hiro: Thank you so much.

Chang: Thank you to Hiro Masutomo for joining us today. You can follow him on LinkedIn and keep an eye out for the English translation of his book Run to Japan. For those who understand Japanese be sure to check out his new podcast Asia Frontline, hosted by Masutomo himself. Each episode features experts on the front lines of the region diving deep into the politics, economics and cultural currents shaping Asia. We’ll leave the links in the show notes. It’s definitely worth a listen.

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